Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-506 (2020)
Limitations on compensation — Recipients of unemployment benefits
- Any other provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, no compensation in any amount for temporary total, temporary partial, or permanent total disability shall be payable to an injured employee with respect to any week for which the injured employee receives unemployment insurance benefits under the Division of Workforce Services Law, § 11-10-101 et seq., or the unemployment insurance law of any other state.
- Provided, however, if a claim for temporary total disability is controverted and later determined to be compensable, temporary total disability shall be payable to an injured employee with respect to any week for which the injured employee receives unemployment benefits but only to the extent that the temporary total disability otherwise payable exceeds the unemployment benefits.
History. Init. Meas. 1948, No. 4, § 10, Acts 1949, p. 1420; Init. Meas. 1956, No. 1, § 1, Acts 1957; Init. Meas. 1968, No. 1, § 1, Acts 1969; Acts 1981, No. 290, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1310; Acts 1993, No. 796, § 18; 2019, No. 910, § 171.
A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 1757, § 9, provided in part:
“Nothing in the act, which originated as House Bill 2646 of 2001, nor in Act 1552 of 1999 shall impliedly repeal any part of Act 796 of 1993. Act 796 of 1993 is expressly reaffirmed by this act, which originated as House Bill 2646 of 2001.”
Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Workforce Services Law” for “Department of Workforce Services Law” in (a).
Case Notes
Partial Disability Benefits.
This section by its language is limited to temporary total disability and permanent total disability, and the receipt of temporary or permanent partial disability benefits is not precluded. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Laymance, 38 Ark. App. 55, 828 S.W.2d 356 (1992).
Social Security Benefits.
There is no exception for excluding compensation to persons who are eligible for or are drawing social security benefits. Cohn v. Haile, 267 Ark. 734, 589 S.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1979).
Unemployment Benefits.
Workers' compensation commission erred in determining that claimant was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits after the date he began receiving unemployment benefits because the claim fell within subsection (b) of this section; thus, the case was remanded to the commission for a factual determination regarding whether claimant remained within his healing period and suffered a total incapacity to earn wages after his receipt of unemployment compensation began. King v. Peopleworks, 97 Ark. App. 105, 244 S.W.3d 729 (2006).
Allen Canning Co. v. Woodruff, 92 Ark. App. 237 (2005), does not stand for the proposition that a workers' compensation claimant's receipt of unemployment benefits acts as a complete bar to temporary total disability benefits when the receipt of unemployment benefits ends. King v. Peopleworks, 97 Ark. App. 105, 244 S.W.3d 729 (2006).
Wages.
Disability which is compensable is based upon incapacity to earn because of injury; the payment of full wages during a compensable disability does not negate the incapacity to earn but may, in proper circumstances, dispense with the requirement that compensation benefits be paid under § 11-9-807. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ark. App. 92, 661 S.W.2d 433 (1983).
Where claimant was incapacitated to earn the wages he was receiving at the time of his accident and the incapacitation continued for a long enough period to entitle him to benefits, he sustained a compensable injury within the meaning of § 11-9-702 and the statute of limitations began running at that time, notwithstanding that the claimant was paid full wages during period of incapacitation. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ark. App. 92, 661 S.W.2d 433 (1983).
Cited: Wilson & Co. v. Christman, 244 Ark. 132, 424 S.W.2d 863 (1968); Continental Ins. Co. v. Richard, 268 Ark. 671, 596 S.W.2d 332 (Ct. App. 1980); Hunter Wasson Pulpwood v. Banks, 270 Ark. 404, 605 S.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1980); Harrison Furn. v. Chrobak, 2 Ark. App. 364, 620 S.W.2d 955 (1981); City of Waldo v. Poetker, 275 Ark. 216, 628 S.W.2d 329 (1982); Oller v. Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 5 Ark. App. 307, 635 S.W.2d 276 (1982); Moro, Inc. v. Davis, 6 Ark. App. 92, 638 S.W.2d 694 (1982); Farm Air Corp. v. Reader, 11 Ark. App. 72, 666 S.W.2d 717 (1984); Bemberg Iron Work v. Martin, 12 Ark. App. 128, 671 S.W.2d 768 (1984); Calion Lumber Co. v. Goff, 14 Ark. App. 18, 684 S.W.2d 272 (1985); Marianna School Dist. v. Vanderburg, 16 Ark. App. 271, 700 S.W.2d 381 (1985); Glenn v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D. Ark. 1986); Ashby v. Arkansas Vinegar Co., 22 Ark. App. 167, 737 S.W.2d 177 (1987); Hampton & Crain v. Black, 34 Ark. App. 77, 806 S.W.2d 21 (1991); Allen Canning Co. v. Woodruff, 92 Ark. App. 237, 212 S.W.3d 25 (2005).