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Wash. Rev. CodeTitle 9Chapter 9.95

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.95.100 (2025)

Prisoner released on serving maximum term

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included cited 1953–2026 70citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 70 opinions since 1953, 7 of them in the last five years.

The 20 cases that cite Wash. Rev. Code § 9.95.100 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENIn the Matter of Pers. Restraint of Powell, 814 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1991).
cites § 9.95.100 6×cited by 120 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“When making decisions on duration of confinement, including those relating to persons committed under a mandatory life sentence, and parole release under RCW 9.95.100 *187 and 9.95.110, the board shall consider the purposes, standards, and sentencing ranges adopted pursuant to…”
The case’s holding
A prosecutor breaches a plea agreement only if they fail to recommend the specific sentence or term agreed upon during negotiations.
Later courts cite it for
“subject entirely to the discretion of the isrb, which may parole him now or never.” · 6 citing courts
2
GREENTaggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243 (Wash. 1992).
cites § 9.95.100 6×cited by 274 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“" Grimm is distinguishable from the present case because the Arizona statute requires a "reasonable probability" that the parole applicant is rehabilitated, whereas RCW 9.”
The case’s holding
A physical custodial relationship is not required for liability to attach under a statute defining special relations that give rise to a duty to control a third person (basis: § 319).
Later courts cite it for
“the question whether an exception to the public duty doctrine applies is thus another way of asking whether the state had a duty to the plaintiff.” · 7 citing courts
3
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Addleman, 151 Wash. 2d 769 (2004).
cites § 9.95.100 7×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“” RCW 9.95.100 (emphasis added). We conclude that between a statutory requirement that a prisoner is not to be released until rehabilitation is complete and a duty to attempt consistency with the SRA, the statutory requirement trumps the duty to attempt.”
4
GREENIn re Addleman, 92 P.3d 221 (Wash. 2004).
cites § 9.95.100 7×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“" RCW 9.95.100 (emphasis added). We conclude that between a statutory requirement that a prisoner is not to be released until rehabilitation is complete and a duty to attempt consistency with the SRA, the statutory requirement trumps the duty to attempt.”
The case’s holding
A parole board's statutory duty to withhold release until rehabilitation is complete takes precedence over the requirement to make decisions consistent with the Sentencing Reform Act.
Later courts cite it for
“shall not, however, until his or her maximum term expires, release a prisoner, unless in its opinion his or her rehabilitation has been complete and he or she is a fit subject for release.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENIn re Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 189 P.3d 759 (Wash. 2008).
cites § 9.95.100 6×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“RCW 9.95.100. We have adopted the position that "the first step toward rehabilitation is `the offender's recognition that he was at fault.”
The case’s holding
Repeated denials of parole do not violate substantive due process rights if the decisions do not shock the conscience (explaining ex post facto violations in context of sentencing).
Later courts cite it for
“reliance upon 'speculation and conjecture' with disregard of the evidence also constitutes an abuse of discretion.” · 4 citing courts
6
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 164 Wash. 2d 274 (2008).
cites § 9.95.100 5×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“RCW 9.95.100. We have adopted the position that “the first step toward rehabilitation is ‘the offender’s recognition that he was at fault.”
7
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Ayers, 713 P.2d 88 (Wash. 1986).
cites § 9.95.100 5×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“The critical language in this case is contained in RCW 9.95.100: "The board shall not, however, until his maximum term expires, release a prisoner, unless in its opinion his rehabilitation has been complete and he is a fit subject for release.”
The case’s holding
A parole board must comply with its own regulations requiring a concise written statement of findings and conclusions for each case heard.
Later courts cite it for
“a concise written statement of findings and conclusions in each case heard under the provisions of this chapter.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENIn re Dyer, 139 P.3d 320 (Wash. 2006).
cites § 9.95.100 4×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“¶ 4 The ISRB considered Dyer for parole under RCW 9.95.100 in 1995, 1998, and 2002. On each occasion, the ISRB denied parole and extended Dyer's minimum term by 60 months.”
The case’s holding
A parole board abuses its discretion when it disregards favorable psychological reports and bases its decision on speculation rather than the evidence in the record.
Later courts cite it for
“the isrb abuses its discretion when it fails to follow its own procedural rules for parolability hearings or acts without consideration of and in disregard of the facts.” · 7 citing courts
9
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 157 Wash. 2d 358 (2006).
cites § 9.95.100 4×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“¶4 The ISRB considered Dyer for parole under RCW 9.95.100 in 1995, 1998, and 2002. On each occasion, the ISRB denied parole and extended Dyer’s minimum term by 60 months.”
10
GREENBell v. State, 52 P.3d 503 (Wash. 2002).
cites § 9.95.100 4×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“Had the court accepted Bell’s proposed instructions 11 through 13, the jury would also have been instructed on what Bell claimed to be “matters pertaining to the law concerning parole.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff in a negligent parole supervision action must prove that the damage sustained would have been avoided but for the inadequate supervision.
Later courts cite it for
“a plaintiff in a negligent parole supervision action must show not only inadequate supervision, but must also carry the burden to demonstrate the damage sustained by the plaintiff would have been avoided but for the inadequate supervision.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENBell v. State, 52 P.3d 503 (Wash. 2002).
cites § 9.95.100 4×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“CP at 108. Had the court accepted Bell's proposed instructions 11 through 13, the jury would also have been instructed on what Bell claimed to be "matters pertaining to the law concerning parole.”
12
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 283 P.3d 1103 (Wash. 2012).
cites § 9.95.100 4×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“” RCW 9.95.100 (emphasis added). Finally, the ISRB has a duty to “thoroughly inform itself as to the facts of [the] convicted person’s crime.”
Later courts cite it for
“an abuse of discretion may be found where the isrb fails to follow its own procedural rules for parolability hearings or where the isrb bases its decision on speculation and conjecture only.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENIn re Pers. Restraint of Brooks, 480 P.3d 399 (Wash. 2021).
cites § 9.95.100 3×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“By contrast, a parole hearing under RCW 9.95.100 places the burden on the incarcerated person to demonstrate rehabilitation, and the ISRB “shall not” grant parole unless it finds “rehabilitation has been complete and he or she is a fit subject for release.”
Later courts cite it for
“an early release hearing looks to the future and focuses on one's likelihood of reoffending.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENAddleman v. Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 730 P.2d 1327 (Wash. 1986).
cites § 9.95.100 2×cited by 119 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“070); granting and defining terms of parole (RCW 9.95.100, .110); and resolving disciplinary matters (RCW 9.”
The case’s holding
Insufficient rehabilitation constitutes a valid reason for a parole board to decline conformity with statutory requirements (insufficient rehabilitation).
Later courts cite it for
“a court may not read into a statute those things which it conceives the legislature may have left out unintentionally.” · 6 citing courts
15
YELLOWState v. Phelan, 671 P.2d 1212 (Wash. 1983).
cites § 9.95.100 2×cited by 110 cases
Superseded by statute on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“010; RCW 9.95.100. For certain specified crimes, a mandatory minimum sentence must be fixed as well.”
The case’s holding
Intermediate scrutiny applies to state policies that classify individuals based on wealth when affecting the physical liberty of poor people.
Later courts cite it for
“since a denial of credit for presentence jail time involves both a deprivation of liberty in addition to that which would otherwise exist, and a classification based solely on wealth, we will apply an intermediate level of scrutiny in the present case.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENForster v. Pierce Cnty., 991 P.2d 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 9.95.100 4×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“Hoping to remedy this deficiency, Forster relies on RCW 9.95.100. It provides: Any convicted person undergoing sentence in the penitentiary or the reformatory, not sooner released under the provisions of this chapter, shall, in accordance with the provisions of law, be…”
The case’s holding
A statute does not violate the ex post facto clause if it regulates future conduct rather than retroactively punishing past offenses.
Later courts cite it for
“if a law is not 'criminal' or 'punitive,' it can be applied to any conduct, either past or future, without violating the ex post facto clause.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENThomas v. Lehman, 138 Wash. App. 618 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 9.95.100 3×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“See WAC 381-40-100; RCW 9.95.100. According to DOC parole eligibility procedures, an inmate may petition for parole under RCW 9.”
18
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Haynes, 996 P.2d 637 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 9.95.100 3×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“(4) Statements or declarations by the inmate that he or she intends to re-offend or does not intend to comply with conditions of parole.”
The case’s holding
A party asserting a violation of the doctrine of fairness must produce sufficient evidence of bias, such as personal or pecuniary interest, rather than mere speculation.
Later courts cite it for
“a party asserting a violation of the doctrine must produce sufficient evidence demonstrating bias, such as personal or pecuniary interest on the part of the decision maker; mere speculation is not enough.” · 4 citing courts
19
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Marler, 108 Wash. App. 799 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 9.95.100 5×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“A MAP with no infractions and careful and scrupulous compliance with all conditions is the only acceptable course for this inmate, as a preliminary to a further [parole eligibility hearing under RCW 9.95.100].[ 8 ] This court’s stay was lifted in August 2000.”
20
GREENState v. Rice, 320 P.3d 723 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
cites § 9.95.100 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 9.95.100
“010, and RCW 9.95.100. *316 But these statues do not resolve the ambiguity of RCW 9.”
The case’s holding
Where a probation statute's phrase is ambiguous and both readings are plausible, the rule of lenity applies and the court adopts the reading favoring the defendant.
Later courts cite it for
“if the statute is still susceptible to more than one interpretation after we conduct a plain meaning review, then the statute is ambiguous and we rely on statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law to determine legislative intent.” · 4 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
195219892026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 8 cases in 2006–2007. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wash.37Wash. Ct. App.329th Cir.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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