Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Workmen's Compensation — Attorney's Fees and Amount of Recovery, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 195.

Taxability of Attorneys' Fees Cost, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 70.

One State's Experience With the Statutory Remedy for Insurers' Delays a Problem of Payment, 10 Ark. L. Rev. 439.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Karber, Survey of Arkansas Law: Workers' Compensation, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 294.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Labor Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 493.

Case Notes

Construction.

Where the claimant lost on his appeal from an administrative law judge's decision to the Workers' Compensation Commission, but he won on his cross-appeal, the court regarded the claimant as having prevailed on appeal and therefore he was entitled to an award of attorney fees since this chapter should be interpreted liberally in favor of the claimant. Owens Country Sausage v. Crane, 268 Ark. 732, 594 S.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1980).

The legislature intended § 11-9-716 and this section to be read in conjunction with one another and saw no conflict between the two statutes; the legislature felt strongly that the commission should be able to award lump-sum attorneys' fees. Had the legislature perceived any conflict between the two sections they would have undoubtedly repealed this section. International Paper Co. v. McBride, 12 Ark. App. 400, 678 S.W.2d 375 (1984).

The legislature's use of the word “and” between “controverted” and “awarded” in subsection (a)(2)(B)(ii) means that attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases are contingent upon not only the amount controverted but also the amount awarded. Cleek v. Great S. Metals, 62 Ark. App. 177, 970 S.W.2d 304 (1998), rev'd, Cleek v. Great Southern Metals, 335 Ark. 342, 981 S.W.2d 529 (1998).

Appellate court overruled the assertion that the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission should have vacated rather than reversed the award of attorney's fees for the claimant, because the Commission's reversing of the award of attorney's fees rather than vacating the award had no bearing on whether the claimant was entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. Sierra v. Griffin Gin, 100 Ark. App. 113, 265 S.W.3d 129 (2007), rehearing denied, Sierra v. Griffen Gin, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 775 (Nov. 7, 2007), superseded, 374 Ark. 320, 287 S.W.3d 556 (2008).

When the claimant did not receive any of the additional workers’ compensation benefits awarded because of the offset required by § 11-9-411 of his disability retirement compensation, this section required the employer to pay the injured worker's one-half portion of the attorney's fees due from the workers’ compensation benefits awarded. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Gerard, 2018 Ark. 97, 541 S.W.3d 422 (2018).

The General Assembly intended the attorney's fees awarded under § 11-9-715 to have priority over the offset provided for in § 11-9-411. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Gerard, 2018 Ark. 97, 541 S.W.3d 422 (2018).

Plain language of subdivision (a)(2)(B)(i) of this section provides that the attorney's fees awarded will be paid one-half (½) by the employer or carrier in addition to compensation awarded; and one-half (½) by the injured employee or dependents of a deceased employee out of compensation payable to them. The employee’s half comes from the payable amount owed to the employee before any offset. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Gerard, 2018 Ark. 97, 541 S.W.3d 422 (2018).

To apply the offset statute, § 11-9-411, over the attorney's-fees statute, § 11-9-715, would defeat the purpose of the attorney's-fees statute and the worker's compensation laws and would ignore the statutory language. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Gerard, 2018 Ark. 97, 541 S.W.3d 422 (2018).

Purpose.

Attorney's fees in Workers' Compensation cases are provided by statute in Arkansas as a matter of public policy to enable injured workers to obtain the services of an attorney in settlement of controverted claims. Aluminum Co. of America v. Neal, 4 Ark. App. 11, 626 S.W.2d 620 (1982).

One of the purposes of this section is to place the burden of litigation expense on the party which makes litigation necessary by controverting the claim; placing this responsibility on the employer is intended to encourage prompt and honest settlements and to compensate an employee for delay. It is not the purpose of this section to compel an employer to make settlement of a claim for which he has no responsibility and is not liable, or to compensate an employee for delay in collecting funds from the Second Injury Fund for which that employer is likewise not liable. Prier Brass v. Weller, 23 Ark. App. 193, 745 S.W.2d 647 (1988).

A maxim of workers' compensation law is that when the commission finds that a case has been controverted, in whole or in part, the commission shall direct the payment of legal fees by the employer or carrier in addition to the compensation awarded. Harvest Foods v. Washam, 52 Ark. App. 72, 914 S.W.2d 776 (1996).

Applicability.

This section which provides that attorneys' fees shall be allowed only on the amount of compensation controverted and awarded, is not limited by the application of § 11-9-502(b); thus an award of attorneys' fees on the controverted portion of the award in lump sum based upon the present value computation of claimant's compensation benefits, unlimited by § 11-9-502(b), but with appropriate credit for fees previously paid, was proper. Hot Spring County Bicentennial Park v. Walker, 271 Ark. 688, 610 S.W.2d 268 (1981).

This section does not permit the award of attorney's fees against the Second Injury Trust Fund, since such entity is not an employer or carrier within the meaning of this section. Second Injury Fund v. Furman, 62 Ark. App. 194, 972 S.W.2d 255 (1998), aff'd 336 Ark. 10, 983 S.W.2d 923 (1999).

Amendment of Section.

An initiative petition filed under Ark. Const. Amend. 7 was insufficient because the ballot title was misleading due to various omissions and misstatements in its terms, particularly with respect to its hidden amendments of this section, regarding attorney's fees, and § 11-9-704, regarding the construction of this chapter. Bailey v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 277, 884 S.W.2d 938 (1994).

Amount.

Award of attorney's fee proper. Lundell v. Walker, 204 Ark. 871, 165 S.W.2d 600 (1942) (decision under prior law); Brown v. W.H. Patterson Constr. Co., 235 Ark. 465, 361 S.W.2d 13 (1962); Garner v. American Can Co., 246 Ark. 746, 440 S.W.2d 210 (1969).

The attorney's fees in a workers' compensation case, wherein the employer's insurer denies all liability, should consist of a percentage of the amounts expended for medical services and hospitalization in addition to a percentage of the cash awarded to the client, since the compensation from which the fees are to be derived include medical and hospital services. Ragon v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 224 Ark. 387, 273 S.W.2d 524 (1954).

Workers' Compensation Commission's determination with respect to attorney's fees will not be disturbed by Supreme Court unless clearly wrong or a gross abuse of discretion. Littlejohn v. Earle Indus. Inc., 239 Ark. 439, 389 S.W.2d 898 (1965).

Evidentiary hearing to determine whether maximum attorney fees should be awarded to the claimant's attorney found to be necessary, since such a hearing is necessary only when the record indicates that a bare minimum of services was provided; and the claimant's attorney clearly provided more than a minimum of services. Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Pitts, 268 Ark. 911, 597 S.W.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1980).

The award of attorney's fees is not a penalty but an award of reasonable compensation for services necessarily rendered to compensation claimants based on consideration by the Workers' Compensation Commission of the various factors usually taken into consideration in determining reasonable attorney's fees. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Fatherree, 16 Ark. App. 41, 696 S.W.2d 782 (1985).

Attorneys' fees in a Workers' Compensation case should consist of a percentage of the amounts expended for medical services and hospitalization in addition to a percentage of the cash awarded to the claimant, since the compensation from which the fees are to be derived includes medical and hospital services. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Bussey, 17 Ark. App. 47, 703 S.W.2d 459 (1986).

Where the claimant was totally disabled, but his employment caused only 10% of that disability, attorneys' fees should have been computed upon the basis of the compensation due from the employer, not upon the entire compensation payable for the claimant's total disability. Prier Brass v. Weller, 23 Ark. App. 193, 745 S.W.2d 647 (1988).

This section does not provide any set figure as “statutory attorney's fees”; rather, the Commission is to determine and award a reasonable fee within specific limitations. Sonic Drive-In v. Wade, 36 Ark. App. 4, 816 S.W.2d 889 (1991).

The claimant prevailed in his appeal to the court of appeals, which remanded for reconsideration, and claimant's attorney was allowed the maximum fee under this section. Crow v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 41 Ark. App. 225, 852 S.W.2d 334 (1993).

Subdivision (b)(1) of this section neither expressly provides for nor expressly prohibits an additional award of attorney's fees in cases where the claimant has been required to defend his award of workers' compensation benefits through two separate appeals brought by the employer; construing the attorney's fees provision liberally and in accordance with the remedial purposes given in § 11-9-704(c)(3), an additional award of attorney's fees is authorized. Cagle Fabricating & Steel, Inc. v. Patterson, 43 Ark. App. 79, 861 S.W.2d 114 (1993).

Employer who demonstrated that it was liable for only a portion of its worker's present disability was entitled to a reduction in the amount of attorney's fees awarded. Stucco Plus v. Rose, 327 Ark. 314, 938 S.W.2d 556 (Ark. 1997).

—Amount of Award.

Where the employer paid all but $35.00 of the claimant's medical expenses, but never recognized liability for her injury, thereby forcing the claimant to try the case fully on the merits in order to be able to seek future medical expenses, she was entitled to recover attorney fees based on the entire amount of her medical expenses, rather than just the $35.00 awarded to her. Cleek v. Great Southern Metals, 335 Ark. 342, 981 S.W.2d 529 (1998).

—Maximum.

Attorney was not entitled to keep amount received under agreement with client that any amount recovered would be divided equally between attorney and client, but he was entitled to only the amount, as limited by this section, which was approved by the commission. Robinson v. Keaton, 239 Ark. 600, 393 S.W.2d 231 (1965).

There was no abuse of the commission's discretion in limiting the attorney's fee to the maximum allowable percentage of the accrued amount due rather than on the amount paid and to be paid under the award. Sisk v. Philpot, 244 Ark. 79, 423 S.W.2d 871 (1968).

A claim for additional compensation is to be treated as a continuation of the original demand for compensation, and in fixing the attorney's fee, the action of the commission in the parent case is to be considered, while the maximum fee shall be within the fixed limitations of this section and shall not exceed certain percentages of compensation awarded. Norsworthy v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 249 Ark. 159, 458 S.W.2d 401 (1970).

Evidence sufficient to find abuse of discretion to award the maximum fee. Aluminum Co. of America v. Henning, 260 Ark. 699, 543 S.W.2d 480 (1976).

There is no language in the statutes limiting the award of the attorneys' fees to amounts for which the employer and its carrier both controvert and owe; the test is that fees are calculated on the amount controverted and awarded. Hot Spring County Bicentennial Park v. Walker, 271 Ark. 688, 610 S.W.2d 268 (1981).

This section does not authorize the arbitrary allowance of maximum fees in every case; it specifically sets out those factors which are to be considered in arriving at a reasonable attorney's fee. Masonite Corp. v. Mitchell, 16 Ark. App. 209, 699 S.W.2d 409 (1985).

Evidence insufficient to find an abuse of discretion in awarding the maximum allowable fee. Masonite Corp. v. Mitchell, 16 Ark. App. 209, 699 S.W.2d 409 (1985).

Appeal.

The plea by claimant seeking an additional attorney's fee allowance in connection with an appeal to the Supreme Court must be denied as the statute does not authorize such an allowance, only the commission being empowered to award fees for legal services, further, the maximum fee having been allowed in this case. Sparks Mem. Hosp. v. Walton, 229 Ark. 1014, 320 S.W.2d 102 (1959).

Where there was no showing of what services were rendered in behalf of claimant by his attorney on an appeal from the administrative law judge, the attorney should not have been awarded an additional fee relating to the appeal. Aluminum Co. of America v. Wilson, 262 Ark. 602, 559 S.W.2d 710 (1978).

Where the claimant suffered an undisputably compensable injury to his finger, but the payment of compensation benefits was significantly delayed due to delay by employer's physician, the burden of that delay should rest on the employer and since the record contained no evidence that the employer attempted to get the physician to expedite the report, the delay justified award in fees to the claimant's attorney for purposes of the appeal to the Court of Appeals. Ellis v. Clayton Shoe Co., 267 Ark. 882, 595 S.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1979).

Where court of appeals remanded for a new determination as to wage loss disability in worker's compensation case, attorney's fees pursuant to subsection (b) were proper. Belcher v. Holiday Inn, 50 Ark. App. 148, 900 S.W.2d 215 (1995).

Attorney of a workers' compensation claimant who prevailed on appeal was not entitled to an attorney fee from the claimant's employer because the employer did not contest an administrative law judge's award to the claimant and was not a party to the Second Injury Fund's appeal before the Workers' Compensation Commission. Firestone Tube Co. v. Potts, 100 Ark. App. 203, 266 S.W.3d 223 (2007).

Because an appellate court upheld the Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of additional medical benefits to an employee, it also upheld its denial of attorney's fees to the employee. Towler v. Tyson Poultry, Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 546, 423 S.W.3d 664 (2012).

Administrative law judge awarded the employee the maximum attorney's fee on the controverted indemnity benefits awarded; but as the Commission's decision did not mention the attorney's fee award, this issue was remanded. Vann v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 2018 Ark. App. 353, 551 S.W.3d 432 (2018).

—Attorneys' fees.

This section does not permit an award of attorneys' fees against the Second Injury Fund. Furman v. Second Injury Fund, 336 Ark. 10, 983 S.W.2d 923 (1999).

Claims Not Controverted.

There was substantial evidence to support the commission's finding that the Second Injury Fund did not controvert employee's claim, so that no attorney's fees needed to be awarded pursuant to subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section. Lambert v. Baldor Elec., 44 Ark. App. 117, 868 S.W.2d 513 (1993).

Employer did not controvert employee's change-of-physician request where employee submitted a request for a change of physician only after employer refused to pay certain medical bills because they were not from the original treating physician; employee did not provide the name of the physician when requested to do so and employer was not responsible for knowing the name of the new doctor based on bills received prior to the submission of the request for change. Jonesboro Human Dev. Ctr. v. Taylor, 61 Ark. App. 42, 963 S.W.2d 617 (1998).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly found that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his attorney was entitled to an attorney's fee as part of the action before it because the attorney did not prove the claimant's entitlement to benefits upon which a fee would be due in the workers' compensation forum, and the claimant had not proved controversion. Burton v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 47 (2014).

Compensation Due Other Persons.

Subdivision (a)(2)(B) does not authorize the commission to direct a carrier to withhold proportionate amounts due to medical providers for payment of the claimant's portion of the attorney's fee. Holiday Inn-West v. Coleman, 31 Ark. App. 224, 792 S.W.2d 345 (1990).

As used in subdivision (a)(2)(B), in the phrase “out of compensation payable to them,” the word “them” refers to the claimant or his dependents; it cannot be read to include medical providers. Holiday Inn-West v. Coleman, 31 Ark. App. 224, 792 S.W.2d 345 (1990).

Controverted Claim.

Evidence sufficient to support commission's finding that claim was controverted and award of attorney's fee. Littlejohn v. Earle Indus. Inc., 239 Ark. 439, 389 S.W.2d 898 (1965); International Paper Co. v. Remley, 256 Ark. 7, 505 S.W.2d 219 (1974); Aluminum Co. of America v. Henning, 260 Ark. 699, 543 S.W.2d 480 (1976); Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Talley, 7 Ark. App. 234, 647 S.W.2d 477 (1983); General Indus. v. Gibson, 22 Ark. App. 217, 738 S.W.2d 104 (1987).

The employer's contention that the employee's healing period ended later than that claimed by the employee entitled the employee to an attorney's fee upon the sustaining of her position. Pike County Poultry Co. v. Kelley, 243 Ark. 460, 420 S.W.2d 523 (1967).

Fundamental purposes for making an employer liable for claimant's attorney fees when a claim is controverted are to discourage delay in recognition of liability, to deter arbitrary or capricious denial of claims, and to secure competent legal representation for indigent claimants. Aluminum Co. of America v. Henning, 260 Ark. 699, 543 S.W.2d 480 (1976).

Evidence insufficient to find that the carrier had controverted the claim and was therefore not liable for attorney fees or a penalty under § 11-9-802. Turner v. Trade Winds Inn, 267 Ark. 861, 592 S.W.2d 454 (Ct. App. 1979).

Evidence sufficient to find that case had not been controverted was justified and claimant was not entitled to controverted attorney's fee. Climer v. Drake's Backhoe, 7 Ark. App. 148, 644 S.W.2d 637 (1983); Walter v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 17 Ark. App. 43, 702 S.W.2d 822 (1986).

The question of whether a claim is controverted is one of fact to be determined from the circumstances of the particular case. Climer v. Drake's Backhoe, 7 Ark. App. 148, 644 S.W.2d 637 (1983); Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Talley, 7 Ark. App. 234, 647 S.W.2d 477 (1983).

The mere failure of an employer to pay compensation benefits does not amount to controversion, in and of itself, especially where the carrier accepts the injury as compensable and is attempting to determine the extent of the disability. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Talley, 7 Ark. App. 234, 647 S.W.2d 477 (1983).

The Workers' Compensation Commission properly awarded a second maximum statutory attorney's fee which was calculated on some of the same controverted benefits as a prior lump-sum fee, where the same benefits had been controverted and placed in jeopardy twice by the employer and claimant had been required to obtain the services of an attorney on both occasions. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Fatherree, 16 Ark. App. 41, 696 S.W.2d 782 (1985).

The question of whether a claim is controverted is one of fact to be determined from the circumstances of each particular case, and the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's finding will not be disturbed if there is substantial evidence to support it. Masonite Corp. v. Mitchell, 16 Ark. App. 209, 699 S.W.2d 409 (1985).

The determination of whether a claim is controverted is a fact question to be resolved from the circumstances of the particular case; the mere failure of the employer to pay benefits does not, in and of itself, amount to controversion, especially when the carrier accepts the injury as compensable and is attempting to determine the extent of the disability. Walter v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 17 Ark. App. 43, 702 S.W.2d 822 (1986).

It was not significant for the award of attorneys' fees that medical bills were paid by a collateral source, where they were awarded to the claimant by the Workers' Compensation Commission after being controverted by the employer. The test for the award of attorneys' fees is that fees are calculated on the amount controverted and awarded. General Indus. v. Gibson, 22 Ark. App. 217, 738 S.W.2d 104 (1987).

Neither § 11-9-503 nor this section makes any provision for assessment of a separate fee based on the amount of the penalty. The attorney's fee allowable should be computed on the amount of compensation controverted and awarded, increased by the safety-violation penalty. Prier Brass v. Weller, 23 Ark. App. 193, 745 S.W.2d 647 (1988).

Direct proof of controversion is where the claimant must incur legal expenses to defend his disability benefits award on appeal. Harvest Foods v. Washam, 52 Ark. App. 72, 914 S.W.2d 776 (1996).

The appellate court remanded claimant's case to the commission for an award of attorney's fees where the entire claim was controverted. Milligan v. West Tree Serv., 57 Ark. App. 14, 946 S.W.2d 697 (1997).

The claimant was entitled to an award of attorney's fees, notwithstanding the conclusion of the Workers' Compensation Commission that the employer, by prevailing on its request for a credit, was justified in not paying the claimant an attorney fee on his ten-percent permanent impairment rating because the credit exceeded its liability for payment of benefits, as the granting of the credit did not diminish the fact that the employer controverted and did not pay permanent disability benefits and that the claimant was, therefore, required to employ counsel. Goodwin v. Phillips Petro. Co., 72 Ark. App. 302, 37 S.W.3d 644 (2001).

Where an employer controverts an injured employee's entitlement to certain benefits, but later accepts liability prior to a hearing on the merits, the employee's attorney may still request a hearing for an attorney's fee on those controverted benefits. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Brown, 73 Ark. App. 174, 40 S.W.3d 835 (2001).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that the Second Injury Fund controverted employee's benefits in excess of 25 percent under subdivision (a)(2)(B) of this section; the Fund claimed that the wage loss disability was not ripe and had listed for litigation the extent of employee's disability, and the record indicated that, if employee had not retained an attorney, he would not likely have been receiving any award for wage loss disability. Lee v. Alcoa Extrusion, Inc., 89 Ark. App. 228, 201 S.W.3d 449 (2005).

Attorneys' fees were properly awarded in a workers' compensation case because an employer and its insurer took the position that employee was not entitled to a wage-loss benefit above an impairment rating, which amounted to a controversion of benefits owed. Logan County v. McDonald, 90 Ark. App. 409, 206 S.W.3d 258 (2005).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission had substantial evidence before it to conclude that employer had not controverted employee's permanently totally disabled (PTD) status for purposes of awarding attorney fees because, when the employee had formally requested a hearing on several matters, the employer responded with a letter accepting that the employee was PTD. Osborne v. Bekaert Corp., 97 Ark. App. 147, 245 S.W.3d 185 (2006).

Mere failure of an employer to pay certain benefits does not, in and of itself, amount to controversion, especially when the carrier accepts the injury as compensable and is attempting to determine the extent of the disability. Osborne v. Bekaert Corp., 97 Ark. App. 147, 245 S.W.3d 185 (2006).

Entitlement.

Doctor who was represented by his counsel in claim for compensation for services rendered was entitled to an attorney's fee in a sum determined by the Workers' Compensation Commission, inasmuch as a fee would have been recoverable if the doctor's claim had been represented by claimant's attorney. Hulvey v. Kellwood Co., 262 Ark. 564, 559 S.W.2d 153 (1977).

Where there was no final order in the case, but claimant prevailed because the appeal was dismissed, attorney's fees were awarded under this section. Gina Marie Farms v. Jones, 28 Ark. App. 90, 770 S.W.2d 680 (1989).

The allowance or disallowance of an attorney's fee does not hinge on whether the medical bills were paid by a collateral source. Varnell v. Union Carbide, 29 Ark. App. 185, 779 S.W.2d 542 (1989).

Attorney that had been retained by an employee to represent the employee in a workers' compensation case, but then had been told by the employee that he wanted to end the case, was entitled to assert a lien on a final settlement that was reached after the employee hired a second lawyer instead of abandoning the case; the fact that the attorney had been involved in the case before there was any controversy did not preclude the attorney from imposing a lien for fees. Wren v. DeQueen Sand & Gravel Co., 87 Ark. App. 212, 189 S.W.3d 522 (2004).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied employee's request for attorney's fees under subdivision (a)(4) of this section; in the absence of a contract between employee's medical providers and his attorney, the attorney was not entitled to attorney's fees based upon the value of medical services provided to him. Teasley v. Hermann Cos., 92 Ark. App. 40, 211 S.W.3d 40 (2005).

Finding in favor of the employee in a workers' compensation action was appropriate under subdivision (a)(2)(B) of this section because the Workers' Compensation Commission had substantial evidence before it to conclude that the employer and carrier had controverted the employee's entitlement to benefits for purposes of awarding an attorney fee. It was undisputed that the rating report from the doctor was dated April 1, 2005, but that the carrier did not issue a check for the employee's permanent-partial-disability benefits until June 8, 2005. Southeast Ark. Human Dev. Ctr. v. Courtney, 99 Ark. App. 87, 257 S.W.3d 554 (2007).

Substantial evidence supported the finding that the employee did not prevail on appeal to the full Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission, because it was the employee who appealed to the full Commission, which affirmed and adopted the opinion of the administrative law judge. Taggart v. Mid Am. Packaging, 2009 Ark. App. 335, 308 S.W.3d 643 (2009).

Where an employee proved entitlement to TTD benefits and wage-loss disability benefits, and because the employee prevailed on appeal to the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission, the employee was entitled to attorney fees, as awarded by the Commission pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section. Tyson Poultry, Inc. v. Narvaiz, 2012 Ark. 118, 388 S.W.3d 16 (2012), superseded, 2012 Ark. 118, 388 S.W.3d 16 (2012).

Exhaustion of Remedies.

An attorney seeking fees for a workers' compensation suit to be based on a percentage of the medical payments made by an employer and his insurer, even though the full amount of payments is not yet known, cannot obtain a declaratory judgment if he has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Ragon v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 224 Ark. 387, 273 S.W.2d 524 (1954).

Lump Sum.

Where the only compensation awarded to a claimant is weekly benefits, the Workers' Compensation Commission had no statutory authority to direct that an attorney's fee be paid on the basis of a lump-sum award, and since the award and assessment of an attorney's fee against the employer or carrier is purely statutory, the commission erred in awarding a lump-sum fee. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Potter, 263 Ark. 689, 567 S.W.2d 104 (1978).

The Workers' Compensation Commission improperly awarded a claimant's attorney an additional attorney's fee under this section when he filed an action seeking a lump-sum attorney's fee instead of the weekly fee he had been awarded by the administrative law judge, since this section provides for the additional fee only if the claimant prevails on appeal and, considering the nature of the relief sought in this action, it was the claimant's attorney alone who benefitted from the appeal. Aluminum Co. of America v. Neal, 4 Ark. App. 11, 626 S.W.2d 620 (1982).

The legislature intended § 11-9-716 and this section to be read in conjunction with one another and saw no conflict between the two statutes; the legislature felt strongly that the commission should be able to award lump-sum attorneys' fees. International Paper Co. v. McBride, 12 Ark. App. 400, 678 S.W.2d 375 (1984).

It was the intention of the legislature to enable the Workers' Compensation Commission to approve the lump-sum payment of attorney's fees chargeable to the employer while providing for installment payments of the portion of the attorney's fee chargeable to the injured employee or the injured employee's dependents; in such a situation the portion of the fee to be paid in installments by the injured employee or the injured employee's dependents should not be discounted since it is not being received by the attorney in a lump sum. Seward v. Bud Avants Co., 65 Ark. App. 88, 985 S.W.2d 332 (1999).

Second Injury Fund.

Strictly construing this section and § 11-9-716, it is clear that an award of lump-sum attorney's fees is not limited to employers. Therefore, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission had the authority to award a lump-sum attorney's fee payable by a second injury fund under § 11-9-716, and an appellate court declined to overrule the decision in Lewis v. Auto Parts & Tire Co., Inc., 104 Ark. App. 230, 290 S.W.3d 37 (2008); moreover, further findings of fact were not necessary. Davis v. Action Mech., 2012 Ark. App. 515 (2012).

Cited: Empire Life & Hosp. Ins. Co. v. Armorel Planting Co., 247 Ark. 994, 449 S.W.2d 200 (1970); Faldon Indus. Wiring Co. v. Downs, 255 Ark. 923, 504 S.W.2d 346 (1974); Meadors Lumber Co. v. Wysong, 262 Ark. 425, 557 S.W.2d 395 (1977); Horseshoe Bend Bldrs. v. Sosa, 259 Ark. 267, 532 S.W.2d 182 (1976); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Martin, 264 Ark. 266, 571 S.W.2d 416 (1978); Model Laundry & Dry Cleaning v. Simmons, 268 Ark. 770, 596 S.W.2d 337 (Ct. App. 1980); Henderson v. Winchester, 268 Ark. 710, 594 S.W.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1980); Vittitow v. Central Maloney, 69 Ark. App. 176, 11 S.W.3d 12 (2000).