Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-701 (2020)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Karber, Survey of Arkansas Law: Workers' Compensation, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 294.

Case Notes

Construction.

In view of the beneficent purposes of the workers' compensation program, this section must be construed liberally in favor of the claimant and all doubtful cases resolved in claimant's favor. Aluminum Co. of America v. Henning, 260 Ark. 699, 543 S.W.2d 480 (1976).

Where claim predated the 1993 amendment of § 11-9-704(c)(3), the court properly declined to apply the new strict standard of construction to its interpretation of the notice provisions of this section. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Johnson, 48 Ark. App. 100, 891 S.W.2d 64 (1995).

Applicability.

In plaintiff's asbestosis claim, this statutory exception to the three-year statute of limitations of § 11-9-702 was inapplicable because the plaintiff's case did not turn on his failure to notify his employer of the injury but instead on his failure to timely file a claim. Chambers v. International Paper Co., 56 Ark. App. 90, 938 S.W.2d 861 (1997).

Effect of Failure.

Where no prejudice was shown, claimant's failure to give timely notice of his injury was not prejudicial. Gunn Distrib. Co. v. Talbert, 230 Ark. 442, 323 S.W.2d 434 (1959).

Where a worker injured his back but the symptoms did not manifest themselves for over a year, his failure to give notice of his injury at the time it took place was not a bar to recovery. Calion Lumber Co. v. Goff, 14 Ark. App. 18, 684 S.W.2d 272 (1985).

Employer's Knowledge.

Worker did not give formal notice, as required by this section, until September 2012, and the Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that the worker did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer knew that her injury was work-related before the form was filed; therefore, the start date of the worker's benefits was September 2012, rather than February 2012. A.E.R.T., Inc. v. Estrada, 2016 Ark. App. 604, 508 S.W.3d 906 (2016).

Evidence.

Where there was some confusion as to when city employing police officer received a report of the officer's injury as required by subdivision (a)(1) of this section, testimony of chief of police as to when he was informed of the officer's injury provided substantial evidence to support the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision as to when the officer's entitlement to compensation commenced. City of Fort Smith v. Brooks, 40 Ark. App. 120, 842 S.W.2d 463 (1992).

Exceptions.

Claimant's failure to give the required statutory notice did not come within any of the three statutory exceptions. Wallis v. Whirlpool Corp., 12 Ark. App. 101, 671 S.W.2d 760 (1984).

The authority of the Workers' Compensation Commission to excuse the failure to give notice under this section would also apply to the failure to give notice of occupational disease as required under § 11-9-603. Quality Serv. Railcar v. Williams, 36 Ark. App. 29, 820 S.W.2d 278 (1991).

Subdivision (b)(1) provides excuses for a claimant's failure to give written notice to an employer according to the requirements set forth in subdivision (a)(1). Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Johnson, 48 Ark. App. 100, 891 S.W.2d 64 (1995).

Because the complainant was both the employer and the employee, he had knowledge of his injury and, pursuant to subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section, his claim was not barred for failure to give notice. Baxter v. Baxter, 2012 Ark. App. 251, 413 S.W.3d 561 (2012).

Injury.

The term injury means compensable injury. An injury does not become compensable until the claimant first learns the extent of his injuries and is off work for a period that would entitle him to benefits for a compensable injury. Calion Lumber Co. v. Goff, 14 Ark. App. 18, 684 S.W.2d 272 (1985).

Objection for Failure to Notify.

An objection that claimant failed to give timely notice of his injury could not be availed of under this section where the objection was not made at or before the first hearing, which in this case was not done. Gunn Distrib. Co. v. Talbert, 230 Ark. 442, 323 S.W.2d 434 (1959).

Where employer did not object to lack of formal notice at first hearing, the objection could not be raised on appeal. Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Funk, 239 Ark. 330, 389 S.W.2d 237 (1965).

Employer did not assert his defenses of failure of employee to give notice and the running of the statute of limitations at the initial hearing, and they could not be raised for the first time on appeal. International Paper Co. v. Langley, 251 Ark. 859, 475 S.W.2d 686 (1972).

Sufficiency.

Where an employee reports his injury as he knows it without designating its nature because not aware thereof, compensation cannot be refused for lack of notice. Harris Motor Co. v. Pitts, 212 Ark. 145, 205 S.W.2d 21 (1947) (decision under prior law).

The Workers' Compensation Commission used the wrong legal standard when deciding that the physician's testimony must be given in terms of reasonable medical certainty before it could be said the claimant had met his burden of proof on the causation issue. Pittman v. Wygal Trucking Plant, 16 Ark. App. 232, 700 S.W.2d 59 (1985), superseded by statute as stated in, Service Chevrolet v. Atwood, 61 Ark. App. 190, 966 S.W.2d 909 (1998).

Workers' compensation benefits were properly awarded to an employee, a teacher, after the employee fell and sustained a knee injury where the employee had informed a supervisor of the injury on the date of occurrence, thus satisfying the notice requirement. Swifton Pub. Schs. Risk Mgmt. Res. v. Shields, 101 Ark. App. 208, 272 S.W.3d 851 (2008).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding sufficient evidence that a claimant imparted notice of his work-related injury to his employer where the Commission found the claimant to be credible, and it relied on his testimony that he reported the injury to three technical assistants, his supervisor, and the human-resources representative. St. Jean Indus. v. Ezell, 2016 Ark. App. 516, 504 S.W.3d 679 (2016).

Timeliness.

Evidence sufficient to find that notice was timely. Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 218 Ark. 379, 237 S.W.2d 26 (1951); Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Funk, 239 Ark. 330, 389 S.W.2d 237 (1965) (decisions prior to 1986 amendment).

Denial of an employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits was remanded because the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission arbitrarily attributed the injury to a non-work related cause despite competent medical evidence to the contrary. A delay in notifying the employer of the injury did not bar the claim under subdivision (b)(1)(B) of this section. Stevens v. Mid-South Mixers, Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 519 (2010).

Waiver.

The requirement of giving notice to employer of claims can be waived either in a case of occupational disease or accidental injury. Peerless Coal Co. v. Gordon, 237 Ark. 152, 372 S.W.2d 240 (1963).

Cited: Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 25 Ark. App. 66, 752 S.W.2d 288 (1988).