Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.010 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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The following definitions apply in this chapter:
(1) "Enter." The word "enter" when constituting an element or part of a crime, shall include the entrance of the person, or the insertion of any part of his or her body, or any instrument or weapon held in his or her hand and used or intended to be used to threaten or intimidate a person or to detach or remove property.
(2) "Enters or remains unlawfully." A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when he or she is not then licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to so enter or remain.
A license or privilege to enter or remain in a building which is only partly open to the public is not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that part of a building which is not open to the public. A person who enters or remains upon unimproved and apparently unused land, which is neither fenced nor otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, does so with license and privilege unless notice against trespass is personally communicated to him or her by the owner of the land or some other authorized person, or unless notice is given by posting in a conspicuous manner. Land that is used for commercial aquaculture or for growing an agricultural crop or crops, other than timber, is not unimproved and apparently unused land if a crop or any other sign of cultivation is clearly visible or if notice is given by posting in a conspicuous manner. Similarly, a field fenced in any manner is not unimproved and apparently unused land. A license or privilege to enter or remain on improved and apparently used land that is open to the public at particular times, which is neither fenced nor otherwise enclosed in a manner to exclude intruders, is not a license or privilege to enter or remain on the land at other times if notice of prohibited times of entry is posted in a conspicuous manner.
(3) "Premises" includes any building, dwelling, structure used for commercial aquaculture, or any real property.
[ 2016 c 164 s 12. Prior: 2011 c 336 s 369; 2004 c 69 s 1; 1985 c 289 s 1; prior: 1984 c 273 s 5; 1984 c 49 s 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.52.010.]

Notes:

FindingsIntentShort title2016 c 164: See RCW 9A.90.010 and 9A.90.020.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 138 cases (24 in the last 5 years), 1978–2026 · leading case: State v. Wilson, 150 P.3d 144 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Wilson, 150 P.3d 144 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 4× “020 and RCW 9A.52.010(3). 1. Elements A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building and if, in entering or while in the building or in immediate…”
State v. Thomson, 861 P.2d 492 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 5× “2 See also, RCW 9A.52.010-(3), second paragraph (recognizing implied limitation as to place); State v.”
State v. C.B., 380 P.3d 626 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 3× “” Former RCW 9A.52.010(5) (2011) (emphasis added).”
State v. J.P., 125 P.3d 215 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 3× “See RCW 9A.52.010, .070. Undefined statutory terms are given their usual and ordinary meaning as may be found in the dictionary.”
State v. Glover, 806 P.2d 760 (Wash. 1991). · cites it 2× “RCW 9A.52.010(3). None of the circumstances *520 existing at the time the officers stopped Glover justify a reasonable suspicion that he was trespassing.”
State v. R.H., 939 P.2d 217 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 3× “contends the State must disprove this public premises defense beyond a reasonable doubt and did not, and that the disposition of guilt must therefore be reversed.”
State v. Cordero, 284 P.3d 773 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “We quote the current version of RCW 9A.52.010, which was amended by Laws of 2011, chapter 336, section 369 to make the language gender neutral and whose definitions have been alphabetized pursuant to RCW 1.”
State v. Wilson, 136 Wash. App. 596 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “020 and RCW 9A.52.010(3). 1. Elements A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building and if, in entering or while in the building or in immediate…”
State v. Steinbach, 679 P.2d 369 (Wash. 1984). · cites it 4× “The phrase "enters or remains unlawfully" is defined in RCW 9A.52.010(3): (3) "Enters or remains unlawfully".”
State v. Jackson, 774 P.2d 1211 (Wash. 1989). · cites it 2× “RCW 9A.52.010(2); see also Bassett, at 26 (insertion of finger through window constitutes entry); State v.”
State v. Klimes, 117 Wash. App. 758 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 2× “RCW 9A.52.010(3) defines “enters or remains unlawfully” for purposes of the burglary and trespass chapter of the Washington Criminal Code as follows: “A person ‘enters or remains unlawfully 5 in or upon premises when he is not then licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to…”
State v. Little, 806 P.2d 749 (Wash. 1991). · cites it 2× “RCW 9A.52.010(3). The State must prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.010(1) — 6 cases
State v. Poling, 128 Wash. App. 659 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
State of Washington v. Anthony Albert Joseph, 381 P.3d 187 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
State v. Poling, 116 P.3d 1054 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Bassett, 746 P.2d 1240 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
State Of Washington, V David M. Kalac (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.010(2) — 49 cases
State v. Jackson, 774 P.2d 1211 (Wash. 1989). “RCW 9A.52.010(2); see also Bassett, at 26 (insertion of finger through window constitutes entry); State v.”
United States v. David Brown, 957 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 2020).
State v. Moreno, 499 P.3d 198 (Wash. 2021).
State Of Washington v. Joshua Lambert, 395 P.3d 1080 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
State v. Koss, 241 P.3d 415 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.010(3) — 58 cases
State v. Wilson, 150 P.3d 144 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “020 and RCW 9A.52.010(3). 1. Elements A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building and if, in entering or while in the building or in immediate…”
State v. Thomson, 861 P.2d 492 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). “2 See also, RCW 9A.52.010-(3), second paragraph (recognizing implied limitation as to place); State v.”
State v. Glover, 806 P.2d 760 (Wash. 1991). “RCW 9A.52.010(3). None of the circumstances *520 existing at the time the officers stopped Glover justify a reasonable suspicion that he was trespassing.”
State v. R.H., 939 P.2d 217 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). “contends the State must disprove this public premises defense beyond a reasonable doubt and did not, and that the disposition of guilt must therefore be reversed.”
State v. Wilson, 136 Wash. App. 596 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “020 and RCW 9A.52.010(3). 1. Elements A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building and if, in entering or while in the building or in immediate…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.010(4) — 1 case
State Of Washington v. Cory Thomas (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.010(5) — 23 cases
State v. C.B., 380 P.3d 626 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). “” Former RCW 9A.52.010(5) (2011) (emphasis added).”
State v. Garcia, 318 P.3d 266 (Wash. 2014).
State v. Cordero, 284 P.3d 773 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). “We quote the current version of RCW 9A.52.010, which was amended by Laws of 2011, chapter 336, section 369 to make the language gender neutral and whose definitions have been alphabetized pursuant to RCW 1.”
State v. Olson, 329 P.3d 121 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.010(6) — 4 cases
State v. Riley, 846 P.2d 1365 (Wash. 1993).
State v. Olson, 735 P.2d 1362 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
State of Washington v. Anthony Albert Joseph, 381 P.3d 187 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
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