Wisconsin Statutes
Wis. Stat. § 111.36 (2026)
Sex, sexual orientation; exceptions and special cases
✓ current as of July 2026
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111.36(1)(1) Employment discrimination because of sex includes, but is not limited to, any of the following actions by any employer, labor organization, employment agency, licensing agency or other person:
111.36(1)(a)(a) Discriminating against any individual in promotion, compensation paid for equal or substantially similar work, or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment or licensing on the basis of sex where sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification.
111.36(1)(b)(b) Engaging in sexual harassment; or implicitly or explicitly making or permitting acquiescence in or submission to sexual harassment a term or condition of employment; or making or permitting acquiescence in, submission to or rejection of sexual harassment the basis or any part of the basis for any employment decision affecting an employee, other than an employment decision that is disciplinary action against an employee for engaging in sexual harassment in violation of this paragraph; or permitting sexual harassment to have the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an employee’s work performance or of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. Under this paragraph, substantial interference with an employee’s work performance or creation of an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment is established when the conduct is such that a reasonable person under the same circumstances as the employee would consider the conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere substantially with the person’s work performance or to create an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.
111.36(1)(br)(br) Engaging in harassment that consists of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct directed at another individual because of that individual’s gender, other than the conduct described in par. (b), and that has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment or has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with that individual’s work performance. Under this paragraph, substantial interference with an employee’s work performance or creation of an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment is established when the conduct is such that a reasonable person under the same circumstances as the employee would consider the conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere substantially with the person’s work performance or to create an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.
111.36(1)(c)(c) Discriminating against any woman on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, maternity leave or related medical conditions by engaging in any of the actions prohibited under s. 111.322, including, but not limited to, actions concerning fringe benefit programs covering illnesses and disability.
111.36(1)(d)1.1. For any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or employment agency or other person to refuse to hire, employ, admit or license, or to bar or terminate from employment, membership or licensure any individual, or to discriminate against an individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s sexual orientation; or
111.36(1)(d)2.2. For any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or employment agency or other person to discharge or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any discriminatory practices under this paragraph or because he or she has made a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this paragraph.
111.36(2)(2) For the purposes of this subchapter, sex is a bona fide occupational qualification if all of the members of one sex are physically incapable of performing the essential duties required by a job, or if the essence of the employer’s business operation would be undermined if employees were not hired exclusively from one sex.
111.36(3)(3) For purposes of sexual harassment claims under sub. (1) (b), an employer, labor organization, employment agency or licensing agency is presumed liable for an act of sexual harassment by that employer, labor organization, employment agency or licensing agency or by any of its employees or members, if the act occurs while the complaining employee is at his or her place of employment or is performing duties relating to his or her employment, if the complaining employee informs the employer, labor organization, employment agency or licensing agency of the act, and if the employer, labor organization, employment agency or licensing agency fails to take appropriate action within a reasonable time.
111.36 AnnotationFederal law may be looked to in interpreting sub. (1) (b) and (br). Under federal law, “hostile environment” sexual harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment. Kannenberg v. LIRC, 213 Wis. 2d 373, 571 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1997), 97-0224.
111.36 AnnotationThe exclusion of contraceptives from an employer or college or university sponsored benefits program that otherwise provides prescription drug coverage violates Wisconsin law prohibiting sex discrimination in employment and in higher education, ss. 111.31 to 111.395, 36.12, and 38.23. OAG 1-04.
111.36 AnnotationEmotional distress injury due to on-the-job sexual harassment was exclusively compensable under s. 102.03. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540 (1986).
111.36 AnnotationExpanding the Notion of “Equal Coverage”: The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act Requires Contraceptive Coverage for All Employer-Sponsored Prescription Drug Plans. Mason. 2005 WLR 913.
111.36 AnnotationSexual Harassment. Gibson. WBB Mar. 1981.
111.36 AnnotationSex Discrimination Law: Old Problems, New Scrutiny. Larson & Tutwiler. Wis. Law. Apr. 2020.
111.36 AnnotationWorkplace Protections for LGBTQ Employees. Covington. Wis. Law. Oct. 2020.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 45
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1957–2024 · leading case: Watkins v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 345 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. 1984).
Watkins v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 345 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. 1984). “Section 111.36(3) (b), Stats., does not expressly authorize DILHR to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing complainant.”
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). “Wis. Stat. §§111.36 (1)(d)(1), 111.321 (2016) (prohibiting employment discrimination because of sex, defined as including discrim- ination because of “sexual orientation”); Mich.”
Cnty. of Milwaukee v. State, Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 335 N.W.2d 412 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). “The circuit court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Williams’ complaint of sexual discrimination to the LIRC was not filed within 300 days after the alleged discrimination occurred, pursuant to sec. 111.36(1), Stats. (1977). 3 Judgment was entered April 16,…”
Kannenberg v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 571 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). “5 LIRC has developed experience and expertise in deciding claims of sexual harassment under the WFEA, using the standards from federal cases decided under Title VII.”
Lindas v. Cady, 515 N.W.2d 458 (Wis. 1994). “Section 111.36(3)(c), Stats, (1979-80). While these may not be the remedies Lindas eventually sought to obtain in a sec.”
Byers v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 561 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1997). “Wis. Stat. § 111.36 (l)(b). Section 111.36(l)(b) provides that "employment discrimination because of sex includes.”
Winkelman v. Beloit Mem'l Hosp., 483 N.W.2d 211 (Wis. 1992). “" Section 111.36(3)(b), Stats. 1975 (currently sec.”
Wingra Redi-Mix Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2023 WI App 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). “§ 111.36(1)(c), which provides that “[e]mployment discrimination because of sex includes … discriminating against any woman on the basis of pregnancy … by engaging in any of the actions prohibited under s.”
Jim Walter Color Separations v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 595 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). “: (b) Engaging in sexual harassment; or implicitly or explicitly making or permitting acquiescence in or submission to sexual harassment a term or condition of employment; or making or permitting acquiescence in, submission to or rejection of sexual harassment the basis or any…”
Am. Motors Corp. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 305 N.W.2d 62 (Wis. 1981). “" [3] Although Bartell on March 1, 1973, requested DILHR to withdraw his complaint, nevertheless DILHR, proceeding under the provisions of sec. 111.36, Stats., made *343 a finding of probable cause that discrimination had occurred, and attempted conciliation, which was…”
Wholey v. Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482 (Md. 2002). “)(creating private right of action for employees suffering retaliation); Wis. Stat § 111.36 (1997)(declaring retaliation for reporting discrimination or harassment to be an unfair employment practice).”
Anderson v. State Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 330 N.W.2d 594 (Wis. 1983). “Section 111.36(3) (b), Stats. 1973, provides that "amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person discriminated against shall operate to reduce back pay otherwise allowable.”
— Wis. Stat. § 111.36(1) — 4 cases
Cnty. of Milwaukee v. State, Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 335 N.W.2d 412 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). “The circuit court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Williams’ complaint of sexual discrimination to the LIRC was not filed within 300 days after the alleged discrimination occurred, pursuant to sec. 111.36(1), Stats. (1977). 3 Judgment was entered April 16,…”
Tucker v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 454 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
Jim Walter Color Separations v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 595 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). “: (b) Engaging in sexual harassment; or implicitly or explicitly making or permitting acquiescence in or submission to sexual harassment a term or condition of employment; or making or permitting acquiescence in, submission to or rejection of sexual harassment the basis or any…”
Hiegel v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 359 N.W.2d 405 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.36(1)(b) — 4 cases
Jim Walter Color Separations v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 595 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). “: (b) Engaging in sexual harassment; or implicitly or explicitly making or permitting acquiescence in or submission to sexual harassment a term or condition of employment; or making or permitting acquiescence in, submission to or rejection of sexual harassment the basis or any…”
Kannenberg v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 571 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). “5 LIRC has developed experience and expertise in deciding claims of sexual harassment under the WFEA, using the standards from federal cases decided under Title VII.”
Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Int'l Union, Allied Indus. Workers of Am., 748 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Wis. 1990).
Bowen v. Labor & Indus. Review Com'n, 2007 WI App 45 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.36(1)(br) — 1 case
Kannenberg v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 571 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). “5 LIRC has developed experience and expertise in deciding claims of sexual harassment under the WFEA, using the standards from federal cases decided under Title VII.”
— Wis. Stat. § 111.36(1)(c) — 1 case
Wingra Redi-Mix Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2023 WI App 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). “§ 111.36(1)(c), which provides that “[e]mployment discrimination because of sex includes … discriminating against any woman on the basis of pregnancy … by engaging in any of the actions prohibited under s.”
— Wis. Stat. § 111.36(3) — 5 cases
Watkins v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 345 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. 1984). “Section 111.36(3) (b), Stats., does not expressly authorize DILHR to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing complainant.”
Anderson v. State Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 330 N.W.2d 594 (Wis. 1983). “Section 111.36(3) (b), Stats. 1973, provides that "amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person discriminated against shall operate to reduce back pay otherwise allowable.”
City of La Crosse Police & Fire Comm'n v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 510 (Wis. 1987).
Chicago & North W. R.R. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 283 N.W.2d 603 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
CHICAGO & NWRR v. Labor & Ind. Rev. Comm., 283 N.W.2d 603 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.36(3)(a) — 1 case
Cunegin v. Zayre Dep't Store, 437 F. Supp. 100 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.36(3)(b) — 8 cases
Watkins v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 345 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. 1984). “Section 111.36(3) (b), Stats., does not expressly authorize DILHR to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing complainant.”
Winkelman v. Beloit Mem'l Hosp., 483 N.W.2d 211 (Wis. 1992). “" Section 111.36(3)(b), Stats. 1975 (currently sec.”
Wisconsin Dep't of Transp. v. Wisconsin Pers. Comm'n, 500 N.W.2d 664 (Wis. 1993).
Tatum v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 392 N.W.2d 840 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
Cunegin v. Zayre Dep't Store, 437 F. Supp. 100 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.36(3)(c) — 3 cases
Lindas v. Cady, 515 N.W.2d 458 (Wis. 1994). “Section 111.36(3)(c), Stats, (1979-80). While these may not be the remedies Lindas eventually sought to obtain in a sec.”
Watkins v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 345 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. 1984). “Section 111.36(3) (b), Stats., does not expressly authorize DILHR to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing complainant.”
Glamann v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 412 N.W.2d 522 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
— Wis. Stat. § 111.36(6) — 1 case
Am. Motors Corp. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 305 N.W.2d 62 (Wis. 1981). “" [3] Although Bartell on March 1, 1973, requested DILHR to withdraw his complaint, nevertheless DILHR, proceeding under the provisions of sec. 111.36, Stats., made *343 a finding of probable cause that discrimination had occurred, and attempted conciliation, which was…”
— Wis. Stat. § 111.36(l)(b) — 2 cases
Byers v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 561 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1997). “Wis. Stat. § 111.36 (l)(b). Section 111.36(l)(b) provides that "employment discrimination because of sex includes.”
Kannenberg v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 571 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). “5 LIRC has developed experience and expertise in deciding claims of sexual harassment under the WFEA, using the standards from federal cases decided under Title VII.”
— Wis. Stat. § 111.36(l)(d) — 1 case
Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 476 N.W.2d 707 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
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