Code of Alabama
Ala. Code § 32-5A-7 (2026)
Authorized Emergency Vehicles.
✓ official Alabama Legislature (ALISON) text, current July 2026
(a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions herein stated.
(b) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
(1) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter;
(2) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;
(3) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property;
(4) Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions.
(c) The exemptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle is making use of an audible signal meeting the requirements of Section 32-5-213 and visual requirements of any laws of this state requiring visual signals on emergency vehicles.
(d) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others.
(Acts 1980, No. 80-434, p. 604, §1-106.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 22
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1985–2025 · leading case: Whatley v. Higginbotham, 145 So. 3d 751 (Ala. 2013).
Whatley v. Higginbotham, 145 So. 3d 751 (Ala. 2013). “Specifically, the petitioners argued that Coleman was entitled to State-agent immunity because he was acting in *754 accordance with § 32-5A-7, Ala.Code 1975, which states, in pertinent part: “(a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency…”
Williams v. City of Midfield, 161 So. 3d 1158 (Ala. 2014). “Brown were acting “beyond their authority” by violating various provisions of the department’s vehicle-pursuit and emergency-response policy (“the policy”) and § 32-5A-7, Ala.Code 1975. As noted previously, “ ‘a plaintiff can show that a State agent acted beyond his or her…”
Kendrick v. City of Midfield, 203 So. 3d 1200 (Ala. 2016). “Specifically, Kendrick contends that Wor-dell acted beyond his authority based on the conditions provided in § 32-5A-7, Ala. Code 1975, for operating an emergency vehicle.”
Suttles v. Roy, 75 So. 3d 90 (Ala. 2010). “Code 1975, § 6-5-338(a) and § 32-5A-7(b)(3)). The existence of a genuine issue of material fact may require a factual issue to be determined by a jury, “under appropriate instructions from the trial court,” Blackwood, 936 So.”
Blackwood v. City of Hanceville, 936 So. 2d 495 (Ala. 2006). “"Although [the officer] did have the discretion to decide whether he would drive in excess of the speed limit, once he made that decision he did not have the discretion to further decide whether he would comply with the audible and visual signal requirements of § 32-5A-7(c)."…”
Smith v. Bradford, 512 So. 2d 50 (Ala. 1987). “The determinative issue before this Court is whether, in the second trial, the court erred in admitting into evidence testimony as to the defendant's training and instruction in "catch-up" driving, when that driving practice is directly contrary to Code 1975, § 32-5A-7(c). We…”
Frank v. Shavers (In re City of Montgomery), 272 So. 3d 155 (Ala. 2018). “Frank contended that Shavers had not complied with § 32-5A-7 and § 32-5A-115, Ala. Code 1975, regarding emergency vehicles and, thus, that neither Shavers nor the City was entitled to immunity.”
Cupps v. Mitchell, 182 So. 3d 495 (Ala. 2015). “Next; Cupps contends that the trial court properly denied Officer Brown’s summary-judgment motion because, she says, Officer Brown’s conduct violated § 32-5A-7, Ala.Code 1975, and a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether that violation excepts him from State-agent…”
N.C. v. Caldwell, 77 So. 3d 561 (Ala. 2011). “Code 1975, § 6-5-338(a) and § 32-5A-7(b)(3)).” Suttles v. Roy, 75 So.”
Seals v. City of Columbia, 641 So. 2d 1247 (Ala. 1994). “See § 32-5A-7, [Ala.Code 1975], and Madison v.”
Frank v. Shavers (In re City of Montgomery), 272 So. 3d 155 (Ala. 2018). “Frank contended that Shavers had not complied with § 32-5A-7 and § 32-5A-115, Ala. Code 1975, regarding emergency vehicles and, thus, that neither Shavers nor the City was entitled to immunity.”
Sprinkle ex rel. Philyaw v. Edwards, 848 So. 2d 217 (Ala. 2002). “Section 32-5A-7 permits drivers of authorized emergency vehicles to take certain privileges with regard to the rules of the road when answering an emergency call or when pursuing a suspect.”
— Ala. Code § 32-5A-7(a) — 5 cases
Whatley v. Higginbotham, 145 So. 3d 751 (Ala. 2013). “Specifically, the petitioners argued that Coleman was entitled to State-agent immunity because he was acting in *754 accordance with § 32-5A-7, Ala.Code 1975, which states, in pertinent part: “(a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency…”
Kendrick v. City of Midfield, 203 So. 3d 1200 (Ala. 2016). “Specifically, Kendrick contends that Wor-dell acted beyond his authority based on the conditions provided in § 32-5A-7, Ala. Code 1975, for operating an emergency vehicle.”
Frank v. Shavers (In re City of Montgomery), 272 So. 3d 155 (Ala. 2018). “Frank contended that Shavers had not complied with § 32-5A-7 and § 32-5A-115, Ala. Code 1975, regarding emergency vehicles and, thus, that neither Shavers nor the City was entitled to immunity.”
Frank v. Shavers (In re City of Montgomery), 272 So. 3d 155 (Ala. 2018). “Frank contended that Shavers had not complied with § 32-5A-7 and § 32-5A-115, Ala. Code 1975, regarding emergency vehicles and, thus, that neither Shavers nor the City was entitled to immunity.”
— Ala. Code § 32-5A-7(b) — 1 case
Williams v. City of Midfield, 161 So. 3d 1158 (Ala. 2014). “Brown were acting “beyond their authority” by violating various provisions of the department’s vehicle-pursuit and emergency-response policy (“the policy”) and § 32-5A-7, Ala.Code 1975. As noted previously, “ ‘a plaintiff can show that a State agent acted beyond his or her…”
— Ala. Code § 32-5A-7(b)(2) — 3 cases
Frank v. Shavers (In re City of Montgomery), 272 So. 3d 155 (Ala. 2018). “Frank contended that Shavers had not complied with § 32-5A-7 and § 32-5A-115, Ala. Code 1975, regarding emergency vehicles and, thus, that neither Shavers nor the City was entitled to immunity.”
Frank v. Shavers (In re City of Montgomery), 272 So. 3d 155 (Ala. 2018). “Frank contended that Shavers had not complied with § 32-5A-7 and § 32-5A-115, Ala. Code 1975, regarding emergency vehicles and, thus, that neither Shavers nor the City was entitled to immunity.”
— Ala. Code § 32-5A-7(b)(3) — 8 cases
Suttles v. Roy, 75 So. 3d 90 (Ala. 2010). “Code 1975, § 6-5-338(a) and § 32-5A-7(b)(3)). The existence of a genuine issue of material fact may require a factual issue to be determined by a jury, “under appropriate instructions from the trial court,” Blackwood, 936 So.”
N.C. v. Caldwell, 77 So. 3d 561 (Ala. 2011). “Code 1975, § 6-5-338(a) and § 32-5A-7(b)(3)).” Suttles v. Roy, 75 So.”
Cupps v. Mitchell, 182 So. 3d 495 (Ala. 2015). “Next; Cupps contends that the trial court properly denied Officer Brown’s summary-judgment motion because, she says, Officer Brown’s conduct violated § 32-5A-7, Ala.Code 1975, and a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether that violation excepts him from State-agent…”
City of Thomasville v. Tate, 175 So. 3d 663 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015).
Frank v. Shavers (In re City of Montgomery), 272 So. 3d 155 (Ala. 2018). “Frank contended that Shavers had not complied with § 32-5A-7 and § 32-5A-115, Ala. Code 1975, regarding emergency vehicles and, thus, that neither Shavers nor the City was entitled to immunity.”
— Ala. Code § 32-5A-7(c) — 10 cases
Whatley v. Higginbotham, 145 So. 3d 751 (Ala. 2013). “Specifically, the petitioners argued that Coleman was entitled to State-agent immunity because he was acting in *754 accordance with § 32-5A-7, Ala.Code 1975, which states, in pertinent part: “(a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency…”
Blackwood v. City of Hanceville, 936 So. 2d 495 (Ala. 2006). “"Although [the officer] did have the discretion to decide whether he would drive in excess of the speed limit, once he made that decision he did not have the discretion to further decide whether he would comply with the audible and visual signal requirements of § 32-5A-7(c)."…”
Smith v. Bradford, 512 So. 2d 50 (Ala. 1987). “The determinative issue before this Court is whether, in the second trial, the court erred in admitting into evidence testimony as to the defendant's training and instruction in "catch-up" driving, when that driving practice is directly contrary to Code 1975, § 32-5A-7(c). We…”
Williams v. City of Midfield, 161 So. 3d 1158 (Ala. 2014). “Brown were acting “beyond their authority” by violating various provisions of the department’s vehicle-pursuit and emergency-response policy (“the policy”) and § 32-5A-7, Ala.Code 1975. As noted previously, “ ‘a plaintiff can show that a State agent acted beyond his or her…”
Kendrick v. City of Midfield, 203 So. 3d 1200 (Ala. 2016). “Specifically, Kendrick contends that Wor-dell acted beyond his authority based on the conditions provided in § 32-5A-7, Ala. Code 1975, for operating an emergency vehicle.”
— Ala. Code § 32-5A-7(d) — 4 cases
Frank v. Shavers (In re City of Montgomery), 272 So. 3d 155 (Ala. 2018). “Frank contended that Shavers had not complied with § 32-5A-7 and § 32-5A-115, Ala. Code 1975, regarding emergency vehicles and, thus, that neither Shavers nor the City was entitled to immunity.”
Frank v. Shavers (In re City of Montgomery), 272 So. 3d 155 (Ala. 2018). “Frank contended that Shavers had not complied with § 32-5A-7 and § 32-5A-115, Ala. Code 1975, regarding emergency vehicles and, thus, that neither Shavers nor the City was entitled to immunity.”
Dunn v. Wharton, 852 So. 2d 113 (Ala. 2002).
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