(a) Intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge, except as provided in subsection (c) of this section. However, intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, is admissible in evidence whenever it is relevant to negate an element of the offense charged.
(b) When recklessness establishes an element of an offense and the actor is unaware of a risk because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense.
(c) Involuntary intoxication is a defense to prosecution if as a result the actor lacks capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(d) Intoxication in itself does not constitute mental disease or defect within the meaning of Section 13A-3-1.
(e) In this section:
(1) “Intoxication” includes a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body.
(2) “Voluntary intoxication” means intoxication caused by substances that the actor knowingly introduced into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them under circumstances that would afford a defense to a charge of crime.
(Acts 1977, No. 607, p. 812, §505.)
Notes of Decisions
Donald Dwayne Whatley v. State of Alabama., 146 So. 3d 437 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
· cites it 4× “§ 13A-3-2. The degree of intoxication required to establish that a defendant was incapable of forming an intent to kill is a degree so extreme as to render it impossible for the defendant to form the intent to kill.”
Albarran v. State, 96 So. 3d 131 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
· cites it 3× “) Section 13A-3-2, Ala.Code 1975, specifically provides: “Intoxication in itself does not constitute mental disease or defect within the meaning of § 13A-3-1.”
Lam Luong v. State, 199 So. 3d 173 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016).
· cites it 3× “First, Luong argues that the circuit court’s instructions on intoxication were contrary to the law set out in § 13A-3-2, Ala.Code 1975. Specifically, Luong argues that the circuit court erroneously instructed the jury that to find that Luong’s intoxication negated his specific…”
Smith v. State, 246 So. 3d 1086 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017).
· cites it 3× “' Commentary to Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-3-2. Where the defendant is charged with a crime requiring specific intent and there is evidence of intoxication, ' "drunkenness, as affecting the mental state and condition of the accused, becomes a proper subject to be considered by the…”
Coon v. State, 494 So. 2d 184 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
· cites it 3× “Alabama Code 1975, § 13A-3-2(a). The requested charge is confusing and misleading because it in effect instructs the jury that they should find the defendant not guilty if they find (1) that he could not form the specific intent to damage a building, and (2) that he knew that…”
Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 1276 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).
· cites it 2× “§ 13A-3-2. The degree of intoxication required to establish that a defendant was incapable of forming an intent to kill is a degree so extreme as to render it impossible for the defendant to form the intent to kill.”
Williams v. State, 506 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
· cites it 3× “Code, 1975, § 13A-3-2 (Commentary). III There was no error in the court's disallowing the following question on cross-examination of a State's witness: "Would it surprise you to learn that [the victim] had a reputation for carrying a gun?" "The victim's bad general reputation…”
Sockwell v. State, 675 So. 2d 4 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
· cites it 2× “"`[D]runkenness due to liquor or drugs may render [a] defendant incapable of forming or entertaining a specific intent or some particular mental element that is essential to the crime.”
Jackson v. State, 791 So. 2d 979 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
· cites it 2× “§ 13A-3-2. The degree of intoxication required to establish that a defendant was incapable of forming an intent to kill is a degree so extreme as to render it impossible for the defendant to form the intent to kill.”
Whitehead v. State, 777 So. 2d 781 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).
· cites it 2× “§ 13A-3-2, Code of Alabama (1975) (Commentary).”
Hutcherson v. State, 677 So. 2d 1174 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
· cites it 2× “' Commentary to Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-3-2. Where the defendant is charged with a crime requiring specific intent and there is evidence of intoxication, `"drunkenness, as affecting the mental state and condition of the accused, becomes a proper subject to be considered by the jury…”
McWhorter v. State, 781 So. 2d 257 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).
· cites it 2× “§ 13A-3-2. The degree of intoxication required to establish that a defendant was incapable of forming an intent to kill is a degree so extreme as to render it impossible for the defendant to form the intent to kill.”
— Ala. Code § 13A-3-2(a) — 13 cases
Coon v. State, 494 So. 2d 184 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
“Alabama Code 1975, § 13A-3-2(a). The requested charge is confusing and misleading because it in effect instructs the jury that they should find the defendant not guilty if they find (1) that he could not form the specific intent to damage a building, and (2) that he knew that…”
Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 1276 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).
“§ 13A-3-2. The degree of intoxication required to establish that a defendant was incapable of forming an intent to kill is a degree so extreme as to render it impossible for the defendant to form the intent to kill.”
Albarran v. State, 96 So. 3d 131 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
“) Section 13A-3-2, Ala.Code 1975, specifically provides: “Intoxication in itself does not constitute mental disease or defect within the meaning of § 13A-3-1.”
Jackson v. State, 791 So. 2d 979 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
“§ 13A-3-2. The degree of intoxication required to establish that a defendant was incapable of forming an intent to kill is a degree so extreme as to render it impossible for the defendant to form the intent to kill.”
— Ala. Code § 13A-3-2(b) — 2 cases
Williams v. State, 506 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
“Code, 1975, § 13A-3-2 (Commentary). III There was no error in the court's disallowing the following question on cross-examination of a State's witness: "Would it surprise you to learn that [the victim] had a reputation for carrying a gun?" "The victim's bad general reputation…”
Leal, 26 I. & N. Dec. 20 (2012).
— Ala. Code § 13A-3-2(c) — 1 case
— Ala. Code § 13A-3-2(c)(1) — 1 case
— Ala. Code § 13A-3-2(c)(l) — 4 cases
— Ala. Code § 13A-3-2(d) — 4 cases
Albarran v. State, 96 So. 3d 131 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
“) Section 13A-3-2, Ala.Code 1975, specifically provides: “Intoxication in itself does not constitute mental disease or defect within the meaning of § 13A-3-1.”
Donald Dwayne Whatley v. State of Alabama., 146 So. 3d 437 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
“§ 13A-3-2. The degree of intoxication required to establish that a defendant was incapable of forming an intent to kill is a degree so extreme as to render it impossible for the defendant to form the intent to kill.”
— Ala. Code § 13A-3-2(e) — 3 cases
— Ala. Code § 13A-3-2(e)(1) — 11 cases
Smith v. State, 246 So. 3d 1086 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017).
“' Commentary to Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-3-2. Where the defendant is charged with a crime requiring specific intent and there is evidence of intoxication, ' "drunkenness, as affecting the mental state and condition of the accused, becomes a proper subject to be considered by the…”
— Ala. Code § 13A-3-2(e)(l) — 2 cases
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