A. The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an employee or for the death of an employee is the exclusive remedy against the employer or any co-employee acting in the scope of his employment, and against the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier or administrative service representative, except as provided by section 23-906, and except that if the injury is caused by the employer's wilful misconduct, or in the case of a co-employee by the co-employee's wilful misconduct, and the act causing the injury is the personal act of the employer, or in the case of a co-employee the personal act of the co-employee, or if the employer is a partnership, on the part of a partner, or if a corporation, on the part of an elective officer of the corporation, and the act indicates a wilful disregard of the life, limb or bodily safety of employees, the injured employee may either claim compensation or maintain an action at law for damages against the person or entity alleged to have engaged in the wilful misconduct.
B. "Wilful misconduct" as used in this section means an act done knowingly and purposely with the direct object of injuring another.
C. This section does not apply to an action for medical malpractice against any employee of a hospital maintained by the employer pursuant to section 23-1070. Any suit allowed by this subsection is subject to the lien rights provided by section 23-1023.
D. An employee of a public agency, as defined in section 11-951, who works under the jurisdiction or control of or within the jurisdictional boundaries of another public agency pursuant to a specific intergovernmental agreement or contract entered into between the public agencies as provided in section 11-952 is deemed to be an employee of both public agencies for the purposes of this section. The primary employer shall be solely liable for the payment of workers' compensation benefits for the purposes of this section.
E. Every public agency as defined in section 11-951 for which an intergovernmental agreement or contract is in effect shall post a notice pursuant to the provisions of section 23-906, in substantially the following form:
"All employees are hereby further notified that they may be required to work under the jurisdiction or control of or within the jurisdictional boundaries of another public agency pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement or contract, and under such circumstances they are deemed by the laws of Arizona to be employees of both public agencies for the purposes of workers' compensation."
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
113
cases (
13 in the last 5 years), 1959–2026 · leading case:
Callan v. Bernini, 141 P.3d 737 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
Callan v. Bernini, 141 P.3d 737 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 31× “¶ 14 Subsections (D) and (E) were added to § 23-1022 in 1983 in response to this court’s decision in Garcia v.”
Mitchell v. Gamble, 86 P.3d 944 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 13× “Resolution of that issue, however, hinges on whether appellees were acting as school employees and, therefore, as Mitchell’s coemployees, at the time of her injury.”
Franks v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 718 P.2d 193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 28× “The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an employee or for the death of an employee is the exclusive remedy against the employer or any co-employee acting in the scope of his employment, and against the employer's workers'…”
Swichtenberg v. Brimer, 828 P.2d 1218 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 20× “The parties urge the following issues on appeal: (1) did Brimer's statements to his worker's compensation carrier and at his deposition that Swichtenberg was not his employee estop him from claiming immunity under A.R.S. § 23-1022(A) as Swichtenberg's employer; (2) do genuine…”
Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987).
· cites it 8× “18, § 8; A.R.S. § 23-1022. The trial evidence does not warrant an inference that Revlon had the "direct object of injuring" Ford and neither it nor its elected officers ( see A.”
Bonner v. Minico, Inc., 766 P.2d 598 (Ariz. 1988).
· cites it 18× “The trial court dismissed the amended complaint, finding that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction because the shooting did not fall within the “wilful misconduct” exception of A.R.S. § 23-1022 and Ariz. Const. art. XVIII, § 8.”
McKee v. State, 388 P.3d 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 9× “A.R.S. § 23-1022(A). An employee can elect to maintain an action at law for damages in lieu of receiving workers’ compensation only where an employer’s wilful misconduct caused the employee’s injury or death.”
Inmon v. Crane Rental Servs., Inc., 67 P.3d 726 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 17× “The Workers’ Compensation “Lent Employee” Doctrine Cannot Be Used To Interpret The Term “Co-employee” Under A.R.S. § 23-1022(A). ¶ 7 The Act prevents employees who are provided with coverage under the Act from suing their employer or co-employees for accidents arising from their…”
Serna v. Statewide Contractors, Inc., 429 P.2d 504 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
· cites it 14× “The plaintiffs brought an action for wrongful death against the defendant employer, alleging that the deaths were the result of the employer’s willful misconduct within the meaning of A.R.S. § 23-1022 and that plaintiffs were therefore exempted from the exclusive remedy…”
Diaz v. Magma Copper Co., 950 P.2d 1165 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 9× “Coworker malpractice The Diazes argue that their claim against David Necochea, the Magma dispensary worker who administered first aid to Diaz at the accident site, was improperly dismissed because A.R.S. § 23-1022(0 exempts him from the Act’s protection.”
Bussanich v. Douglas, 733 P.2d 644 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 10× “18, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 23-1022, the defendant moved for summary judgment contending that plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was for the receipt of workmen’s compensation benefits.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1022(A) — 65 cases
Mitchell v. Gamble, 86 P.3d 944 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
“Resolution of that issue, however, hinges on whether appellees were acting as school employees and, therefore, as Mitchell’s coemployees, at the time of her injury.”
Swichtenberg v. Brimer, 828 P.2d 1218 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
“The parties urge the following issues on appeal: (1) did Brimer's statements to his worker's compensation carrier and at his deposition that Swichtenberg was not his employee estop him from claiming immunity under A.R.S. § 23-1022(A) as Swichtenberg's employer; (2) do genuine…”
Franks v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 718 P.2d 193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
“The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an employee or for the death of an employee is the exclusive remedy against the employer or any co-employee acting in the scope of his employment, and against the employer's workers'…”
Inmon v. Crane Rental Servs., Inc., 67 P.3d 726 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
“The Workers’ Compensation “Lent Employee” Doctrine Cannot Be Used To Interpret The Term “Co-employee” Under A.R.S. § 23-1022(A). ¶ 7 The Act prevents employees who are provided with coverage under the Act from suing their employer or co-employees for accidents arising from their…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1022(B) — 12 cases
McKee v. State, 388 P.3d 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“A.R.S. § 23-1022(A). An employee can elect to maintain an action at law for damages in lieu of receiving workers’ compensation only where an employer’s wilful misconduct caused the employee’s injury or death.”
Diaz v. Magma Copper Co., 950 P.2d 1165 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
“Coworker malpractice The Diazes argue that their claim against David Necochea, the Magma dispensary worker who administered first aid to Diaz at the accident site, was improperly dismissed because A.R.S. § 23-1022(0 exempts him from the Act’s protection.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1022(D) — 6 cases
Callan v. Bernini, 141 P.3d 737 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“¶ 14 Subsections (D) and (E) were added to § 23-1022 in 1983 in response to this court’s decision in Garcia v.”
McKee v. State, 388 P.3d 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“A.R.S. § 23-1022(A). An employee can elect to maintain an action at law for damages in lieu of receiving workers’ compensation only where an employer’s wilful misconduct caused the employee’s injury or death.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1022(E) — 2 cases
Callan v. Bernini, 141 P.3d 737 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“¶ 14 Subsections (D) and (E) were added to § 23-1022 in 1983 in response to this court’s decision in Garcia v.”
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