If property distributed in kind or a security interest therein is acquired for value by a purchaser from or lender to a distributee who has received an instrument or deed of distribution from the personal representative, or is so acquired by a purchaser from or lender to a transferee from such distributee, the purchaser or lender takes title free of rights of any person interested in the estate and incurs no personal liability to the estate, whether or not the distribution was proper or supported by court order and whether or not the authority of the personal representative was terminated prior to execution of the instrument or deed. This section protects a purchaser from or lender to a distributee who as personal representative has executed a deed of distribution to himself, as well as from any other distributee or his transferee. To be protected under this provision, a purchaser or lender need not inquire whether a personal representative acted properly in making the distribution in kind, even if the personal representative and the distributee are the same person, or whether the authority of the personal representative had terminated prior to the distribution.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
5
cases, 2000–2010 · leading case:
Johnson v. Davis, 12 P.3d 1203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
Johnson v. Davis, 12 P.3d 1203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 7× “” A.R.S. § 14-3910. ¶ 8 Johnson contends that Moody, and not Johnson, was the “distributee” of the truck, ring, and watch under section 14-3909.”
Beck v. Deem, 224 P.3d 938 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 10× “The parties contested the action and alleged they were protected by A.R.S. §§ 14-3910 (2005) and 14-3972 (2005) or, in the alternative, counterclaimed under an equitable sub *444 rogation theory for a lien equivalent to the amount necessary to satisfy the Midland mortgage.”
Dometri Investments, LLC v. Lind, 177 P.3d 305 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 9× “Parker and that Dometri, having purchased the property from Choice, was entitled to the protections of A.R.S. §§ 14-3910 (2005), 14-3971 (Supp. 2007) and 14-3972(0 (2005).”
In Re Est. of Parker, 177 P.3d 305 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 9× “Parker and that Dometri, having purchased the property from Choice, was entitled to the protections of A.R.S. §§ 14-3910 (2005), 14-3971 (Supp. 2007) and 144972(C) (2005).”
In Re Est. of Olson, 224 P.3d 938 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 10× “The parties contested the action and alleged they were protected by A.R.S. §§ 14-3910 (2005) and 14-3972 (2005) or, in the alternative, counterclaimed under an equitable subrogation *941 theory for a lien equivalent to the amount necessary to satisfy the Midland mortgage.”
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