12-820.05. Other immunities
(Eff. until 1/1/28)
A. Except as specifically provided in this article, this article does not affect, alter or otherwise modify any other rules of tort immunity regarding public entities and public officers as developed at common law and as established under the statutes and the constitution of this state.
B. A public entity is not liable for losses that arise out of and are directly attributable to an act or omission determined by a court to be a criminal felony by a public employee unless the public entity knew of the public employee's propensity for that action. This subsection does not apply to acts or omissions arising out of either of the following:
1. The operation or use of a motor vehicle.
2. A sexual offense if the victim is a minor or a child with a disability as defined in section 15-761 and either of the following conditions exist:
(a) The public entity was in violation of a statutory duty relating to obtaining information regarding the background of employees.
(b) The public entity or public employee had a statutory duty to report and failed to do so.
C. A public entity is not liable for damages as a result of an injury caused by any act or omission by a public officer who renders emergency care gratuitously and in good faith in a public building, at a public gathering on the grounds of a public building or at the scene of an emergency occurrence or as the result of any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured person, unless the public officer, while rendering the emergency care, is guilty of gross negligence.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
29
cases (
16 in the last 5 years), 1997–2025 · leading case:
McGrath v. Scott, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Ariz. 2003).
McGrath v. Scott, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Ariz. 2003).
· cites it 22× “(a) Immunity Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B) Plaintiffs third cause of action alleges assault and battery against (1) Scott directly and (2) the State under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”
Tucson Unified Sch. Dist. v. Borek, 322 P.3d 181 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 15× “¶ 10 Finally, we explained that, “when the legislature has chosen to employ a standard of actual or constructive knowledge, it has expressly so stated,” citing numerous examples.”
Susan Ryan v. napier/klein, 425 P.3d 230 (Ariz. 2018).
· cites it 3× “¶23 We are further persuaded because permitting negligence liability to rest on an officer's internal evaluation of the need for intentionally inflicted force could permit plaintiffs to "plead around" statutory provisions that apply only to intentional tort claims. ¶24 First, a…”
Gallagher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 349 P.3d 228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 17× “They argue the court erred by concluding A.R.S. § 12-820.05 provided TUSD immunity “for its own negligence with respect to the hiring and supervision of [its employee,] Michael Corum.”
Doe v. Dickenson, 615 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (D. Ariz. 2009).
· cites it 7× “” Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-820.05(B). Liability stemming from knowledge of an employee’s propensity to engage in felonious action is a “limited exception” to this statutory grant of municipal immunity.”
Spooner v. Phoenix, 435 P.3d 462 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 2× “” See A.R.S. § 12-820.05(A); see also Clouse ex rel.”
Fidelty Sec. Life Ins. v. State, 935 P.2d 861 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 4× “§ 12-820.01 provides absolute immunity for certain governmental functions.”
Marcie Redgrave v. Doug Ducey, 953 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2020).
“See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-820.05 (A) (stating that the Public Entities Act “shall not be construed to affect, alter or otherwise modify any other rules of tort immunity regarding public entities and public officers as developed at common law and as established under the statutes…”
Betancourt v. Phoenix (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 15× “Law-of-the-Case Doctrine ¶11 Betancourt argues the superior court previously found that A.R.S. § 12-820.05 does not apply when it denied the City’s motion to dismiss.”
Mesa v. Hon. driggs/charon (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024).
· cites it 15× “DRIGGS/CHARON Decision of the Court propensity to commit aggravated assault, the City argued that A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B) granted them immunity and barred Charon’s suit.”
Adame v. Surprise, City of (D. Ariz. 2021).
· cites it 12× “11 §12-820.05’s vehicle exception in light of similar language in Arizona insurance statutes 12 to require a causal connection between the vehicle and injury at issue); Garcia v.”
Mosher v. Mesa, City of (D. Ariz. 2024).
· cites it 11× “26, 2008) (finding “a felony conviction [was] not a 23 prerequisite to application of the immunity provided by A.R.S. § 12-820.05” and that “the trial court did not err in determining that [] claims for battery and false arrest/imprisonment, 24 as alleged in [the] complaint .”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-820.05(A) — 5 cases
Spooner v. Phoenix, 435 P.3d 462 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
“” See A.R.S. § 12-820.05(A); see also Clouse ex rel.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-820.05(B) — 20 cases
McGrath v. Scott, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Ariz. 2003).
“(a) Immunity Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B) Plaintiffs third cause of action alleges assault and battery against (1) Scott directly and (2) the State under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”
Tucson Unified Sch. Dist. v. Borek, 322 P.3d 181 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
“¶ 10 Finally, we explained that, “when the legislature has chosen to employ a standard of actual or constructive knowledge, it has expressly so stated,” citing numerous examples.”
Susan Ryan v. napier/klein, 425 P.3d 230 (Ariz. 2018).
“¶23 We are further persuaded because permitting negligence liability to rest on an officer's internal evaluation of the need for intentionally inflicted force could permit plaintiffs to "plead around" statutory provisions that apply only to intentional tort claims. ¶24 First, a…”
Gallagher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 349 P.3d 228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
“They argue the court erred by concluding A.R.S. § 12-820.05 provided TUSD immunity “for its own negligence with respect to the hiring and supervision of [its employee,] Michael Corum.”
Doe v. Dickenson, 615 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (D. Ariz. 2009).
“” Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-820.05(B). Liability stemming from knowledge of an employee’s propensity to engage in felonious action is a “limited exception” to this statutory grant of municipal immunity.”
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