Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-705 (2026)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Labor Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 493.

Ark. L. Rev.

Rules of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 138.

Watkins, Open Meetings Under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 268.

Case Notes

Appeal.

The Workers' Compensation Commission is vested with discretion in determining whether and under what circumstances a case appealed to them should be remanded for the taking of additional evidence; on appeal an exercise of that discretion will not be lightly disturbed. A case should only be remanded if the new discovered evidence is relevant, is not merely cumulative, would change the result, and was diligently discovered and produced by the movant. Roberts-McNutt, Inc. v. Williams, 15 Ark. App. 240, 691 S.W.2d 887 (1985), aff'd, 288 Ark. 587, 708 S.W.2d 87 (Ark. 1986).

Continuance.

Workers' Compensation Commission acted within its discretion in affirming the administrative law judge's (ALJ) denial of the claimant's motion for a continuance because the claimant failed to present evidence to demonstrate his assertion that claimants had an absolute right to obtain a dismissal without prejudice, notwithstanding the language in the ALJ's prehearing order stating that the hearing schedules would be changed only for good cause. The ALJ allowed the claimant additional time to take his treating physician's deposition and it was entered into the record; the proffered testimony from the only missing witnesses at the hearing was deemed as having no bearing on the facts that would determine compensability. Long v. Wal-Mart Stores, 98 Ark. App. 70, 250 S.W.3d 263 (2007).

Discretion of Commission.

It is a discretionary matter for the commission as to whether it will hear oral arguments or allow the presentation of any additional evidence. Bartlett v. Mead Containerboard, 47 Ark. App. 181, 888 S.W.2d 314 (1994).

Duty of Court.

The Workers' Compensation Commission is not an appellate court, but the factfinder, and its duty and statutory obligation is to make specific findings of fact, on de novo review based on the record as a whole, and to decide the issues before it by determining whether the party having the burden of proof on an issue has established it by a preponderance of the evidence. Willmon v. Allen Canning Co., 38 Ark. App. 105, 828 S.W.2d 868 (1992).

Plain language of §§ 11-9-511(a) and 11-9-811 did not authorize the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) to, sua sponte, order an independent medical examination (IME) after the parties had litigated compensability and additional benefits; these statutes did not give the Commission authority to reserve making determinations on compensability and additional benefits when those were the only issues litigated by the parties, and the Commission did not err in finding that the administrative law judge exceeded his authority when he ordered an IME. Burkett v. Exxon Tiger Mart, Inc., 2009 Ark. App. 93, 304 S.W.3d 2 (2009).

Evidence.

Where the employee sought workers' compensation benefits for a left-knee injury, the decision to admit a belated MRI report was entirely within the ALJ's discretion, and he did not abuse that discretion under subdivision (c)(3) of this section. The employee had a good reason for waiting until after the first hearing to undergo an MRI; the employee could not afford it until then. The Steak House v. Weigel, 101 Ark. App. 81, 270 S.W.3d 365 (2007).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in holding that an employee was entitled to implantation of a dorsal-column stimulator if additional testing and examination showed it to be necessary because the finding that another evaluation needed to occur was a tacit admission that the record did not contain evidence sufficient under subdivision (c)(1) of this section to rule outright that additional treatment was reasonable and necessary. Sea Ark Marine, Inc. v. Pippinger, 2009 Ark. App. 223, 303 S.W.3d 102 (2009).

Workers' compensation claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant was entitled to additional medical treatment in the form of surgery recommended by a different doctor after the claimant's doctor opined that the claimant had reached maximum medical improvement and would not benefit from surgery. Crawford v. Superior Indus. & Crockett Adjustment, Inc., 2009 Ark. App. 738, 361 S.W.3d 290 (2009).

When the employee suffered a compensable neck injury, physical therapy was unsuccessful and two doctors recommended injection therapy as a reasonable treatment alternative. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred by refusing to require the employer to provide additional medical care under subdivision (a)(3) of this section. Foster v. Kann Enters., 2009 Ark. App. 746, 350 S.W.3d 796 (2009).

Appellate court was required to defer to the Workers' Compensation Commission's determination that one doctor's opinion that an employee had reached maximum medical improvement for a compensable neck injury was entitled to greater weight than the opinions of other doctors, who opined that the employee needed lower back surgery. Beliew v. Lennox Indus., 2010 Ark. App. 112 (2010).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit into evidence a form an employer's human resources administrator completed at a doctor's request or certain photographs because the employer deposed both the employee and doctor well in advance of the hearing, and the proffered medical document did not rebut the doctor's testimony since there was nothing in the record to indicate that he was aware of the document; the photographs were available and discussed at the employee's deposition. Mack-Reynolds Appraisal Co. v. Morton, 2010 Ark. App. 142, 375 S.W.3d 6 (2010).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to remand a case to the administrative law judge (ALJ) based upon alleged new medical findings where the employer and the insurer were not diligent in exploring the possibility of other causes for the claimant's headaches until after the ALJ had awarded benefits. Wayne Smith Trucking, Inc. v. McWilliams, 2011 Ark. App. 414, 384 S.W.3d 561 (2011).

Finding that an employee in a workers' compensation action was not entitled to medical treatment from a doctor in connection with the employee's compensable back injury was appropriate under § 11-9-508(a) and subdivision (a)(3) of this section because the doctor's statement that the injuries “could” have been caused by her accident at work was insufficient under § 11-9-102(16)(B). Hawley v. First Sec. Bancorp, 2011 Ark. App. 538, 385 S.W.3d 388 (2011).

Substantial evidence supported the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that a claimant was not entitled to additional medical treatment under § 11-9-508(a) because the claimant's medical records indicated her complaints were inconsistent with and in excess of the clinical, objective findings and there was credible testimony the claimant was malingering; thus, the claimant failed to prove that additional medical treatment was reasonably necessary, in accordance with subdivision (a)(3) of this section. Briseno v. George's, Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 513 (2011).

Substantial evidence supported the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that a claimant's relationship with a contractor was that of an independent contractor because that was the relationship both parties agreed to before the work began and, as such, the contractor was not liable for the claimant's injuries, pursuant to § 11-9-402(c)(1)(A); the claimant acknowledged his intent in the beginning of the work relationship with the contractor was that no taxes would be withheld from his pay and the claimant would not be covered by workers' compensation insurance. Woodmancy v. Framco, Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 785, 387 S.W.3d 286 (2011).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in denying the admission of evidence appellants proffered because its determination that appellants were not diligent was not an abuse of discretion; appellants had ample opportunity to offer proof to support their case at the initial hearing before the administrative law judge, but the evidence was not proffered until the case was remanded on appeal. St. Joseph's Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Redmond, 2012 Ark. App. 7, 388 S.W.3d 45 (2012).

Where an employee contended that he was in excruciating pain, the Workers' Compensation Commission's allowance of photographs showing the employee drinking and partying did not constitute an abuse of the Commission's discretion under subsection (a) of this section because the pictures could have had a bearing on the employee's credibility. Clement v. Johnson's Warehouse Showroom, Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 17, 388 S.W.3d 469 (2012).

—In General.

Decedent's testimony held sufficiently corroborated to allow claim. Garrison Furn. Co. v. Butler, 206 Ark. 702, 177 S.W.2d 738 (1944); American Can Co. v. Pettyjohn, 258 Ark. 98, 522 S.W.2d 358 (1975).

Claimant was entitled to have facts submitted to commission on any provision of law which would justify award in his favor. Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 218 Ark. 379, 237 S.W.2d 26 (1951).

Whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission is a matter of law. Boyd Excelsior Fuel Co. v. McKown, 226 Ark. 174, 288 S.W.2d 614 (1956).

On an appeal to the full commission presented solely on the transcript of the record made before the referee, it is the duty of the commission to make a finding according to the preponderance of the evidence, and not merely whether there is substantial evidence to support the finding of the referee, and the commission may pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. Moss v. El Dorado Drilling Co., 237 Ark. 80, 371 S.W.2d 528 (1963); Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Smith, 237 Ark. 468, 374 S.W.2d 166 (1964); Arkansas Coal Co. v. Steele, 237 Ark. 727, 375 S.W.2d 673 (1964).

Commission has broad discretion with reference to admission of evidence. Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Funk, 239 Ark. 330, 389 S.W.2d 237 (1965).

The commission is not bound by strict rules of evidence in the admission or consideration of any evidence, including medical testimony; it has broad discretion with reference to admission of evidence, and it is free to make such inquiry and to conduct the proceedings in such a manner as to best ascertain the rights of the parties. Clark v. Peabody Testing Serv., 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979).

While the commission is not bound by technical rules of evidence or procedure, the fact-finders are expected to adhere to basic rules of fair play, such as recognizing the right of cross-examination and the necessity of having all the evidence in the record. Brewer v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 10 Ark. App. 88, 661 S.W.2d 423 (1983).

Where at second hearing the judge considered two documents that had not previously been introduced into evidence and did not notify the parties until after the final hearing that he intended to make the documents a part of the record, the claimant was effectively denied a hearing concerning the documents admitted and considered by the judge and was thereby precluded from cross-examining the individuals who completed the two exhibits; consequently, decision denying benefits must be reversed and remanded. Brewer v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 10 Ark. App. 88, 661 S.W.2d 423 (1983).

The commission erred where it based its decision on a finding of fact which was clearly not in issue or developed by the evidence without notice to the parties of its intent to do so and where no opportunity to offer proof on that issue was afforded. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ark. App. 92, 661 S.W.2d 433 (1983).

The Workers' Compensation Commission has broad discretion with reference to admission of evidence and its decision will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. Southwest Pipe & Supply v. Hoover, 13 Ark. App. 144, 680 S.W.2d 723 (1984).

Under subsection (c) of this section, the judge has discretion to order further hearings for the purpose of introducing additional evidence, even though this section directs that each party must present all evidence at the initial hearing; thus, if an administrative law judge can order additional evidentiary hearings, a fortiori, the judge necessarily should have the power and discretion to reserve his or her decision on a related issue which might be affected by any additional evidence. Wooten v. Arkansas Aluminum Window & Door, Inc., 17 Ark. App. 209, 706 S.W.2d 198 (1986).

Employer should have been permitted to present evidence that the employee's injuries were caused when he fell from the roof of his home. Whirlpool Corp. v. Kaelin, 19 Ark. App. 331, 720 S.W.2d 722 (1986).

Workers' Compensation Commission was given a great deal of latitude in evidentiary matters; commission was not bound by technical or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure. Bryant v. Staffmark, Inc., 76 Ark. App. 64, 61 S.W.3d 856 (2001).

—Additional Evidence.

Subdivision (c)(1) specifically contemplates that while all evidence is to be offered at the initial hearing, the commission and the administrative law judge have the discretionary power to permit the introduction of additional evidence. Grimes v. North Am. Foundry, 316 Ark. 395, 872 S.W.2d 59 (Ark. 1994).

Substantial evidence supported Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that claimant acted diligently in obtaining the additional medical evidence and that claimant sustained a compensable injury; the December 2001 MRI report and the February 2002 operative report, both introduced at the second hearing, constituted sufficient evidence to uphold the findings. Hargis Transp. v. Chesser, 87 Ark. App. 301, 190 S.W.3d 309 (2004).

Workers' Compensation Commission was correct in refusing to allow the claimant to present new evidence contained in six depositions because the claimant failed to demonstrate the evidence's relevancy; the evidence in the depositions related solely to the claimant's vague constitutional arguments that had no bearing on whether his injury was compensable and the evidence did not suggest that political pressure caused the administrative law judge to treat the claimant's case unfairly. The claimant also failed to demonstrate that the evidence he sought to introduce would have produced a different result. Long v. Wal-Mart Stores, 98 Ark. App. 70, 250 S.W.3d 263 (2007).

There was no statutory requirement that a benefits claimant request a hearing on the introduction of additional evidence or that the Workers' Compensation Commission conduct a hearing before allowing such. Therefore, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in admitting newly generated medical records as additional evidence in this case; the records were not cumulative and they were relevant, particularly with regards to an evaluation of the claimant's left-knee pain and resultant surgery. Get Rid of It Ark. v. Graham, 2016 Ark. App. 88 (2016).

—Blood Tests.

The Workers' Compensation Commission was not bound by technical rules of evidence or procedure; however a sufficient foundation for the admission of a blood-alcohol test was laid and thus was admissible. St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Touzin, 267 Ark. 539, 592 S.W.2d 447 (1980).

Where only persons who had any part in a blood-alcohol test introduced into evidence in a workers' compensation hearing, all testified and were cross-examined, and the machine used in the test had been approved by the Department of Health and was constantly kept in proper calibration by the lab, there was a sufficient degree of compliance with §§ 5-65-201 — 5-65-205 and the Department of Health's rules so that the test results were admissible. St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Touzin, 267 Ark. 539, 592 S.W.2d 447 (1980).

—Burden of Proof.

Burden of proof is upon claimant to show that injury or death was the result of an accident incurred in and growing out of the course of employment. Pearson v. Faulkner Radio Serv. Co., 220 Ark. 368, 247 S.W.2d 964 (1952); Lybrand v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 266 Ark. 946, 588 S.W.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1979).

The evidence is to be weighed impartially, without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party. Gencorp Polymer Prods. v. Landers, 36 Ark. App. 190, 820 S.W.2d 475 (1991).

—Decedent's Declarations.

Where testimony of witness was not about a deceased employee's statement concerning an injury, but about statements of a deceased employee concerning her relationship with a former coworker who murdered the decedent, subdivision (a)(2) did not apply. Kendrick v. Peel, Eddy & Gibbons Law Firm, 32 Ark. App. 29, 795 S.W.2d 365 (1990).

—Medical.

An employee must object to the failure to verify a doctor's report on the cause of disability when the case is before the commission so that it can be verified and the doctor cross-examined. Foster v. Fort Smith Cotton Oil Co., 224 Ark. 394, 273 S.W.2d 529 (1954).

A doctor's report even though properly verified is only entitled to such weight as may be warranted from all the evidence in the case. Boyd Excelsior Fuel Co. v. McKown, 226 Ark. 174, 288 S.W.2d 614 (1956).

Doctor's reports which were not verified as required by statute but to which no objections were made and no opportunity for cross-examination afforded were only entitled to such weight as was warranted from all the facts of the case. Boyd Excelsior Fuel Co. v. McKown, 226 Ark. 174, 288 S.W.2d 614 (1956).

Commission erred in holding that employee's healing period terminated several months prior to date of physician's testimony in light of physician's testimony to the contrary. Hamilton v. Kelley-Nelson Constr. Co., 228 Ark. 612, 309 S.W.2d 323 (1958).

It was proper for expert medical witnesses to give their opinion on basis of information contained in autopsy report and hospital record. Holstein v. Quality Excelsior Coal Co., 230 Ark. 758, 324 S.W.2d 529 (1959).

Where pivotal question of fact as to the exact cause of medical condition could not be resolved by any witness with complete certainty, conflicts in proof had a bearing on the testimony of each witness but did not have effect of depriving testimony of all substantiality. Holstein v. Quality Excelsior Coal Co., 230 Ark. 758, 324 S.W.2d 529 (1959).

Since autopsy reports and clinical histories are statements of fact rather than expressions of an opinion, they are admissible. Rhea v. M-K Grocer Co., 236 Ark. 615, 370 S.W.2d 33 (1963).

Commission did not err in admitting letter of physician expressing medical opinion where physician subsequently testified and was available for cross-examination. Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Funk, 239 Ark. 330, 389 S.W.2d 237 (1965).

When the commission reopened the case for a further hearing at which time a doctor testified, who had reexamined the claimant by order of the commission, it was error for the commission to refuse claimant's motion that he be allowed to call two doctors in rebuttal to the testimony of the commission's doctor. Davis v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., 239 Ark. 632, 393 S.W.2d 237, 17 A.L.R.3d 986 (1965).

The refusal to allow claimant's attorney to impeach a doctor's testimony by the introduction of a letter written by the witness in another case and only allowing the last sentence of the letter to be introduced was error; to get the full effect of the attempted impeachment the entire letter should have been allowed to be introduced. Davis v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., 239 Ark. 632, 393 S.W.2d 237, 17 A.L.R.3d 986 (1965).

While technical rules of evidence do not apply to workers' compensation procedures, a litigant has the right to cross-examine a witness and thus it is error for the commission to allow a doctor to read from medical textbooks and writings. Davis v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., 239 Ark. 632, 393 S.W.2d 237, 17 A.L.R.3d 986 (1965).

The commission has broad discretion with reference to the admission of evidence, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the commission to permit appellants to cross-examine medical witness subsequent to the close of the hearing, nor did appellants waive their right to cross-examine. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Weast, 253 Ark. 710, 488 S.W.2d 322 (1972).

Inasmuch as the commission was not bound by Civil Rules of Evidence in its admission and consideration of evidence, the commission was within its discretion in hearing the testimony of a doctor on the issue of whether an employee's fatal heart attack was the result of his employment, despite the fact that the testimony was in conflict with the opinions of more celebrated experts. Barksdale Lumber Co. v. McAnally, 262 Ark. 379, 557 S.W.2d 868 (1977).

Although the commission's knowledge and experience is not evidence, once it has before it firm medical evidence of physical impairment and functional limitation it has the advantage of its own superior knowledge of industrial demands, limitations and requirements and can apply its knowledge and expertise in weighing the medical evidence of functional limitations together with other evidence of the manner in which the functional disability will affect the ability of an injured employee to obtain or hold a job and thereby arrive at reasonably accurate conclusions as to the extent of injury. City of Fayetteville v. Guess, 10 Ark. App. 313, 663 S.W.2d 946 (1984).

—Specific Cases.

Workers' Compensation Commission did not arbitrarily disregard the treating physician's opinion, but rather, it was just not given as much weight as the opinion of the doctor who prepared the independent medical examination report; the Commission's reliance on the video surveillance of the employee carrying grocery sacks showed that the choice of the doctor's opinion over that of the treating physician was based on the record as a whole and on a determination of the employee's credibility. Stoker v. Thomas Randal Fowler, Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 594, 533 S.W.3d 596 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied an employee's claim for additional medical testing and treatment because it did not abuse its discretion in admitting a doctor's report of the independent medical examination he performed. The Commission was not bound by technical or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure and was empowered to allow whatever evidence it saw fit into the record. Stoker v. Thomas Randal Fowler, Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 594, 533 S.W.3d 596 (2017).

—Stipulations.

The commission did not err in allowing the employer to raise the issue of compensability after the compensability of his claim had been stipulated by the parties. Jackson v. Circle T Express, 49 Ark. App. 94, 896 S.W.2d 602 (1995).

—Sufficiency.

Evidence held sufficient to support commission's findings. Garrison Furn. Co. v. Butler, 206 Ark. 702, 177 S.W.2d 738 (1944); Johnson v. Little Rock Furn. Mfg. Co., 206 Ark. 1016, 178 S.W.2d 249 (1944); Kloss v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 207 Ark. 115, 179 S.W.2d 172 (1944); Fordyce Lumber Co. v. Shelton, 206 Ark. 1134, 179 S.W.2d 464 (1944) (preceding cases decided under prior law); Frank Lyon Co. v. Scott, 215 Ark. 274, 220 S.W.2d 128 (1949); Foster v. Fort Smith Cotton Oil Co., 224 Ark. 394, 273 S.W.2d 529 (1954); Grimsley v. Manufacturers Furn. Co., 224 Ark. 769, 276 S.W.2d 64 (1955); McFall v. Farmers Tractor & Truck Co., 227 Ark. 985, 302 S.W.2d 801 (1957); Pruitt v. Moon, 230 Ark. 986, 328 S.W.2d 71 (1959); Burnett v. St. Mary's Hosp., 255 Ark. 1023, 505 S.W.2d 24 (1974).

Evidence held insufficient to support commission's findings. Tri-States Constr. Co. v. Worthen, 224 Ark. 418, 274 S.W.2d 352 (1955); Eddington v. City Elec. Co., 237 Ark. 804, 376 S.W.2d 550 (1964); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 255 Ark. 73, 498 S.W.2d 865 (1973).

Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of the worker's claim for permanent total disability for a back injury and the finding that he sustained only a 10 percent wage loss turned on the Commission's assessment of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence, and the denial had a substantial basis, but the wage-loss issue was remanded in light of the reversal of the impairment rating; the Commission did not find that the worker was motivated to return to the workforce, and the Commission considered his age, education, work experience, and the nature of the injury. Thompson v. Mt. Home Good Samaritan Vill., 2014 Ark. App. 493, 442 S.W.3d 873 (2014).

Appellants' argument asked the court to find appellee's testimony not credible and to believe certain medical reports over other medical evidence, but the Workers' Compensation Commission found that the evidence corroborated one doctor's opinion, and it was the Commission's duty to make credibility determinations; the court was foreclosed from determining the credibility of the testimony on appeal, and accordingly, substantial evidence supported the Commission's decision. Waste Mgmt. v. Cook, 2015 Ark. App. 159 (2015).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision displayed a substantial basis for the denial of an employee's claim that a cyst and tendinitis constituted a compensable injury because the Commission found that the employee's job duties did not require her to engage in rapid repetitive motion; the employee's arguments regarding the cause of her cyst and tendinitis simply went to the weight of the evidence, a matter that the Commission decided against her. Bennett v. Tyson Poultry, Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 479, 504 S.W.3d 653 (2016).

Fact Question.

Where the medical testimony was conflicting on whether claimant was either permanently partially or totally disabled or currently totally disabled, the resolution of such a conflict was a question of fact for the commission. City of Humphrey v. Woodward, 4 Ark. App. 64, 628 S.W.2d 574 (1982).

Jurisdiction.

Action to reform workers' compensation insurance policy was properly brought in chancery court rather than before Workers' Compensation Commission. American Cas. Co. v. Hambleton, 233 Ark. 942, 349 S.W.2d 664 (1961).

Notice.

Where reasonable notice was not given as required by commission's own rules, order of commission dismissing claim for want of prosecution was void. Dura Craft Boats, Inc. v. Daugherty, 247 Ark. 125, 444 S.W.2d 562 (1969).

Reopening Case.

Absent a showing that the Workers' Compensation Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously, or abused its discretion, a determination made by the commission not to reopen a case will not be disturbed. Walker v. J & J Pest Control, 6 Ark. App. 171, 639 S.W.2d 748 (1982).

Courts must adhere to legislative decision to adopt rigid rule that absent a showing of total disability a scheduled injury cannot be apportioned to the body as a whole; accordingly, commission did not err in refusing to reopen record to receive additional evidence concerning degree to which injury caused disability to body as a whole. Hill v. White-Rodgers, 10 Ark. App. 402, 665 S.W.2d 292 (1984).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying a claimant's motion to reopen a claim for permanent total disability for carpal tunnel injuries on proffered evidence that the claimant sustained a degree of permanent impairment to both hands that was less than 100-percent impairment. Kirkendolph v. DF&A Revenue Servs. Div., 2009 Ark. App. 629 (2009).

Unresolved Issues.

The issue of permanent disability compensation for decreased visual acuity caused by an irregular corneal astigmatism was properly reserved where the employee's physician had not yet determined the degree of correctable impairment. Service Chevrolet v. Atwood, 61 Ark. App. 190, 966 S.W.2d 909 (1998).

Cited: Shipp v. Tanner Estate, 229 Ark. 815, 318 S.W.2d 821 (1958); Mason v. Lauck, 232 Ark. 891, 340 S.W.2d 575 (1960); Ward Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Reather, 234 Ark. 151, 350 S.W.2d 691 (1961); Clemons v. Bearden Lumber Co., 240 Ark. 571, 401 S.W.2d 16 (1966); Dura Craft Boats, Inc. v. Daugherty, 247 Ark. 125, 444 S.W.2d 562 (1969); Tri State Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 254 Ark. 944, 497 S.W.2d 39 (1973); Sneed v. Colson Corp., 254 Ark. 1048, 497 S.W.2d 673 (1973); Ethridge v. Alexander Brown & Associates, 258 Ark. 444, 527 S.W.2d 591 (1975); Home Ins. Co. v. Meeker, 9 Ark. App. 201, 657 S.W.2d 215 (1983); Nicholas v. Hempstead County Mem. Hosp., 9 Ark. App. 261, 658 S.W.2d 408 (1983); Odom v. Tosco Corp., 12 Ark. App. 196, 672 S.W.2d 915 (1984); Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1985); State, Second Injury Fund v. Mid-State Constr. Co., 16 Ark. App. 169, 698 S.W.2d 804 (1985); Tracor/MBA v. Flowers, 41 Ark. App. 186, 850 S.W.2d 30 (1993); American Can Co. v. Pettyjohn, 258 Ark. 98, 522 S.W.2d 358 (1975); Priest v. UPS, 58 Ark. App. 282, 950 S.W.2d 476 (1997); Ester v. National Home Ctrs., Inc., 61 Ark. App. 91, 967 S.W.2d 565 (1998); Cyphers v. UPS, 68 Ark. App. 62, 3 S.W.3d 698 (1999); Excelsior Hotel v. Squires, 83 Ark. App. 26, 115 S.W.3d 823 (2003); Maulding v. Price's Util. Contrs., Inc., 2009 Ark. App. 776, 358 S.W.3d 915 (2009); Watkins v. United States Trucking, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 444, 429 S.W.3d 308 (2013); Wilhelm v. Parsons, 2016 Ark. App. 56, 481 S.W.3d 767 (2016).