Arizona Revised Statutes

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415 (2026)

Sanctions for litigation misconduct

✓ current as of May 2026

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25-415. Sanctions for litigation misconduct

A. The court shall sanction a litigant for costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred by an adverse party if the court finds that the litigant has done any one or more of the following:

1. Knowingly presented a false claim under section 25-403, 25-403.03 or 25-403.04 with knowledge that the claim was false.

2. Knowingly accused an adverse party of making a false claim under section 25-403, 25-403.03 or 25-403.04 with knowledge that the claim was actually true.

3. Violated a court order compelling disclosure or discovery under rule 65 of the Arizona rules of family law procedure, unless the court finds that the failure to obey the order was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

B. If the court makes a finding against any litigant under subsection A of this section, it may also:

1. Impose additional financial sanctions on behalf of an aggrieved party who can demonstrate economic loss directly attributable to the litigant's misconduct.

2. Institute civil contempt proceedings on its own initiative or on request of an aggrieved party, with proper notice and an opportunity to be heard.

3. Modify legal decision-making or parenting time if that modification would also serve the best interests of the child.

C. For the purposes of this section, a false claim does not mean a claim that is merely unsubstantiated.

D. This section does not prevent the court from awarding costs and attorney fees or imposing other sanctions if authorized elsewhere by state or federal law.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 39 cases (15 in the last 5 years), 1998–2026 · leading case: Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).

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Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 270× “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 112× “¶ 47 I concur in vacating the order but do so on separate grounds.”

Downs v. Scheffler, 80 P.3d 775 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 28× “In February 2001, after Downs sought to move Kortnee into her new home, Scheffler petitioned the court to grant her legal custody pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-415 (2000), dealing with custody proceedings by persons other than the legal parents.”

Thomas v. Thomas, 49 P.3d 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 14× “”) section 25-415 (2000), requires findings that make it impossible for the court to properly award custody to both a legal parent (Thomas) and a nonlegal parent (Nielson).”

Marriage of Higgins v. Higgins, 981 P.2d 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 18× “A.R.S. § 25-415 (Supp.1998), added by 1997 Ariz.”

Sheets v. Hon. mead/reynolds, 356 P.3d 341 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 11× “” A.R.S. § 25-415(0 (1997). ¶ 12 As had been the case since 1992, a person seeking nonparent visitation must demonstrate that “[t]he child was born out of wedlock.”

Stephenson v. Nastro in & for Cnty. of Maricopa, 967 P.2d 616 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 8× “If, however, mother establishes father’s nonpaternity, father may still seek to retain custody as a nonparent pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-415, which also necessitates an inquiry into the child’s best interests.”

Andrew R. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 P.3d 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 4× “See A.R.S. § 25-415(C) (2007) (allowing for in loco parentis visitation).”

Fish v. Fish, 939 A.2d 1040 (Conn. 2008). · cites it 2× “, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415 (B) (2007); Mich.”

Eans-Snoderly v. Snoderly, 473 P.3d 337 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 2× “¶28 Wife also requests attorneys’ fees as a sanction under A.R.S. § 25-415. Because she failed to provide any supporting grounds, we deny 11 EANS-SNODERLY v.”

McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40 (N.D. 2010). · cites it 2× “150 (2004); Ariz. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 25-415 (2009); Cal.”

Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078 (Alaska 2004). “[37] In custody disputes between a parent and a third party, our research reveals that 14 states, including Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, impose a…”

Show all 39 citing cases →

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(0) — 3 cases

Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

Downs v. Scheffler, 80 P.3d 775 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). “In February 2001, after Downs sought to move Kortnee into her new home, Scheffler petitioned the court to grant her legal custody pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-415 (2000), dealing with custody proceedings by persons other than the legal parents.”

Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). “¶ 47 I concur in vacating the order but do so on separate grounds.”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(A) — 6 cases

Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

Pappas v. Darby (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022).

McLaughlin v. McLaughlin (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023).

Prouty v. Hughes (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(A)(1) — 5 cases

Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

Fiori v. Lanini-Fiori (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).

Kaiser v. Gamarano (Ariz. Ct. App. 2026).

Clark v. Hon. kreamer/chao (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).

Lamb v. Nielsen (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(A)(2) — 8 cases

Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). “¶ 47 I concur in vacating the order but do so on separate grounds.”

Thomas v. Thomas, 49 P.3d 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002). “”) section 25-415 (2000), requires findings that make it impossible for the court to properly award custody to both a legal parent (Thomas) and a nonlegal parent (Nielson).”

Garner v. Daurio (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).

Peter D. v. Geetika C. (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(A)(2)(4) — 1 case

Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(A)(4) — 1 case

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(A)(4)(b) — 1 case

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(A)(l) — 1 case

Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(B) — 5 cases

Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). “¶ 47 I concur in vacating the order but do so on separate grounds.”

Fish v. Fish, 939 A.2d 1040 (Conn. 2008). “, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415 (B) (2007); Mich.”

Stephenson v. Nastro in & for Cnty. of Maricopa, 967 P.2d 616 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). “If, however, mother establishes father’s nonpaternity, father may still seek to retain custody as a nonparent pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-415, which also necessitates an inquiry into the child’s best interests.”

Strovink v. Jones (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(B)(0) — 1 case

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(B)(1999) — 1 case

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(B)(3) — 1 case

Jf v. Hon. como/cf (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(C) — 5 cases

Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). “¶ 47 I concur in vacating the order but do so on separate grounds.”

Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

Andrew R. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 P.3d 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). “See A.R.S. § 25-415(C) (2007) (allowing for in loco parentis visitation).”

Sheets v. Hon. mead/reynolds, 356 P.3d 341 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015). “” A.R.S. § 25-415(0 (1997). ¶ 12 As had been the case since 1992, a person seeking nonparent visitation must demonstrate that “[t]he child was born out of wedlock.”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(C)(2) — 1 case

Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(D) — 1 case

Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(G) — 1 case

Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(G)(1) — 3 cases

Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). “¶ 47 I concur in vacating the order but do so on separate grounds.”

Gutierrez v. Gutierrez (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(G)(2) — 5 cases

Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). “¶ 47 I concur in vacating the order but do so on separate grounds.”

Strovink v. Jones (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-415(G)(l) — 2 cases

Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “However, based upon the evidence presented, the Court cannot factually conclude that she stood in loco parentis to Cody as defined by A.”

Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). “¶ 47 I concur in vacating the order but do so on separate grounds.”

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