REPEALED BY ACT 2023-493, EFFECTIVE SEPTEMBER 1, 2023.
(a) A person commits the crime of making a terrorist threat when he or she credibly, based on an objective evaluation, threatens to commit a crime of violence against a person or to damage any property by use of a bomb, explosive, weapon of mass destruction, firearm, deadly weapon, or other mechanism and any of the following:
(1) The threat causes the evacuation of any real property, as defined under this section.
(2) The threat causes the disruption of school, church, or government activity.
(3) The threat is with intent to retaliate against the victim because of his or her involvement or participation as any of the following:
a. A witness or party in any judicial or administrative proceeding.
b. A person who produced records, documents, or other objects in a judicial or administrative proceeding.
c. A person who provided to a law enforcement officer, adult or juvenile probation officer, prosecuting attorney, or judge any information relating to the commission or possible commission of an offense under the laws of this state, of the United States, or a violation of conditions of bail, pretrial release, probation, or parole.
(b) As used in this section, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
(1) PROPERTY. Personal or real property. The term includes, but is not limited to, any of the following buildings or real property:
a. A church, mosque, synagogue, or other religious real property.
b. A public or private school.
(2) THREATEN. A person threatens another if all of the following occur:
a. The person intentionally and knowingly makes a statement verbally, in writing, by means of an electronic communication device, or by any other means to harm a person or property.
b. The statement is communicated to another person.
c. Under the circumstances, the threatened harm is credible and imminent.
d. The statement, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.
e. The statement causes the person to reasonably be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for the object of the threat.
(3) WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. Any of the following:
a. A destructive device as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921.
b. A weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals.
c. A weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector, as those terms are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 178.
d. A weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.
(c) The crime of making a terrorist threat is a Class C felony.
(Act 2000-807, p. 1919, §1; Act 2018-553, §1.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
14
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 2007–2026 · leading case:
Ex Parte Soto, 991 So. 2d 691 (Ala. 2008).
Ex Parte Soto, 991 So. 2d 691 (Ala. 2008).
· cites it 44× “Moreover, Soto did not address in her petition the finding by the *692 Court of Criminal Appeals, in its unpublished memorandum, that she failed to preserve her constitutional challenge to Ala.”
Lee Carrell v. United States (Revised Version), 165 A.3d 314 (D.C. 2017).
“Amicus Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project ("DVLEAP”) informs us that a number of other jurisdictions have enacted threats statutes that specify a mens rea of recklessness or reckless disregard.”
State v. Garner, 28 So. 3d 831 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).
· cites it 18× “The State of Alabama appeals from the pretrial dismissal of an indictment charging David Mark Garner with violating § 13A-10-15, Ala.Code 1975, for making a terrorist threat.”
P.J.B. v. State, 999 So. 2d 581 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).
· cites it 6× “does not argue that his statement about burning the field did not constitute a threat within the meaning of § 13A-10-15, Ala.Code 1975; therefore, we assume for purposes of this opinion that his statement was a threat under § 13A-10-15, Ala.”
Lansdell v. State, 25 So. 3d 1169 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007).
· cites it 2× “See § 13A-10-15(a)(1)a., Ala. Code 1975. As this Court has stated: *Page 1179 "[B]ecause intent is a state of mind, it is rarely susceptible of direct or positive proof.”
Murphy v. State, 108 So. 3d 531 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).
· cites it 2× “Code 1975; one count of making a terrorist threat, a violation of § 13A-10-15, Ala.Code 1975; and five counts of attempted murder, a violation of §§ 13A-4-2 and 13A-6-2, Ala.”
Ex Parte Lansdell, 25 So. 3d 1183 (Ala. 2009).
· cites it 2× “, concurring specially): "Structurally, syntactically, and grammatically, § 13A-10-15(a), Ala.Code 1975, is nonsensical.”
PJB v. State, 999 So. 2d 581 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).
· cites it 7× “does not argue that his statement about burning the field did not constitute a threat within the meaning of § 13A-10-15, Ala.Code 1975; therefore, we assume for purposes of this opinion that his statement was a threat under § 13A-10-15, Ala.”
Lansdell v. State, 25 So. 3d 1169 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007).
· cites it 14× “The appellant, Brandon Lee Lansdell, was convicted of one count of making a terrorist threat, a violation of § 13A-10-15, Ala.Code 1975. Because Lansdell had two prior felony convictions, he was sentenced pursuant to § 13A-5-9, Ala.”
D.G. v. State, 994 So. 2d 923 (Ala. 2008).
“, concurring specially): “Structurally, syntactically, and grammatically, § 13A-10-15(a), Ala.Code 1975, is nonsensical.”
M.C. v. State of Alabama (Ala. Crim. App. 2026).
· cites it 3× “Code 1975, and making a terrorist threat in the second degree, see § 13A-10-242, the offense at issue in this case.”
Smoak v. State, 186 So. 3d 493 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015).
· cites it 5× “Thomas Brian Smoak appeals from convictions for making a terrorist threat, see § 13A-10-15, AIa.Code 1975, and possession of a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm on the premises of a school, see § 13A-11-72, Ala.”
— Ala. Code § 13A-10-15(a) — 6 cases
Ex Parte Soto, 991 So. 2d 691 (Ala. 2008).
“Moreover, Soto did not address in her petition the finding by the *692 Court of Criminal Appeals, in its unpublished memorandum, that she failed to preserve her constitutional challenge to Ala.”
Ex Parte Lansdell, 25 So. 3d 1183 (Ala. 2009).
“, concurring specially): "Structurally, syntactically, and grammatically, § 13A-10-15(a), Ala.Code 1975, is nonsensical.”
State v. Garner, 28 So. 3d 831 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).
“The State of Alabama appeals from the pretrial dismissal of an indictment charging David Mark Garner with violating § 13A-10-15, Ala.Code 1975, for making a terrorist threat.”
D.G. v. State, 994 So. 2d 923 (Ala. 2008).
“, concurring specially): “Structurally, syntactically, and grammatically, § 13A-10-15(a), Ala.Code 1975, is nonsensical.”
— Ala. Code § 13A-10-15(a)(1) — 3 cases
Ex Parte Soto, 991 So. 2d 691 (Ala. 2008).
“Moreover, Soto did not address in her petition the finding by the *692 Court of Criminal Appeals, in its unpublished memorandum, that she failed to preserve her constitutional challenge to Ala.”
Lansdell v. State, 25 So. 3d 1169 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007).
“See § 13A-10-15(a)(1)a., Ala. Code 1975. As this Court has stated: *Page 1179 "[B]ecause intent is a state of mind, it is rarely susceptible of direct or positive proof.”
PJB v. State, 999 So. 2d 581 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).
“does not argue that his statement about burning the field did not constitute a threat within the meaning of § 13A-10-15, Ala.Code 1975; therefore, we assume for purposes of this opinion that his statement was a threat under § 13A-10-15, Ala.”
— Ala. Code § 13A-10-15(a)(l) — 4 cases
P.J.B. v. State, 999 So. 2d 581 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).
“does not argue that his statement about burning the field did not constitute a threat within the meaning of § 13A-10-15, Ala.Code 1975; therefore, we assume for purposes of this opinion that his statement was a threat under § 13A-10-15, Ala.”
State v. Garner, 28 So. 3d 831 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).
“The State of Alabama appeals from the pretrial dismissal of an indictment charging David Mark Garner with violating § 13A-10-15, Ala.Code 1975, for making a terrorist threat.”
Lansdell v. State, 25 So. 3d 1169 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007).
“The appellant, Brandon Lee Lansdell, was convicted of one count of making a terrorist threat, a violation of § 13A-10-15, Ala.Code 1975. Because Lansdell had two prior felony convictions, he was sentenced pursuant to § 13A-5-9, Ala.”
Smoak v. State, 186 So. 3d 493 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015).
“Thomas Brian Smoak appeals from convictions for making a terrorist threat, see § 13A-10-15, AIa.Code 1975, and possession of a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm on the premises of a school, see § 13A-11-72, Ala.”
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