Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9A · Chapter 9A.40
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.080 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Any reasonable expenses incurred in locating or returning a child or incompetent person shall be assessed against a defendant convicted under RCW 9A.40.060 or 9A.40.070.
(2) In any prosecution of custodial interference in the first or second degree, it is a complete defense, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that:
(a) The defendant's purpose was to protect the child, incompetent person, or himself or herself from imminent physical harm, that the belief in the existence of the imminent physical harm was reasonable, and that the defendant sought the assistance of the police, sheriff's office, protective agencies, or the court of any state before committing the acts giving rise to the charges or within a reasonable time thereafter;
(b) The complainant had, prior to the defendant committing the acts giving rise to the crime, for a protracted period of time, failed to exercise his or her rights to physical custody or access to the child under a court-ordered parenting plan or order granting visitation rights, provided that such failure was not the direct result of the defendant's denial of access to such person;
(c) The acts giving rise to the charges were consented to by the complainant; or
(d) The offender, after providing or making a good faith effort to provide notice to the person entitled to access to the child, failed to provide access to the child due to reasons that a reasonable person would believe were directly related to the welfare of the child, and allowed access to the child in accordance with the court order within a reasonable period of time. The burden of proof that the denial of access was reasonable is upon the person denying access to the child.
(3) Consent of a child less than sixteen years of age or of an incompetent person does not constitute a defense to an action under RCW 9A.40.060 or 9A.40.070.
[ 1989 c 318 s 5; 1984 c 95 s 3.]

Notes:

Severability—1989 c 318: See note following RCW 26.09.160.
Severability—1984 c 95: See note following RCW 9A.40.060.
Child custody, action by relative: RCW 26.09.255.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases, 1988–2006 · leading case: State v. Vinyard, 751 P.2d 339 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
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State v. Vinyard, 751 P.2d 339 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 4× “140(1) and RCW 9A.40.080, she was ordered to pay $76,021.”
State v. Davison, 809 P.2d 1374 (Wash. 1991). · cites it 2× “2 The Court of Appeals' application in Vinyard of the general restitution statute for expenses incurred in locating the child should be read in light of the later holding by this court that where the conviction is for custodial interference, RCW 9A.40.080 applies and the general…”
State v. Maidi, 537 N.W.2d 280 (Minn. 1995). · cites it 4× “") (emphasis added); Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 9A.40.080 (West Supp.”
State v. Halsen, 757 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1988). · cites it 3× “In light of this statute, Halsen acknowledged through her attorney at oral argument that Allen was entitled to most of the restitution ordered by the trial court.”
State v. Mannering, 75 P.3d 961 (Wash. 2003). “030(2), (3) (rape of a child in the first, second, or third degree; child molestation in the first, second or third degree; and sexual misconduct with a minor in the first or second degree); RCW 9A.”
State v. Mannering, 150 Wash. 2d 277 (Wash. 2003). “030(2), (3) (rape of a child in the first, second, or third degree; child molestation in the first, second or third degree; and sexual misconduct with a minor in the first or second degree); RCW 9A.”
State v. Munoz, 2006 NMSC 5 (N.M. 2006). “26(2)(1) (2004) (requiring a reasonable belief); N.J. Stat Ann. § 2C:13-4(c)(l) (2005) (requiring a reasonable belief); Ohio Rev.”
State v. Martinez, 899 P.2d 1302 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). “RCW 9A.40.080(1). However, the Vinyard court also relied on restitution provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act (RCW 9.”
State v. Justesen, 121 Wash. App. 83 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). “She also served notice of her intent to present a statutory defense. A defendant who can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, among other things, she reasonably believed the child was in danger of imminent physical harm has a complete defense to a charge of custodial…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.080(1) — 4 cases
State v. Davison, 809 P.2d 1374 (Wash. 1991). “2 The Court of Appeals' application in Vinyard of the general restitution statute for expenses incurred in locating the child should be read in light of the later holding by this court that where the conviction is for custodial interference, RCW 9A.40.080 applies and the general…”
State v. Halsen, 757 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1988). “In light of this statute, Halsen acknowledged through her attorney at oral argument that Allen was entitled to most of the restitution ordered by the trial court.”
State v. Martinez, 899 P.2d 1302 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). “RCW 9A.40.080(1). However, the Vinyard court also relied on restitution provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act (RCW 9.”
State v. Vinyard, 751 P.2d 339 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). “140(1) and RCW 9A.40.080, she was ordered to pay $76,021.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.080(2) — 2 cases
State v. Mannering, 75 P.3d 961 (Wash. 2003). “030(2), (3) (rape of a child in the first, second, or third degree; child molestation in the first, second or third degree; and sexual misconduct with a minor in the first or second degree); RCW 9A.”
State v. Mannering, 150 Wash. 2d 277 (Wash. 2003). “030(2), (3) (rape of a child in the first, second, or third degree; child molestation in the first, second or third degree; and sexual misconduct with a minor in the first or second degree); RCW 9A.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.080(2)(a) — 2 cases
State v. Munoz, 2006 NMSC 5 (N.M. 2006). “26(2)(1) (2004) (requiring a reasonable belief); N.J. Stat Ann. § 2C:13-4(c)(l) (2005) (requiring a reasonable belief); Ohio Rev.”
State v. Justesen, 121 Wash. App. 83 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). “She also served notice of her intent to present a statutory defense. A defendant who can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, among other things, she reasonably believed the child was in danger of imminent physical harm has a complete defense to a charge of custodial…”
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