Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9 · Chapter 9.95
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.95.100 (2026)

Prisoner released on serving maximum term

✓ current as of May 2026
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Any person convicted of a felony committed before July 1, 1984, and undergoing sentence in a state correctional institution, not sooner released under the provisions of this chapter, shall, in accordance with the provisions of law, be discharged from custody on serving the maximum punishment provided by law for the offense of which such person was convicted, or the maximum term fixed by the court where the law does not provide for a maximum term. The board shall not, however, until his or her maximum term expires, release a prisoner, unless in its opinion his or her rehabilitation has been complete and he or she is a fit subject for release.
[ 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 s 330; 1955 c 133 s 11. Prior: (i) 1947 c 92 s 1, part; 1935 c 114 s 2, part; Rem. Supp. 1947 s 10249-2, part. (ii) 1939 c 142 s 1, part; 1935 c 114 s 4, part; RRS s 10249-4, part.]

Notes:

Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.
Application—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 ss 301-363: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 70 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1953–2026 · leading case: In the Matter of Pers. Restraint of Powell, 814 P.2d 635 (Wash. 2004).
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In the Matter of Pers. Restraint of Powell, 814 P.2d 635 (Wash. 2004). · cites it 6× “When making decisions on duration of confinement, including those relating to persons committed under a mandatory life sentence, and parole release under RCW 9.95.100 *187 and 9.95.110, the board shall consider the purposes, standards, and sentencing ranges adopted pursuant to…”
Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243 (Wash. 1992). · cites it 6× “" Grimm is distinguishable from the present case because the Arizona statute requires a "reasonable probability" that the parole applicant is rehabilitated, whereas RCW 9.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Addleman, 151 Wash. 2d 769 (Wash. 2004). · cites it 7× “” RCW 9.95.100 (emphasis added). We conclude that between a statutory requirement that a prisoner is not to be released until rehabilitation is complete and a duty to attempt consistency with the SRA, the statutory requirement trumps the duty to attempt.”
In Re Addleman, 92 P.3d 221 (Wash. 2004). · cites it 7× “" RCW 9.95.100 (emphasis added). We conclude that between a statutory requirement that a prisoner is not to be released until rehabilitation is complete and a duty to attempt consistency with the SRA, the statutory requirement trumps the duty to attempt.”
In Re Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 189 P.3d 759 (Wash. 2008). · cites it 6× “RCW 9.95.100. We have adopted the position that "the first step toward rehabilitation is `the offender's recognition that he was at fault.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 164 Wash. 2d 274 (Wash. 2008). · cites it 5× “RCW 9.95.100. We have adopted the position that “the first step toward rehabilitation is ‘the offender’s recognition that he was at fault.”
In Re the Pers. Restraint of Ayers, 713 P.2d 88 (Wash. 1986). · cites it 5× “The critical language in this case is contained in RCW 9.95.100: "The board shall not, however, until his maximum term expires, release a prisoner, unless in its opinion his rehabilitation has been complete and he is a fit subject for release.”
In Re Dyer, 139 P.3d 320 (Wash. 2006). · cites it 4× “¶ 4 The ISRB considered Dyer for parole under RCW 9.95.100 in 1995, 1998, and 2002. On each occasion, the ISRB denied parole and extended Dyer's minimum term by 60 months.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 157 Wash. 2d 358 (Wash. 2006). · cites it 4× “¶4 The ISRB considered Dyer for parole under RCW 9.95.100 in 1995, 1998, and 2002. On each occasion, the ISRB denied parole and extended Dyer’s minimum term by 60 months.”
Bell v. State, 52 P.3d 503 (Wash. 2002). · cites it 4× “Had the court accepted Bell’s proposed instructions 11 through 13, the jury would also have been instructed on what Bell claimed to be “matters pertaining to the law concerning parole.”
Bell v. State, 52 P.3d 503 (Wash. 2002). · cites it 4× “CP at 108. Had the court accepted Bell's proposed instructions 11 through 13, the jury would also have been instructed on what Bell claimed to be "matters pertaining to the law concerning parole.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 283 P.3d 1103 (Wash. 2012). · cites it 4× “” RCW 9.95.100 (emphasis added). Finally, the ISRB has a duty to “thoroughly inform itself as to the facts of [the] convicted person’s crime.”
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