Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401 (2020)

Research References

ALR.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions. 122 A.L.R.5th 337.

Right to Workers' Compensation for Injury Suffered by Employee While Driving Employer's Vehicle. 28 A.L.R.6th 1.

Right to Workers' Compensation for Physical Injury or Illness Suffered by Claimant as Result of Nonsudden Mental Stimuli — Compensability under Particular Circumstances. 39 A.L.R.6th 445.

Right to Compensation under State Workers' Compensation Statute for Injuries Sustained During or as Result of Horseplay, Joking, Fooling, or the Like. 41 A.L.R.6th 207.

Injury to Employee as Arising out of or in Course of Employment for Purposes of State Workers' Compensation Statute — Effect of Employer-Provided Living Quarters, Room and Board, or the Like. 42 A.L.R.6th 61.

Ark. L. Rev.

Workmen's Compensation — Employee Returning to Work After Weekend — Whether “in Course of Employment,” 7 Ark. L. Rev. 423.

The Relationship of Effort or Stress to Coronary Heart Disease, 17 Ark L. Rev. 39.

Workmen's Compensation — Injury from Act of God as One Arising Out of Employment, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 357.

Workmen's Compensation — Injury Arising Out of the Course of Employment — Horseplay, 19 Ark. L. Rev. 197.

Workmen's Compensation: The “Going and Coming Rule” and Its Exceptions in Arkansas, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 414.

Workmen's Compensation — Recreational Activities Within the Scope of Employment, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 682.

Workmen's Compensation: Injuries Sustained While Preparing for Work Ruled Compensable, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 89.

Leflar, Compensation for Work-Related Illness in Arkansas, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 89.

Case Notes

Construction.

In considering a claim, the Workers' Compensation Commission must follow a liberal approach and draw all reasonable inferences favorable to the claimant; to further the beneficent and humane purposes of the Workers' Compensation law, all doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of the claimant. American Red Cross v. Hogan, 13 Ark. App. 194, 681 S.W.2d 417 (1985).

Applicability.

The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act does not specify what extrastate situations it covers. An employer's liability, however, is based upon disability or death from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, and “employment” is defined as every employment carried on in the state. Therefore, the application of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act is limited by its terms to harms arising out of employments carried on in Arkansas. Patton v. Brown & Root, Inc., 31 Ark. App. 141, 789 S.W.2d 745 (1990).

Living assistance services provided by mother to disabled son were held not to be compensable nursing services. Little Rock Convention & Visitors Bureau v. Pack, 60 Ark. App. 82, 959 S.W.2d 415 (1997).

Appeal.

On appeal, the court will review the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission and will give the testimony its strongest probative value in favor of the order of the commission. Southwest Pipe & Supply v. Hoover, 13 Ark. App. 144, 680 S.W.2d 723 (1984).

Assaults.

In the case of assaults, the general rule is that injuries resulting from an assault are compensable where the assault is casually related to the employment, but such injuries are not compensable when the assault arises out of purely personal reasons. Pigg v. Auto Shack, 27 Ark. App. 42, 766 S.W.2d 36 (1989).

Where altercation occurred during business hours, on the employer's premises, and as the result of a quarrel having its origin in the employment, the injuries were compensable. Welch's Laundry & Cleaners v. Clark, 38 Ark. App. 223, 832 S.W.2d 283 (1992).

An assault arises out of the employment either if the risk of assault is increased by the nature or setting of the work (regardless of the reason for the assault), or if the reason for the assault was a quarrel having its origin in the work; the test is an alternative one and the satisfaction of either condition will render injuries received as the result of an assault compensable. Bryan v. Best Western/Coachman's Inn, 47 Ark. App. 75, 885 S.W.2d 28 (1994).

Claimant, a maintenance worker and security guard, was injured in the course of his employment when he was assaulted by a trespasser who refused to leave the property; because the risk of assault was increased by the nature of the claimant's work, the injury arose out of his employment. Bryan v. Best Western/Coachman's Inn, 47 Ark. App. 75, 885 S.W.2d 28 (1994).

Compensation.

The term “compensation” as used in this section refers to three kinds of benefits: (1) the money allowance payable for disability; (2) the medical and hospital services and supplies; and (3) funeral expenses. Brooks v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 247 Ark. 61, 444 S.W.2d 246 (1969).

Concurrent Benefit Rule.

The “concurrent benefit” rule calls for a liberal construction of the requirements of the statute that requires that the injury resulting in death must arise “out of and in the course of employment.” Robbins v. Jackson, 232 Ark. 658, 339 S.W.2d 417 (1960).

The “concurrent benefit” rule had no application where deceased's death did not occur while he was performing the duties of his employment. Robbins v. Jackson, 232 Ark. 658, 339 S.W.2d 417 (1960).

The “concurrent benefit” rule cannot be applied to circumvent the necessity of a claimant first showing that his injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Robbins v. Jackson, 232 Ark. 658, 339 S.W.2d 417 (1960).

False Representation.

The trial court did not err in granting a workers' compensation award to an employee, even though he falsely represented on his employment application that he had no previous injury, where the employer told the employee to omit any reference to the injury because it would make his insurance go up. Roberts-McNutt, Inc. v. Williams, 288 Ark. 587, 708 S.W.2d 87 (Ark. 1986).

The following factors must be present before a false statement in an employment application will bar benefits: (1) the employee must have knowingly and willfully made a false representation as to his physical condition, (2) the employer must have relied upon the false representation and this reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring, and (3) there must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. College Club Dairy v. Carr, 25 Ark. App. 215, 756 S.W.2d 128 (1988); James River Corp. v. Walters, 53 Ark. App. 59, 918 S.W.2d 211 (1996).

The commission's finding that employer failed to prove that it relied on false representations made by the employee when it decided to hire him was supported by substantial evidence in that the employment application appeared to have been filled out by someone other than the employee some four months after he was hired. James River Corp. v. Walters, 53 Ark. App. 59, 918 S.W.2d 211 (1996).

Healing Period.

Recurring symptoms may give rise to a subsequent healing period, after the original one has ended. Elk Roofing Co. v. Pinson, 22 Ark. App. 191, 737 S.W.2d 661 (1987).

Determination that employee's healing period had not ended was supported by substantial evidence. Ketcher Roofing Co. v. Johnson, 50 Ark. App. 63, 901 S.W.2d 25 (1995).

Idiopathic Fall.

The effects of an idiopathic fall may be compensable if the employment places the employee in a position increasing the dangerous effects of such a fall. Nu-Way Laundry & Cleaners v. Palmer, 12 Ark. App. 31, 670 S.W.2d 464 (1984).

When a truly unexplained fall occurs while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment, the injury resulting therefrom is compensable. Moore v. Darling Store Fixtures, 22 Ark. App. 21, 732 S.W.2d 496 (1987).

Injury Arising out of and in Course of Employment.

Before a widow can recover, it must appear that her husband's death arose out of his employment and also in the course of his employment. Robbins v. Jackson, 232 Ark. 658, 339 S.W.2d 417 (1960).

Injury held not to arise out of and in course of employment. Moseley v. Temple, 231 Ark. 502, 330 S.W.2d 719 (1960); Robbins v. Jackson, 232 Ark. 658, 339 S.W.2d 417 (1960); Williams v. Central Flying Serv., Inc., 236 Ark. 709, 368 S.W.2d 87 (1963); Willis v. Dumas, 250 Ark. 496, 466 S.W.2d 268 (1971); Foster v. Johnson, 264 Ark. 894, 576 S.W.2d 187 (1979).

Independent contractors were not constituted employees by a clause in the contract which provided the alleged employer should carry Workers' Compensation insurance on them and deduct their pro rata share of the premiums from their remuneration. Hughes v. Hooker Bros., 237 Ark. 544, 374 S.W.2d 355 (1964).

Injuries suffered by employees, who at the precise moment of the accident are not acting within the course and scope of their employment may be compensated if their temporary departure from the job is not great. Coleman's Bar-B-Que v. Fuller, 262 Ark. 645, 559 S.W.2d 714 (1978).

Injury held to have occurred in the course of employment. Coleman's Bar-B-Que v. Fuller, 262 Ark. 645, 559 S.W.2d 714 (1978); Benton Serv. Ctr. v. Pinegar, 269 Ark. 768, 601 S.W.2d 227 (1980); Moore v. Darling Store Fixtures, 22 Ark. App. 21, 732 S.W.2d 496 (1987); Preway, Inc. v. Davis, 22 Ark. App. 132, 736 S.W.2d 21 (1987).

The Workers' Compensation Commission should follow a liberal approach in determining whether the accident in fact grew out of and occurred in the course of the employment and it is the duty of the commission to draw all legitimate inferences possible in favor of the claimant and to give the claimant the benefit of doubt. Gerber Prods. v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985).

An employer's obligation under workers' compensation may extend beyond termination when the activity causing injury is a normal and reasonable incident of the employment relationship. Jones v. City of Imboden, 39 Ark. App. 19, 832 S.W.2d 866 (1992).

An injury may be found to have occurred “in the course of employment” despite the fact that the claimant had been discharged prior to the work-related assault. Jones v. City of Imboden, 39 Ark. App. 19, 832 S.W.2d 866 (1992).

The phrase “arising out of the employment” refers to the origin or cause of the accident. Tbe phrase “in the course of” the employment refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the injury occurs. Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Angus, 39 Ark. App. 24, 832 S.W.2d 869 (1992), aff'd, 313 Ark. 100, 852 S.W.2d 804 (1993).

—Causal Connection.

An accident arises “out of” the employment when there is a causal connection between the two; that is, when the accident results from a risk reasonably incident to the employment. Southland Corp. v. Hester, 253 Ark. 959, 490 S.W.2d 132 (1973).

Where second injury results from nonwork-related negligent conduct on the part of the claimant which effects an independent intervening cause, no liability can be placed upon the employer; where it occurs within the scope of the employment, the neglect of the claimant leading to his injury is of no consequence. The employer at the time of the injury is liable for all consequences of that injury without regard to the claimant's conduct. Bearden Lumber Co. v. Bond, 7 Ark. App. 65, 644 S.W.2d 321 (1983).

The mere fact that an assault occurs on an employer's parking lot or in close proximity to his place of employment does not establish a causal connection with the employment. Bagwell v. Falcon Jet Corp., 8 Ark. App. 192, 649 S.W.2d 841 (1983).

In order for a worker's disability to be compensable, there must be a causal connection between the accident and a risk which is reasonably incident to the employment. There must be affirmative proof of a distinctive employment risk as the cause of the injury; the connection with the employment cannot be supplied by speculation. Bagwell v. Falcon Jet Corp., 8 Ark. App. 192, 649 S.W.2d 841 (1983); Gerber Prods. v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985).

It is not essential that the causal relationship between the accident and disability be established by medical evidence. Gerber Prods. v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985).

Causal connection held established. Benton Serv. Ctr. v. Pinegar, 269 Ark. 768, 601 S.W.2d 227 (1980); Gerber Prods. v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985).

Causal connection held not established. Southland Corp. v. Hester, 253 Ark. 959, 490 S.W.2d 132 (1973); Hammer v. Intermed N.W., 270 Ark. 262, 603 S.W.2d 913 (1980); Henson v. Club Prods., 22 Ark. App. 136, 736 S.W.2d 290 (1987); Fowler v. McHenry, 22 Ark. App. 196, 737 S.W.2d 663 (1987); Woodard v. White Spot Cafe, 30 Ark. App. 221, 785 S.W.2d 54 (1990).

Where it was clear that if it had not been for the stress placed on the employee at his workplace, there would have been no suicide, then there was no independent intervening cause breaking the chain of causation between the stress employee experienced as a result of his employment and his suicide, and the exclusion provided in subdivision (b)(2) did not apply. George W. Jackson Mental Health Ctr. v. Lambie, 49 Ark. App. 139, 898 S.W.2d 479 (1995).

Where there was no causal connection between injury and employment other than employee's own assertion that a fall occurred; commission's finding that employee was not credible was a permissible one and the Commission's opinion displayed a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Kuhn v. Majestic Hotel, 50 Ark. App. 23, 899 S.W.2d 845 (1995), rev'd, 324 Ark. 21, 918 S.W.2d 158 (1996).

Employee held to have experienced an “unexplained fall,” a compensable injury. Little Rock Convention & Visitors Bureau v. Pack, 60 Ark. App. 82, 959 S.W.2d 415 (1997).

—Evidence.

Workers' compensation claimant bears the burden of proving that his injury was the result of an accident that arose in the course of his employment, and that it grew out of, or resulted from, the employment. Moore v. Darling Store Fixtures, 22 Ark. App. 21, 732 S.W.2d 496 (1987).

Evidence sufficient to support finding that employee's psychological disorders were not causally connected to his compensable burn injury. Henson v. Club Prods., 22 Ark. App. 136, 736 S.W.2d 290 (1987).

Evidence sufficient to find causal connection between original injury and subsequent complication which resulted in a second healing period. Elk Roofing Co. v. Pinson, 22 Ark. App. 191, 737 S.W.2d 661 (1987).

Evidence sufficient to support finding of an independent intervening cause. Appleby v. Belden Corp., 22 Ark. App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (1987).

Because employee injured by a tornado while eating dinner was a resident employee, on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and one could reasonably expect this type of employee to, at some point, sit down to eat dinner, the commission's decision that the employee was injured while “in the course of” his employment was supported by substantial evidence. Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Angus, 39 Ark. App. 24, 832 S.W.2d 869 (1992), aff'd, 313 Ark. 100, 852 S.W.2d 804 (1993).

Employee failed to prove that he sustained compensable injuries to his feet and to his back. Morelock v. Kearney Co., 48 Ark. App. 227, 894 S.W.2d 603 (1995).

—Going to or from Work.

Injuries incurred while traveling to or from work held not to arise out of employment. Dickinson v. Central Constr. Co., 233 Ark. 360, 344 S.W.2d 599 (1961); American Red Cross v. Hogan, 13 Ark. App. 194, 681 S.W.2d 417 (1985).

The general rule is that injuries which occurred while an employee is going to or from work are not compensable since all persons, including employees, are subject to the recognized hazards of travel to and from work in a vehicle, generally referred to as the “street risk doctrine.” Williams v. National Youth Corps in Sch. Programs, 269 Ark. 649, 600 S.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1980).

Injuries sustained while traveling to or from work held compensable. Williams v. National Youth Corps in Sch. Programs, 269 Ark. 649, 600 S.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1980).

Injuries sustained by employees while going to and returning from their regular place of employment are not, as a general rule, deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment. American Red Cross v. Hogan, 13 Ark. App. 194, 681 S.W.2d 417 (1985); Lepard v. West Memphis Mach. & Welding, 51 Ark. App. 53, 908 S.W.2d 666 (1995).

Although an exception to the going and coming rule may operate to place an employee traveling to or from work within the course of his employment, it does not follow that the employee's injury is therefore compensable, because the employee must still show that the injury arose out of his employment. Woodard v. White Spot Cafe, 30 Ark. App. 221, 785 S.W.2d 54 (1990).

The exception to the going and coming rule permitting recovery for injuries received by employees traveling between two parts of an employer's premises, such as by way of a public street, was applicable to injury incurred prior to July 1, 1993 (the effective date of the amendment of § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iii) (now § 11-9-102(4))), where employee was struck by a car after parking in employer's parking lot. Wentworth v. Sparks Regional Medical Ctr., 49 Ark. App. 10, 894 S.W.2d 956 (1995).

Some nexus between the employment and travel must be present in order for a claimant to recover for injuries sustained on a trip from his employer's premises to his home. Lepard v. West Memphis Mach. & Welding, 51 Ark. App. 53, 908 S.W.2d 666 (1995).

—Positional Risk.

Under the positional risk doctrine, an injury arises out of the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position where he was injured. The only connection of the employment with the injury is that its obligations placed the employee in a particular place at the particular time when he is injured by some neutral force, “neutral” meaning neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment. Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Angus, 39 Ark. App. 24, 832 S.W.2d 869 (1992), aff'd, 313 Ark. 100, 852 S.W.2d 804 (1993).

A worker required to be on company property 24 hours a day, who was injured by a tornado while on company property eating dinner, was entitled to compensation for that injury, as the tornado constituted a neutral risk. Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Angus, 39 Ark. App. 24, 832 S.W.2d 869 (1992), aff'd, 313 Ark. 100, 852 S.W.2d 804 (1993).

—Preexisting Condition.

Preexisting disease or infirmity of an employee does not disqualify a claim under the “arising out of employment” requirement if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the death or disability for which compensation is sought. Black v. Riverside Furn. Co., 6 Ark. App. 370, 642 S.W.2d 338 (1982)Criticized byCox v. Nashville Livestock Com., 28 Ark. App. 138, 771 S.W.2d 786 (1989).

The aggravation of the symptoms of a preexisting heart condition was not compensable. Black v. Riverside Furn. Co., 6 Ark. App. 370, 642 S.W.2d 338 (1982)Criticized byCox v. Nashville Livestock Com., 28 Ark. App. 138, 771 S.W.2d 786 (1989).

An award of workers' compensation benefits will be sustained where heart attack is shown to have been aggravated or precipitated by the employment; there is no requirement that in order for a heart attack to be compensable, it must be caused or brought on by some unusual exertion rather than by the employee's regular work. C.J. Horner Co. v. Stringfellow, 14 Ark. App. 138, 685 S.W.2d 533 (1985), aff'd, 286 Ark. 342, 691 S.W.2d 861 (Ark. 1985).

Where the requirement of a causal connection is not met, the commission did not err in finding employee's psychological disorders not compensable as an aggravation of a preexisting condition. Henson v. Club Prods., 22 Ark. App. 136, 736 S.W.2d 290 (1987).

Where injuries sustained while working for employer amounted to an aggravation, not a recurrence, of previous injury, employer was liable for the aggravation of the old injury. Hawkins Constr. v. Maxell, 52 Ark. App. 116, 915 S.W.2d 302 (1996), rev'd, 325 Ark. 133, 924 S.W.2d 789 (1996).

—Specific Diseases or Conditions.

An attack of angina pectoris which results in disability may constitute an injury giving rise to compensation if it arises out of and occurs in the course of employment; and a work-related disabling angina attack, although temporary, is a disability. Nashville Livestock Comm'n v. Cox, 302 Ark. 69, 787 S.W.2d 664 (1990).

Substantial evidence supported the determination that the claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome was not causally related to her employment where: (1) the claimant's supervisors testified that she worked no more than 30 minutes at a time on a production line; (2) the claimant first noticed a problem with her hands while she was a supervisor; (3) the claimant often played volleyball, racquetball, and walleyball; and (4) the claimant told a company nurse that she might have to stop playing volleyball and racquetball because her hands hurt, but she never told anyone that her injury was work-related. Arnold v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 64 Ark. App. 245, 983 S.W.2d 444 (1998).

—Stress.

Evidence that employee took his own life because of job-related stress held sufficient, particularly where there was nothing in the record indicating any other possible reason for his suicide. George W. Jackson Mental Health Ctr. v. Lambie, 49 Ark. App. 139, 898 S.W.2d 479 (1995).

—Travel.

In situations where employee's work requires travel on his employer's business, Arkansas has adopted the traveling salesman doctrine. Arkansas Dep't of Health v. Huntley, 12 Ark. App. 287, 675 S.W.2d 845 (1984).

Injuries incurred by employee while traveling on employer's business held to be a natural and probable consequence or incident of her employment and to arise out of and in the course of employment. Arkansas Dep't of Health v. Huntley, 12 Ark. App. 287, 675 S.W.2d 845 (1984).

Inspections.

An insurer, under this section, assumes only the employer's liability to pay compensation and is not required to make safety inspections. Horne v. Security Mut. Cas. Co., 265 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Ark. 1967).

This chapter does not permit an employee's common-law action against a workers' compensation carrier for negligent safety inspections of the employer's premises, as such an action would be contrary to the purposes and policies underlying the chapter. Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1985).

Insurance Coverage.

There is no statute which prohibits an employer and its insurer from excluding health care insurance benefits for injuries or illnesses covered by workers' compensation since, without such a clause, insureds might be allowed double recovery for certain medical or income disability expenses already paid for by workers' compensation; there is no reason why an insurance clause that precludes the prospects of double recovery of medical benefits would be against public policy. Atkins v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 4 Ark. App. 257, 630 S.W.2d 50 (1982).

The employer is required by the state to carry insurance, and the state dictates the rates to be charged. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crist, 664 F. Supp. 1242 (W.D. Ark. 1987), rev'd, 855 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. Ark. 1988).

Obligations of an employee who negligently injured her employer could not arise under this chapter. Estate of Sodorff v. United S. Assurance Co., 980 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D. Ark. 1997).

Intent to Injure.

Where employer willfully assaulted employee, the fact that employee might have recovered under this chapter did not bar employee's action for damages. Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., 217 Ark. 350, 230 S.W.2d 28 (1950).

The willful misconduct or willful intent to injure an employee in a work connected fight which will bar his recovery of workers' compensation for resulting injuries must be premeditated or deliberate and violent. Johnson v. Safreed, 224 Ark. 397, 273 S.W.2d 545 (1954).

Claimant held entitled to benefits for injuries suffered in work-related fight where no willful intent to injure was established. Johnson v. Safreed, 224 Ark. 397, 273 S.W.2d 545 (1954); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. McDowell, 2 Ark. App. 321, 621 S.W.2d 15 (1981); Welch's Laundry & Cleaners v. Clark, 38 Ark. App. 223, 832 S.W.2d 283 (1992).

For claimant's injury to be found noncompensable under subdivision (a)(2), claimant must have had a willful intention to injure himself or another or a willful intention to injure denoting premeditated or deliberate misconduct, rather than a sudden or impulsive act, and have acted with a physical force designed to inflict real injury. Ramirez v. Hudson Foods, Inc., 53 Ark. App. 49, 918 S.W.2d 207 (1996).

Intoxication.

Burden is on the employer to show that employee's death resulted solely from his intoxicated condition. Elm Springs Canning Co. v. Sullins, 207 Ark. 257, 180 S.W.2d 113 (1944) (decision under prior law); Cox Bros. Lumber Co. v. Jones, 220 Ark. 431, 248 S.W.2d 91 (1952) (decision prior to 1976 amendment).

Evidence insufficient to show employee's intoxication caused injury. Cox Bros. Lumber Co. v. Jones, 220 Ark. 431, 248 S.W.2d 91 (1952); Jones Truck Lines v. Letsch, 245 Ark. 982, 436 S.W.2d 282 (1969).

Reference to injuries caused solely by intoxication was not intended to include the effects of medication innocently taken upon the orders of a physician. Jones Truck Lines v. Letsch, 245 Ark. 982, 436 S.W.2d 282 (1969) (decision prior to 1976 amendment).

Evidence supported conclusion that employee's death was “solely occasioned by intoxication.” Goza v. Central Ark. Dev. Council, Inc., 254 Ark. 694, 496 S.W.2d 388 (1973) (decision prior to 1976 amendment).

Evidence supported finding that the claimant's injury was substantially occasioned by his intoxication. Country Pride v. Holly, 3 Ark. App. 216, 624 S.W.2d 443 (1981); Davis v. C & M Tractor Co., 4 Ark. App. 34, 627 S.W.2d 561 (1982); Southwest Pipe & Supply v. Hoover, 13 Ark. App. 144, 680 S.W.2d 723 (1984).

Employer's knowledge of the claimant's propensity to consume alcohol did not estop the employer from raising the defense of intoxication. Davis v. C & M Tractor Co., 4 Ark. App. 34, 627 S.W.2d 561 (1982).

Blood test which indicated that the claimant was intoxicated at the time of his accident held admissible. Davis v. C & M Tractor Co., 4 Ark. App. 34, 627 S.W.2d 561 (1982).

Commission's finding that employer was not estopped to assert the defense of intoxication was supported by substantial evidence. Blevins v. Safeway Stores, 25 Ark. App. 297, 757 S.W.2d 569 (1988).

Multiple Employment.

Where joint employment occurs both employers are liable for workers' compensation. Williams v. National Youth Corps in Sch. Programs, 269 Ark. 649, 600 S.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1980).

Where there is a dual employment and the particular industry in which the injury occurs can be clearly identified, the employer in whose service the employee was acting at the time of his injury should be exclusively liable for the consequences of that injury. Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Mel's Texaco, 8 Ark. App. 236, 651 S.W.2d 101 (1983).

Out-of-State Injury.

An Arkansas resident came under Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law, even though his injury occurred in another state in which all of his employment was performed. International Paper Co. v. Tidwell, 250 Ark. 623, 466 S.W.2d 488 (1971).

Where claimant was injured while working in another state and the only circumstance bearing on jurisdiction was that claimant was an Arkansas resident, and facts connecting the state with the employment per se were entirely lacking, the statutory basis required for the commission's jurisdiction was absent. Patton v. Brown & Root, Inc., 31 Ark. App. 141, 789 S.W.2d 745 (1990).

—Reasonableness of Activity.

In determining whether the claimant's horseback riding was unreasonable under the circumstances, and thus, precluded recovery, Commission should have considered the claimant's knowledge of his condition where the claimant, after horseback riding, suffered a second injury from fainting caused by pain from his work-related injury. Lunsford v. Rich Mt. Elec. Co-op, 33 Ark. App. 66, 800 S.W.2d 732 (1990).

In determining whether recovery for second injury caused by pain from work related injury was precluded by claimant's horseback riding, claimant's belief that the activity had been cleared by his doctor should be considered in determining whether claimant's horseback riding was unreasonable “under the circumstances”. Lunsford v. Rich Mt. Elec. Co-op, 33 Ark. App. 66, 800 S.W.2d 732 (1990).

Third-Party Claim.

In matters involving workers' compensation benefits the employer shall be immune from third-party tortfeasors claim. W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in, Billings v. Aeropres Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Cited: Ellington v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 53 F.R.D. 280 (W.D. Ark. 1971); Green v. Jacuzzi Bros., 269 Ark. 733, 600 S.W.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1980); Kempner's & Dodson Ins. Co. v. Hall, 7 Ark. App. 181, 646 S.W.2d 31 (1983); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Logan, 13 Ark. App. 116, 680 S.W.2d 720 (1984); Pittman v. Wygal Trucking Plant, 16 Ark. App. 232, 700 S.W.2d 59 (1985); Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1985); Sloat Chiropractic Clinic v. Datsun, 17 Ark. App. 161, 706 S.W.2d 181 (1986); Wilhelm v. Parsons, 2016 Ark. App. 56, 481 S.W.3d 767 (2016).