A. Compensation, whether determined or not, is not, prior to the delivery of the warrant therefor, assignable.
B. Except as provided in subsection D of this section, compensation is exempt from attachment, garnishment and execution and does not pass to another person by operation of law, except that:
1. The amount of compensation payable to a person at the time of death, whether payable in periodic payments or converted to a lump sum, and whether or not the warrant therefor has been issued or delivered after that person's death, shall be paid to that person's personal representative.
2. If medical, wage loss or disability benefits are paid or otherwise provided by an employer to or for the benefit of an employee for an injury or illness for which medical or compensation benefits payable pursuant to this article have been denied or for which a claim for compensation under this article has not been filed, and the injury or illness is subsequently determined to be compensable under this article, the employer or the person authorized by the employer to provide such benefits is entitled to a direct payment out of, or a direct credit against, the medical or compensation benefits payable under this article in the amount of the benefits previously paid or provided.
C. Any dispute as to the amount of the direct payment or credit against the medical or compensation benefits payable shall be resolved pursuant to section 23-1061, subsection J.
D. Compensation is subject to an assignment for the payment of support as defined in section 25-500, spousal maintenance and the fee for handling child support and spousal maintenance payments authorized by section 25-510.
E. Payment to the consular agent, or the consular agent's representative, of the nation of which a dependent is a resident or subject, of compensation due the dependent residing outside the United States, any power of attorney to receive or receipt for such compensation to the contrary notwithstanding, is a full discharge of the benefits or compensation as if made directly to the beneficiary.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
21
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1968–2025 · leading case:
Gibbons v. Indus. Comm'n, 3 P.3d 1028 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
Gibbons v. Indus. Comm'n, 3 P.3d 1028 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 11× “Applicant’s post-hearing memorandum argues that A.R.S. § 23-1068(B) not only gives the Commission subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute regarding the amount of applicant’s liability to Standard for repayment of STD benefits but also personal jurisdiction over Standard.”
Brooks v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 839 P.2d 1111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 17× “§ 23-1068(B) unless the assignment is for child support, that the assignment in this case was solely for spousal maintenance, and therefore that the July 1988 order of assignment “is barred by A.R.S. § 23-1068 B____” The AU ordered Freightways to resume paying workers’…”
Dimaio v. Indus. Comm'n, 840 P.2d 308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 15× “Here, the administrative law judge erroneously concluded that because the county’s policy prohibited its employees from receiving both workers’ compensation benefits and full accrued benefits for the same period of disability, the employer satisfied the statutory conditions of A.”
Marriage of Bugh v. Bugh, 608 P.2d 329 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
· cites it 2× “2 Finally, A.R.S. § 23-1068 provides that workmen’s compensation benefits are not assignable and shall not pass to another person by operation of law.”
Sneed v. Belt, 635 P.2d 517 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
· cites it 4× “1928 (statutory predecessor of A.R.S. § 23-1068) prohibited “accident” (now, medical) benefits from passing to a deceased employee’s personal representative for the benefit of the estate.”
Reed v. Indus. Comm'n, 454 P.2d 157 (Ariz. 1969).
· cites it 4× “A.R.S. § 23-1068, subsec. B. We agree that petitioner had standing as administratrix to be joined as an interested party.”
Naslund v. Indus. Com'n of Ariz., 110 P.3d 363 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 3× “After the parties filed initial briefs in this case, we issued an order notifying the Arizona Attorney General of Naslund’s constitutional challenge to A.”
Argonaut Ins. v. Lyons, 766 P.2d 619 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 4× “Thereafter, Argonaut filed a petition for an order to show cause, asserting that, pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-1068(B), workers’ compensation benefits were exempt from orders of assignment to pay child support.”
Red Bluff Mines, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 696 P.2d 1348 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 2× “See A.R.S. § 23-1068(B). As can be seen, for the purposes of claim preclusion analysis, the generic term “death benefits” is of little analytical help.”
Lee v. Indus. Comm'n, 212 P.3d 119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 20× “¶ 12 Arizona Revised Statutes § 23-1068 (Supp.2008) addresses coordination of benefits and provides in pertinent part: B.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1068(A) — 3 cases
Naslund v. Indus. Com'n of Ariz., 110 P.3d 363 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
“After the parties filed initial briefs in this case, we issued an order notifying the Arizona Attorney General of Naslund’s constitutional challenge to A.”
Dimaio v. Indus. Comm'n, 840 P.2d 308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
“Here, the administrative law judge erroneously concluded that because the county’s policy prohibited its employees from receiving both workers’ compensation benefits and full accrued benefits for the same period of disability, the employer satisfied the statutory conditions of A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1068(B) — 10 cases
Gibbons v. Indus. Comm'n, 3 P.3d 1028 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
“Applicant’s post-hearing memorandum argues that A.R.S. § 23-1068(B) not only gives the Commission subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute regarding the amount of applicant’s liability to Standard for repayment of STD benefits but also personal jurisdiction over Standard.”
Brooks v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 839 P.2d 1111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
“§ 23-1068(B) unless the assignment is for child support, that the assignment in this case was solely for spousal maintenance, and therefore that the July 1988 order of assignment “is barred by A.R.S. § 23-1068 B____” The AU ordered Freightways to resume paying workers’…”
Dimaio v. Indus. Comm'n, 840 P.2d 308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
“Here, the administrative law judge erroneously concluded that because the county’s policy prohibited its employees from receiving both workers’ compensation benefits and full accrued benefits for the same period of disability, the employer satisfied the statutory conditions of A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1068(B)(2) — 1 case
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