Ark. Code Ann. » Title 11 Chapter 09
Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-502 (2026)

Limitations on compensation — Exceptions

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. The benefits shall be paid for a period not to exceed four hundred fifty (450) weeks of disability, except that this limitation shall not apply in cases of permanent total disability or death.
      1. For injuries occurring on or after March 1, 1981, but on or before December 31, 2007, and a claim for death or permanent total disability benefits filed on or before June 30, 2019, the first seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000) of weekly benefits for death or permanent total disability shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in the manner provided in this chapter.
      2. For injuries occurring on or after January 1, 2008, and a claim for death or permanent total disability benefits filed on or before June 30, 2019, the employer or its insurance carrier shall pay weekly benefits for death or permanent total disability not to exceed three hundred twenty-five (325) times the maximum total disability rate established for the date of the injury under this chapter.
      1. An employee or a dependent of an employee who has filed a claim for death or permanent total disability benefits on or before June 30, 2019, and who receives a total of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000) in weekly benefits for injuries sustained on or before December 31, 2007, shall be eligible to continue to draw benefits at the rates prescribed in this chapter, but all benefits in excess of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000) shall be payable from the Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund.
      2. An employee or a dependent of an employee who has filed a claim for death or permanent total disability benefits on or before June 30, 2019, and who receives the maximum amount specified in subdivision (b)(1)(B) of this section shall be eligible to continue to draw benefits at the rates prescribed by this chapter payable from the trust fund.
    3. The trust fund shall consist of such funds as may be prescribed by law and shall be administered, invested, and disbursed by the Workers' Compensation Commission.
    4. Each employer or the insurance carrier of the employer in each case of death of an employee where there are no dependents shall pay into the trust fund the sum of five hundred dollars ($500).
    1. A claim against the trust fund shall not be filed later than June 30, 2019, regardless of the date of injury or death, or otherwise.
    2. The trust fund is not liable for a claim for permanent total disability or death filed after June 30, 2019.
    3. For a claim for permanent total disability or death filed after June 30, 2019, the employer at the time of the employee's compensable injury is liable for permanent total disability or death benefits under this chapter, excluding this section and any claim pending under § 11-9-525 on June 30, 2019.
    4. Upon satisfaction of the liabilities of the trust fund, the trust fund shall be terminated.

History. Init. Meas. 1948, No. 4, § 10, Acts 1949, p. 1420; Init. Meas. 1956, No. 1, § 1, Acts 1957; Init. Meas. 1968, No. 1, § 1, Acts 1969; Acts 1973, No. 221, § 1; 1979, No. 253, § 2; 1981, No. 290, § 2; 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 10, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1310; Acts 2007, No. 1599, § 1; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 4, §§ 5, 6; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 5, §§ 5, 6.

Amendments. The 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.) amendment by identical acts Nos. 4 and 5 inserted “and a claim for death or permanent total disability benefits filed on or before June 30, 2019” in (b)(1)(A) and (B); inserted “has filed a claim for death or permanent total disability benefits on or before June 30, 2019, and who” in (b)(2)(A) and (B); and added (c).

Research References

ALR.

Workers' Compensation: Value of Expenses Reimbursed by Employer as Factor in Determining Basis for or Calculation of Amount of Compensation Under State Workers' Compensation Statute. 63 A.L.R.6th 187.

Case Notes

Construction.

There is no ambiguity between the language of § 11-9-501(c) and subdivision (b)(1) of this section. Sparks Regional Medical Ctr. v. Death & Permanent Total Disability Bank Fund, 22 Ark. App. 204, 737 S.W.2d 463 (1987).

The General Assembly merely failed to amend former § 81-1313(f)(1) (§§ 11-9-519 to 11-9-526) to conform with this section through oversight and did not intentionally retain the employer's maximum liability at $50,000. The legislature intended a reasonable result and one which allows a worker to receive all the benefits to which he is entitled; therefore, the legislative intent that the employer shall pay the first $75,000 of permanent total disability benefits is manifest and needs no further discussion. Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Whirlpool Corp., 39 Ark. App. 62, 837 S.W.2d 293 (1992).

Attorney's Fees.

Section 11-9-715 is not limited by the application of subsection (b) of this section; thus, award of attorney's fees on the controverted portion of the award in lump sum based upon the present value computation of claimant's compensation benefits, unlimited by subsection (b), but with appropriate credit for fees previously paid, was proper. Hot Spring County Bicentennial Park v. Walker, 271 Ark. 688, 610 S.W.2d 268 (1981).

There is no language in the statutes limiting the award of the attorney's fees to amounts for which the employer and its carrier both controvert and owe; the test is that fees are calculated on the amount controverted and awarded. Hot Spring County Bicentennial Park v. Walker, 271 Ark. 688, 610 S.W.2d 268 (1981).

Classification of Disability.

Payments of compensation characterized as current total disability by the law judge at the time of the initial award, and not appealed from by the employer, cannot now be recharacterized as permanent total disability in order to make the payments apply toward the maximum at which the death and permanent total disability trust fund assumes liability. Safeway Stores v. McGough, 32 Ark. App. 15, 794 S.W.2d 626 (1990).

Credits.

One statute only provides the maximum amount of money an employer must pay as compensation for an employee's work-related death, but the statute is silent on whether a credit for good-faith, but ultimately mistaken, payments may be given; because the widow was not her husband's dependent, the money the employer paid her could not be counted as weekly benefits or compensation, and the payments did not accrue as a credit against the employer's responsibility to the Fund. Royal v. Bypass Diesel & Wrecker, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 90, 432 S.W.3d 139 (2014).

Death Benefits.

Lump sum payments made to surviving spouses upon remarriage pursuant to § 11-9-527 were not death benefits; thus, the employer was not entitled to credit for death benefits paid. Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 304 Ark. 359, 801 S.W.2d 653 (1991).

It is not inconsistent with the limitations on liability found in this section to require an employer or its carrier to pay a lump sum benefit to a widow, pursuant to § 11-9-527(d)(1). Ft. Smith v. Tate, 311 Ark. 405, 844 S.W.2d 356 (Ark. 1993).

Disability Payments.

Employer was not entitled to credit its weekly temporary total disability payments against the statutory limit of weekly benefits as that limit applied only to weekly indemnity benefits paid for permanent and total disability. Sparks Regional Medical Ctr. v. Death & Permanent Total Disability Bank Fund, 22 Ark. App. 204, 737 S.W.2d 463 (1987). See J.A. Riggs Tractor Co. v. Etzkorn, 30 Ark. App. 200, 785 S.W.2d 51 (1990).

Insurance carrier was entitled to credit for payments made toward a twenty-nine percent permanent-anatomical-impairment rating against its $75,000 maximum liability for permanent-total-disability benefits as the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission effectively adopted December 10 as the date that payments for temporary-total-disability benefits ended and permanent disability payments began; all payments made after December 10, 2002, were classified by the Commission as permanent-total-disability payments that could be applied towards the $75,000 maximum. Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Legacy Ins. Servs., 95 Ark. App. 189, 235 S.W.3d 544 (2006).

Employer's Liability.

The limit on an employer or carrier's liability under this section applies only to weekly benefits; the employer or carrier is still responsible for any benefits in addition to weekly compensation to which the claimant is entitled. It is therefore not inconsistent with the limitations on liability found in this section to require the employer or carrier to pay the lump sum benefit under § 11-9-527(d)(1). City of Fort Smith v. Tate, 38 Ark. App. 172, 832 S.W.2d 262 (1992), aff'd, 311 Ark. 405, 844 S.W.2d 356 (Ark. 1993).

Although the limit on an employer or its carrier's liability under this section applies only to weekly benefits, an employer or its carrier is still responsible for any benefits in addition to weekly compensation to which the claimant is entitled. Ft. Smith v. Tate, 311 Ark. 405, 844 S.W.2d 356 (Ark. 1993).

Because the limit on an employer's or insurance carrier's liability in subsection (b) of this section applied only to weekly benefits, they were responsible for the remarriage benefit described in § 11-9-527(d)(1), even after the $75,000 cap was reached. Ark. Elec. Co-Op Corp. v. Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund, 2012 Ark. App. 13 (2012).

Fund.

Subsection (b) does not require that each dependent must draw the limit in weekly funds before becoming eligible to draw from the fund. Hill v. CGR Medical Corp., 282 Ark. 35, 665 S.W.2d 274 (Ark. 1984).

The provision of subsection (b) that the liability of the fund arises only after the limit of weekly benefits has been paid by the carrier and received by the dependents prevents acceleration of the date of liability for the fund because the credit for payments of compensation in advance can only be allowed in the weekly amounts as they fall due. Hill v. CGR Medical Corp., 282 Ark. 35, 665 S.W.2d 274 (Ark. 1984).

Where the initial obligation of the carrier had been discharged in part by payment of weekly benefits and the balance by waiving its right as subrogee to participate in a recovery from a third-party tortfeasor in consideration for not being required to pay future weekly benefits to the widow and dependents of a deceased worker, the fund would become liable on the date the carrier's limitation would have been discharged had there been no settlement. Hill v. CGR Medical Corp., 282 Ark. 35, 665 S.W.2d 274 (Ark. 1984).

Healing Period.

Claimant's contention that further litigation was not precluded regarding his healing period held without merit where the requirements of collateral estoppel were satisfied; the determination of the end of the healing period was essential to the judgment because the issue in the prior litigation was whether the claimant was permanently and totally disabled, and a finding of permanent impairment necessarily entailed a determination of the end of the healing period. Pine Bluff Whse. v. Berry, 51 Ark. App. 139, 912 S.W.2d 11 (1995).

Recurrent Injury.

Additional benefits denied where claimant failed to prove that either his degree of permanent physical impairment or his degree of permanent partial disability increased as a result of his recurrence; any wage loss claimant suffered was a result of his first injury and not his recurrence. Weldon v. Pierce Bros. Constr., 54 Ark. App. 344, 925 S.W.2d 179 (1996).

Cited: Wilson & Co. v. Christman, 244 Ark. 132, 424 S.W.2d 863 (1968); Continental Ins. Co. v. Richard, 268 Ark. 671, 596 S.W.2d 332 (Ct. App. 1980); Hunter Wasson Pulpwood v. Banks, 270 Ark. 404, 605 S.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1980); Harrison Furn. v. Chrobak, 2 Ark. App. 364, 620 S.W.2d 955 (1981); City of Waldo v. Poetker, 275 Ark. 216, 628 S.W.2d 329 (1982); Oller v. Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 5 Ark. App. 307, 635 S.W.2d 276 (1982); Moro, Inc. v. Davis, 6 Ark. App. 92, 638 S.W.2d 694 (1982); Farm Air Corp. v. Reader, 11 Ark. App. 72, 666 S.W.2d 717 (1984); Bemberg Iron Work v. Martin, 12 Ark. App. 128, 671 S.W.2d 768 (1984); Calion Lumber Co. v. Goff, 14 Ark. App. 18, 684 S.W.2d 272 (1985); Marianna School Dist. v. Vanderburg, 16 Ark. App. 271, 700 S.W.2d 381 (1985); Glenn v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D. Ark. 1986); Ashby v. Arkansas Vinegar Co., 22 Ark. App. 167, 737 S.W.2d 177 (1987); Noggle v. Arkansas Valley Elec. Coop., 31 Ark. App. 104, 788 S.W.2d 497 (1990); Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Branum, 82 Ark. App. 338, 107 S.W.3d 876 (2003).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1990–2023 · leading case: City of Fort Smith v. Tate, 844 S.W.2d 356 (Ark. 1993).
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City of Fort Smith v. Tate, 844 S.W.2d 356 (Ark. 1993). · cites it 12× “At the time of Tate’s death, the maximum liability of an employer or its carrier in weekly benefits was $50,000.00. Appellants reached payment of the maximum amount in August of 1988.”
Weldon v. Pierce Bros. Constr., 925 S.W.2d 179 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 4× “Wage loss is a component of permanent partial disability benefits under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-502 (b). A claimant may receive permanent partial disability benefits to the extent that his disability exceeds his percentage of physical impairment.”
Skinner v. Tango Transp., Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 304 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 4× “1 were obligated to make dual payments of PPD and PTD and that they were not entitled to any credit for the PPD payments toward their maximum obligation of $182,650 for PTD benefits pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-502. Appellant further contended that he was…”
J.A. Riggs Tractor Co. v. Etzkorn, 785 S.W.2d 51 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 4× “Based on the foregoing, we are unwilling to depart from the above and other decisions which have given these words their idiomatic meanings and decline to reverse or modify our decision in Sparks which applies those meanings to Arkansas Code Annotated Section 11-9-502. Regarding…”
Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Whirlpool Corp., 837 S.W.2d 293 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “The question of whether the $50,000 limit on an employer’s liability provided for in § 81-1313 (f) (1) has been superseded by the $75,000 limit provided for in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-502 is not properly before us in this case; the employer stipulated to its liability to the…”
Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Brewer, 65 S.W.3d 463 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “The Commission found that pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-502(b) (Repl.1996), the employer/insurance carrier met its liability for indemnity benefits on October 2, 1998.”
Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Legacy Ins. Servs., 235 S.W.3d 544 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 8× “This appeal from the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) presents the question of whether an insurance carrier is entitled to a credit for payments made toward a twenty-nine percent permanent-anatomical-impairment rating against its $75,000 maximum liabiHty…”
City of Fort Smith v. Tate, 832 S.W.2d 262 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 5× “Section 11-9-502 specifically provided at the time of Tate’s death that the employer’s liability for weekly benefits ceased at $50,000 and that the Fund thereafter became liable for benefits.”
Death & Permanent Disability Trust Fund v. Anderson, 125 S.W.3d 819 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 4× “The Commission remanded the case to the law judge for further development of issues, including whether the Trust Fund should credit the benefits paid by the Municipal League during the time periods in question against the limitations imposed by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-502 . The…”
Kymira Gant v. First Step, Inc., & Risk Mgmt. Resources, 2023 Ark. App. 393 (Ark. Ct. App. 2023). “However, this section contemplates an employee who has returned to work but, because of a temporary partial disability, is not earning the same wages as before the injury.”
Death & Perm. Total Disabi. v. Legacy Ins., 235 S.W.3d 544 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 14× “Appellant does not challenge the Commission's determination on the admissibility of the actuarial valuation study; instead, for reversal, appellant asserts only that the Commission erred in its interpretations of Ark.”
Death & Permanent Total Disability Fund v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 798 S.W.2d 120 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “1976), now codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-502 (1987), is one of the applicable statutes in question as the date of death was August 27, 1979.”
Show all 13 citing cases →
— Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-502(b) — 3 cases
Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Brewer, 65 S.W.3d 463 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002). “The Commission found that pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-502(b) (Repl.1996), the employer/insurance carrier met its liability for indemnity benefits on October 2, 1998.”
Weldon v. Pierce Bros. Constr., 925 S.W.2d 179 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996). “Wage loss is a component of permanent partial disability benefits under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-502 (b). A claimant may receive permanent partial disability benefits to the extent that his disability exceeds his percentage of physical impairment.”
Death & Perm. Total Disabi. v. Legacy Ins., 235 S.W.3d 544 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006). “Appellant does not challenge the Commission's determination on the admissibility of the actuarial valuation study; instead, for reversal, appellant asserts only that the Commission erred in its interpretations of Ark.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-502(b)(1) — 1 case
J.A. Riggs Tractor Co. v. Etzkorn, 785 S.W.2d 51 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990). “Based on the foregoing, we are unwilling to depart from the above and other decisions which have given these words their idiomatic meanings and decline to reverse or modify our decision in Sparks which applies those meanings to Arkansas Code Annotated Section 11-9-502. Regarding…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-502(b)(1)(B) — 1 case
Royal v. Bypass Diesel & Wrecker, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 90 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014).
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