Wisconsin Statutes
Wis. Stat. § 893.13 (2026)
Tolling of statutes of limitation
✓ current as of July 2026
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893.13(1)(1) In this section and ss. 893.14 and 893.15 “final disposition” means the end of the period in which an appeal may be taken from a final order or judgment of the trial court, the end of the period within which an order for rehearing can be made in the highest appellate court to which an appeal is taken, or the final order or judgment of the court to which remand from an appellate court is made, whichever is latest.
893.13(2)(2) A law limiting the time for commencement of an action is tolled by the commencement of the action to enforce the cause of action to which the period of limitation applies. The law limiting the time for commencement of the action is tolled for the period from the commencement of the action until the final disposition of the action.
893.13(3)(3) If a period of limitation is tolled under sub. (2) by the commencement of an action and the time remaining after final disposition in which an action may be commenced is less than 30 days, the period within which the action may be commenced is extended to 30 days from the date of final disposition.
893.13 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: Section 893.35 is repealed and this section created to clarify the ending of the tolled period of a statute of limitations in the various situations which can arise when an appeal is taken.
893.13 NoteSub. (3) would apply when, for example, an action was commenced when the period of limitation has only 5 days left to run. The running of the period of limitation is tolled for the period from commencement of the action until the day of its final disposition, such as dismissal of the action based on the pleadings. A 30-day period is then provided (rather than the 5 days left on the original period of limitation) in order to provide a reasonable time for a party to consider whether to recommence the action. [Bill 326-A]
893.13 AnnotationThis section does not toll the statute to allow an independent claim by an insurer. It simply insures that the joinder of constituent parts of a cause of action during the pendency of the action is not frustrated by the application of the appropriate statute of limitations. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Owen, 191 Wis. 2d 744, 530 N.W.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1995).
893.13 AnnotationThe filing of an action, subsequently voluntarily dismissed, tolls the statute of limitations under sub. (2) for the period specified in sub. (1) for cases in which no appeal is taken. Johnson v. County of Crawford, 195 Wis. 2d 374, 536 N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1995), 95-0144.
893.13 AnnotationA suit filed prior to the expiration of the 120-day period for a denial of claim under s. 893.80 is not truly commenced and does not toll the statute of limitations when filed. Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996), 93-3348.
893.13 AnnotationTo interpret this statute to mean that a plaintiff’s timely lawsuit tolled the statute of limitations as to all other possible victims would abrogate the statute of limitations. Such an interpretation would lead to absurd results and render meaningless the statute of limitations in multiple-victim cases. Barnes v. WISCO Hotel Group, 2009 WI App 72, 318 Wis. 2d 537, 767 N.W.2d 352, 08-1884.
893.13 AnnotationAetna, 191 Wis. 2d 744 (1995), does not establish that whenever a person intervenes in a pending lawsuit, asserting claims identical to, although not constituent of, those of the original parties, the intervenor receives the benefit of tolling under sub. (2). Only a person having one of the three “constituent parts” of an original, timely cause of action under s. 803.03 (2) (a), i.e., subrogation, derivation, or assignment, may successfully intervene in a pending action without regard to the statute of limitations. Town of Burnside v. City of Independence, 2016 WI App 94, 372 Wis. 2d 802, 889 N.W.2d 186, 16-0034.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 36
cases (12 in the last 5 years), 1984–2025 · leading case: C. Coakley Relocation Sys., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68 (Wis. 2008).
C. Coakley Relocation Sys., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68 (Wis. 2008). “We further conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.13 (2) does not toll the two-year statute of limitations in this case.”
Johnson v. Cnty. of Crawford, 536 N.W.2d 167 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). “Section 893.13, STATS., provides in relevant part: (1) In this section and ss.”
Colby v. Columbia Cnty., 550 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. 1996). “1990), and had concluded that Wis. Stat. § 893.13 (2) tolled the running of a statute of limitations where the first complaint was defective because it was prematurely filed under Wis.”
Femala Fleming v. Amateur Athletic Union of the United States, Inc., 2023 WI 40 (Wis. 2023). “She also argues that Wis. Stat. § 893.13 tolls this deadline for "30 days from the date of final disposition" of Fleming's "action to enforce [her] cause of action.”
Colby v. Columbia Cnty., 531 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). “Columbia County argues that §893.13, Stats., does not operate to toll the statute of limitations because the filing and service of the first complaint did not constitute "the commencement of the action.”
Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, Inc., 2001 WI 86 (Wis. 2001). “55 (2) and (3), "statutes of limitation," Wis. Stat. § 893.13 (title), "statute of limitations," Wis.”
Fox v. Smith, 464 N.W.2d 845 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). “" Section 893.13(1), Stats. An action is commenced for statute-of-limitations purposes when, "as to each defendant,.”
State Ex Rel. Schatz v. McCaughtry, 2003 WI 80 (Wis. 2003). “Under Wis. Stat. § 893.13 (2), the statute of limitations will be tolled from the date the petitioner filed the original petition until the "final disposition" of the petition as defined in Wis.”
Kurt Van Engel Comm'n Co., Inc. v. Zingale, 2005 WI App 82 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005). “§ 893.13 provides in relevant part: Tolling of statutes of limitation .”
Barnes v. WISCO Hotel Grp., 2009 WI App 72 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009). “09 (3) (2007-08) 1 and because the statute of limitations was tolled under Wis. Stat. § 893.13 (2). Because the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in dismissing the plaintiffs added in the amended complaint, and because § 893.”
MBS-Certified Pub. Accountants, LLC v. Wisconsin Bell Inc., 2012 WI 15 (Wis. 2012). “2d 124 (1996) ("[W]e did not consider, and were not asked to consider [in a previous case], the impact of section 893.13(2), Stats. Our statement, although superficially supporting the City's position here, is thus not precedent.”
Donaldson v. West Bend Mut. Ins., 2009 WI App 134 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009). “54 , does not apply to counterclaims; (2) Berg's claim was timely because the tolling provisions of Wis. Stat. § 893.13 apply; and (3) Berg's claim was timely because the tolling provisions of Wis.”
— Wis. Stat. § 893.13(1) — 6 cases
Johnson v. Cnty. of Crawford, 536 N.W.2d 167 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). “Section 893.13, STATS., provides in relevant part: (1) In this section and ss.”
Fox v. Smith, 464 N.W.2d 845 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). “" Section 893.13(1), Stats. An action is commenced for statute-of-limitations purposes when, "as to each defendant,.”
Colby v. Columbia Cnty., 531 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). “Columbia County argues that §893.13, Stats., does not operate to toll the statute of limitations because the filing and service of the first complaint did not constitute "the commencement of the action.”
Holifield v. Rivamonte (E.D. Wis. 2022).
Jay Link v. John Link (Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
— Wis. Stat. § 893.13(2) — 17 cases
Johnson v. Cnty. of Crawford, 536 N.W.2d 167 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). “Section 893.13, STATS., provides in relevant part: (1) In this section and ss.”
C. Coakley Relocation Sys., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68 (Wis. 2008). “We further conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.13 (2) does not toll the two-year statute of limitations in this case.”
Fox v. Smith, 464 N.W.2d 845 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). “" Section 893.13(1), Stats. An action is commenced for statute-of-limitations purposes when, "as to each defendant,.”
Colby v. Columbia Cnty., 531 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). “Columbia County argues that §893.13, Stats., does not operate to toll the statute of limitations because the filing and service of the first complaint did not constitute "the commencement of the action.”
Kurt Van Engel Comm'n Co., Inc. v. Zingale, 2005 WI App 82 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005). “§ 893.13 provides in relevant part: Tolling of statutes of limitation .”
— Wis. Stat. § 893.13(3) — 5 cases
Colby v. Columbia Cnty., 550 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. 1996). “1990), and had concluded that Wis. Stat. § 893.13 (2) tolled the running of a statute of limitations where the first complaint was defective because it was prematurely filed under Wis.”
Colby v. Columbia Cnty., 531 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). “Columbia County argues that §893.13, Stats., does not operate to toll the statute of limitations because the filing and service of the first complaint did not constitute "the commencement of the action.”
McMillan-Warner Mut. Ins. v. Kauffman, 465 N.W.2d 201 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
Fox v. Smith, 464 N.W.2d 845 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). “" Section 893.13(1), Stats. An action is commenced for statute-of-limitations purposes when, "as to each defendant,.”
Holifield v. Rivamonte (E.D. Wis. 2022).
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