Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-101 (2026)
Title — Purpose
- This chapter shall be cited as the “Workers' Compensation Law”.
- The primary purposes of the workers' compensation laws are to pay timely temporary and permanent disability benefits to all legitimately injured workers who suffer an injury or disease arising out of and in the course of their employment, to pay reasonable and necessary medical expenses resulting therefrom, and then to return the worker to the work force; to improve workplace safety through safety programs; to improve health care delivery through use of managed care concepts; to encourage the return to work of injured workers; to deter and punish frauds of agents, brokers, solicitors, employers, and employees relating to procurement of workers' compensation coverage or the provision or denial of benefits; to curtail the rise in medical costs associated with the provision of workers' compensation benefits; and to emphasize that the workers' compensation system in this state must be returned to a state of economic viability.
History. Init. Meas. 1948, No. 4, § 1, Acts 1949, p. 1420; Acts 1975 (Extended Sess., 1976), No. 1227, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1301; reen. Acts 1987, No. 1015, § 1; Acts 1993, No. 796, § 1.
A.C.R.C. Notes. As amended by Acts 1993, No. 796, § 1, this section provided, in part:
“Any and all case law inconsistent with the purposes set forth herein is specifically annulled.”
Acts 2001, No. 1757, § 9, provided:
“Nothing in the act, which originated as House Bill 2646 of 2001, nor in Act 1552 of 1999 shall impliedly repeal any part of Act 796 of 1993. Act 796 of 1993 is expressly reaffirmed by this act, which originated as House Bill 2646 of 2001.”
Research References
U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.
Moore, Workers' Compensation — Who Has Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction? The Arkansas Supreme Court Abandons a Rule of Concurrent Jurisdiction and Adopts the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. VanWagoner v. Beverly Enterprises, 334 Ark. 12, 970 S.W.2d 810 (1998), 21 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 413.
Case Notes
In General.
Denial of employer's writ of prohibition after the circuit court refused to dismiss employee's negligence claim against employer was proper pursuant to Ark. Const. art. 2, § 13 because a worker whose injury was not covered by the Workers' Compensation Act was not precluded from filing a claim in tort against his employer. Automated Conveyor Sys. v. Hill, 362 Ark. 215, 208 S.W.3d 136 (2005).
Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act, § 11-9-101 et seq., including the exclusive-remedy provision of § 11-9-105(a), is made possible by Ark. Const. Amend. 26, which amended Ark. Const. Art. V, § 32; that amendment provides that the Arkansas general assembly has the power to enact legislation prescribing the amount of compensation employers are required to pay for injuries or deaths of employees. Honeysuckle v. Curtis H. Stout, Inc., 2010 Ark. 328, 368 S.W.3d 64 (2010).
Purpose.
The purpose of this chapter is to protect the rights of both the employee and the compensation carrier. Simpson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 28 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 1994).
Section 11-9-522(f) and this section restate the goals of avoiding duplicate payments and of curtailing the cost of workers' compensation insurance, which are legitimate governmental concerns. Golden v. Westark Community College, 58 Ark. App. 209, 948 S.W.2d 108 (1997), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 333 Ark. 41, 969 S.W.2d 154 (1998).
Construction of Workers' Compensation Act had to take into account the purpose of it, which was to provide benefits to workers after they had been injured on the job in order for them to be able to return to work; the purpose of the act was not furthered by denying benefits to the claimant who tried to work through the pain and did not leave the job after the employer refused his request to provide medical treatment and he was unable to pay for it himself. Farmers Coop. v. Biles, 77 Ark. App. 1, 69 S.W.3d 899 (2002).
Employment.
Worker was not in the employment of the employer, a charitable organization, at the time he was injured and thus was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits; worker was performing labor as part of an alcohol rehabilitation program in which he had enrolled himself, and the work that he performed was temporary work therapy designed to assist him in overcoming his addiction. Dixon v. Salvation Army, 360 Ark. 309, 201 S.W.3d 386 (2005).
Jurisdiction.
Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), § 11-9-101 et seq., deprives federal district courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over tort claims asserted against in-state employers when the employer's workers have received benefits under the WCA. Without subject matter jurisdiction, the district courts cannot subject in-state employers to compulsory process, which is a requirement for a fair trial under U.S. Const. Amend. VI. Billings v. Aeropres Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Ark. 2007).
Court granted a writ of prohibition preventing a circuit court from exercising jurisdiction over a husband's action against an employer arising out of the death of his wife while she was working for the employer because at the point in the litigation, the circuit court was wholly without jurisdiction over the claims as under Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act, §§ 11-9-101 — 1001, the claims were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission. Int'l Paper Co. v. Clark Co. Cir. Ct., 375 Ark. 127, 289 S.W.3d 103 (2008).
Cited: Glenn v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D. Ark. 1986); Golden v. Westark Community College, 333 Ark. 41, 969 S.W.2d 154 (1998); Garcia v. A&M Roofing, 89 Ark. App. 251, 202 S.W.3d 532 (2005); Craven v. Fulton Sanitation Serv., 361 Ark. 390, 206 S.W.3d 842 (2005); Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Gerard, 2018 Ark. 97, 541 S.W.3d 422 (2018).