Wisconsin Statutes
Wis. Stat. § 111.322 (2026)
Discriminatory actions prohibited
✓ current as of July 2026
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111.322111.322 Discriminatory actions prohibited. Subject to ss. 111.33 to 111.365, it is an act of employment discrimination to do any of the following:
111.322(1)(1) To refuse to hire, employ, admit or license any individual, to bar or terminate from employment or labor organization membership any individual, or to discriminate against any individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment or labor organization membership because of any basis enumerated in s. 111.321.
111.322(2)(2) To print or circulate or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement or publication, or to use any form of application for employment or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which implies or expresses any limitation, specification or discrimination with respect to an individual or any intent to make such limitation, specification or discrimination because of any basis enumerated in s. 111.321.
111.322(2m)(2m) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against any individual because of any of the following:
111.322(2m)(a)(a) The individual files a complaint or attempts to enforce any right under s. 103.02, 103.10, 103.11, 103.13, 103.28, 103.32, 103.34, 103.455, 104.12, 109.03, 109.07, 109.075, 146.997, or 995.55, or ss. 101.58 to 101.599 or 103.64 to 103.82.
111.322(2m)(b)(b) The individual testifies or assists in any action or proceeding held under or to enforce any right under s. 103.02, 103.10, 103.11, 103.13, 103.28, 103.32, 103.34, 103.455, 104.12, 109.03, 109.07, 109.075, 146.997, or 995.55, or ss. 101.58 to 101.599 or 103.64 to 103.82.
111.322(2m)(bm)(bm) The individual files a complaint or attempts to enforce a right under s. 49.197 (6) (d) or 49.845 (4) (d) or testifies or assists in any action or proceeding under s. 49.197 (6) (d) or 49.845 (4) (d).
111.322(2m)(d)(d) The individual’s employer believes that the individual engaged or may engage in any activity described in pars. (a) to (bm).
111.322(3)(3) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against any individual because he or she has opposed any discriminatory practice under this subchapter or because he or she has made a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this subchapter.
111.322 HistoryHistory: 1981 c. 334; 1989 a. 228, 359; 1997 a. 237; 1999 a. 150 s. 672; 1999 a. 167, 176; 2009 a. 3, 28, 76, 182, 290; 2011 a. 32; 2013 a. 208; 2015 a. 55, 345; 2017 a. 59, 365.
111.322 AnnotationActions under subs. (1) and (2) do not involve wholly different elements of proof. Sub. (1) involves actual discrimination; the violation of sub. (2) is not in adopting a discriminatory policy, but rather the publication of it. The remaining elements are the same for both subsections. Sub. (2) is not limited to advertising for employees, it also applies to the printing of policies that affect existing employees. Racine Unified School District v. LIRC, 164 Wis. 2d 567, 476 N.W.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1991).
111.322 AnnotationAn unlawful practice occurs when an impermissible motivating factor enters into an employment decision, but if the employer can demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible factor, the complainant may not be awarded monetary damages or reinstatement. Hoell v. LIRC, 186 Wis. 2d 603, 522 N.W.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1994).
111.322 AnnotationThe state is prevented from enforcing discrimination laws against religious associations when the employment at issue serves a ministerial or ecclesiastical function. While it must be given considerable weight, a religious association’s designation of a position as ministerial or ecclesiastical does not control its status. Jocz v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 273, 538 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1995), 93-3042. But see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171, 132 S. Ct. 694, 181 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2012); Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 207 L. Ed. 2d 870 (2020).
111.322 AnnotationThe exclusive remedy provision in s. 102.03 (2) does not bar a complainant whose claim is covered by the Workers Compensation Act from pursuing an employment discrimination claim under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, this subchapter. Byers v. LIRC, 208 Wis. 2d 388, 561 N.W.2d 678 (1997), 95-2490.
111.322 AnnotationA prima facie case of discrimination triggers a burden of production against an employer, but unless the employer remains silent in the face of the prima facie case, the complainant continues to bear the burden of proof on the ultimate issue of discrimination. Currie v. DILHR, 210 Wis. 2d 380, 565 N.W.2d 253 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1720.
111.322 AnnotationA prima facie case for a violation of this section requires that the complainant: 1) was a member of a protected class; 2) was discharged; 3) was qualified for the position; and 4) was either replaced by someone not in the protected class or that others not in the protected class were treated more favorably. Knight v. LIRC, 220 Wis. 2d 137, 582 N.W.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-1606.
111.322 AnnotationThe free exercise clause of the 1st amendment and the freedom of conscience clauses in article I, section 18, of the Wisconsin Constitution preclude employment discrimination claims under ss. 111.31 to 111.395 for employees whose positions are important and closely linked to the religious mission of a religious organization. Coulee Catholic Schools v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868, 07-0496. See also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171, 132 S. Ct. 694, 181 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2012); Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 207 L. Ed. 2d 870 (2020).
111.322 AnnotationAn employer does not engage in intentional discrimination because of disability when the employer bases an adverse employment action on an employee’s conduct unless the employee proves the employer knew the employee’s disability caused the conduct. The Labor and Industry Review Commission’s “inference method” of finding discriminatory intent is inconsistent with sub. (1) because the method excuses the employee from the burden of proving discriminatory intent. Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. LIRC, 2018 WI 76, 382 Wis. 2d 624, 914 N.W.2d 1, 16-0355.
111.322 AnnotationWhile sub. (3) protects employee opposition to discriminatory practices, sub. (2m) (a) only applies when an individual files a complaint or attempts to enforce a right. An employee does not attempt to enforce a right under sub. (2m) (a) merely by asking an employer to compensate the employee for unpaid overtime. A person may attempt to enforce a right under sub. (2m) (a) if the person tries to compel observance or obedience to that right. There is an element of compulsion or force that is inherent in the statute’s use of the word “enforce” that supports the Labor and Industry Review Commission’s interpretation of sub. (2m) (a) as requiring some resort to a governmental authority. Radtke v. LIRC, 2025 WI App 14, 415 Wis. 2d 347, 18 N.W.3d 187, 24-0332.
111.322 AnnotationCertain employment discrimination laws authorize employees who have been wrongfully terminated to sue their employers for reinstatement and damages. However, the establishment and free exercise clauses of the 1st amendment to the U.S. Constitution bar such an action when the employer is a religious group and the employee is one of the group’s ministers. Thus, in an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister challenging the church’s decision to fire the minister, the ministerial exception barred the suit. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171, 132 S. Ct. 694, 181 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2012). See also Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 207 L. Ed. 2d 870 (2020).
111.322 AnnotationTitle VII of the federal Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from taking certain actions “because of” sex, a test that incorporates the simple and traditional standard of but-for causation. When it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision. So long as the plaintiff’s sex was one but-for cause of that decision, that is enough to trigger the law. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 207 L. Ed. 2d 218 (2020).
111.322 AnnotationSome “Hardship”: Defending a Disability Discrimination Suit Under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. Hansch. 89 MLR 821 (2006).
111.322 AnnotationDiscrimination in advertising. Abramson. WBB Mar. 1985.
111.322 AnnotationEmployer Liability for Employment References. Mac Kelly. Wis. Law. Apr. 2008.
111.322 Annotation2009 Wisconsin Act 20: Changes to Wisconsin’s Fair Employment Law. Karls-Ruplinger. Wis. Law. Sept. 2009.
111.322 AnnotationWorkplace Protections for LGBTQ Employees. Covington. Wis. Law. Oct. 2020.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 38
cases (8 in the last 5 years), 1985–2025 · leading case: Wis. Bell, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 914 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 2018).
Wis. Bell, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 914 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 2018). “ncy's interpretation and application of a statute, we asked the parties to also address this issue: "Does the practice of deferring to agency interpretations of statutes comport with Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which vests the judicial power in the…”
Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 476 N.W.2d 707 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). “See sec. 111.322, Stats. The WFEA's prohibition against handicap discrimination, unlike that of sexual orientation discrimination, is not absolute.”
Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2003 WI 106 (Wis. 2003). “32 (8), and that the employer took one of the actions enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 111.322 . [16] Target, 217 Wis.”
Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2004 WI 90 (Wis. 2004). “32 (8) and that his or her employer took one of the several actions listed in Wis. Stat. § 111.322 . Id., ¶ 42 . Once the employee meets the initial burden of proving that he or she has a disability, we stated that the employer then has the burden of proving a defense under Wis.”
Wingra Redi-Mix Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2023 WI App 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). “”8 That section applies generally to all of the 7 See WIS.”
Coulee Catholic Schs. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2009 WI 88 (Wis. 2009). “Wis. Stat. § 111.322 Discriminatory actions prohibited.”
Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2007 WI 105 (Wis. 2007). “34 (1)(b) (2005-06), [2] and terminated Geen because of his disability within the meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 111.322 and 111.34. ¶ 2 This case involves interpretation of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act ("WFEA") and review of an agency determination.”
Stevenson v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6918 (Cal. 1997). “) For all these reasons, we are persuaded that the FEHA's policy against age discrimination in employment is sufficiently substantial and fundamental to support a tort claim for wrongful discharge. We therefore conclude that the FEHA's policy against age discrimination satisfies…”
Stores v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). “, which includes complaints under § 111.322, Stats., for handicap discrimination.”
Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2006 WI App 157 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). “We conclude that LIRC's determination that Stoughton Trailers violated the WFEA by terminating Geen's employment because of his disability is based on a reasonable interpretation of the statute and comports with its purpose.”
Kannenberg v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 571 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). “, 1 and was not subjected to retaliation as prohib *376 ited by § 111.322(3), Stats. 2 She contends that LIRC erred in the legal standards it applied to determine whether there was sexual harassment and that the evidence shows that she was subject to sexual harass *377 ment and…”
Braatz v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 496 N.W.2d 597 (Wis. 1993). “Section 111.322(1); 2 sec. 111.321, Stats.”
— Wis. Stat. § 111.322(1) — 10 cases
Wingra Redi-Mix Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2023 WI App 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). “”8 That section applies generally to all of the 7 See WIS.”
Braatz v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 496 N.W.2d 597 (Wis. 1993). “Section 111.322(1); 2 sec. 111.321, Stats.”
Stores v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). “, which includes complaints under § 111.322, Stats., for handicap discrimination.”
Hazelton v. State Pers. Comm'n, 505 N.W.2d 793 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 476 N.W.2d 707 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). “See sec. 111.322, Stats. The WFEA's prohibition against handicap discrimination, unlike that of sexual orientation discrimination, is not absolute.”
— Wis. Stat. § 111.322(2) — 1 case
Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 476 N.W.2d 707 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). “See sec. 111.322, Stats. The WFEA's prohibition against handicap discrimination, unlike that of sexual orientation discrimination, is not absolute.”
— Wis. Stat. § 111.322(2m) — 2 cases
Strong v. C.I.R., Inc., 516 N.W.2d 719 (Wis. 1994).
Cheryl A. Radtke v. The Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.322(2m)(a) — 2 cases
Cheryl A. Radtke v. The Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
David Knott v. Timothy B. O'Brien LLC (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.322(2m)(d) — 1 case
Cheryl A. Radtke v. The Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.322(3) — 7 cases
Kannenberg v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 571 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). “, 1 and was not subjected to retaliation as prohib *376 ited by § 111.322(3), Stats. 2 She contends that LIRC erred in the legal standards it applied to determine whether there was sexual harassment and that the evidence shows that she was subject to sexual harass *377 ment and…”
Bourque v. Wausau Hosp. Ctr., 427 N.W.2d 433 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
Lopez v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2002 WI App 63 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
Marten Transp., Ltd. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 501 N.W.2d 391 (Wis. 1993).
Callaway v. Hafeman, 628 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wis. 1986).
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