Code of Alabama
Ala. Code § 6-2-30 (2026)
Commencement of Actions - Generally; Actions for Injuries Resulting from Exposure to Asbestos.
✓ official Alabama Legislature (ALISON) text, current July 2026
(a) All civil actions must be commenced after the cause of action has accrued within the period prescribed in this article and not afterwards, unless otherwise specifically provided for in this code.
(b) A civil action for any injury to the person or rights of another resulting from exposure to asbestos, including asbestos-containing products, shall be deemed to accrue on the first date the injured party, through reasonable diligence, should have reason to discover the injury giving rise to such civil action. This subsection shall not apply to or affect in any way, actions referred to in Section 6-5-482.
(Code 1852, §2474; Code 1867, §2898; Code 1876, §3223; Code 1886, §2612; Code 1896, §2793; Code 1907, §4832; Code 1923, §8941; Code 1940, T. 7, §18; Acts 1980, No. 80-566, p. 876, §2.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 31
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1979–2024 · leading case: Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So. 2d 291 (Ala. 2008).
Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So. 2d 291 (Ala. 2008). “Then, as now, § 6-2-30, Ala.Code 1975, required that all civil actions must be commenced within the statutorily prescribed limitations period "after the cause of action has accrued " (emphasis supplied).”
Cline v. Ashland, Inc., 970 So. 2d 755 (Ala. 2007). “Then, as now, § 6-2-30, Ala.Code 1975, required that all civil actions must be commenced within the statutorily prescribed limitations period "after the cause of action has accrued " (emphasis supplied).”
Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1998). “However, Haussecker testified at a deposition in January 1969 to the facts recited in this opinion.”
Walker v. Capstone Bldg. Corp., 96 So. 3d 77 (Ala. 2012). “In this regard, the specific issue presented in Foremost was when a fraud cause of action "accrued” under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-30(a), so as to trigger the running of the limitations period of § 6-2-38(Z).”
Henderson v. MeadWestvaco Corp., 23 So. 3d 625 (Ala. 2009). “, supra, this Court explained: *630 "Until May 18, 1980, § 6-2-30 of the Alabama Code of 1975, and Garrett v.”
Ex Parte Panell, 756 So. 2d 862 (Ala. 1999). “Before 1987, the time within which a plaintiff could file a legal-malpractice action was governed by Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-30 and § 6-2-34. Section 6-2-30 provides in pertinent part: "(a) All civil actions must be commenced after the cause of action has accrued within the period…”
Tuscumbia City Sch. Sys. v. Pharmacia Corp., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (N.D. Ala. 2012). “Again, the court believes that, by this language, the legislature was describing its primary concern, but not excluding other victims of asbestos exposure.”
Coilplus-Alabama, Inc. v. Vann, 53 So. 3d 898 (Ala. 2010). “Also, in an appendix to Griffin, 4 Justice Harwood discussed the legislature’s right to prescribe different statutes of limitations for different actions, recognizing the ALSLA is one of those statutes: “The proper construction of the term ‘accrued’ in § 6-2-30(a)[, Ala.Code…”
Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n v. Edwards, 32 So. 3d 572 (Ala. 2009). “Pursuant to our endorsement in Lyles of Justice Scalia's view that prospective-only application of a constitutional principle "does not make sense," we decline to give BJCCA prospective application only.”
S. Bakeries, Inc. v. Knipp, 852 So. 2d 712 (Ala. 2002). “There is also a concern that if [they have] to wait there is no guarantee that [SBI] will be around to bring an action against even if [they] can otherwise satisfy the requirements of the Code of Alabama, Section 6-2-30, and other statutes of limitations.”
Blannie S. Wilson, Adm'x of the Est. of Henry J. Wilson, Deceased v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982). “80-566, 1980 Alabama Acts (amending Ala.Code § 6-2-30 (1975) ). However, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the Alabama Constitution prohibited retroactive application of this statute to claims which had become time-barred prior to the statute’s effective date.”
Garrett v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979). “" This statute is, of course, read in conjunction with § 6-2-30, Code Ala.1975, which states: "All civil actions must be commenced after the cause of action has accrued within the period prescribed in this article and not afterwards, unless otherwise specifically provided for in…”
— Ala. Code § 6-2-30(a) — 9 cases
Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So. 2d 291 (Ala. 2008). “Then, as now, § 6-2-30, Ala.Code 1975, required that all civil actions must be commenced within the statutorily prescribed limitations period "after the cause of action has accrued " (emphasis supplied).”
Cline v. Ashland, Inc., 970 So. 2d 755 (Ala. 2007). “Then, as now, § 6-2-30, Ala.Code 1975, required that all civil actions must be commenced within the statutorily prescribed limitations period "after the cause of action has accrued " (emphasis supplied).”
Walker v. Capstone Bldg. Corp., 96 So. 3d 77 (Ala. 2012). “In this regard, the specific issue presented in Foremost was when a fraud cause of action "accrued” under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-30(a), so as to trigger the running of the limitations period of § 6-2-38(Z).”
Coilplus-Alabama, Inc. v. Vann, 53 So. 3d 898 (Ala. 2010). “Also, in an appendix to Griffin, 4 Justice Harwood discussed the legislature’s right to prescribe different statutes of limitations for different actions, recognizing the ALSLA is one of those statutes: “The proper construction of the term ‘accrued’ in § 6-2-30(a)[, Ala.Code…”
Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n v. Edwards, 32 So. 3d 572 (Ala. 2009). “Pursuant to our endorsement in Lyles of Justice Scalia's view that prospective-only application of a constitutional principle "does not make sense," we decline to give BJCCA prospective application only.”
— Ala. Code § 6-2-30(b) — 11 cases
Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So. 2d 291 (Ala. 2008). “Then, as now, § 6-2-30, Ala.Code 1975, required that all civil actions must be commenced within the statutorily prescribed limitations period "after the cause of action has accrued " (emphasis supplied).”
Cline v. Ashland, Inc., 970 So. 2d 755 (Ala. 2007). “Then, as now, § 6-2-30, Ala.Code 1975, required that all civil actions must be commenced within the statutorily prescribed limitations period "after the cause of action has accrued " (emphasis supplied).”
Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1998). “However, Haussecker testified at a deposition in January 1969 to the facts recited in this opinion.”
Beasley v. Alabama State Univ., 966 F. Supp. 1117 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
Tuscumbia City Sch. Sys. v. Pharmacia Corp., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (N.D. Ala. 2012). “Again, the court believes that, by this language, the legislature was describing its primary concern, but not excluding other victims of asbestos exposure.”
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