(a) When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, such mental state is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless the context thereof indicates to the contrary.
(b) Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, an appropriate culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, states a crime of mental culpability.
(c) If a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts recklessly, knowingly or intentionally. If recklessness suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts knowingly and intentionally. If acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.
(Acts 1977, No. 607, p. 812, §315.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
23
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1984–2022 · leading case:
Ex Parte Edwards, 816 So. 2d 98 (Ala. 2001).
Ex Parte Edwards, 816 So. 2d 98 (Ala. 2001).
· cites it 7× “The commentary to § 13A-2-4 states, "An express statement is required in the statute defining the offense if strict liability is being imposed.”
Sullens v. State, 878 So. 2d 1216 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
· cites it 4× “) The Commentary to § 13A-2-4, Ala.Code 1975, states: "Subsection (b) explicitly states a policy adverse to arbitrary use of `strict liability' concepts.”
Scott v. State, 917 So. 2d 159 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).
· cites it 5× “" The commentary to § 13A-2-4, states, in relevant part, that "[s]ubsection (b) explicitly states a policy adverse to arbitrary use of `strict liability' concepts.”
Harrison v. State, 879 So. 2d 594 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
· cites it 5× “) The Commentary to § 13A-2-4, Ala.Code 1975, states: "`Subsection (b) explicitly states a policy adverse to arbitrary use of "strict liability" concepts.”
Kennedy v. State, 640 So. 2d 22 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
· cites it 2× “See Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-2-4(b), which provides: "Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, an appropriate culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of…”
McGuire v. Strange, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1231 (M.D. Ala. 2015).
· cites it 3× “2003) (finding that a criminal provision did not define a strict liability offense because the provision did "not expressly state that [the conduct was] a strict liability offense”); Ala. Code § 13A-2-4 cmt. (“Subsection (b) explicitly states a policy adverse to arbitrary use of…”
Ex Parte Knowles, 689 So. 2d 832 (Ala. 1997).
· cites it 3× “) The applicability of § 32-5A-192 to this vehicular accident raises this issue: Given the constitutional guarantee of due process, what level or degree of culpable conduct is necessary before a person can be imprisoned pursuant to this statute? In pertinent part, Ala.Code 1975,…”
Hunt v. State, 642 So. 2d 999 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
“According to § 13A-2-4(b), Code of Alabama 1975: "`Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, an appropriate culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of…”
Ex Parte Murry, 455 So. 2d 72 (Ala. 1984).
“Section 13A-2-4 provides in part as follows: "(a) When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, such mental state is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless the context thereof indicates to the contrary.”
Burnett v. State, 807 So. 2d 573 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).
· cites it 2× “In pertinent part, § 13A-2-4(b), Ala.Code 1975, provides: "Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, an appropriate culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or…”
Ex Parte Washington, 818 So. 2d 424 (Ala. 2001).
· cites it 2× “Section 13A-2-4 provides, in pertinent part: "(a) When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, such mental state is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless the context thereof indicates to the contrary.”
Ex Parte Miller, 41 So. 3d 54 (Ala. 2009).
· cites it 4× “See § 13A-2-4(b), Ala.Code 1975; Ex parte Edwards 816 So.”
Ala. Code § 13A-2-4(b): 19 cases
Ex Parte Edwards, 816 So. 2d 98 (Ala. 2001).
“The commentary to § 13A-2-4 states, "An express statement is required in the statute defining the offense if strict liability is being imposed.”
Kennedy v. State, 640 So. 2d 22 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
“See Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-2-4(b), which provides: "Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, an appropriate culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of…”
Harrison v. State, 879 So. 2d 594 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
“) The Commentary to § 13A-2-4, Ala.Code 1975, states: "`Subsection (b) explicitly states a policy adverse to arbitrary use of "strict liability" concepts.”
Sullens v. State, 878 So. 2d 1216 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
“) The Commentary to § 13A-2-4, Ala.Code 1975, states: "Subsection (b) explicitly states a policy adverse to arbitrary use of `strict liability' concepts.”
Scott v. State, 917 So. 2d 159 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).
“" The commentary to § 13A-2-4, states, in relevant part, that "[s]ubsection (b) explicitly states a policy adverse to arbitrary use of `strict liability' concepts.”
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