Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-508 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Workers' Compensation: Value of Expenses Reimbursed by Employer as Factor in Determining Basis for or Calculation of Amount of Compensation Under State Workers' Compensation Statute. 63 A.L.R.6th 187.

Construction and Application of State Workers' Compensation Laws to Claim for Hearing Loss — Resulting from Single Traumatic Accident or Event. 90 A.L.R.6th 425.

Case Notes

In General.

The cost of medicine and medical, surgical, or hospital services provided under this chapter is a part of “compensation” provided for by it. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956).

The right to medical benefits is separate and distinct from the right to income benefits and medical benefits can continue even after the income benefits cease. Mad Butcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in, Wright Contracting Co. v. Randall, 12 Ark. App. 358, 676 S.W.2d 750 (1984) (decided under prior law).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in denying payment for expenses incurred for prescribed medications over the time period at issue as there was proof that employee's authorized physician and several successive physicians prescribed the medications to relieve pain associated with employee's compensable injury; further, there was no evidence that some of the medications were unrelated to the medical treatment employee was receiving for his work-related injury. Hamilton v. Gregory Trucking & Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 90 Ark. App. 248, 205 S.W.3d 181 (2005).

Additional Benefits.

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that the claim for additional benefits was barred by the statute of limitations, because the conclusion that the entry of the agreed order resolved the request for additional benefits and effectively adjudicated the claim for additional benefits ignored the statutory language allowing for an injured employee to pursue additional benefits when the need indisputably arose within the statutory framework; the case was never dismissed pursuant to § 11-9-702(d), and the agreed order granted a continuing award of benefits which included the physician referral. Curtis v. Big Lots, 2009 Ark. App. 292, 307 S.W.3d 37 (2009).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in denying the employee's request for additional temporary total and medical benefits under subsection (a) of this section, as substantial evidence supported the finding that the employee had received treatment for a compensable injury and his other problems were not casually related to the compensable injury. Cole v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 2009 Ark. App. 617 (2009).

When the employee suffered a compensable neck injury, physical therapy was unsuccessful and two doctors recommended injection therapy as a reasonable treatment alternative. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred by refusing to require the employer to provide additional medical care under subsection (a) of this section. Foster v. Kann Enters., 2009 Ark. App. 746, 350 S.W.3d 796 (2009).

Workers' Compensation Commission decision that an employee was entitled to additional medical benefits to cover the cost of surgery was supported by substantial evidence, even though several doctors opined that spinal surgery would be to correct a congenital condition and not an injury related to a work-related incident. Because the Commission discussed the opinions of all of the doctors who evaluated the employee, it did not arbitrarily disregard any evidence; the Commission was simply confronted with opposing medical opinions and chose to accept the opinion of the physician whom the Commission found to be most credible. SSI, Inc. v. Cates, 2009 Ark. App. 763, 350 S.W.3d 421 (2009).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's conclusion that a claimant's subsequent back surgery was unrelated to a compensable back injury and, therefore, not reasonably necessary treatment for that injury where the claimant had a pre-existing back injury and the claimant's surgeon never attributed the need for surgery to the compensable injury. Parker v. Stant Mfg., 2009 Ark. App. 812 (2009).

Substantial evidence supported an award of additional medical benefits under subsection (a) of this section where one of the claimant's doctors was of the opinion that the claimant needed ongoing medical treatment in the form of pain management and two doctors testified that the claimant should continue treatment of psychological disorders associated with reflex sympathetic dystrophy. Evans v. Bemis Co., 2010 Ark. App. 65, 374 S.W.3d 51 (2010).

In a case in which a workers' compensation claimant appealed a Workers' Compensation Commission's (Commission) denial of her request for additional medical benefits in the form of medication for pain management, an administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Commission determined that the compensable injury, limited in the present case to an ice-bucket lifting incident, did not cause the need for pain management two years later. There was evidence upon which the ALJ could find that the March 16, 2005 injury had resolved by the end of March 2005. Gilbert v. Sonic Drive-in, 2010 Ark. App. 273 (2010).

Decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission to deny an employee any further medical treatment was supported by substantial evidence even though the court of appeals could have reached a different result because although the medical testimony conflicted, resolving the conflicting medical evidence, making credibility determinations, and deciding what weight to give particular pieces of evidence was within the Commission's province; the Commission's opinion was very detailed and thorough, and it went over the medical records and opinions of the many doctors who treated and evaluated the employee. Adams v. Bemis Co., 2010 Ark. App. 859 (2010).

Substantial evidence supported the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's award of additional medical benefits to a claimant as the evidence supported a finding that neurostimulation was a reasonable and necessary medical expense under subsection (a) of this section related to the claimant's compensable neck injury. LVL, Inc. v. Ragsdale, 2011 Ark. App. 144, 381 S.W.3d 869 (2011).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in denying an employee's claim for additional benefits in the form of pain management because evidence supporting the Commission's finding that a neurosurgeon did not recommend additional treatment was the neurosurgeon's final release to work, no recommended follow-up care, and the contradiction between the medical records and the employee's testimony that his doctors recently treated his pain with prescriptions. Santillan v. Tyson Sales & Distrib., 2011 Ark. App. 634, 386 S.W.3d 566 (2011).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in awarding an employee additional benefits because substantial evidence supported its finding that additional medical treatment was reasonably necessary and that the employee remained within his healing period and unable to earn wages; the employer failed to give the employee the change-of-physician form after his injury, and thus, the employee was not required to petition the Commission in order to be treated by a competent doctor. St. Joseph's Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Redmond, 2012 Ark. App. 7, 388 S.W.3d 45 (2012).

Where appellee employee sustained an injury when a forklift struck him in his hip and back, substantial evidence supported the award of additional medical treatment under subsection (a) of this section for an MRI of his lumbar spine, pain management and medication, and psychological treatment of his anxiety and depression. His doctor's reports contained findings of emotional problems caused by the injury and recommended additional treatment for pain management; there was no contradicting doctor's opinion. Tyson Chicken, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 2012 Ark. App. 99 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied appellant's claim for additional medical benefits. Reasonable persons could conclude that appellant, who sustained a compensable medial meniscus tear in his left knee, failed to prove that the requested medical treatment was reasonably necessary in connection with his compensable injury. Castaneda v. Lexicon, Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 103 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision denying a claim for additional medical treatment under subsection (a) of this section was supported by substantial evidence, because claimant's hip was normal from a neurological standpoint and a doctor testified there was no reasonable expectation that hip replacement would improve claimant's condition. Cumbie v. Bost Human Dev. Serv., 2012 Ark. App. 389 (2012).

Decision to deny a claimant's request for additional medical benefits under subsection (a) of this section was supported by substantial evidence since the Workers' Compensation Commission elected to credit a doctor's note, which stated that the claimant's subjective complaints of pain exceeded the other objective findings and returned her to work without restrictions, over another report recommending conservative treatment substantially similar to what the claimant had already received. Belcher v. River Valley Health & Rehab, 2012 Ark. App. 527 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission's opinion displayed a substantial basis under subsection (a) of this section for denying additional medical treatment received by an employee after July 9, 2010, which included both of the employee's back surgeries, because after reporting a compensable injury to the employer in April 2008, the employee continued to work and did not seek medical treatment until July 2008. Towler v. Tyson Poultry, Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 546, 423 S.W.3d 664 (2012).

In a workers' compensation case, substantial evidence supported a decision that a claimant was not entitled to additional medical treatment for his left elbow; although two tests revealed a tear of a distal-biceps tendon in the elbow, a more recent test did not reveal that injury. Moreover, a doctor opined that surgery would not have improved the claimant's elbow complaints. Greene v. Cockram Concrete Co., 2012 Ark. App. 691 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err by awarding benefits for additional and continued medical treatment under subsection (a) of this section for a knee replacement surgery recommended by claimant's doctor after she suffered a knee injury at work; because claimant was working when she sustained the compensable injury and was unable to work after the injury, substantial evidence indicated the injury was not merely a temporary aggravation of a preexisting condition. Saline Mem'l Hosp. & Risk Mgmt. Res. v. Smith, 2013 Ark. App. 29 (2013).

Worker claimed that the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision to deny her claim for additional medical treatment was not supported by substantial evidence, but the court affirmed given in part that the Commission decided, as was its province, to credit one doctor's testimony over another's, and the one doctor's testimony indicated that he did not find surgery was necessary. Lawrence v. St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr., 2013 Ark. App. 546 (2013).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's award of additional medical services recommended by a doctor because the Commission found the doctor's testimony that the employee's joint pain was related to the fact that he had a lumbar fusion to be probative evidence demonstrating that his need for additional medical treatment was related to the reasonably necessary fusion surgery, and the court was unable to say that reasonable minds could not have come to the decision of the Commission. Jordan v. Home Depot, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 572, 430 S.W.3d 136 (2013).

Award of additional medical treatment for claimant's reflex sympathetic dystrophy was appropriate because substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that additional treatment was reasonable and necessary. Walker v. Fresenius Med. Care Holding, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 322, 436 S.W.3d 164 (2014).

In a workers' compensation case, substantial evidence supported a decision to award a benefits claimant additional medical treatment under this section because it was up to the Workers' Compensation Commission to resolve conflicting medical evidence, and it chose to give greater weight to a neurosurgeon's recommendations. Shiloh Nursing & Rehab, LLC v. Lawson, 2014 Ark. App. 433, 439 S.W.3d 696 (2014).

Award of additional medical treatment was affirmed where the hospital diagnosed the housekeeper with a a knee sprain and referred her to her treating orthopedic surgeon for a previous knee injury, the surgeon reexamined the housekeeper and determined that she had suffered a new injury and was worried about an ACL re-tear, and the surgeon recommended an MRI to understand the extent of her injury. Best Western Inn v. Paul, 2014 Ark. App. 520, 443 S.W.3d 551 (2014).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly decided to award an employee additional medical treatment because substantial evidence was presented that her injury aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the condition to cause her current disabling condition and need for medical treatment; the Commission gave credence to a doctor's note that the employee's pain was the result of a work-related injury and that the employee was not having any back or leg symptoms prior to the injury. Emergency Ambulance Serv. v. Burnett, 2015 Ark. App. 288, 462 S.W.3d 369 (2015).

Finding that claimant had not proven that he was entitled to any additional medical treatment in the form of pain management was not supported by substantial evidence; instead of denying additional narcotic medications based on the evidence of the claimant's addiction history, the Workers' Compensation Commission found that he had not proven that any additional medical treatment in the form of pain management as recommended by a doctor was reasonable or related to his work injury, but there was no medical proof that the claimant's condition did not warrant further treatment. Rice v. Boyd Metals, 2015 Ark. App. 443, 468 S.W.3d 297 (2015).

Employer had not shown that it raised any argument regarding construction of reasonable and necessary under this section to the Workers' Compensation Commission, and the employer was simply questioning the employee's need for additional physical therapy and its appropriateness for her injury, which were factual questions for the Commission. There was substantial evidence to support the award of additional medical treatment in the form of physical therapy, given the physical therapist's opinion and the doctor's opinion that the employee needed physical therapy. Univ. of Ark. Pub. Employee Claims Div. v. Tocci, 2015 Ark. App. 505, 471 S.W.3d 218 (2015).

Substantial evidence supported a finding that a benefits claimant was entitled to additional treatment for a knee injury; the claimant was released from medical care with a 2% permanent impairment rating in 2012 after undergoing surgery for a torn meniscus, and he contended that he continued to suffer chronic pain and instability. The weight of the evidence, the interpretation of the medical evidence, and the credibility of the claimant's testimony were matters for the Workers' Compensation Commission to decide. Get Rid of It Ark. v. Graham, 2016 Ark. App. 88 (2016).

In a workers' compensation case, an additional surgery recommended for a compensable right shoulder injury was reasonable and necessary under this section because a claimant had an obvious deformity to his right shoulder and continued to have functional limitations and pain after four prior surgeries. Another medical opinion was not relied on because that evaluation was performed a year earlier, and the claimant's condition continued to deteriorate during the intervening time period. Ark. Dep't of Parks & Tourism v. Price, 2016 Ark. App. 109 (2016).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in affirming and adopting the administrative law judge's award of additional medical benefits to the claimant for the treatment of his compensable shoulder injury as the Commission's decision to award the claimant additional medical benefits in the form of distal clavicle resection surgery was supported by substantial evidence. Two doctors expressed opinions that the resection was necessary to address the claimant's work-related injury; the claimant testified that he had no problem performing his work duties prior to the 2012 injury and that he had never before experienced similar pain; and the claimant would not have required the surgery but for the compensable injury. Aramark & Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs. v. Stone, 2016 Ark. App. 184, 486 S.W.3d 806 (2016).

Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that an employee failed to prove entitlement to additional medical treatment because reasonable minds could not come to the conclusion that further medical treatment for carpal-tunnel syndrome was not reasonable and necessary; there was no evidence that the left carpal-tunnel syndrome had resolved, that the healing period for the injury had ended, or that maximum medical improvement had been declared regarding it. Bennett v. Tyson Poultry, Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 479, 504 S.W.3d 653 (2016).

Additional medical treatment, including the recommended left carpal tunnel release surgery, was properly required under this section where objective nerve-conduction studies confirmed the ongoing presence of carpal tunnel, and the treating physician had recommended surgery. Nucor Yamato Steel Co. v. Kennedy, 2017 Ark. App. 126, 513 S.W.3d 895 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that the claimant had proved entitlement to additional medical treatment (back surgery) because, after being informed about the claimant's recovery and return to work after a prior back surgery, the claimant's second doctor ultimately concluded that there was not much doubt in his mind that the claimant's need for further treatment occurred as a result of the May 2015 work-related injury; and, although the claimant's first doctor opined that the proposed surgery was not related to the work injury and would not alleviate the claimant's pain, he acknowledged that the second doctor subscribed to a different school of thought regarding whether the surgery would benefit the claimant's condition. Wright Steel & Mach., Inc. v. Heimer, 2017 Ark. App. 643, 535 S.W.3d 311 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in granting additional medical treatment to the claimant, specifically, the recommended spinal surgery, because the Commission was confronted with multiple medical opinions and credited the first doctor's recommendation for spinal surgery; and an independent peer-review report regarding the claimant's proposed treatment agreed with the first doctor's recommendation and opined that the proposed spinal surgery was indicated and medically appropriate. Ark. Health Ctr. v. Burnett, 2018 Ark. App. 427, 558 S.W.3d 408 (2018).

Claimant proved her entitlement to additional medical treatment for the compensable injury to her left knee; although the claimant had an extensive history of problems with her left knee before the compensable injury, the claimant's charge nurse when she worked for the employer testified that the claimant was able to do her job without any problems and never complained about her knee or had to use a cane, but, after the injury, she had to wear a metal brace and use crutches, could not drive, and was unable to do anything but sit-down jobs; and the administrative law judge concluded that the work-related incident aggravated her prior knee problems and that the need for surgery was causally related to the work-related incident. Baxter Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Ferris, 2018 Ark. App. 625, 565 S.W.3d 149 (2018).

Although compensable injuries must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, and complaints of pain are not objective medical findings as objective findings are those that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient, a claimant who has sustained a compensable injury is not required to offer objective medical evidence to prove entitlement to additional benefits. Macsteel v. Hindmarsh, 2019 Ark. App. 458, 588 S.W.3d 53 (2019).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that a claimant was entitled to additional medical treatment in the form of surgery; although the Commission was confronted with competing and differing medical opinions from multiple doctors, the Commission weighed the evidence, gave greater credibility to the opinion of the only doctor who actually examined the claimant, and concluded from the evidence before it that the requested surgery was reasonable and necessary. Macsteel v. Hindmarsh, 2019 Ark. App. 458, 588 S.W.3d 53 (2019).

Award of ongoing pain management was affirmed where the parties stipulated that the claimant had sustained a compensable lower-back injury, and her credible testimony, together with the medical records documenting a worsening of symptoms, was sufficient to prove a causal connection between the claimant's continued need for treatment and the work-related injury. Univ. of Cent. Ark. v. Srite, 2019 Ark. App. 511, 588 S.W.3d 849 (2019).

Decision by Worker's Compensation Commission to award additional medical treatment to claimant in the form of spinal-fusion surgery was affirmed; in view of opposing medical evidence, it could not be said that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Robertson, 2019 Ark. App. 24, 567 S.W.3d 899 (2019).

Additional Benefits Denied.

Medical evidence supported the finding that the worker failed to prove that she was entitled to additional medical treatment for her back injury, as one doctor reported there was nothing else that could be done, two doctors concluded that she was not a candidate for surgery, and one found she had reached maximum medical improvement; medical documents showed she had been complaining of left hip and leg pain before sustaining her work injury, and the decision to deny additional treatment for her back injury had a substantial basis. Pratt v. Rheem Mfg., 2013 Ark. App. 577 (2013).

Workers' compensation claimant was not entitled to additional medical treatment in the form of pain management where great weight was given to a doctor's opinion finding that the claimant's 1993 muscle strain had long since healed and did not require ongoing medical treatment. Cossey v. Pepsi Beverage Co., 2015 Ark. App. 265, 460 S.W.3d 814 (2015).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in denying the former employee's claim for additional medical treatment because the employee failed to prove a causal connection between the compensable injury to his left foot and his peripheral artery disease (PAD). The record was devoid of any medical evidence that the claimant's PAD was work-related. One month after the compensable injury, when the first doctor diagnosed PAD, he did not relate that diagnosis to the work-related accident; a second doctor reported that the PAD was not work-related; and the claimant's vascular problems were bilateral and were detected in both legs commencing at or just below the hips, continuing through the thighs all the way to the feet. Thomas v. Superior Indus., 2015 Ark. App. 335, 463 S.W.3d 748 (2015).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision displayed a substantial basis for the denial of benefits, as the claimant failed to carry his burden of proving that a left-shoulder arthroscopy or rotator-cuff repair was reasonably necessary in connection with the prior compensable right-shoulder injury. Ingram v. Tyson Mexican Original, 2015 Ark. App. 519 (2015).

There was substantial evidence to support the denial of additional medical treatment as not related to the claimant's 2011 or 2013 work injuries; her recent compensable strain injuries were deemed resolved after nearly five months of treatment, and while the claimant testified that the conditions worsened after the May 2013 incident, her credibility was in issue, and it was noted that she had been released from care after her 2011 accident because her physician found her to be dishonest in her reporting and that she had been malingering. Mullin v. Duckwall ALCO, 2016 Ark. App. 122, 484 S.W.3d 283 (2016).

Because a claimant withdrew her contention that she had also sustained a compensable back injury as a result of her accident, the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that she failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to additional medical treatment in the form of a lumbar MRI for her compensable leg injury was supported by substantial evidence. Jones v. N. Ark. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2016 Ark. App. 234, 490 S.W.3d 664 (2016).

Workers' Compensation Commission's opinion displayed a substantial basis for denying an employee's claim for additional medical treatment related to her compensable right-shoulder injury because the Commission found that the employee's later shoulder complaints were not related to her original compensable injury; the Commission cited to a doctor's opinion that the employee's shoulder pain had resolved and that no further diagnostic testing or treatment was needed. Bennett v. Tyson Poultry, Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 479, 504 S.W.3d 653 (2016).

Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of a request for additional medical benefits was supported by substantial evidence where the medical testimony showed the worker suffered no pain and no inflammation, he had full range of motion following the shoulder surgery, a fall at home caused him to seek emergency medical treatment, and his complaints of increased pain did not occur until after his eight-month employment with a second employer. Lovejoy v. Ken's Signs, 2017 Ark. App. 124, 513 S.W.3d 905 (2017).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that an employee was not entitled to additional medical treatment where the medical records and deposition testimony did not support her assertion that her injury remained unchanged, she had been involved in motor vehicle accidents and ceased going to physical therapy on her own accord, and she worked without restriction before and after being released from medical care. Jones v. Target Corp., 2017 Ark. App. 199, 518 S.W.3d 119 (2017).

Substantial evidence supported the decision to deny the claimant additional medical benefits for treatment by his doctor where the claimant's pain and therapy had been unchanged for nearly 10 years. Ayers v. Tyson Poultry, Inc., 2018 Ark. App. 206, 547 S.W.3d 123 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that the claimant was not entitled to additional physical therapy for a compensable low-back injury where a physician's opinion and medical records showed that he had already gained the ability to walk unassisted and without a limp and that his condition had stabilized. Ayers v. Tyson Poultry, Inc., 2018 Ark. App. 206, 547 S.W.3d 123 (2018).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision denying a claimant's request for additional temporary total disability benefits was supported by substantial evidence where three medical opinions that his cervicothoracic syrinx was not causally related to his work-related motor vehicle accident conflicted with a fourth physician's report, and the Commission had accepted the medical opinions finding no causal relationship. Page v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Company/AT&T, Inc., 2019 Ark. App. 521, 590 S.W.3d 740 (2019).

Adequate Medical Services.

Finding in favor of the employee in a workers' compensation action was proper where the employee exercised her absolute, statutory right to a one-time change of physician pursuant to § 11-9-514(a)(3)(A)(ii); thus, the employer and carrier were required to pay for the initial visit to the new physician in order to fulfill their obligation to provide adequate medical services under the provisions of this section. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Brown, 82 Ark. App. 600, 120 S.W.3d 153 (2003).

Workers' Compensation Commission erred as a matter of law by not granting the claimant a change of physician after her initial change-of-physician doctor died. O'Guinn v. Little River Mem'l Hosp., 2013 Ark. App. 593, 430 S.W.3d 150 (2013).

Purpose.

Primary duty to provide medical and hospital care is upon the employer, not the insurance carrier; the basic legislative purpose is to furnish the services to the injured workman, not to enrich him by monetary payment for a loss not actually suffered. McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 234 Ark. 113, 350 S.W.2d 608 (1961).

Attorney's Fee.

Where a judgment is obtained in a workers' compensation case against an employer and his insurer requiring payment for future medical services, the commission can require the employer and his insurer to report the amounts expended so as to determine attorney's fee. Ragon v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 224 Ark. 387, 273 S.W.2d 524 (1954).

Doctor, who was represented by his counsel was entitled to an attorney's fee in a sum determined by the Workers' Compensation Commission, inasmuch as a fee would have been recoverable if the doctor's claim had been represented by claimant's attorney. Hulvey v. Kellwood Co., 262 Ark. 564, 559 S.W.2d 153 (1977).

Challenge to Treatment.

Commission rejected the employer's claims including that the doctor's opinion was inaccurate, and it followed that the arguments failed to support the employer's challenge to the medical treatment for the compensable injury. Firestone Bldg. Prods. v. Hopson, 2013 Ark. App. 618, 430 S.W.3d 162 (2013).

Claimant was entitled to additional medical treatment because the claimant's treating physician, who evaluated the claimant on multiple occasions for preexisting knee injuries before the claimants' accident, opined that the claimant needed additional medical treatment for a compensable knee injury in the form of a recommended surgical procedure. Target Corp. v. Bumgarner, 2015 Ark. App. 12, 455 S.W.3d 378 (2015).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision to award additional medical benefits in the form of a conservative weight-loss program was supported by substantial evidence because the employee's treating physician thought back surgery would improve her condition but would not perform surgery until she lost weight; the Commission found that surgical intervention was reasonable and necessary for the employee's compensable back injury and that she had previously demonstrated the ability to lose a significant amount of weight. Lybyer v. Springdale Sch. Dist., 2019 Ark. App. 77, 568 S.W.3d 805 (2019).

Choice of Physician.

Section 11-9-514 is silent as to whether the employer or employee has the right to make the choice of an initial treating physician; this section implies that the employer has the right of first choice because the employer has a duty to provide medical services to an injured employee, but this section speaks only to the employer's duty to provide medical services or bear the expense of medical services, not to the method of providing medical treatment. Welch v. Tri-County Shirt Co., 49 Ark. App. 112, 897 S.W.2d 575 (1995).

Section 11-9-514(a)(3)(A)(ii) established an absolute, statutory right to a one-time change of physician under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act where the employer had contracted with a managed care organization and had exercised the right to select the initial primary-care physician; thus, employer's denial of the one-time change of physician as a matter of law failed to fulfill the obligation imposed by this section. Collins v. Lennox Indus., Inc., 77 Ark. App. 303, 75 S.W.3d 204 (2002).

Claims for Benefits.

Neither § 11-9-108 nor this section authorizes the medical provider to initiate a claim on behalf of an employee in the event a worker elects not to file a claim for benefits. Sloat Chiropractic Clinic v. Datsun, 17 Ark. App. 161, 706 S.W.2d 181 (1986).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err under subsection (a) of this section in finding that an employee's colon condition was not related to a compensable cervical spine injury because the evidence that would tend to support a finding that the colon problems were causally connected with the compensable injury was not sufficient to satisfy the employee's burden of proof. Efird v. Whelan Sec., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 548, 423 S.W.3d 643 (2012).

Denial of the employee's claim for additional medical benefits related to a compensable injury was appropriate under subsection (a) of this section because the Workers' Compensation Commission assigned little weight to a doctor's belief that the employee did not have any immediate exacerbation of pain following the motor-vehicle accident. Thus, it gave little weight to the doctor's opinion that the continued pain and need for treatment were causally related to the work-related accident of 2008. Sanchez v. Pork Group, Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 570 (2012).

Based on the medical records and medical opinions presented, Workers' Compensation Commission properly determined that an employee's recent back pain and complaints were the result of a degenerative condition and not a 12-year-old compensable lumbar strain work injury. Walker v. United Cerebral Palsy of Ark., 2013 Ark. App. 153, 426 S.W.3d 539 (2013).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision to deny medical treatment in the form of uniformly recommended surgical intervention was not supported by substantial evidence, as reasonable minds could not find that the need for treatment was not causally related to the new injury, which was stipulated to, and the doctor's failure to mention the relevant injury and date was not fatal to the claim. Hopkins v. Harness Roofing, Inc., 2015 Ark. App. 62, 454 S.W.3d 751 (2015).

Double Recovery.

Where employee, who was employed by an out-of-state employer and an Arkansas employer, recovered from out-of-state employer, he cannot recover from Arkansas employer for the expenses as that would be an unjust enrichment. McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 234 Ark. 113, 350 S.W.2d 608 (1961).

Emergency Treatment.

Commission was entitled to direct immediate payment by employer of emergency treatment required by employee where primary question of compensation had been decided in favor of claimant. Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 221 Ark. 469, 254 S.W.2d 322 (1953).

Employee Liability.

A medical provider whose charges are disallowed by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission as unreasonable or unnecessary may recover from the employee. Taggart v. Northeast Ark. Rehabilitation Hosp., 316 Ark. 39, 870 S.W.2d 717 (1994).

Employer Liability.

Where claimant overrode insurer's warning that proposed operation would be at his own expense, he acted at his peril; if the operation had disclosed a problem for which conservative treatment was indicated, as claimed by insurer's physicians, the surgical expense would not have been the employer's responsibility. Caldwell v. Joseph W. Vestal & Son, 237 Ark. 142, 371 S.W.2d 836 (1963).

Where worker was prescribed medications for a compensable back injury and the evidence showed her ulcerated stomach to result from the medications, employer was liable for her hospital bill. Warwick Elecs., Inc. v. Devazier, 253 Ark. 1100, 490 S.W.2d 792 (1973).

Commission should have determined the portion of the rental cost of facility for paraplegic attributable to services and apparatus for which the employer was liable under this section, and the portion of the rent attributable to services for which the employer was not liable. Pine Bluff Parks & Recreation v. Porter, 6 Ark. App. 154, 639 S.W.2d 363 (1982).

Failure to Provide Benefits.

When an employer contends that he acted in reliance upon responsible medical opinion in refusing or terminating benefits, penalties are not ordinarily imposed. Hamrick v. Colson Co., 271 Ark. 740, 610 S.W.2d 281 (1981).

Findings.

Worker's entitlement to medical treatment was not at issue because the company had already accepted the compensability of the injury and was already responsible for the treatment; the finding that the company was to pay all reasonable medical expenses was simply a restatement of a responsibility that the company had already accepted, and there was no need for additional findings on the issue. Ark. Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Wiggins, 2016 Ark. App. 364, 499 S.W.3d 229 (2016).

Judicial Review.

The court of appeals may reverse the commission's decision only when it is convinced that fair-minded persons, with the same facts before them, could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the commission. DeBoard v. Colson Co., 20 Ark. App. 166, 725 S.W.2d 857 (1987).

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of the workers' compensation commission, the court of appeals reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the commission's findings, and must affirm if there is any substantial evidence to support them. DeBoard v. Colson Co., 20 Ark. App. 166, 725 S.W.2d 857 (1987).

Substantial evidence supported the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that a claimant was not entitled to additional medical treatment under subsection (a) of this section because the claimant's medical records indicated her complaints were inconsistent with and in excess of the clinical, objective findings and there was credible testimony the claimant was malingering; thus, the claimant failed to prove that additional medical treatment was reasonably necessary, in accordance with § 11-9-705(a)(3). Briseno v. George's, Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 513 (2011).

Medical Service Provider.

Employee would be permitted treatment by out-of-state physician, where it would violate the employer's statutory duty to provide medical care if that care was denied simply because there was no medical service provider in Arkansas qualified and willing to provide the service. Milligan v. West Tree Serv., 57 Ark. App. 14, 946 S.W.2d 697 (1997), supp. op., Clark v. Director, Empl. Sec. Dep't, 58 Ark. App. 1, 944 S.W.2d 862.

Nursing Services.

Payment for nursing services ordered paid to relative of injured person. Sisk v. Philpot, 244 Ark. 79, 423 S.W.2d 871 (1968); Dresser Minerals v. Hunt, 262 Ark. 280, 556 S.W.2d 138 (1977).

Where the claimant did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a nursing services award should begin on any certain date, the commission's decision to fix the beginning date on the day on which the claim was first filed was supported by the evidence. Dresser Minerals v. Hunt, 262 Ark. 280, 556 S.W.2d 138 (1977).

Nursing services, in the context of this chapter, embrace more than a wife's ordinary care for her sick husband. Dresser Minerals v. Hunt, 262 Ark. 280, 556 S.W.2d 138 (1977).

Nursing services do not include assistance with household and personal tasks which the claimant is unable to perform. Pickens-Bond Constr. Co. v. Case, 266 Ark. 323, 584 S.W.2d 21 (1979); Pine Bluff Parks & Recreation v. Porter, 6 Ark. App. 154, 639 S.W.2d 363 (1982).

The nursing services for which the employer is responsible are those reasonably necessary for the treatment of the injury; this does not include those services which one spouse is normally expected to render to another. Pickens-Bond Constr. Co. v. Case, 266 Ark. 323, 584 S.W.2d 21 (1979).

Finding that the employer and insurer were not liable for the employee's long-term-care expenses at a facility was appropriate pursuant to subsection (a) of this section because the employee failed to prove that residential placement at the facility qualified as compensable nursing care. Further, even assuming that the therapies offered at the facility were in the realm of nursing services and not simply “cues,” the facility's administration declined to carve out the costs of such therapies from other nonnursing services. Pack v. Little Rock Convention & Visitors Bureau, 2011 Ark. App. 755, 387 S.W.3d 260 (2011).

Finding in a workers' compensation action that the services at a facility were not nursing services was improper under this section because the facility's services were nursing services since they would take care of, minister to, and tend to the employee as a brain-injured individual. Pack v. Little Rock Convention Ctr., 2013 Ark. 186, 427 S.W.3d 586 (2013).

Payment by Private Carrier.

An employer is not entitled to an offset for medical expenses paid by a claimant's private insurance carrier. Owen Drilling Co. v. Allison, 33 Ark. App. 60, 800 S.W.2d 728 (1990).

Prosthetic Devices.

There was substantial evidence to support the finding that a myoelectric prosthesis, rather than a conventional prosthesis, was reasonably necessary to restore the claimant as far as practicable to his physical condition before his work-related injury, notwithstanding the large increase in cost, where the claimant's surgeon stated that the claimant “would be best fitted with a neuro electric device, as it is more functional, and this gentleman will require the dexterity of this device,” that “this myoelectric device will be best suited for his future needs,” and that not allowing him the myoelectric prosthesis was “totally unacceptable.” Air Compressor Equip. Co. v. Sword, 69 Ark. App. 162, 11 S.W.3d 1 (2000).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's conclusion that the cosmetic prosthesis that a benefits claimant desired was not a reasonable and necessary medical treatment, pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, was supported by substantial evidence because the prosthesis would reduce the claimant's level of function due to its lack of a functional thumb or hand attachment. Shaver v. Land O' Frost, 2010 Ark. App. 117 (2010).

Reasonably Necessary Treatment.

The commission's factual determination that a medical procedure was reasonably necessary for treatment of injured worker was supported by sufficient evidence. Meadors Lumber Co. v. Wysong, 262 Ark. 425, 557 S.W.2d 395 (1977); Crain Burton Ford Co. v. Rogers, 12 Ark. App. 246, 674 S.W.2d 944 (1984).

It is the obligation of the employer to provide medical services reasonably necessary for the treatment of the injury received by the employee, however, the law does not require the employer to pay for medical expenses for the treatment of a preexisting disease not aggravated by the injury except to the extent it may be necessary to accomplish treatment of the injury. Artex Hydrophonics, Inc. v. Pippin, 267 Ark. 1014, 593 S.W.2d 473 (Ct. App. 1980).

Claimant's estate was entitled to disability and medical benefits where work-related injury traumatized preexisting condition which caused claimant to become disabled. Little v. Delta Rice Mill, Inc., 11 Ark. App. 114, 667 S.W.2d 373 (1984).

What constitutes reasonable and necessary treatment under this section is a fact question for the commission. Wright Contracting Co. v. Randall, 12 Ark. App. 358, 676 S.W.2d 750 (1984).

Whether the medical treatment actually provided is reasonable and necessary is a question of fact for the commission. DeBoard v. Colson Co., 20 Ark. App. 166, 725 S.W.2d 857 (1987).

“Compensation” includes the furnishing of medicine only to the extent that it is “reasonably necessary” for treatment of the compensable injury. Northwest Tire Serv. v. Evans, 295 Ark. 246, 748 S.W.2d 134 (1988).

What constitutes reasonable and necessary treatment under this section is a fact question for the commission. Arkansas Dep't of Cor. v. Holybee, 46 Ark. App. 232, 878 S.W.2d 420 (1994).

Where employee of Arkansas Department of Correction was bitten by an inmate known to be HIV positive, the medical treatment prescribed for the purposes of detecting and/or preventing tetanus, HIV, and hepatitis was reasonably necessary for the treatment of the injury. Arkansas Dep't of Cor. v. Holybee, 46 Ark. App. 232, 878 S.W.2d 420 (1994).

The answer to the issue of what constitutes reasonable and necessary treatment under this section naturally turns on the sufficiency of the evidence. Gansky v. Hi-Tech Eng'g, 325 Ark. 163, 924 S.W.2d 790 (1996).

Where the treating neurosurgeon prescribed a functional capacity assessment that was not done because employer would not pay for it, and a final evaluation by the neurosurgeon was never made, the Commission erred in holding that additional medical treatment was not reasonably necessary and that the healing period had ended. Gansky v. Hi-Tech Eng'g, 325 Ark. 163, 924 S.W.2d 790 (1996).

Claimant's follow-up medical care was “reasonably necessary” for treatment of her compensable injury. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Dickens, 58 Ark. App. 266, 950 S.W.2d 463 (1997).

Where there was evidence that physician was a qualified specialist in whom employee had confidence and that his recommendations greatly improved employee's worsening condition, his services were reasonably necessary. American Greetings Corp. v. Garey, 61 Ark. App. 18, 963 S.W.2d 613 (1998).

A physician's notes constituted substantial evidence that continued treatment of an employee for a cervical spine strain sustained at work was reasonable and necessary, notwithstanding the physician's testimony that the injury involved some degenerative changes in the employee's cervical spine. GE Railcar Repair Servs. Workers' Comp. v. Hardin, 62 Ark. App. 120, 969 S.W.2d 667 (1998).

Where no postsurgical improvement took place and the Workers' Compensation Commission gave little weight to the claimant's surgeon's opinion, the commission did not err in finding that the claimant's surgical treatment was not reasonable and necessary in relation to her compensable injury. Cox v. Klipsch & Assocs., 71 Ark. App. 433, 30 S.W.3d 764 (2000).

Workers' compensation commission erred in finding that a laminectomy was not reasonable and necessary treatment, as it ignored evidence that the worker's symptoms significantly improved after this surgery. Hill v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 74 Ark. App. 250, 57 S.W.3d 735 (2001).

There was no evidence in the record that former employee did not suffer from coccydynia or coccygeal pain, that her pain condition stemmed from anything other than the compensable injury she sustained while working for her former employer, or that her condition did not warrant further treatment; thus, the Workers' Compensation Commission erred when it denied the employee continued medical treatment for a chronic-pain condition resulting from her work-related-injury. Patchell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 86 Ark. App. 230, 184 S.W.3d 31 (2004).

Court overturned an order from the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission holding that employee failed to prove her cervical surgery was reasonably necessary under subsection (a) of this section because the Commission's opinion did not address the surgical report or the post-surgical diagnosis; the reports might have contained evidence linking employee's injuries to a robbery in which she was choked and dragged. Stone v. Dollar General Stores, 91 Ark. App. 260, 209 S.W.3d 445 (2005).

In a workers' compensation case, employee sustained a compensable injury when ceramic glaze splashed into his eye during an art class and the medical treatment he received was reasonably necessary to treat the chemical exposure. Fayetteville Sch. Dist. v. Kunzelman, 93 Ark. App. 160, 217 S.W.3d 149 (2005).

Employee was examined by various physicians, none of whom recommended any future treatment options other than physical therapy, and although the physicians initially recommended physical therapy for the employee, she refused to participate in the recommended therapy because she found it too painful; thus, substantial evidence supported the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that the employee was not entitled to additional medical treatment. Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, 100 Ark. App. 17, 262 S.W.3d 630 (2007).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in determining that additional medical treatment, including but not limited to a neurologist's recommendations, was not necessary under subsection (a) of this section where it relied heavily on the opinion of the poison control center director, that opinion was based upon inaccurate assumptions and speculation surrounding the employee's exposure to chemicals through an air conditioning unit, the director's opinion assumed that the employee did not suffer from symptoms that normally accompanied chemical inhalation, but the medical reports revealed that she had in fact suffered from such symptoms, and the MRI the neurologist had recommended to compare with the SPECT scan results was not done because the insurer refused to pay for it. Bohannon v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 102 Ark. App. 37, 279 S.W.3d 502 (2008).

Where an employee sustained a compensable heart injury by inhaling toxic smoke, substantial evidence supported the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that a heart/lung transplant constituted reasonably necessary treatment for the employee's compensable heart injury because there was evidence that the employee had to undergo a lung transplant as well as a heart transplant to stabilize or maintain the compensable heart condition. Martin Charcoal, Inc. v. Britt, 102 Ark. App. 252, 284 S.W.3d 91 (2008).

Appellate court affirmed an award of additional medical benefits based on the injuries a claimant sustained when the bucket of the front-end loader he was driving unexpectedly dropped, causing his face to hit the steering wheel and dashboard. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission found the opinion of an ear, nose, and throat specialist that the claimant's facial injuries were caused by the accident was credible and the treatment that the specialist provided was reasonably necessary in connection with the claimant's compensable injury under subsection (a) of this section; substantial evidence supported these findings. Owens Planting Co. v. Graham, 102 Ark. App. 299, 284 S.W.3d 537 (2008).

Finding against the employee in a workers' compensation action was inappropriate pursuant to subsection (a) of this section because it was erroneous to have found that the employee failed to seek reasonably necessary medical treatment when she sought periodic examinations to determine whether a medically foreseeable condition related to her compensable injury was advancing. A doctor had consistently recommended that the employee be periodically evaluated to allow for proper monitoring of her condition and periodic evaluations of a medically foreseeable condition related to a compensable injury constituted reasonably necessary medical treatment. Huckabee v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 104 Ark. App. 22, 289 S.W.3d 107 (2008).

Where the employee's former doctors pronounced his maximum medical improvement from a back injury and assigned a five-percent impairment rating, the employee failed to show that an EMG diagnostic study recommended by a new doctor was reasonably necessary in connection with his compensable injury for purposes of subsection (a) of this section. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission had a substantial basis for denying payment. Goyne v. Crabtree Contr. Co., 2009 Ark. App. 200, 301 S.W.3d 16 (2009), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 874 (Apr. 22, 2009).

Workers' compensation claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant was entitled to additional medical treatment in the form of surgery recommended by a different doctor after the claimant's doctor opined that the claimant had reached maximum medical improvement and would not benefit from surgery. Crawford v. Superior Indus. & Crockett Adjustment, Inc., 2009 Ark. App. 738, 361 S.W.3d 290 (2009).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's award of additional medical treatment to an employee was affirmed because, pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the opinion of a second doctor regarding findings on employee's MRI was substantial evidence to establish that the requested medical treatment was reasonably necessary. Staffmark v. King, 2009 Ark. App. 830 (2009).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that the employee satisfied her burden of proving that her psychiatric treatment was reasonably necessary in connection with her work-related injury was supported by substantial evidence; it was essentially undisputed that the employee suffered from significant pain and a doctor opined that pain made depression worse and depression made pain worse, creating a merry-go-round of stress-related medical problems. Moreover, the doctor also reported that the employee's psychiatric impairment was raised from a class-two level to a class-three level as a result of her compensable injury. Dillard's, Inc. v. Johnson, 2010 Ark. App. 138, 374 S.W.3d 92 (2010).

Substantial basis existed for the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that additional diagnostic testing was not reasonably necessary for the treatment of a claimant's compensable injuries; she was released to full duty and reported no continuing problems for four years until her new treating physician recommended additional diagnostic testing. Chanslor v. Sonic Drive-In, 2010 Ark. App. 557 (2010).

Substantial evidence supported a finding by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that a second surgery on an employee's left knee was reasonable, necessary, and related to the employee's compensable injury, in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, because the first surgery was unsuccessful and the employee never had left-knee problems prior to suffering the compensable injury. Richardson Waste, Inc. v. Corcoran, 2010 Ark. App. 817, 379 S.W.3d 77 (2010).

Workers' compensation claimant's psychiatric treatment was reasonably necessary and causally related to the claimant's compensable back injury, as substantial evidence showed that the claimant's chronic pain exacerbated the claimant's depression; thus, a finding that the employer was liable for such treatment under this section was proper. Aegon Ins. United States v. Durham-Gilpatrick, 2010 Ark. App. 827, 378 S.W.3d 773 (2010), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ark. LEXIS 277 (Ark. June 23, 2011).

Claimant failed to prove that additional medical treatment for his right shoulder was reasonable and necessary as evidence showed ongoing problems were due to degenerative joint disease, and not his job-related injury. Lankford v. Crossland Constr. Co., 2011 Ark. App. 416 (2011).

Finding that an employee in a workers' compensation action was not entitled to medical treatment from a doctor in connection with the employee's compensable back injury was appropriate under subsection (a) of this section and § 11-9-705(a)(3) because the doctor's statement that the injuries “could” have been caused by her accident at work was insufficient under § 11-9-102(16)(B). Hawley v. First Sec. Bancorp, 2011 Ark. App. 538, 385 S.W.3d 388 (2011).

Employee was not entitled to additional medical treatment because, after testing and treatment, the consensus of the medical experts was that her back was essentially normal, and no surgical treatment was necessary. Any additional medical treatment the employee needed was more likely related to her preexisting scoliosis or her prior motor-vehicle accident. Harris v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 2011 Ark. App. 672 (2011).

Workers' Compensation Commission's conclusion that further medical treatment for an employee's hernia injury was not reasonably necessary under subsection (a) of this section was supported by substantial evidence because diagnostic testing had ruled out a recurrent hernia, nerve damage, or inflammation, and two physicians did not consider the employee to be a surgical candidate. Clement v. Johnson's Warehouse Showroom, Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 17, 388 S.W.3d 469 (2012).

In a worker's compensation case, there was no error in finding that a surgical procedure was a reasonable and necessary treatment for the thoracic spine. Even though an employer contended that it was a risky procedure, the weight and probative value given to medical opinions was a function left to the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission. Walgreen Co. v. Goode, 2012 Ark. App. 196, 395 S.W.3d 398 (2012).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that the claimant proved, as required by subsection (a) of this section, that additional medical treatment was reasonably necessary in connection with his compensable back injury as the claimant's physician had stated his opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and he reaffirmed that opinion during his deposition. Hyde's Termite & Pest Control v. Rogers, 2012 Ark. App. 410 (2012).

For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, substantial evidence supported the determination that the treatment given by one doctor was causally related to and necessary for treating the claimant's compensable injury; a 2006 MRI showed a moderate herniation, but a 2010 MRI showed a large herniation, and although a medical center claimed that a physican's opinion concerning compensability was not stated within a reasonable degree of certainty under § 11-9-102(16)(B), the court disagreed because the physician and doctor related the treatment and surgery to the compensable cervical-spine injury, the Workers' Compensation Commission credited their opinions, and the court left the weighing of the medical evidence to the Commission. St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr. & Sisters of Mercy Health Sys. v. Chrisman, 2012 Ark. App. 475, 422 S.W.3d 171 (2012).

Because the court affirmed the award of additional medical treatment, the court also affirmed the award of temporary total disability benefits associated with the treatment. St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr. & Sisters of Mercy Health Sys. v. Chrisman, 2012 Ark. App. 475, 422 S.W.3d 171 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission's findings did not adequately support its denial of additional medical treatment; the fact that injections proposed by the employee's physician were directed toward pain management did not disqualify them from being reasonably necessary under subsection (a) of this section if that treatment was causally related to the compensable injury. Stallworth v. Hayes Mech., Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 188 (2013).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that an injured employee was not entitled to additional medical treatments because she failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that surgical intervention was reasonable and necessary. Three physicians concluded that the employee would not benefit from surgical intervention. Wilkerson v. St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr., 2013 Ark. App. 345 (2013).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in holding that an employee's left-knee replacement surgery was not reasonable and necessary medical treatment under subsection (a) of this section for his compensable left-knee injury because it was the opinion of the employee's physician that arthritis was the need for the knee replacement. Jackson v. O'Reilly Auto., Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 755 (2013).

Workers’ Compensation Commission’s opinion adequately explained its decision and its findings regarding medical causation were supported by substantial evidence because it found that an employee proved that he suffered a compensable injury to his right knee, that he was entitled to temporary total-disability benefits, and that the medical treatment he received was reasonably necessary. St. John's Reg'l Health Ctr. v. Bartlett, 2014 Ark. App. 94 (2014).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly awarded an employee additional-medical benefits because he had been receiving various benefits for nearly two years before he filed an AR-C Form, the first hearing on the employee's claim for additional-medical benefits was held more than eight years later, the “additional follow-up care” sought by the employee was reasonably necessary medical treatment, and a subsequent car wreck was not an independent intervening cause of the employee's need for further medical treatment where his conduct was not unreasonable and he was never restricted from driving by any doctor. Nabholz Constr. Corp. v. White, 2015 Ark. App. 102 (2015).

In a workers' compensation case, medical treatment provided for shortness of breath and chest pain was reasonable and necessary medical treatment for a work-related ankle injury; after the claimant began medication due to ongoing problems with his ankle, he sought treatment in the emergency room for a cardiac evaluation and diagnostic testing. Although objective medical evidence is necessary to establish the existence and extent of an injury, it is not essential to establish the causal relationship between the injury and a work-related accident. Centria, Inc. v. Bailey, 2015 Ark. App. 270 (2015).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that the worker's post-surgical improvement was evidence that the surgeries were reasonable and necessary, for medical treatment purposes. Golden Years Manor v. Delargy, 2015 Ark. App. 309, 461 S.W.3d 725 (2015).

Workers' Compensation Commission concluded that the employee was just a drug-seeking individual, but the Commission made two material mistakes of fact, including finding that the employee was only seeking medication, when it was undisputed that she was requesting additional pain management treatment, plus the Commission erred in finding that a discharge from treatment from one doctor was equivalent to his opinion that additional pain management treatment was not reasonable and necessary. On remand, the Commission was to make findings on the issue of whether additional pain management treatment was reasonably necessary. Wise v. Village Inn, 2015 Ark. App. 406, 467 S.W.3d 186 (2015).

In a workers' compensation case, there was no error in determining that a benefits claimant was entitled to treatment for a right-knee anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) tear because the Workers' Compensation Commission credited a doctor's opinion that it was more likely than not that a work injury suffered in October 2013 was the cause of the ACL injury, as well as of the meniscal injuries. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Turcios, 2015 Ark. App. 647, 476 S.W.3d 177 (2015).

Appellant, who was permanently and totally disabled due to a work-related injury, was not entitled under this section to have his former employer purchase a new van to accommodate an electric wheelchair, as the van was not reasonably necessary for the treatment of appellant's injury. Turner v. S. Alloy & Metals Corp., 2017 Ark. App. 277, 521 S.W.3d 515 (2017).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of additional medical-treatment benefits under this section; no doctor recommended that the claimant receive surgery for his cervical-trapezius condition as additional treatment, and after the healing period, there were no further specific recommendations as to what treatments were medically necessary. Newby v. Century Indus., 2017 Ark. App. 527, 530 S.W.3d 386 (2017).

Workers’ Compensation Commission did not err in finding the recommended additional medical treatment for the claimant’s compensable knee injury was reasonably necessary and in finding that the doctor’s medical opinion was not based on any mistake of material fact; it was not unreasonable for the claimant to have forgotten a single incident when he received an injection in his knee two years before his compensable injury, three years before seeing the doctor, and four years before his deposition. The doctor was aware of preexisting degenerative changes and substantial medical evidence supported the Commission’s finding that claimant proved the necessary causal connection between his injury and the need for a total knee replacement. Tyson Poultry, Inc. v. Montelongo, 2019 Ark. App. 535, 589 S.W.3d 449 (2019).

Reimbursement.

Employee held justified in seeking medical assistance on his own initiative and entitled to reimbursement. Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Funk, 239 Ark. 330, 389 S.W.2d 237 (1965).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that an employee was entitled to be reimbursed for the installation of a walk-in shower in her bathroom because the employee was receiving treatment from the employer's accepted physician, who told her that she needed a medical shower; the physician documented the employee's need for a walk-in shower in his office notes, letters, and prescriptions, and the employer did not present any witnesses. Ark. State Univ. v. Gatlin-Tennant, 2017 Ark. App. 651 (2017).

Subsequent Claims.

Lump-sum settlements under § 11-9-804 for the full amounts payable for permanent total disability did not preclude future claims for additional medical benefits accruing subsequent to the lump-sum award. Brooks v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 247 Ark. 61, 444 S.W.2d 246 (1969).

Opinion evidence which rejected a causal relationship between the growth on claimant's leg and a chemical burn on the same location, presented by two expert witness physicians, neither of whom treated or examined claimant, held substantial evidence supporting denial of the claim for additional medical benefits. Hanson v. Amfuel, 54 Ark. App. 370, 925 S.W.2d 166 (1996).

Employee's claim for additional medical benefits under this section resulted from a prior injury at a prior employer; the employee's doctor predicted that the employee would have flare-ups, and his office notes characterized the employee's ongoing problems as a recurrence, rather than a new injury or an aggravation. Bryant Sch. Dist. v. Aylor, 2011 Ark. App. 173, 381 S.W.3d 895 (2011).

Cited: Wilson v. Border Queen Kitchen Cabinet Co., 221 Ark. 580, 254 S.W.2d 682 (Ark. 1953); Downs v. Miller, 224 Ark. 35, 271 S.W.2d 623 (1954); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956); McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 234 Ark. 113, 350 S.W.2d 608 (1961); Phillips v. Bray, 234 Ark. 190, 351 S.W.2d 147 (1961); Shelby Electric Co. v. Duran, 243 Ark. 344, 419 S.W.2d 798 (Ark. 1967); Garner v. American Can Co., 246 Ark. 746, 440 S.W.2d 210 (1969); Miller v. Everett, 252 Ark. 824, 481 S.W.2d 335 (1972); Aluminum Co. of America v. McClendon, 259 Ark. 675, 535 S.W.2d 832 (1976); Hulvey v. Kellwood Co., 262 Ark. 564, 559 S.W.2d 153 (1977); Mohawk Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 265 Ark. 16, 576 S.W.2d 216 (1979); Alred v. Jackson Atl., Inc., 268 Ark. 695, 595 S.W.2d 249 (1980); Model Laundry & Dry Cleaning v. Simmons, 268 Ark. 770, 596 S.W.2d 337 (Ct. App. 1980); Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Pitts, 268 Ark. 911, 597 S.W.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1980); Wise v. Deltic Farm & Timber Co., 269 Ark. 881, 601 S.W.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1980); Franklin County Rd. Dep't v. Nordin, 270 Ark. 177, 603 S.W.2d 477 (1980); Hamrick v. Colson Co., 271 Ark. 740, 610 S.W.2d 281 (1981); Markham v. K-Mart Corp., 4 Ark. App. 310, 630 S.W.2d 550 (1982); Vann v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ark. 1983); Artex Hydrophonics, Inc. v. Pippin, 8 Ark. App. 200, 649 S.W.2d 845 (1983); Tibbs v. Dixie Bearings, Inc., 9 Ark. App. 150, 654 S.W.2d 588 (1983); Savage v. General Indus., 23 Ark. App. 188, 745 S.W.2d 644 (1988); County Mkt. v. Thornton, 27 Ark. App. 235, 770 S.W.2d 156 (1989); Nashville Livestock Comm'n v. Cox, 302 Ark. 69, 787 S.W.2d 664 (1990); TEC v. Falkner, 38 Ark. App. 13, 827 S.W.2d 661 (1992); Johnson v. Triple T Foods, 55 Ark. App. 83, 929 S.W.2d 730 (1996); Dalton v. Allen Eng'g Co., 66 Ark. App. 201, 989 S.W.2d 543 (1999); GEO Specialty Chem., Inc. v. Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000); Williams v. L & W Janitorial, Inc., 85 Ark. App. 1, 145 S.W.3d 383 (2004); Vite v. Vite, 2010 Ark. App. 565, 377 S.W.3d 453 (2010); Myers v. City of Rockport, 2015 Ark. App. 710, 479 S.W.3d 33 (2015).