A. It is unlawful for a person to knowingly terrify, intimidate, threaten or harass a specific person or persons by doing any of the following:
1. Directing any obscene, lewd or profane language or suggesting any lewd or lascivious act to the person in an electronic communication.
2. Threatening to inflict physical harm on any person or to property in any electronic communication.
3. Otherwise disturbing by repeated anonymous, unwanted or unsolicited electronic communications the peace, quiet or right of privacy of the person at the place where the communications were received.
4. Without the person's consent and for the purpose of imminently causing the person unwanted physical contact, injury or harassment by a third party, use an electronic communication device to electronically distribute, publish, email, hyperlink or make available for downloading the person's personal identifying information, including a digital image of the person, and the use does in fact incite or produce that unwanted physical contact, injury or harassment. This paragraph also applies to a person who intends to terrify, intimidate, threaten or harass an immediate family member of the person whose personal identifying information is used.
B. Any offense committed by use of an electronic communication in violation of this section is deemed to have been committed at either the place where the communications originated or at the place where the communications were received.
C. This section does not apply to:
1. Constitutionally protected speech or activity or to any other activity authorized by law.
2. An interactive computer service, as defined in 47 United States Code section 230(f)(2), or to an information service or telecommunications service, as defined in 47 United States Code section 153, for content that is provided by another person.
D. A person who violates this section is guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor.
E. For the purposes of this section:
1. "Electronic communication" means a social media post, a wire line, cable, wireless or cellular telephone call, a text message, an instant message or electronic mail.
2. "Electronic communication device" includes a telephone, mobile telephone, computer, internet website, internet telephone, hybrid cellular, internet or wireless device, personal digital assistant, video recorder, fax machine or pager.
3. "Harassment" means a knowing and wilful course of conduct that is directed at a specific person, that a reasonable person would consider as seriously alarming, seriously disruptive, seriously tormenting or seriously terrorizing the person and that serves no legitimate purpose.
4. "Personal identifying information":
(a) Means information that would allow the identified person to be located, contacted or harassed.
(b) Includes the person's home address, work address, phone number, email address or other contact information that would allow the identified person to be located, contacted or harassed.
5. "Social media post" means a social media communication that is knowingly intended to communicate to a specific person or persons in violation of subsection A of this section.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
9
cases (
5 in the last 5 years), 1987–2026 · leading case:
State v. Brown, 85 P.3d 109 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Brown, 85 P.3d 109 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 2× “§ 13-895 (since renumbered A.R.S. § 13-2916), which provided: It shall be unlawful for any person, with intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy or offend, to telephone another and use any obscene, lewd or profane language or suggest any lewd or lascivious act, or…”
State v. City Court of Tucson, 760 P.2d 599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 2× “Rife was denied a jury trial after being charged with three counts of unlawful use of a telephone to terrify, intimidate, threaten, annoy, or harrass in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2916, a class 1 misdemeanor. Rife filed a habeas corpus petition, claiming that his constitutional…”
Dennis Raber v. Karyl Lynn Wagner, 571 P.3d 902 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).
· cites it 5× “A person commits harassment if she “knowingly and repeatedly commits an act or acts that harass another person” or if, “in a manner that harasses,” she knowingly “[c]ontacts or causes a communication with another person by . . . electronic . . . means.” § 13-2921(A)(1).”
Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987).
“Rife, after being denied a jury trial, was convicted of three counts of unlawful use of the telephone to terrify, intimidate, threaten, annoy, or harass, which is a misdemeanor in violation of Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-2916. Defendant was initially sentenced to one year in jail, six…”
State v. Musser, 954 P.2d 1053 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 27× “STANDING Defendant does not claim that his telephonic conduct was constitutionally protected; he acknowledges that it might have been constitutionally prohibited and prosecuted under a narrowly drawn statute.”
Gregorwicz v. Villa-Kennedy, No. 1 CA-CV 25-0510 FC (Ariz. Ct. App. June 17, 2026).
· cites it 7× “” Although the court orally stated the order of protection was based on A.R.S. § 13-2916, the written order of protection did not cite a statutory basis.”
Diacos v. Ringwald, No. 1 CA-CV 23-0717-FC (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2025).
· cites it 3× ““Implied in every judgment, in addition to the express findings made by the court, are any additional findings necessary to sustain the judgment, if reasonably supported by the evidence and not in conflict with the express findings.”
State v. Eisenbeiss, No. 1 CA-CR 24-0678 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2025).
· cites it 2× “¶12 A few days after Eisenbeiss’s arrest, S.”
Ctr. for Az v. Az Sec'y of State, No. CV-24-0295-PR (Ariz. June 29, 2026).
· cites it 2× “574 (1998)); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68 (“It is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute.”
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2916(A): 2 cases
State v. Musser, 954 P.2d 1053 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
“STANDING Defendant does not claim that his telephonic conduct was constitutionally protected; he acknowledges that it might have been constitutionally prohibited and prosecuted under a narrowly drawn statute.”
Diacos v. Ringwald, No. 1 CA-CV 23-0717-FC (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2025).
““Implied in every judgment, in addition to the express findings made by the court, are any additional findings necessary to sustain the judgment, if reasonably supported by the evidence and not in conflict with the express findings.”
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2916(A)(2): 1 case
State v. Eisenbeiss, No. 1 CA-CR 24-0678 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2025).
“¶12 A few days after Eisenbeiss’s arrest, S.”
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2916(A)(3): 1 case
Dennis Raber v. Karyl Lynn Wagner, 571 P.3d 902 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).
“A person commits harassment if she “knowingly and repeatedly commits an act or acts that harass another person” or if, “in a manner that harasses,” she knowingly “[c]ontacts or causes a communication with another person by . . . electronic . . . means.” § 13-2921(A)(1).”
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2916(A)(4): 1 case
Ctr. for Az v. Az Sec'y of State, No. CV-24-0295-PR (Ariz. June 29, 2026).
“574 (1998)); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68 (“It is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute.”
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2916(B): 1 case
State v. Musser, 954 P.2d 1053 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
“STANDING Defendant does not claim that his telephonic conduct was constitutionally protected; he acknowledges that it might have been constitutionally prohibited and prosecuted under a narrowly drawn statute.”
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2916(C): 1 case
Gregorwicz v. Villa-Kennedy, No. 1 CA-CV 25-0510 FC (Ariz. Ct. App. June 17, 2026).
“” Although the court orally stated the order of protection was based on A.R.S. § 13-2916, the written order of protection did not cite a statutory basis.”
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2916(E)(3): 1 case
Dennis Raber v. Karyl Lynn Wagner, 571 P.3d 902 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).
“A person commits harassment if she “knowingly and repeatedly commits an act or acts that harass another person” or if, “in a manner that harasses,” she knowingly “[c]ontacts or causes a communication with another person by . . . electronic . . . means.” § 13-2921(A)(1).”
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