Arizona Revised Statutes
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-9306 (2026)
Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in letter-of-credit rights
✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases:
SyfertCases citing this section
AZ-LEGazleg.gov (official)
JustiaTitle on Justia
CornellLII Search
CasesGoogle Scholar
A. Subject to subsection C of this section, the local law of the issuer's jurisdiction or a nominated person's jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a security interest in a letter-of-credit right if the issuer's jurisdiction or nominated person's jurisdiction is a state.
B. For purposes of this article, an issuer's jurisdiction or nominated person's jurisdiction is the jurisdiction whose law governs the liability of the issuer or nominated person with respect to the letter-of-credit right as provided in section 47-5116.
C. This section does not apply to a security interest that is perfected only under section 47-9308, subsection D.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10
cases, 1987–2005 · leading case: In Re: Tower Air, Inc., Debtor Charles A. Stanziale, Jr., Chapter 7 Tr. of Tower Air, Inc. v. Finova Capital Corp., 397 F.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 2005).
In Re: Tower Air, Inc., Debtor Charles A. Stanziale, Jr., Chapter 7 Tr. of Tower Air, Inc. v. Finova Capital Corp., 397 F.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 2005). “” Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 47-9306 cmt. 3 (1999). 8 Thus, while we have decided that the insurance money constitutes “proceeds,” we must conduct a further inquiry before deciding conclusively that FINOVA is entitled to recover it.”
Valley Nat'l Bank v. Cotton Growers Hail Ins., 747 P.2d 1225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). “Since Paloma Ranch never actually “received” any money, appellants argue, the bank’s security interest never attached to the $300,277 loss award, and the bank accordingly had no claim for recovery against appellants.”
Pavilion Hotel, Inc. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 885 P.2d 186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). “” AR.S. § 47-9306(A). Thus, we must determine whether any portion of the accounts arise out of property acquired before the filing of the bankruptcy petition (“before-acquired property”) that has been converted into some other form.”
Mur-Ray Mgmt. Corp. v. Founders Title Co., 819 P.2d 1003 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). “” A.R.S. § 47-9306(B). Because defendants acquired their interest in the Note subsequent to the creation of plaintiffs’ security interest, defendants’ interest generally yields to plaintiffs’.”
Baird v. Pace, 752 P.2d 507 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). “§ 44-3127(B) (now A.R.S. § 47-9306(B)) to support this argument.”
Wollenberg v. Phoenix Leasing Inc., 893 P.2d 4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). “Due to his acquiescence in Mays’ transfer of Paradise Valley and express statement that Mays was “within his rights”' in doing so, Wollenberg “authorized” this disposition of the collateral within the meaning of A.R.S. § 47-9306(B) and thus lacks a security interest in the…”
Figueroa v. Delphi Acropolis, 968 P.2d 1048 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). “Article Nine of the UCC applies to security interests in personal property, including “documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts,” A.”
Fin. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Familian Corp., 905 P.2d 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). “In this opinion, we refer to the applicable sections of the Arizona UCC according to their designation and numbering in the current version of the UCC: e.”
Park Tucson Investors Ltd. P'ship v. Ali, 770 F. Supp. 531 (D. Ariz. 1991). “§ 47-9502(A) explains the collection rights of a secured party: When so agreed and in any event on default the secured party is entitled to *536 notify an account debtor or the obligor on an instrument to make payment to him whether or not the assignor was theretofore making…”
In Re Tower Air Inc (3rd Cir. 2005). “” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-9306 (A). The following sentence reads: “Insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it is payable to a person other than a party to the security agreement.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-9306(A) — 4 cases
In Re: Tower Air, Inc., Debtor Charles A. Stanziale, Jr., Chapter 7 Tr. of Tower Air, Inc. v. Finova Capital Corp., 397 F.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 2005). “” Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 47-9306 cmt. 3 (1999). 8 Thus, while we have decided that the insurance money constitutes “proceeds,” we must conduct a further inquiry before deciding conclusively that FINOVA is entitled to recover it.”
Valley Nat'l Bank v. Cotton Growers Hail Ins., 747 P.2d 1225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). “Since Paloma Ranch never actually “received” any money, appellants argue, the bank’s security interest never attached to the $300,277 loss award, and the bank accordingly had no claim for recovery against appellants.”
Pavilion Hotel, Inc. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 885 P.2d 186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). “” AR.S. § 47-9306(A). Thus, we must determine whether any portion of the accounts arise out of property acquired before the filing of the bankruptcy petition (“before-acquired property”) that has been converted into some other form.”
Figueroa v. Delphi Acropolis, 968 P.2d 1048 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). “Article Nine of the UCC applies to security interests in personal property, including “documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts,” A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-9306(B) — 6 cases
In Re: Tower Air, Inc., Debtor Charles A. Stanziale, Jr., Chapter 7 Tr. of Tower Air, Inc. v. Finova Capital Corp., 397 F.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 2005). “” Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 47-9306 cmt. 3 (1999). 8 Thus, while we have decided that the insurance money constitutes “proceeds,” we must conduct a further inquiry before deciding conclusively that FINOVA is entitled to recover it.”
Mur-Ray Mgmt. Corp. v. Founders Title Co., 819 P.2d 1003 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). “” A.R.S. § 47-9306(B). Because defendants acquired their interest in the Note subsequent to the creation of plaintiffs’ security interest, defendants’ interest generally yields to plaintiffs’.”
Baird v. Pace, 752 P.2d 507 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). “§ 44-3127(B) (now A.R.S. § 47-9306(B)) to support this argument.”
Wollenberg v. Phoenix Leasing Inc., 893 P.2d 4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). “Due to his acquiescence in Mays’ transfer of Paradise Valley and express statement that Mays was “within his rights”' in doing so, Wollenberg “authorized” this disposition of the collateral within the meaning of A.R.S. § 47-9306(B) and thus lacks a security interest in the…”
Pavilion Hotel, Inc. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 885 P.2d 186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). “” AR.S. § 47-9306(A). Thus, we must determine whether any portion of the accounts arise out of property acquired before the filing of the bankruptcy petition (“before-acquired property”) that has been converted into some other form.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-9306(D) — 1 case
Pavilion Hotel, Inc. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 885 P.2d 186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). “” AR.S. § 47-9306(A). Thus, we must determine whether any portion of the accounts arise out of property acquired before the filing of the bankruptcy petition (“before-acquired property”) that has been converted into some other form.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-9306(D)(2) — 1 case
In Re: Tower Air, Inc., Debtor Charles A. Stanziale, Jr., Chapter 7 Tr. of Tower Air, Inc. v. Finova Capital Corp., 397 F.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 2005). “” Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 47-9306 cmt. 3 (1999). 8 Thus, while we have decided that the insurance money constitutes “proceeds,” we must conduct a further inquiry before deciding conclusively that FINOVA is entitled to recover it.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-9306(D)(4)(a) — 1 case
Valley Nat'l Bank v. Cotton Growers Hail Ins., 747 P.2d 1225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). “Since Paloma Ranch never actually “received” any money, appellants argue, the bank’s security interest never attached to the $300,277 loss award, and the bank accordingly had no claim for recovery against appellants.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.