Wisconsin Statutes
Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (2026)
Prior convictions, suspensions or revocations to be counted as offenses
✓ current as of July 2026
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343.307(1)(1) The court shall count the following to determine the length of a revocation under s. 343.30 (1q) (b) and to determine the penalty under ss. 114.09 (2) and 346.65 (2):
343.307(1)(a)(a) Convictions for violations under s. 346.63 (1), or a local ordinance in conformity with that section.
343.307(1)(b)(b) Convictions for violations of a law of a federally recognized American Indian tribe or band in this state in conformity with s. 346.63 (1).
343.307(1)(c)(c) Convictions for violations under s. 346.63 (2) or 940.25, or s. 940.09 where the offense involved the use of a vehicle.
343.307(1)(d)(d) Convictions under the law of another jurisdiction that prohibits a person from refusing chemical testing or using a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence of a controlled substance or controlled substance analog, or a combination thereof; with an excess or specified range of alcohol concentration; while under the influence of any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely driving; or while having a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood, as those or substantially similar terms are used in that jurisdiction’s laws.
343.307(1)(e)(e) Operating privilege suspensions or revocations under the law of another jurisdiction arising out of a refusal to submit to chemical testing.
343.307(2)(2) The court shall count the following to determine the length of a revocation under s. 343.305 (10) and to determine the penalty under s. 346.65 (2j) and to determine the prohibited alcohol concentration under s. 340.01 (46m):
343.307(2)(a)(a) Convictions for violations under s. 346.63 (1) or (5), or a local ordinance in conformity with either section.
343.307(2)(b)(b) Convictions for violations of a law of a federally recognized American Indian tribe or band in this state in conformity with s. 346.63 (1) or (5).
343.307(2)(d)(d) Convictions under the law of another jurisdiction that is in substantial conformity with 49 CFR 383.51 (b) Table 1, items (1) to (4).
343.307(2)(e)(e) Convictions under the law of another jurisdiction that prohibits a person from refusing chemical testing or using a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence of a controlled substance or controlled substance analog, or a combination thereof; with an excess or specified range of alcohol concentration; while under the influence of any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely driving; or while having a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood, as those or substantially similar terms are used in that jurisdiction’s laws.
343.307(2)(f)(f) Operating privilege suspensions or revocations under the law of another jurisdiction arising out of a refusal to submit to chemical testing.
343.307(3)(3) If the same elements of the offense must be proven under a local ordinance or under a law of a federally recognized American Indian tribe or band in this state as under s. 346.63 (1) (a), (am), or (b), any combination of s. 346.63 (1) (a), (am), or (b), or s. 346.63 (5), the local ordinance or the law of a federally recognized American Indian tribe or band in this state shall be considered to be in conformity with s. 346.63 (1) (a), (am), or (b), any combination of s. 346.63 (1) (a), (am), or (b), or s. 346.63 (5), for purposes of ss. 343.30 (1q) (b) 1., 343.305 (10) (b) 1. and 346.65 (2) and (2j).
343.307 HistoryHistory: 1977 c. 193; 1981 c. 20, 184; 1985 a. 80, 337; 1987 a. 3; 1989 a. 105, 271, 359; 1991 a. 39, 277; 1995 a. 448; 1997 a. 84; 2003 a. 33, 97; 2007 a. 20; 2009 a. 276.
343.307 AnnotationAn Illinois court’s placement of an operating while intoxicated (OWI) offender under court supervision is a conviction that is counted as a prior offense under sub. (1) (d) when charging an OWI suspect in Wisconsin. Placement under court supervision as a result of a determination that the defendant violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction meets the definition of conviction under s. 340.01 (9r). State v. List, 2004 WI App 230, 277 Wis. 2d 836, 691 N.W.2d 366, 03-3149.
343.307 AnnotationThe final phrase of sub. (1) (d), “as those or substantially similar terms are used in that jurisdiction’s laws,” indicates the broad scope of that provision. When determining a penalty, Wisconsin counts prior offenses committed in states with operating while under the influence statutes that differ significantly from Wisconsin’s. “Substantially similar” simply emphasizes that the out-of-state statute need only prohibit conduct similar to the list of prohibited conduct in sub. (1) (d). State v. Puchacz, 2010 WI App 30, 323 Wis. 2d 741, 780 N.W.2d 536, 09-0840.
343.307 AnnotationThe definition of “conviction” in s. 340.01 (9r) applies to “convictions” in sub. (1) (d). Under sub. (1) (d), the other jurisdiction need only have a law that prohibits conduct specified in sub. (1) (d). The Illinois “zero tolerance” law punishes a person who is less than 21 years of age for refusing to submit to a chemical test, or for using a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration above 0.00 and thus, in the context of sub. (1) (d), was a conviction under a law of another jurisdiction that prohibits refusal of chemical testing or prohibits using a motor vehicle with an excess or specified range of alcohol concentration. State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132, 330 Wis. 2d 1, 794 N.W.2d 213, 08-3144.
343.307 AnnotationIn sub. (1) (d), the phrase “with an excess or specified range of alcohol concentration” modifies the phrase “using a motor vehicle,” not the phrase “using a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence of a controlled substance or controlled substance analog, or a combination thereof.” Thus, the statute should be read as follows: convictions under the law of another jurisdiction that prohibits a person from using a motor vehicle with an excess or specified range of alcohol concentration. State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132, 330 Wis. 2d 1, 794 N.W.2d 213, 08-3144.
343.307 AnnotationThe elements of an underlying first-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI) need not be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding for a subsequent OWI violation. State v. Verhagen, 2013 WI App 16, 346 Wis. 2d 196, 827 N.W.2d 891, 11-2033.
343.307 AnnotationSub. (1) (d)’s inclusion of out-of-state convictions under a law that prohibits driving “with an excess or specified range of alcohol concentration” does not violate the equal protection clause, even if a consequence is to treat Illinois zero tolerance offenses differently than Wisconsin absolute sobriety offenses. Ease of administration in Wisconsin courts provides a rational basis for a single, straightforward, and broad definition of out-of-state offenses applicable to all other jurisdictions. The definition consistently counts all convictions under out-of-state laws prohibiting driving with an excess or specified range of alcohol concentration regardless of their labels or treatment. State v. Hirsch, 2014 WI App 39, 353 Wis. 2d 453, 847 N.W.2d 192, 13-0427.
343.307 AnnotationEvery term in sub. (1) (d) relates in some way to a person operating a motor vehicle with either drugs or alcohol, or both, in the person’s system. That critical aspect is completely absent from the reckless driving offense of which the defendant was convicted. The initial charge, sanctions, and potential future consequences are of no moment. State v. Jackson, 2014 WI App 50, 354 Wis. 2d 99, 851 N.W.2d 465, 13-1282.
343.307 AnnotationA prior expunged operating while intoxicated (OWI) conviction constitutes a prior conviction under sub. (1) when determining the penalty for OWI-related offenses. The state must prove the prior OWI conviction by a preponderance of the evidence if the prior conviction is not an element of the charged offense. State v. Braunschweig, 2018 WI 113, 384 Wis. 2d 742, 921 N.W.2d 199, 17-1261.
343.307 AnnotationWith an eye toward the fact that the applicable burden of proof of a prior conviction for the purposes of this section is a preponderance of the evidence, a defendant’s admissions, coupled with the Department of Transportation driving record and the references to the defendant’s probation, are sufficient to meet such a burden. The state must demonstrate only that it is more likely than not that the defendant was previously convicted of operating while intoxicated. State v. Loayza, 2021 WI 11, 395 Wis. 2d 521, 954 N.W.2d 358, 18-2066.
343.307 AnnotationFor the purpose of this section, prior convictions may be proven by certified copies of conviction or other competent proof offered by the state before sentencing. Such competent proof must reliably demonstrate, with particularity, the existence of each prior conviction. State v. Loayza, 2021 WI 11, 395 Wis. 2d 521, 954 N.W.2d 358, 18-2066.
343.307 AnnotationUnder Birchfield, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), and Dalton, 2018 WI 85, Wisconsin’s operating while intoxicated graduated-penalty scheme is unconstitutional to the extent it counts prior revocations for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood draw as offenses for the purpose of increasing the criminal penalty. State v. Forrett, 2022 WI 37, 401 Wis. 2d 678, 974 N.W.2d 422, 19-1850.
343.307 AnnotationA conviction that has been collaterally attacked meets the definition of “conviction” under s. 340.01 (9r) because a collateral attack does not overturn or vacate the conviction. Instead, it attempts to avoid the conviction’s force of law in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Thus, as long as the adjudication of guilt is unvacated, the conviction remains on the Department of Transportation’s records and should be counted in determining whether to revoke the offender’s operating privilege. OAG 2-14.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 63
cases (21 in the last 5 years), 1987–2026 · leading case: State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132 (Wis. 2010).
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132 (Wis. 2010). “The question of law before this court is whether Gerard Carter's two prior suspensions of his operating privilege under the Illinois "zero tolerance" law 2 fall within Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1) (2007-08) 3 so that the Illinois suspensions are counted in sentencing Carter for his…”
State v. Alexander, 571 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 1997). “*634 suspensions or revocations as counted under Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1). ¶ 2. The issue is whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it allowed the introduction of evidence of two or more prior convictions, suspensions or revocations as counted under…”
State v. Justin A. Braunschweig, 921 N.W.2d 199 (Wis. 2018). “First, we consider whether a prior expunged OWI conviction constitutes a prior conviction under Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1), when determining the penalty for OWI-related offenses.”
City of Eau Claire v. Melissa M. Booth, 2016 WI 65 (Wis. 2016). “At the time of Booth Britton's 1992 OWI in Eau Claire County, the escalating penalty scheme was similar to the current penalty scheme except that it counted "the total number of suspensions, revocations and convictions" under Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1) in a five-year period.”
State v. Jackson, 2014 WI App 50 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). “He filed a motion to dismiss the charge on the grounds that his 1997 Illinois statutory summary suspension and 2003 Illinois reckless driving conviction — both used by the State as a basis for the fifth offense designation — were being improperly counted as prior convictions…”
State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 914 N.W.2d 120 (Wis. 2018). “Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1)(f). If his refusal were counted as his first OWI, there would have been no criminal penalties.”
State v. Deilke, 2004 WI 104 (Wis. 2004). “See Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (explaining which convictions count as prior convictions for charging purposes).”
State v. David W. Howes, 2017 WI 18 (Wis. 2017). “For example, Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1)(f) provides that a revocation under § 343.”
State v. Andre M. Chamblis, 2015 WI 53 (Wis. 2015). “The State argues that the plain language of Wis. Stat. §§ 343.307 (1)10 and 346.65(2)(am)611 provides that the time for 10 Wisconsin Stat.”
State v. Verhagen, 2013 WI App 16 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013). “He also argued that, without any such requirement, Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1), describing which convictions are to be counted to determine the penalty for OWI, was unconstitutional as applied.”
State v. Warbelton, 2008 WI App 42 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). “One of the three elements of this offense was that the defendant must have had two or more prior convictions, suspensions or revocations as counted under Wis. Stat. §343.307 (1) (1993-94). Alexander, 214 Wis.”
State v. List, 2004 WI App 230 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). “List contends that he was improperly charged with second- *839 offense OWI because his first-offense OWI did not count as a prior conviction under Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (l)(d). We disagree and affirm.”
— Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) — 34 cases
State v. Alexander, 571 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 1997). “*634 suspensions or revocations as counted under Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1). ¶ 2. The issue is whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it allowed the introduction of evidence of two or more prior convictions, suspensions or revocations as counted under…”
State v. Ryan C. Diehl, 2020 WI App 16 (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
City of Eau Claire v. Melissa M. Booth, 2016 WI 65 (Wis. 2016). “At the time of Booth Britton's 1992 OWI in Eau Claire County, the escalating penalty scheme was similar to the current penalty scheme except that it counted "the total number of suspensions, revocations and convictions" under Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1) in a five-year period.”
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132 (Wis. 2010). “The question of law before this court is whether Gerard Carter's two prior suspensions of his operating privilege under the Illinois "zero tolerance" law 2 fall within Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1) (2007-08) 3 so that the Illinois suspensions are counted in sentencing Carter for his…”
State v. Justin A. Braunschweig, 921 N.W.2d 199 (Wis. 2018). “First, we consider whether a prior expunged OWI conviction constitutes a prior conviction under Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1), when determining the penalty for OWI-related offenses.”
— Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(d) — 9 cases
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132 (Wis. 2010). “The question of law before this court is whether Gerard Carter's two prior suspensions of his operating privilege under the Illinois "zero tolerance" law 2 fall within Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1) (2007-08) 3 so that the Illinois suspensions are counted in sentencing Carter for his…”
State v. Alfonso C. Loayza, 2021 WI 11 (Wis. 2021).
State v. Scott W. Forrett, 2021 WI App 31 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Evan J. Schnoll (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
State v. Jenny E. Clark (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
— Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(e) — 4 cases
City of Cedarburg v. Ries B. Hansen, 2020 WI 11 (Wis. 2020).
City of Cedarburg v. Ries B. Hansen, 2020 WI 11 (Wis. 2020).
State v. Jeffery Scott Wiganowsky (Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
State v. Jenny E. Clark (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
— Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(f) — 4 cases
State v. Scott W. Forrett, 2021 WI App 31 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
Oconto Cnty. v. Robert E. Hammersley (Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
State v. Aman D. Singh (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
Craig Lee Miller v. State of Wisconsin (E.D. Wis. 2025).
— Wis. Stat. § 343.307(2) — 3 cases
State v. Justin A. Braunschweig, 921 N.W.2d 199 (Wis. 2018). “First, we consider whether a prior expunged OWI conviction constitutes a prior conviction under Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1), when determining the penalty for OWI-related offenses.”
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132 (Wis. 2010). “The question of law before this court is whether Gerard Carter's two prior suspensions of his operating privilege under the Illinois "zero tolerance" law 2 fall within Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1) (2007-08) 3 so that the Illinois suspensions are counted in sentencing Carter for his…”
State v. Schuman, 520 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
— Wis. Stat. § 343.307(l)(a) — 1 case
State v. Holder, 2011 WI App 116 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011).
— Wis. Stat. § 343.307(l)(b) — 1 case
State v. Schuman, 520 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
— Wis. Stat. § 343.307(l)(d) — 7 cases
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132 (Wis. 2010). “The question of law before this court is whether Gerard Carter's two prior suspensions of his operating privilege under the Illinois "zero tolerance" law 2 fall within Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1) (2007-08) 3 so that the Illinois suspensions are counted in sentencing Carter for his…”
State v. Puchacz, 2010 WI App 30 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Jackson, 2014 WI App 50 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). “He filed a motion to dismiss the charge on the grounds that his 1997 Illinois statutory summary suspension and 2003 Illinois reckless driving conviction — both used by the State as a basis for the fifth offense designation — were being improperly counted as prior convictions…”
State v. List, 2004 WI App 230 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). “List contends that he was improperly charged with second- *839 offense OWI because his first-offense OWI did not count as a prior conviction under Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (l)(d). We disagree and affirm.”
State v. Hirsch, 2014 WI App 39 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014).
— Wis. Stat. § 343.307(l)(e) — 3 cases
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132 (Wis. 2010). “The question of law before this court is whether Gerard Carter's two prior suspensions of his operating privilege under the Illinois "zero tolerance" law 2 fall within Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (1) (2007-08) 3 so that the Illinois suspensions are counted in sentencing Carter for his…”
State v. Hirsch, 2014 WI App 39 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014).
State v. Carter, 2009 WI App 156 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
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