A. At any time, for good cause, the presiding judge of the superior court or a designee may excuse a grand juror temporarily or permanently. If a grand juror is excused permanently, the presiding judge of the superior court or a designee may replace the excused juror with an alternate grand juror so as to maintain the original membership at the prescribed number of persons. The alternate grand juror shall be selected as prescribed by chapter 3 of this title.
B. A grand juror shall not vote on any matter on which evidence has been taken in the juror's absence or before the juror's impanelment.
Notes of Decisions
Honk v. Karlsson, 292 P.2d 455 (Ariz. 1956).
· cites it 2× “Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(c), section 21-406, A.C.A. 1939, and Rule 12(h), section 21-436, A.”
Mallamo v. Hartman, 219 P.2d 1039 (Ariz. 1950).
· cites it 2× “Section 21-406, A.C.A.1939, requires the Statute of Frauds to be affirmatively plead to make it available as a defense.”
In re Brandt's Est., 190 P.2d 497 (Ariz. 1948).
“The executrix relies on section 21-406, A.C.A.1939, for the proposition that the defense of estoppel is not available to a party unless it is affirmatively pleaded by way of answer or other responsive pleading.”
Mallamo v. Hartman, 222 P.2d 797 (Ariz. 1950).
· cites it 2× “That the court erred in holding that section 21-406, A.C.A.1939 requires the Statute of Frauds to be affirmatively plead in all cases; 2.”
Trujillo v. Trujillo, 252 P.2d 1071 (Ariz. 1953).
“Section 19-101(8) (c) of the New Mexico Code is identical with section 21-406, A.C.A.1939, requiring the statute of limitations to be affirmatively plead.”
Kotsonaros v. State of Minnesota, 290 P.2d 478 (Ariz. 1955).
“Plaintiff claims as further grounds for surprise that defendant in his answer did not affirmatively allege payment as a defense, and that the denials of the defendant were not sufficient to put payment in issue, citing Section 21-406, A.C.A.1939, which states: “In pleading to a…”
Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co. v. Meyer, 204 P.2d 171 (Ariz. 1949).
“The finding of the trial court on the ten-year statute, instead of the five-year statute, to our mind constitutes further evidence that the question was not by common consent considered an issue during the course of the trial.”
Gentry v. Andrews, 288 P.2d 487 (Ariz. 1955).
· cites it 2× “instrument in writing upon which any pleading is founded, in whole or in part, and alleged to have been executed by him or by his authority, and not alleged to be lost or destroyed; * * Plaintiff further contends that it was necessary for defendant to affirmatively plead payment…”
Kalaf v. Assyd, 130 P.2d 1036 (Ariz. 1942).
“Under section 21-406, Arizona Code 1939, when a party relies upon such negligence he must affirmatively plead it.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.