A. Except as otherwise provided in subsection B, if the local law of this state governs perfection of a security interest or agricultural lien, the office in which to file a financing statement to perfect the security interest or agricultural lien is:
1. The office designated for the filing or recording of a record of a mortgage on the related real property, if:
(a) The collateral is as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut; or
(b) The financing statement is filed as a fixture filing and the collateral is goods that are or are to become fixtures; or
2. The office of the secretary of state, in all other cases, including a case in which the collateral is goods that are or are to become fixtures and the financing statement is not filed as a fixture filing.
B. The office in which to file a financing statement to perfect a security interest in collateral, including fixtures, of a transmitting utility is the office of the secretary of state. The financing statement also constitutes a fixture filing as to the collateral indicated in the financing statement that is or is to become fixtures.
Notes of Decisions
Int'l Harvester Co. v. Fuoss, 758 P.2d 649 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 4× “§ 47-9504(C) and that said notice could not be waived because of A.R.S. § 47-9501(C); and 3) that the resale of equipment and parts taken by IH was not conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.”
Glamorgan Coal Corp. v. Bowen, 742 F. Supp. 308 (W.D. Va. 1990).
“” Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 47-9501(A) (1988). Courts which have interpreted this language, which is virtually the same as § 9-501 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the commercial codes of various states, differ as to its exact meaning.”
Poling v. Morgan, 598 F. Supp. 686 (D. Ariz. 1984).
· cites it 5× “A.R.S. § 47-9501 et seq. (formerly § 44-3147 et seq) sets forth the procedures that must be followed when a secured party takes possession of collateral after the debtors default.”
Poling v. Morgan, 829 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1987).
“The Polings contend on appeal that the district court (1) erred in ruling that Mobile Discount was not subject to the restrictions of Ariz.Rev.Stat. §§ 47-9501 — 47-9507 at the time it took possession of the mobile home; (2) erroneously instructed the jury that a guarantor has…”
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-9501(A): 1 case
Glamorgan Coal Corp. v. Bowen, 742 F. Supp. 308 (W.D. Va. 1990).
“” Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 47-9501(A) (1988). Courts which have interpreted this language, which is virtually the same as § 9-501 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the commercial codes of various states, differ as to its exact meaning.”
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-9501(C): 2 cases
Int'l Harvester Co. v. Fuoss, 758 P.2d 649 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
“§ 47-9504(C) and that said notice could not be waived because of A.R.S. § 47-9501(C); and 3) that the resale of equipment and parts taken by IH was not conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.”
Poling v. Morgan, 598 F. Supp. 686 (D. Ariz. 1984).
“A.R.S. § 47-9501 et seq. (formerly § 44-3147 et seq) sets forth the procedures that must be followed when a secured party takes possession of collateral after the debtors default.”
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-9501(C)(2): 1 case
Poling v. Morgan, 598 F. Supp. 686 (D. Ariz. 1984).
“A.R.S. § 47-9501 et seq. (formerly § 44-3147 et seq) sets forth the procedures that must be followed when a secured party takes possession of collateral after the debtors default.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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