Alaska Statutes
Alaska Stat. § 33.16.220 (2026)
Revocation of parole
✓ current as of July 2026
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Sec. 33.16.220. Revocation of parole.
(a) The board may revoke parole if the prisoner or parolee (1) engages in conduct in violation of AS 33.16.150(a), (b), or (f), or (2) has violated an order of the court to participate in or comply with the treatment plan of a rehabilitation program under AS 12.55.015(a)(10). Mandatory parole may be revoked before a prisoner's actual release on parole.
(b) Except as provided in (e) of this section, within 15 working days after the arrest and incarceration of a parolee for violation of a condition of parole, the board or its designee shall hold a preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing, the board or its designee shall determine if there is probable cause to believe that the parolee violated the conditions of parole and, when probable cause exists, whether the parolee should be released pending a final revocation hearing. A finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing in a criminal case is conclusive proof of probable cause that a parole violation occurred.
(c) In determining whether a parole violator should be released pending a final revocation hearing, the board or its designee shall consider
(1) the likelihood of the parolee's appearance at a final revocation hearing;
(2) the seriousness of the alleged violation;
(3) whether the parolee presents a danger to the community;
(4) whether the parolee is likely to further violate conditions of parole; and
(5) whether the parolee is on parole for a crime involving domestic violence; if the violation of the condition of parole involved an act of domestic violence, the parolee may not be released pending the final revocation hearing.
(d) If the parole violator is released pending a final revocation hearing, the board or its designee may impose additional conditions necessary to ensure the parolee's appearance at the final revocation hearing, and to prevent further violation of conditions of parole.
(e) A preliminary hearing under (b) of this section is not required if the board holds a final revocation hearing within 20 working days after the parolee's arrest and incarceration.
(f) If a parolee has had a preliminary hearing under (b) of this section, the board shall hold a final revocation hearing not later than 120 days after a parolee's arrest, subject to restrictions arising under AS 33.36.110 and (g) of this section.
(g) When the basis for the revocation proceeding is a criminal charge, the parolee may request, or the board upon its own motion may propose, that further proceedings on the revocation be delayed. In making the determination to delay further proceedings, the board shall consider prejudice that may result to the parolee's and the state's interests in the pending criminal case and the parolee's decision to delay final revocation proceedings. If good cause to proceed is found, the board shall consult with the attorney general before continuing the final revocation proceeding.
(h) At a final revocation hearing, a violation of a condition of parole must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
(i) If, after the final revocation hearing, the board finds that the parolee has violated a condition of parole imposed under AS 33.16.150(a), (b), or (f), or a law or ordinance, the board may revoke all or a portion of the remaining period of parole or change any condition of parole. A parolee's period of parole is tolled from the date of filing with the parole board of a violation report until the date of the final revocation hearing.
(j) [Repealed, § 138 ch 4 FSSLA 2019.]
(a) The board may revoke parole if the prisoner or parolee (1) engages in conduct in violation of AS 33.16.150(a), (b), or (f), or (2) has violated an order of the court to participate in or comply with the treatment plan of a rehabilitation program under AS 12.55.015(a)(10). Mandatory parole may be revoked before a prisoner's actual release on parole.
(b) Except as provided in (e) of this section, within 15 working days after the arrest and incarceration of a parolee for violation of a condition of parole, the board or its designee shall hold a preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing, the board or its designee shall determine if there is probable cause to believe that the parolee violated the conditions of parole and, when probable cause exists, whether the parolee should be released pending a final revocation hearing. A finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing in a criminal case is conclusive proof of probable cause that a parole violation occurred.
(c) In determining whether a parole violator should be released pending a final revocation hearing, the board or its designee shall consider
(1) the likelihood of the parolee's appearance at a final revocation hearing;
(2) the seriousness of the alleged violation;
(3) whether the parolee presents a danger to the community;
(4) whether the parolee is likely to further violate conditions of parole; and
(5) whether the parolee is on parole for a crime involving domestic violence; if the violation of the condition of parole involved an act of domestic violence, the parolee may not be released pending the final revocation hearing.
(d) If the parole violator is released pending a final revocation hearing, the board or its designee may impose additional conditions necessary to ensure the parolee's appearance at the final revocation hearing, and to prevent further violation of conditions of parole.
(e) A preliminary hearing under (b) of this section is not required if the board holds a final revocation hearing within 20 working days after the parolee's arrest and incarceration.
(f) If a parolee has had a preliminary hearing under (b) of this section, the board shall hold a final revocation hearing not later than 120 days after a parolee's arrest, subject to restrictions arising under AS 33.36.110 and (g) of this section.
(g) When the basis for the revocation proceeding is a criminal charge, the parolee may request, or the board upon its own motion may propose, that further proceedings on the revocation be delayed. In making the determination to delay further proceedings, the board shall consider prejudice that may result to the parolee's and the state's interests in the pending criminal case and the parolee's decision to delay final revocation proceedings. If good cause to proceed is found, the board shall consult with the attorney general before continuing the final revocation proceeding.
(h) At a final revocation hearing, a violation of a condition of parole must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
(i) If, after the final revocation hearing, the board finds that the parolee has violated a condition of parole imposed under AS 33.16.150(a), (b), or (f), or a law or ordinance, the board may revoke all or a portion of the remaining period of parole or change any condition of parole. A parolee's period of parole is tolled from the date of filing with the parole board of a violation report until the date of the final revocation hearing.
(j) [Repealed, § 138 ch 4 FSSLA 2019.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1991–2026 · leading case: Jacob Roller v. State of Alaska, 539 P.3d 518 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023).
Jacob Roller v. State of Alaska, 539 P.3d 518 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023). “”22 The result is that the original “maximum release date” on a sentence is the date projected for the 19 Former AS 33.16.220 (pre-July 2016); 22 AAC 20.275.”
State, Dep't of Corr. v. Cowles, 151 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2006). “It is unclear whether the complaint alleges that the parole officer as well as the parole board failed to impose appropriate parole conditions on McGrew.”
Raymond E. Hill v. State of Alaska, 297 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002). “Alaska Stat. § 33.16.220 (i); Hill, 22 P.”
Hill v. State, 22 P.3d 24 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). “See AS 33.16.220(i). This statute reads: "If, after the final revocation hearing, the [parole] board finds that the parolee has violated a condition of parole imposed under AS 33.”
Covington v. State, 938 P.2d 1085 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). “Covington asserts that the parole board violated his procedural due process rights by holding the final revocation hearing 131 days after Covington’s arrest, in violation of the 120-day period provided by AS 33.16.220(f). Alaska Statute 33.16.220(f) provides: The board shall…”
State v. Stores, 816 P.2d 206 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991). “150; AS 33.16.220(a). When there is probable cause to believe that a parole condition has been violated, the parole board has the authority to issue a warrant for the parolee’s arrest.”
David Middleton II v. State of Alaska, 556 P.3d 276 (Alaska Ct. App. 2024). “1 More specifically, Middleton argues that the 2016 amendment to AS 33.16.220(i) applied retroactively,2 rendering DOC’s 2015 action, which resulted in an extension of his maximum release date, unlawful.”
Demitri Kardem Scott v. State of Alaska (Alaska Ct. App. 2026). “3 See AS 33.16.220(i) (providing if “the board finds that the parolee has violated a condition of parole .”
Webb v. Alaska Dep't of Corr., 963 P.2d 1074 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). “Under AS 33.16.220(a)(2), the Parole Board is authorized to revoke a person’s parole if the person “has violated an order of the court [under AS 12.”
Gwalthney v. State, 964 P.2d 1285 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). “7 The legislature also amended AS 33.16.220(a) to explicitly empower the Parole Board to revoke a defendant’s parole if the defendant “has violated an order of the court to participate in or comply with the treatment plan of a rehabilitation program under AS 12.”
— Alaska Stat. § 33.16.220(a) — 2 cases
State v. Stores, 816 P.2d 206 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991). “150; AS 33.16.220(a). When there is probable cause to believe that a parole condition has been violated, the parole board has the authority to issue a warrant for the parolee’s arrest.”
Gwalthney v. State, 964 P.2d 1285 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). “7 The legislature also amended AS 33.16.220(a) to explicitly empower the Parole Board to revoke a defendant’s parole if the defendant “has violated an order of the court to participate in or comply with the treatment plan of a rehabilitation program under AS 12.”
— Alaska Stat. § 33.16.220(a)(2) — 2 cases
Webb v. Alaska Dep't of Corr., 963 P.2d 1074 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). “Under AS 33.16.220(a)(2), the Parole Board is authorized to revoke a person’s parole if the person “has violated an order of the court [under AS 12.”
Gwalthney v. State, 964 P.2d 1285 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). “7 The legislature also amended AS 33.16.220(a) to explicitly empower the Parole Board to revoke a defendant’s parole if the defendant “has violated an order of the court to participate in or comply with the treatment plan of a rehabilitation program under AS 12.”
— Alaska Stat. § 33.16.220(f) — 1 case
Covington v. State, 938 P.2d 1085 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). “Covington asserts that the parole board violated his procedural due process rights by holding the final revocation hearing 131 days after Covington’s arrest, in violation of the 120-day period provided by AS 33.16.220(f). Alaska Statute 33.16.220(f) provides: The board shall…”
— Alaska Stat. § 33.16.220(g) — 1 case
Covington v. State, 938 P.2d 1085 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). “Covington asserts that the parole board violated his procedural due process rights by holding the final revocation hearing 131 days after Covington’s arrest, in violation of the 120-day period provided by AS 33.16.220(f). Alaska Statute 33.16.220(f) provides: The board shall…”
— Alaska Stat. § 33.16.220(i) — 4 cases
Jacob Roller v. State of Alaska, 539 P.3d 518 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023). “”22 The result is that the original “maximum release date” on a sentence is the date projected for the 19 Former AS 33.16.220 (pre-July 2016); 22 AAC 20.275.”
Hill v. State, 22 P.3d 24 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). “See AS 33.16.220(i). This statute reads: "If, after the final revocation hearing, the [parole] board finds that the parolee has violated a condition of parole imposed under AS 33.”
David Middleton II v. State of Alaska, 556 P.3d 276 (Alaska Ct. App. 2024). “1 More specifically, Middleton argues that the 2016 amendment to AS 33.16.220(i) applied retroactively,2 rendering DOC’s 2015 action, which resulted in an extension of his maximum release date, unlawful.”
Demitri Kardem Scott v. State of Alaska (Alaska Ct. App. 2026). “3 See AS 33.16.220(i) (providing if “the board finds that the parolee has violated a condition of parole .”
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