Wisconsin Statutes
Wis. Stat. § 111.32 (2026)
Definitions
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111.32(1)(1) “Arrest record” includes, but is not limited to, information indicating that an individual has been questioned, apprehended, taken into custody or detention, held for investigation, arrested, charged with, indicted or tried for any felony, misdemeanor or other offense pursuant to any law enforcement or military authority.
111.32(2r)(2r) “Constituent group” includes a civic association, community group, social club, fraternal society, mutual benefit alliance, or labor organization.
111.32(3)(3) “Conviction record” includes, but is not limited to, information indicating that an individual has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or other offense, has been adjudicated delinquent, has been less than honorably discharged, or has been placed on probation, fined, imprisoned, placed on extended supervision or paroled pursuant to any law enforcement or military authority.
111.32(3m)(3m) “Creed” means a system of religious beliefs, including moral or ethical beliefs about right and wrong, that are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.
111.32(5)(5) “Employee” does not include any individual employed by his or her parents, spouse, or child or any individual excluded under s. 452.38.
111.32(6)(a)(a) “Employer” means the state and each agency of the state and, except as provided in par. (b), any other person engaging in any activity, enterprise or business employing at least one individual. In this subsection, “agency” means an office, department, independent agency, authority, institution, association, society or other body in state government created or authorized to be created by the constitution or any law, including the legislature and the courts.
111.32(6)(b)(b) “Employer” does not include a social club or fraternal society under ch. 188 with respect to a particular job for which the club or society seeks to employ or employs a member, if the particular job is advertised only within the membership.
111.32(7)(7) “Employment agency” means any person, including this state, who regularly undertakes to procure employees or opportunities for employment for any other person.
111.32(7m)(7m) “Genetic testing” means a test of a person’s genes, gene products or chromosomes, for abnormalities or deficiencies, including carrier status, that are linked to physical or mental disorders or impairments, or that indicate a susceptibility to illness, disease, impairment or other disorders, whether physical or mental, or that demonstrate genetic or chromosomal damage due to environmental factors.
111.32(8)(a)(a) Has a physical or mental impairment which makes achievement unusually difficult or limits the capacity to work;
111.32(9)(a)(a) Any organization, agency or employee representation committee, group, association or plan in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours or other terms or conditions of employment; or
111.32(9)(b)(b) Any conference, general committee, joint or system board or joint council which is subordinate to a national or international committee, group, association or plan under par. (a).
111.32(10)(10) “License” means the whole or any part of any permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter or similar form of permission required by a state or local unit of government for the undertaking, practice or continuation of any occupation or profession.
111.32(11)(11) “Licensing agency” means any board, commission, committee, department, examining board, affiliated credentialing board or officer, except a judicial officer, in the state or any city, village, town, county or local government authorized to grant, deny, renew, revoke, suspend, annul, withdraw or amend any license.
111.32(12)(12) “Marital status” means the status of being married, single, divorced, separated or widowed.
111.32(12g)(12g) “Military service” means service in the U.S. armed forces, the state defense force, the national guard of any state, or any other reserve component of the U.S. armed forces.
111.32(12j)(12j) “Political matters” means political party affiliation, a political campaign, an attempt to influence legislation, or the decision to join or not to join, or to support or not to support, any lawful political group, constituent group, or political or constituent group activity.
111.32(12m)(12m) “Religious association” means an organization, whether or not organized under ch. 187, which operates under a creed.
111.32(12p)(12p) “Religious matters” means religious affiliation or the decision to join or not to join, or to support or not to support, any bona fide religious association.
111.32(13)(13) “Sexual harassment” means unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, unwelcome physical contact of a sexual nature or unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. “Sexual harassment” includes conduct directed by a person at another person of the same or opposite gender. “Unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature” includes but is not limited to the deliberate, repeated making of unsolicited gestures or comments of a sexual nature; the deliberate, repeated display of offensive sexually graphic materials which is not necessary for business purposes; or deliberate verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, whether or not repeated, that is sufficiently severe to interfere substantially with an employee’s work performance or to create an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.
111.32(13m)(13m) “Sexual orientation” means having a preference for heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality, having a history of such a preference or being identified with such a preference.
111.32(13r)(13r) “Unfair genetic testing” means any test or testing procedure that violates s. 111.372.
111.32(14)(14) “Unfair honesty testing” means any test or testing procedure which violates s. 111.37.
111.32 HistoryHistory: 1975 c. 31, 94, 275, 421; 1977 c. 29, 125, 196, 286; 1979 c. 319, 357; 1981 c. 96 s. 67; 1981 c. 112, 334, 391; 1983 a. 36; 1987 a. 149; 1991 a. 117; 1993 a. 107, 427; 1995 a. 27 s. 9130 (4); 1997 a. 3, 112, 283; 2007 a. 159; 2009 a. 290; 2015 a. 258.
111.32 AnnotationThe summary discharge, after two weeks of satisfactory employment, of a person with a history of asthma violated the fair employment act in that it constituted a discriminatory practice against the claimant based on handicap. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co. v. DILHR, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974).
111.32 AnnotationSingling out disabilities associated with pregnancy for less favorable treatment in a benefit plan designed to relieve the economic burden of physical incapacity constituted discrimination on the basis of sex, as pregnancy is undisputedly sex-linked. Ray-O-Vac v. DILHR, 70 Wis. 2d 919, 236 N.W.2d 209 (1975).
111.32 Annotation“Creed,” as used in sub. (5) (a) [now sub. (3m)], means a system of religious beliefs, not political beliefs. Augustine v. Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 75 Wis. 2d 207, 249 N.W.2d 547 (1977).
111.32 AnnotationWisconsin law forbidding pregnancy benefits discrimination was not preempted when an employer negotiated, under the National Labor Relations Act, a welfare benefit plan, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. DILHR, 87 Wis. 2d 56, 273 N.W.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1978).
111.32 AnnotationThe Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA), this subchapter, was not preempted by federal legislation. Chicago & North Western Railroad v. LIRC, 91 Wis. 2d 462, 283 N.W.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1979).
111.32 AnnotationThe inclusion of pregnancy-related benefits within a disability benefit plan does not violate the federal Equal Pay Act. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. LIRC, 95 Wis. 2d 558, 291 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1980).
111.32 AnnotationAn individual may be found to be handicapped under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act although no actual impairment is found. It is sufficient to find that the employer perceived that the individual is handicapped; discrimination may be found when the perceived handicap is the sole basis of a hiring decision. La Crosse Police Commission v. LIRC, 139 Wis. 2d 740, 407 N.W.2d 510 (1987).
111.32 AnnotationCommon-law torts recognized before the adoption of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA), if properly pled, are not barred by the WFEA although the complained of act may fit a definition of discriminatory behavior under the WFEA. A battery claim was not precluded by the WFEA, although the sub. (13) definition of “sexual harassment” is broad enough to include battery, when the tort was pled as an unlawful touching, not a discriminatory act. Becker v. Automatic Garage Door Co., 156 Wis. 2d 409, 456 N.W.2d 888 (Ct. App. 1990).
111.32 AnnotationThe standard to determine whether a person is an “employee” under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act is applicable to Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA) cases. A determination of “employee” status in a Title VII action precludes redetermination in a WFEA action. Moore v. LIRC, 175 Wis. 2d 561, 499 N.W.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1993).
111.32 AnnotationBarring spouses who are both public employees from each electing family medical coverage is excepted from the prohibition against discrimination based on marital status under this chapter. Motola v. LIRC, 219 Wis. 2d 588, 580 N.W.2d 297 (1998), 97-0896.
111.32 AnnotationUnwelcome physical contact of a sexual nature and unwelcome verbal conduct or physical conduct of a sexual nature may constitute sexual harassment, even when they do not create a hostile work environment. Jim Walter Color Separations v. LIRC, 226 Wis. 2d 334, 595 N.W.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2360.
111.32 AnnotationA person claiming a disability under sub. (8) must demonstrate an actual or perceived impairment that makes, or is perceived as making, achievement unusually difficult or limits the capacity to work. An impairment is a real or perceived lessening or deterioration or damage to a normal bodily function or bodily condition, or the absence of such bodily function or condition. “Achievement” is not as to a particular job, but as to a substantial limitation on life’s normal functions or a major life activity. “Limits the capacity to work” refers to the specific job at issue. Hutchinson Technology, Inc. v. LIRC, 2004 WI 90, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 682 N.W.2d 343, 02-3328.
111.32 AnnotationThe Labor and Industry Review Commission properly interpreted sub. (8) to require a claimant to demonstrate a permanent impairment. To demonstrate that a disability exists, the complainant must present competent evidence of a medical diagnosis regarding the alleged impairment. An employer’s decision to grant requests for light-duty work, rather than terminating employment for refusing to perform regular job duties, is not proof of a perceived disability under sub. (8) (c). Erickson v. LIRC, 2005 WI App 208, 287 Wis. 2d 204, 704 N.W.2d 398, 04-3237.
111.32 AnnotationChicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., 62 Wis. 2d 392 (1974), does not hold that a diagnosis of asthma alone establishes a disability. Doepke-Kline v. LIRC, 2005 WI App 209, 287 Wis. 2d 337, 704 N.W.2d 605, 05-0106.
111.32 AnnotationA deferred prosecution agreement is not a part of a person’s “conviction record” under sub. (3) because it occurs before any finding of guilt or culpability has occurred and because the agreement, in and of itself, is not information indicating that an individual has been convicted of an offense, adjudicated delinquent, less than honorably discharged, or placed on probation, fined, imprisoned, placed on extended supervision, or paroled pursuant to any law enforcement or military authority. Vega v. LIRC, 2022 WI App 21, 402 Wis. 2d 233, 975 N.W.2d 249, 21-0024.
111.32 AnnotationThe first element that an employee must prove in a disability discrimination case is that the employee is an individual with a disability, as that term is defined by sub. (8). At the contested case hearing, the employee is required to prove that the employee had a disability at the time the employee was employed by the employer. However, the unambiguous language of sub. (8) (a) does not require an impairment to be diagnosed at the time the employee was employed in order to satisfy the employee’s burden at the evidentiary hearing. Wingra Redi-Mix Inc. v. LIRC, 2023 WI App 34, 408 Wis. 2d 563, 993 N.W.2d 715, 21-2028.
111.32 AnnotationThe ordinary meaning of the phrase “any . . . other offense” in the definition of “arrest record” under sub. (1) includes violations of both criminal and noncriminal laws. Oconomowoc Area School District v. Cota, 2025 WI 11, 416 Wis. 2d 1, 20 N.W.3d 182, 22-1158.
111.32 AnnotationA licensing agency may request information from an applicant regarding conviction records under sub. (5) (h) [now sub. (3)]. 67 Atty. Gen. 327.
111.32 AnnotationExpanding Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment Under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act: Jim Walter Color Separations v. Labor & Industry Review Commission. Edgar. 2000 WLR 885.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 83
cases (8 in the last 5 years), 1965–2025 · leading case: Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2004 WI 90 (Wis. 2004).
Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2004 WI 90 (Wis. 2004). “Vergeront, and Paul Lundsten affirmed the circuit court's judgment, stating that Roytek had a disability under Wisconsin's interpretation of "disability" as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 111.32 (8)(a) (2001-02). [4] The court further concluded that HTI did not proffer sufficient…”
City of La Crosse Police & Fire Comm'n v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 510 (Wis. 1987). “In keeping with this policy, sec. 111.32(5), Stats., specifically makes it "unlawful for any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or person to discriminate against any employe or any applicant for employment or licensing.”
Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2003 WI 106 (Wis. 2003). “See Wis. Stat. §§ 111.32 (8) [14] and 111.34(1)(b).”
Law Enf't Standards Bd. v. Vill. of Lyndon Station, 305 N.W.2d 89 (Wis. 1981). “In its return to the writ, the village alleged that it could not lawfully discharge Jessen because such action would be in violation of the prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of a felony conviction (sec. 111.32(5)(h), Stats., effective November 1, 1977),…”
Cnty. of Milwaukee v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 908 (Wis. 1987). “It should be noted that sec. 111.32(5)(a), Stats., 1979-1980 in defining what categories may not be discriminated against, before it refers to "arrest record or conviction record," lists "age, race, color, handicap, sex, creed, national origin," and "ancestry.”
Samens v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 345 N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 1984). “UTILIZING THE COMMON CARRIER STANDARD, WAS WP&L’S REFUSAL TO HIRE SAMENS LEGITIMATE UNDER THE EXCEPTION TO HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION CONTAINED IN § 111.32(5) (f), STATS.? As we have set out above, WP&L must show that its rejection of Samens bore a rational relationship to the *673…”
Doepke-Kline v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2005 WI App 209 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005). “This appeal concerns the claim of Sharal Doepke-Kline that her employer violated the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA) by discharging her because of her asthma, refusing to accommodate her disability, and discriminating against her in the terms and conditions of her…”
Am. Motors Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 350 N.W.2d 120 (Wis. 1984). “" Section 111.32(5) (f), Stats. 1973. [2] See Chicago, 62 Wis.”
Wingra Redi-Mix Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2023 WI App 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). “§ 111.32(8), id., ¶42; that the employer took one of the actions enumerated in § 111.”
Tina Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Solutions, LLC, 897 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 2017). “200 (1957); Wis. Stat. § 111.32 (5)(b)(3) (1961); Morroe Berger, New York State Law Against Discrimination: Operation and Administration, 35 Cornell L.”
City of Onalaska v. State Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 354 N.W.2d 223 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984). “[2] The definition of "arrest record" is now contained in sec. 111.32(1), Stats. 1981-82, and is unchanged.”
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 2009 WI 79 (Wis. 2009). “2d 499 (citing Wis. Stat. § 111.32 (9)(a); Wis. Stat. § 111.”
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(1) — 5 cases
Oconomowoc Area Sch. Dist. v. Gregory L. Cota, 2024 WI App 8 (Wis. Ct. App. 2024).
Oconomowoc Area Sch. Dist. v. Gregory L. Cota, 2025 WI 11 (Wis. 2025).
City of Onalaska v. State Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 354 N.W.2d 223 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984). “[2] The definition of "arrest record" is now contained in sec. 111.32(1), Stats. 1981-82, and is unchanged.”
David Vega v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
Fitzgerald v. KAROBLIS, 695 N.W.2d 903 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(1)(b) — 1 case
Jim Walter Color Separations v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 595 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(12) — 4 cases
Braatz v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 496 N.W.2d 597 (Wis. 1993).
Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Co. v. Kessler, 388 N.W.2d 553 (Wis. 1986).
Bammert v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2000 WI App 28 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
Braatz v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 483 N.W.2d 246 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(13) — 5 cases
Kannenberg v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 571 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
Becker v. Automatic Garage Door Co., 456 N.W.2d 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
Chomicki v. Wittekind, 381 N.W.2d 561 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
Jim Walter Color Separations v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 595 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(13m) — 1 case
Hazelton v. State Pers. Comm'n, 505 N.W.2d 793 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(2) — 1 case
Johnson v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 547 N.W.2d 783 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(3) — 3 cases
David Vega v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
Oconomowoc Area Sch. Dist. v. Gregory L. Cota, 2025 WI 11 (Wis. 2025).
Nat. Landscapes, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(5) — 16 cases
Am. Motors Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 350 N.W.2d 120 (Wis. 1984). “" Section 111.32(5) (f), Stats. 1973. [2] See Chicago, 62 Wis.”
City of Onalaska v. State Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 354 N.W.2d 223 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984). “[2] The definition of "arrest record" is now contained in sec. 111.32(1), Stats. 1981-82, and is unchanged.”
Am. Motors Corp. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 286 N.W.2d 847 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
Samens v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 345 N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 1984). “UTILIZING THE COMMON CARRIER STANDARD, WAS WP&L’S REFUSAL TO HIRE SAMENS LEGITIMATE UNDER THE EXCEPTION TO HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION CONTAINED IN § 111.32(5) (f), STATS.? As we have set out above, WP&L must show that its rejection of Samens bore a rational relationship to the *673…”
Stores v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(5)(a) — 2 cases
Cnty. of Milwaukee v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 908 (Wis. 1987). “It should be noted that sec. 111.32(5)(a), Stats., 1979-1980 in defining what categories may not be discriminated against, before it refers to "arrest record or conviction record," lists "age, race, color, handicap, sex, creed, national origin," and "ancestry.”
City of La Crosse Police & Fire Comm'n v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 510 (Wis. 1987). “In keeping with this policy, sec. 111.32(5), Stats., specifically makes it "unlawful for any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or person to discriminate against any employe or any applicant for employment or licensing.”
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(5)(e) — 1 case
Kovalic v. Dec Int'l, Inc., 469 N.W.2d 224 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(5)(f) — 5 cases
City of La Crosse Police & Fire Comm'n v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 510 (Wis. 1987). “In keeping with this policy, sec. 111.32(5), Stats., specifically makes it "unlawful for any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or person to discriminate against any employe or any applicant for employment or licensing.”
Samens v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 345 N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 1984). “UTILIZING THE COMMON CARRIER STANDARD, WAS WP&L’S REFUSAL TO HIRE SAMENS LEGITIMATE UNDER THE EXCEPTION TO HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION CONTAINED IN § 111.32(5) (f), STATS.? As we have set out above, WP&L must show that its rejection of Samens bore a rational relationship to the *673…”
CHICAGO & NWRR v. Labor & Ind. Rev. Comm., 297 N.W.2d 819 (Wis. 1980).
Doepke-Kline v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2005 WI App 209 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005). “This appeal concerns the claim of Sharal Doepke-Kline that her employer violated the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA) by discharging her because of her asthma, refusing to accommodate her disability, and discriminating against her in the terms and conditions of her…”
Maine Human Rights Com'n, Etc. v. Canadian Pac., 458 A.2d 1225 (Me. 1983).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(5)(g) — 3 cases
Glamann v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 412 N.W.2d 522 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. COM'R OF LABOR, 608 P.2d 1047 (Mont. 1980).
Mountain States Tel. v. Commis (Mont. 1979).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(5)(h) — 3 cases
Law Enf't Standards Bd. v. Vill. of Lyndon Station, 305 N.W.2d 89 (Wis. 1981). “In its return to the writ, the village alleged that it could not lawfully discharge Jessen because such action would be in violation of the prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of a felony conviction (sec. 111.32(5)(h), Stats., effective November 1, 1977),…”
Cnty. of Milwaukee v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 908 (Wis. 1987). “It should be noted that sec. 111.32(5)(a), Stats., 1979-1980 in defining what categories may not be discriminated against, before it refers to "arrest record or conviction record," lists "age, race, color, handicap, sex, creed, national origin," and "ancestry.”
David Vega v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(6) — 2 cases
Jocz v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 538 N.W.2d 588 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
City of Madison v. State of Wisconsin Dep't of Workforce Dev., 2002 WI App 199 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(6)(a) — 3 cases
Cnty. of Milwaukee v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 908 (Wis. 1987). “It should be noted that sec. 111.32(5)(a), Stats., 1979-1980 in defining what categories may not be discriminated against, before it refers to "arrest record or conviction record," lists "age, race, color, handicap, sex, creed, national origin," and "ancestry.”
Callaway v. Hafeman, 628 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wis. 1986).
Wisconsin Dep't of Transp. v. Wisconsin Pers. Comm'n, 486 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8) — 17 cases
Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2004 WI 90 (Wis. 2004). “Vergeront, and Paul Lundsten affirmed the circuit court's judgment, stating that Roytek had a disability under Wisconsin's interpretation of "disability" as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 111.32 (8)(a) (2001-02). [4] The court further concluded that HTI did not proffer sufficient…”
Wingra Redi-Mix Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2023 WI App 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). “§ 111.32(8), id., ¶42; that the employer took one of the actions enumerated in § 111.”
City of La Crosse Police & Fire Comm'n v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 510 (Wis. 1987). “In keeping with this policy, sec. 111.32(5), Stats., specifically makes it "unlawful for any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or person to discriminate against any employe or any applicant for employment or licensing.”
Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2003 WI 106 (Wis. 2003). “See Wis. Stat. §§ 111.32 (8) [14] and 111.34(1)(b).”
Am. Motors Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 350 N.W.2d 120 (Wis. 1984). “" Section 111.32(5) (f), Stats. 1973. [2] See Chicago, 62 Wis.”
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8)(a) — 6 cases
Wingra Redi-Mix Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2023 WI App 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). “§ 111.32(8), id., ¶42; that the employer took one of the actions enumerated in § 111.”
City of La Crosse Police & Fire Comm'n v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 510 (Wis. 1987). “In keeping with this policy, sec. 111.32(5), Stats., specifically makes it "unlawful for any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or person to discriminate against any employe or any applicant for employment or licensing.”
Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2004 WI 90 (Wis. 2004). “Vergeront, and Paul Lundsten affirmed the circuit court's judgment, stating that Roytek had a disability under Wisconsin's interpretation of "disability" as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 111.32 (8)(a) (2001-02). [4] The court further concluded that HTI did not proffer sufficient…”
Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 476 N.W.2d 707 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
Norris v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 455 N.W.2d 665 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8)(c) — 2 cases
Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 476 N.W.2d 707 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
City of La Crosse Police & Fire Comm'n v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 510 (Wis. 1987). “In keeping with this policy, sec. 111.32(5), Stats., specifically makes it "unlawful for any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or person to discriminate against any employe or any applicant for employment or licensing.”
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