Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-904 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes Imposing Criminal Penalties for Failure to Register as Required Under Sex Offender or Other Criminal Registration Statutes. 33 A.L.R.6th 91.

Validity of State Sex Offender Registration Laws Under Ex Post Facto Prohibitions. 63 A.L.R.6th 351.

Validity, Construction and Application of State Sex Offender Registration Statutes Concerning Level of Classification — General Principles, Evidentiary Matters, and Assistance of Counsel. 64 A.L.R.6th 1.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Sex Offender Registration Statutes Concerning Level of Classification — Claims for Downward Departure. 66 A.L.R.6th 1.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Sex Offender Registration Statutes Concerning Level of Classification — Claims Challenging Upward Departure. 67 A.L.R.6th 1.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Law Enforcement and Emergency Management, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 501.

Case Notes

In General.

Where defendant was convicted of a sex offense and registered as a sex offender in another state, and while living in Arkansas for five years he was convicted of breaking and entering and felony theft of property and was given suspended sentences, but all the while he failed to register as a sex offender as required by § 12-12-905(a)(2) of the Sex Offender Registration Act, § 12-12-901 et seq., his failure to register or report a change of address was a Class D felony, and the state met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant violated a condition of his suspended sentences. Williams v. State, 351 Ark. 229, 91 S.W.3d 68 (2002).

Defendant's conviction under subdivision (a)(1) of this section was affirmed because defendant had previously been ordered to register as a sex offender in Louisiana, and his failure to do so in Arkansas was sufficient to support his conviction. Flowers v. State, 92 Ark. App. 337, 213 S.W.3d 648 (2005).

Because the failure to register as a sex offender was a strict liability offense under § 12-12-901 et seq. and the state proved that defendant was required to register but failed to do so, the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Adkins v. State, 371 Ark. 159, 264 S.W.3d 523 (2007).

Trial court did not utilize defendant's failure to register as a sex and child offender as an additional ground to support the revocation of his suspended sentence because the trial court merely entered a judgment declaring defendant guilty of that charge and pronounced a prison sentence on the registration violation for which he was originally given a suspended sentence; imposition of the sentence was separate and apart from the revocation and was well within the discretion of the trial court. Lowe v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 284 (2010).

Construction with Other Law.

Section § 12-12-909 requires sex offenders to report changes in employment 10 days before they occur and this section provides sex offenders with an affirmative defense if they notify authorities no later than five days after changing employment; reading the two statutes together makes it clear that a defendant must notify authorities 10 days prior to changing employment, absent an affirmative defense, and since the loss of employment constitutes a change, this section and § 12-12-903 do not allow a 30-day grace period for reporting a change in employment. Mashburn v. State, 87 Ark. App. 89, 189 S.W.3d 73 (2004).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant made no effort to comply with sexual-offender registration requirements. Therefore, the trial court properly revoked defendant's suspended sentence. Muldrew v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 568 (2012).

Evidence.

Defendant's conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, or failure to report a change of address, in violation of this section was appropriate because the evidence supported a legitimate inference that he lied when he claimed to continue to live at a residence. The only evidence offered on his behalf was the allegation that he continued to live at the residence without furniture or water, while he allowed the grass to become overgrown. Morrison v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 681, 374 S.W.3d 8 (2009).

Probation of defendant, a registered sex offender, was properly revoked for failing to comply with sex offender registration and reporting requirements, as required by this section, because defendant admitted that he was told that he could not live at a residential care facility which abutted a daycare but he did not move or provide another address for sex offender registry. Gray v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 159 (2010).

During defendant's trial for failure to register as a sex offender, the admission of a judgment and commitment order from a 2004 conviction on a charge of failure to register as a sex offender was neither prejudicial nor probative because the offense was a strict-liability offense; at worst, the evidence could be viewed as irrelevant or cumulative. Reed v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 225 (2012).

Defendant's convictions for failure to comply with registration and reporting requirements applicable to sex offenders and for residing within 2000 feet of a daycare facility as a level 4 sex offender were proper where the evidence supported a finding that he resided in a particular trailer that was shown to be within 2000 feet of a daycare facility because: (1) there was evidence that the trailer's previous resident had moved out approximately two months earlier and that the utilities for the trailer had been reestablished in defendant's name; (2) men's clothing and toiletries were found in the trailer, as were prescription-medication bottles bearing defendant's name; (3) the owner of the trailer admitted that defendant had approached him three times about renting the trailer; (4) defendant's father admitted that defendant had intended to move to the trailer; and (5) defendant had a key to the trailer when arrested. Although defendant argued he was only in the trailer to do repair work, no evidence of repair work was observed in the trailer. Green v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 63 (2013).

Substantial evidence demonstrated that defendant had failed to register his correct address where the testimony showed that he had provided an address that did not exist. Morrow v. State, 2014 Ark. 510, 452 S.W.3d 90 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for failing to register as a sex offender because defendant had been advised of his obligation to register, had been informed on how to register, and had been reporting for over 4 years. Despite defendant's excuses for failing to register after his release from jail, the State was not required to prove that defendant failed to register with any particular culpable mental state. Fleming v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 235 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of failure to comply with registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration Act based on his failure to report a change of address because defendant, who registered as a homeless resident of Marion County, was required to wear an electronic ankle monitor with a GPS tracking system; with the use of the GPS technology, the State introduced documentation that defendant had not been in his usual overnight location in Marion County, or any other location in Marion County, for a period of 13 consecutive days; and, contrary to defendant's argument, the evidence established more than a mere temporary relocation to Boone County to periodically recharge his electronic ankle monitor. Wilson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 164, 485 S.W.3d 698 (2016).

Failure to Register or Report Found.

Circuit court did not err in finding that defendant violated the terms and conditions of his suspended imposition of sentence by committing the new offense of failing to register as a sex offender after he was released from incarceration; although defendant objected to the Arkansas Crime Information Center documents when the documents were introduced, he did not raise the Confrontation Clause basis for objection until after the evidence had been introduced and the State had rested its case and therefore that argument was waived. Allen v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 84, 596 S.W.3d 518 (2020).

Interpretation.

Sex Offender Screening and Risk Assessment Committee's assessment of a sex offender as a level four offender based on convictions which occurred before the effective date of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) did not violate the ex post facto prohibitions of U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 10 and Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 17. Despite subdivision (a)(1) of this section, which sets forth criminal sanctions for a sex offender's failure to report, the SORA is not a form of punishment; therefore, the Supreme Court of Arkansas holds that it cannot be considered a violation of the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions. Parkman v. Sex Offender Screening & Risk Assessment Comm., 2009 Ark. 205, 307 S.W.3d 6 (2009).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the charges under this section where defendant had knowledge that he was required to register as a sex offender, and the statute had remained substantively unchanged since case law concluding that the statute was one of strict liability had been decided. Morrow v. State, 2014 Ark. 510, 452 S.W.3d 90 (2014).