Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-313 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Application of Crawford Confrontation Clause Rule to Autopsy Testimony and Related Documents, 18 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2018).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Criminal Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 617.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to remove reports, as described in subdivision (d)(1), from exclusion under the hearsay rule and make them admissible when certain requirements designed to establish their trustworthiness have been met. Hendrix v. State, 40 Ark. App. 52, 842 S.W.2d 443 (1992); Dodson v. State, 326 Ark. 637, 934 S.W.2d 198 (1996).

The purpose of this section is to remove reports from exclusion under the hearsay rule, not to require that they always be admitted for any reason. Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1244, 117 S. Ct. 1853, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1055 (1997).

Applicability.

This section does not apply when the serologist who compiled the report testifies in person. Williams v. State, 322 Ark. 38, 907 S.W.2d 120 (1995).

Compliance.

The prosecution may introduce a drug analysis report through the testimony of a chemist who had not personally performed the test, if the report contains an attestation by the chemist who is purported to have performed the test; there is no notarization requirement. Willis v. State, 309 Ark. 328, 829 S.W.2d 417 (1992).

Contents of Report.

Hearsay statements contained in a serologist's report were not admissible and the names of suspects listed on the document would not be admitted unless there was some evidence to connect the suspects with the crimes; evidence that a third party may have committed the crime is inadmissible unless it points directly to the guilt of the third party. Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1244, 117 S. Ct. 1853, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1055 (1997).

Crime Lab Report.

If a chemist's crime lab report fails to meet the prerequisites of this section, it is considered inadmissible hearsay under Evid. Rule 803(8)(iii); however, even when the state's report meets the statutory requirements and where the state intends to introduce the report as an exception to the hearsay rule, a defendant may, under subdivision (d)(2) of this section, still require the chemist's presence for the purpose of cross-examination, if the defendant requests the chemist's presence at least ten days prior to trial. Lockhart v. State, 314 Ark. 394, 862 S.W.2d 265 (1993).

A facsimile copy of the crime lab report that contained the analyst's attestation, rather than the copy itself, held admissible. Ingram v. State, 48 Ark. App. 105, 891 S.W.2d 805 (1995).

State presented substantial evidence through testimony from a forensic chemist from the state crime laboratory, although he did not perform the lab analysis for a substance obtained from a controlled buy involving defendant, and the lab report indicated that the substance contained methamphetamine, to show that the substance sold by defendant was a controlled substance. Jackson v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 528, 385 S.W.3d 394 (2011).

Cross-Examination.

While the procedural rule requiring pretrial notice of demand for the right of cross-examination of a laboratory employee is generally a reasonable one, there can be no reasonable basis for enforcing such a rule where it is not possible for the accused to comply. Hendrix v. State, 40 Ark. App. 52, 842 S.W.2d 443 (1992).

If, because this section does not contain a reasonable procedure for asserting the right of confrontation of laboratory employees, the trial has begun, the assertion of that right when it does arise is all that is required of the accused and casts upon the state the burden of either producing the witness for cross-examination or requesting a continuance in order to produce him. Hendrix v. State, 40 Ark. App. 52, 842 S.W.2d 443 (1992).

Trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant the opportunity to question crime lab personnel after he had properly demanded to do so as it was a felony to sell counterfeit drug substances; defendant had committed an offense punishable by incarceration and was subject to a revocation of his probation, whether or not the substances found in the two baggies were narcotics, thus, the crime lab personnel's testimony was not necessary to prove the prosecution's case. Roston v. State, 362 Ark. 408, 208 S.W.3d 759 (2005).

“Duly Attested.”

The General Assembly intended for the phrase “duly attested to” to require more than the mere signature of the person or chemist who performed that analysis. Nard v. State, 304 Ark. 159, 801 S.W.2d 634 (1991); Willis v. State, 309 Ark. 328, 829 S.W.2d 417 (1992).

Where the chemist's report is stamped a certified copy and notarized the duly attested requirement is not fulfilled. Nard v. State, 304 Ark. 159, 801 S.W.2d 634 (1991).

Attestation contained on the face of chemist's report held sufficient. Dodson v. State, 326 Ark. 637, 934 S.W.2d 198 (1996).

Indicia of Truthfulness.

Some indicia of truthfulness must attend a chemist report's admissibility when it is introduced into a criminal proceeding as competent evidence. That assurance of truthfulness can best be given by the one who performed the test and made the analysis as is provided by subdivision (d)(1) of this section. Nard v. State, 304 Ark. 159, 801 S.W.2d 634 (1991).

Noncompliance.

It was error for the trial court to admit into evidence a chemical analysis report which did not conform to the requirements of subdivision (d)(1) of this section; however, when considering the report and other evidence presented by the state, sufficient evidence existed to support the conviction or count in issue and it was therefore proper to remand on that count for possible retrial rather than dismiss the count. Nard v. State, 304 Ark. 159, 801 S.W.2d 634 (1991).

Admission of crime laboratory chemist's report, over defendant's objection and without permitting defendant to cross-examine laboratory employees, contributed to defendant's conviction of delivery of a controlled substance, and since its admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant's conviction was reversed and remanded. Hendrix v. State, 40 Ark. App. 52, 842 S.W.2d 443 (1992).

Right of Confrontation.

Because this section does not contain a reasonable procedure for asserting the right of confrontation when that right arises after the trial has begun, the assertion of that right when it does arise is all that is required of the accused and casts upon the state the burden of either producing the witness for cross-examination or requesting a continuance in order to produce him. Lockhart v. State, 314 Ark. 394, 862 S.W.2d 265 (1993).

The state has the burden of producing the chemist or obtaining a continuance when the state has caused the defendant to be unable to comply with this section's ten-day notice prerequisite; however, defendant is required to inform the state that he desires to have the analyst present at trial so the state will know it has the burden to produce the analyst as a witness. Lockhart v. State, 314 Ark. 394, 862 S.W.2d 265 (1993).

The defendant failed to show that he was deprived of his right of confrontation when the physician who actually performed an autopsy on the murder victim could not appear at trial and another physician from the laboratory testified in his place since he failed to show that he was prejudiced by the absence of the former physician. Marta v. State, 336 Ark. 67, 983 S.W.2d 924 (1999).

Although defendant argued that the introduction of a crime laboratory report without the chemist being available for cross-examination violated his right to confront the witnesses against him, defendant failed to give the required notice requesting the analyst's presence. Defendant cited no authority for his argument that he was excused from the notice requirement because the analyst, who was on maternity leave and was not called as a witness by the prosecution, appeared on the prosecution's witness list. Jones v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 683 (2011).

Even though the trial court violated defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment by allowing a substitute analyst to testify regarding the results of a DNA test performed by another analyst, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; the victim's vivid description of being raped repeatedly and painfully by defendant constituted sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions of rape and second-degree sexual assault. Alejandro-Alvarez v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 450, 587 S.W.3d 269 (2019).

Waiver.

If the defendant does not give the statutory notice prior to the proceedings that he wants the person who performed the analysis to be present for cross-examination, the right of confrontation is waived. Johnson v. State, 303 Ark. 12, 792 S.W.2d 863 (1990).

Cited: Robinson v. State, 317 Ark. 512, 879 S.W.2d 419 (1994); Sanford v. State, 331 Ark. 334, 962 S.W.2d 335 (1998).