Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108 (2026)

Failure to meet qualifications — Effect — Exemptions

✓ current as of May 2026
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    1. Actions taken by law enforcement officers who do not meet all of the standards and qualifications set forth in this subchapter or made by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training shall not be held invalid merely because of the failure to meet the standards and qualifications.
      1. The Director of Law Enforcement Standards and Training may temporarily suspend a law enforcement officer's ability to act as a law enforcement officer for failure to meet the standards or qualifications under this subchapter until the failure is corrected or pending review by the commission.
      2. Notification of a suspension under subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section shall be made in a timely manner to the administrator of the law enforcement agency by which the law enforcement officer is employed.
    1. Nothing in this subchapter or any requirements made by the commission shall prevent any action by a private citizen that is now authorized by law.
    2. No provision of this subchapter shall affect the deputizing of a private citizen by a law enforcement officer in a time of a disaster or emergency.
    3. Nothing in this subchapter or any other law shall prohibit inspectors and code enforcement officers of cities, towns, or counties from issuing citations for the violation of municipal or county codes, ordinances, or regulations that they are charged by their city, town, or county with the duty of enforcing.
      1. Cities of the first class, cities of the second class, and incorporated towns are authorized to employ persons or to contract with private or public corporations, associations, or other entities, whether charitable, nonprofit, or for profit, that employ persons who do not meet certification requirements prescribed by the commission to enforce and execute any or all provisions of a municipal parking enforcement ordinance, including, but not limited to, the issuance of citations, the collection of fines, and any other parking enforcement process or procedure as may be established by ordinance of the municipality.
      2. Persons employed under this subdivision (b)(4) shall not carry firearms nor take any other official law enforcing action except that enumerated in subdivision (b)(4)(A) of this section.

History. Acts 1975, No. 452, § 10; 1983, No. 763, § 1; 1985, No. 580, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-4912, 19-4913, 42-1009; Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 44, § 1; 1999, No. 1247, § 1; 2009, No. 204, § 1; 2017, No. 497, § 7.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 44, § 2, provided:

“It is hereby the intent of the General Assembly by amending the minimum standards for law enforcement officials, ab initio, that actions taken by law enforcement officers that are pending before any Court, Grand Jury, Department, Officer, Agency, Regulatory Body, Legislative Committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a Politicial Subdivision shall not be held invalid merely because of the failure to meet the standards and qualifications.”

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted “or counties” once and “or county” twice in (b)(3), and made related changes.

The 2017 amendment redesignated former (a) as (a)(1); and added (a)(2).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Criminal Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 617.

Case Notes

Note. Some cases noted below were decided under former version of this section before the 1989 amendment.

Constitutionality.

The retroactive application of Acts 1989, No. 44, which amended subsection (a) to provide that action taken by non-qualified officers “shall not be held invalid”, does not violate the ex post facto clause because: 1) it does not punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; 2) it does not make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; 3) it does not alter a legal rule of evidence to receive less or different testimony than was required at the time of the commission of the offense; and 4) it does not deprive a defendant of any defense available according to at the time when the act was committed. Ridenhour v. State, 305 Ark. 90, 805 S.W.2d 639 (1991); Mitchell v. State, 306 Ark. 383, 814 S.W.2d 904 (1991).

While this section does not itemize the standards required, the standards are not unconstitutionally vague because they are either set out under § 12-9-106 in particular or as part of the commission rules. McEntire v. State, 305 Ark. 470, 808 S.W.2d 762 (1991).

The retroactive application of Acts 1989, No. 44 was not prohibited by the ex post facto clauses of our federal and state constitutions where defendant was arrested on February 11, 1989, and his motion to dismiss was denied on August 17, 1989, but the trial was held on October 16, 1990, and judgment was entered on October 22, 1990; therefore, the case was pending when Acts 1989, No. 44 was enacted. Ellis v. State, 306 Ark. 461, 816 S.W.2d 164 (1991).

Construction.

This section deals with standards for employment. It does not deal with police conduct. Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 514, 798 S.W.2d 87 (1990).

Subsection (a) applies to “all of the standards,” leaving no room for an interpretation that makes a distinction between employment standards and training standards. Harshaw v. State, 313 Ark. 51, 852 S.W.2d 318 (1993).

Purpose.

The goal of this section and the goal of the exclusionary rule are different. The goal of this section is to compel police department administrators to check the backgrounds of those seeking to become officers, and to hire only psychologically qualified persons to serve as policemen, whereas, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter unlawful police conduct and compels respect for the Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 514, 798 S.W.2d 87 (1990); Collins v. State, 304 Ark. 587, 804 S.W.2d 680 (1991).

Applicability.

Application of section, as amended in 1989, to a case pending at the time of the amendment, was not a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Harbour v. State, 305 Ark. 316, 807 S.W.2d 663 (1991).

It was proper to apply this section as amended by Acts 1989, No. 44, which removed the strictures previously invalidating actions taken by officers not meeting the commission's qualifications, to cases pending at the time Act 44 was enacted. Barnes v. State, 305 Ark. 428, 810 S.W.2d 909 (1991).

Actions by Others.

This section provides that action taken by an unqualified person “shall be held as invalid.” It does not indicate that actions taken by others should be held invalid or that an exclusionary rule should be applied. Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 514, 798 S.W.2d 87 (1990).

Authority to Arrest.

Section 16-81-106 and this section are repugnant in that § 16-81-106 provides that only certified law enforcement officers have the authority to make arrests, while this section provides that it does not matter whether officers are certified in order to make a valid arrest; however, that limited difference did not repeal the authority of law enforcement officers to make arrests, and a law officer who is vested with the authority to make arrests can issue citations. McDaniel v. State, 309 Ark. 20, 826 S.W.2d 286 (1992).

Bond.

There is no requirement under this section that officers be bonded in order to lawfully execute their duties. Dilday v. State, 300 Ark. 249, 778 S.W.2d 618 (1989).

Competency as Witness.

Law enforcement officers are not disqualified as witnesses based on whether they have met the criteria set forth by regulations promulgated by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training. A person is presumed to be competent to be a witness. Cherry v. State, 302 Ark. 462, 791 S.W.2d 354 (1990).

Date of Compliance.

Subsection (a) does not invalidate any action taken by a police officer if the officer was not hired in compliance with the minimum standards set by the commission, as such an interpretation would place police departments in the impossible position of never being able to rectify an erroneous hiring practice from previous years. Goode v. State, 303 Ark. 609, 798 S.W.2d 430 (1990).

While deputy had not met commission standards when he was hired in 1982 because the results of the federal fingerprint search were not placed in his file as required by regulation of the commission, that deficiency was corrected by 1984 and from that point on, deputy was in compliance with the commission's standards. Goode v. State, 303 Ark. 609, 798 S.W.2d 430 (1990).

Exclusionary Rule.

After the 1989 amendment to subsection (a) of this section, the exclusionary rule no longer applied in cases involving officers who were not qualified. Harshaw v. State, 313 Ark. 51, 852 S.W.2d 318 (1993).

Failure to Be Certified.

Chief of police who was not certified during part of tenure could not validly act as law enforcement officer during that period; however, where he was validly employed by the city, his salary was reasonable, and he acted in good faith, the city was not entitled to a refund of the compensation paid him during the period of noncertification. Allen v. Titsworth, 279 Ark. 138, 649 S.W.2d 185 (1983).

The exclusionary rule should not be applied in a situation involving both qualified and unqualified officers; thus, where several law enforcement officials participated in defendant's arrest and at least one of them was properly qualified to so participate there was a valid arrest. Kittler v. State, 304 Ark. 344, 802 S.W.2d 925 (1991).

Invalid Arrest.

Defendant's conviction was not overturned where arrest was invalid because arresting deputy had not completed the training required by § 12-9-106, because an invalid arrest may call for the suppression of a confession or other evidence, but it does not entitle the defendant to be discharged from responsibility for the offense. Pipes v. State, 22 Ark. App. 235, 738 S.W.2d 423 (1987).

Arrests of the defendants were not invalidated merely because the arresting officers' file failed to contain the specified medical forms required by the commission. Barnes v. State, 305 Ark. 428, 810 S.W.2d 909 (1991).

Police Misconduct.

Where none of the five arresting officers met the minimum employment standards established by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training the exclusionary rule need not be applied where there is no police misconduct. State v. Henry, 304 Ark. 339, 802 S.W.2d 448 (1991).

Proof of Compliance.

Where the trial court denied the defendant's request to examine the arresting officers' personnel files but then held the officers to be properly qualified, there was no prejudice to defendant, and thus no grounds for reversal, since the officer's compliance or noncompliance with the standards was established through testimony. Kittler v. State, 304 Ark. 344, 802 S.W.2d 925 (1991).

Prosecutor's Information.

Where arresting officer's psychological report did not contain recommendations pursuant to Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training regulations, his arrest of defendant was invalid. Freeman v. City of DeWitt, 301 Ark. 581, 787 S.W.2d 658 (1990).

Since a fingerprint check to disclose any criminal record pursuant to minimum standards for employment or appointment is mandatory rather than directory and the arresting officer's fingerprint check was completed but lost and he was hired “in the dark,” his arrest of defendant was invalid. Johnson v. City of Kensett, 301 Ark. 592, 787 S.W.2d 651 (1990).

Where the charges asserted against the defendant were by prosecutor's information and not an officer's citation, and even though the officer had made an initial arrest of the defendant on another minor traffic offense, the validity of the charging instrument and the exclusionary rule were not involved. Moore v. State, 304 Ark. 257, 801 S.W.2d 638 (1990).

Valid Arrest.

Pursuant to subsection (a), arrest by campus patrolman was not invalid although the patrolman's FBI fingerprint check had not been completed, and he had therefore not satisfied the minimum law enforcement standards when he arrested the defendant. Smith v. City of Little Rock, 305 Ark. 168, 806 S.W.2d 371 (1991).

Cited: Smith v. State, 278 Ark. 462, 648 S.W.2d 792 (1983); Lamb v. State, 21 Ark. App. 111, 730 S.W.2d 252 (1987); Huls v. State, 301 Ark. 572, 785 S.W.2d 467 (1990); Ellis v. State, 302 Ark. 597, 791 S.W.2d 370 (1990); King v. State, 304 Ark. 592, 804 S.W.2d 360 (1991); Whitaker v. State, 37 Ark. App. 112, 825 S.W.2d 827 (1992).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 29 cases, 1988–2003 · leading case: Dilday v. State, 778 S.W.2d 618 (Ark. 1989).
Dilday v. State, 778 S.W.2d 618 (Ark. 1989). · cites it 6× “We then noted that the holding in Brewer was a limited exception to that rule which applied when a non-qualified officer issued the only charges in the case, since pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108 (a) (1987), “any action” taken by such officer “shall be held as invalid.”
Biggers v. State, 878 S.W.2d 717 (Ark. 1994). · cites it 4× “Appellant cites Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108 (a) (Supp. 1989), which states: “Actions taken by law enforcement officers who do not meet all of the standards and qualifications set forth in this subchapter or made by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training…”
State v. Henry, 802 S.W.2d 448 (Ark. 1991). · cites it 7× “The appellate court, relying on Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108 (a)(1987), and the cases of Mitchell v.”
Ridenhour v. State, 805 S.W.2d 639 (Ark. 1991). · cites it 6× “We hold that the act is not a violation of the ex post facto doctrine. The officer who issued the citation did not meet the minimum qualifications.”
Grable v. State, 769 S.W.2d 9 (Ark. 1989). · cites it 5× “We rej ect the substantial compliance argument with respect to the psychological testing requirement because of the emphatic language of Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108 (a) which makes clear the intent of the general assembly that we are not to tolerate anything but strict compliance…”
Johnson v. City of Kensett, 787 S.W.2d 651 (Ark. 1990). · cites it 8× “However, the Grable and Mitchell decisions were soon followed by Act 44, amending “ab initio” Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108 (a) to read: Actions taken by law enforcement officers who do not meet all the standards and qualifications set forth in this subchapter or made by the…”
Cherry v. State, 791 S.W.2d 354 (Ark. 1990). · cites it 2× “§ 12-9-108 (a) (1987), which reads: A person who does not meet the standards and qualifications set forth in this subchapter or any made by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training shall not take any official action as a police officer, and any action…”
Huls v. State, 785 S.W.2d 467 (Ark. 1990). · cites it 2× “Martin, who searched the petitioner’s home pursuant to petitioner’s voluntary consent, found a hammer and a bloodstained blanket which were admitted into evidence by the state.”
Leggett v. Centro, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 523 (Ark. 1994). · cites it 4× “Act 796 of 1993 reaffirms the exclusive remedy doctrine and specifically annuls Baysinger and two other ill advised decisions of this court.”
Kittler v. State, 802 S.W.2d 925 (Ark. 1991). · cites it 2× “Appellant argues, as stated in his brief, that “the officers [sic] actions were tainted because of non-compliance with the aforementioned statute [ Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108 (a) (1987)] and therefore any evidence introduced by said officer was ‘fruits of the poison tree’ [sic].”
Goode v. State, 798 S.W.2d 430 (Ark. 1990). · cites it 4× “(4) The minimum standards for employment or appointment must be completed before employment eligibility is established. Employment eligibility should depend upon the results and recommendations received by the investigator and examiners.”
Smith v. City of Little Rock, 806 S.W.2d 371 (Ark. 1991). · cites it 2× “The appellant first argues that failure to meet the minimum standards rendered the arrest an invalid act under Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108 (a) (1987). We do not agree.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108(a) — 8 cases
Dilday v. State, 778 S.W.2d 618 (Ark. 1989). “We then noted that the holding in Brewer was a limited exception to that rule which applied when a non-qualified officer issued the only charges in the case, since pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108 (a) (1987), “any action” taken by such officer “shall be held as invalid.”
State v. Henry, 802 S.W.2d 448 (Ark. 1991). “The appellate court, relying on Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108 (a)(1987), and the cases of Mitchell v.”
Johnson v. City of Kensett, 787 S.W.2d 651 (Ark. 1990). “However, the Grable and Mitchell decisions were soon followed by Act 44, amending “ab initio” Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108 (a) to read: Actions taken by law enforcement officers who do not meet all the standards and qualifications set forth in this subchapter or made by the…”
Grable v. State, 769 S.W.2d 9 (Ark. 1989). “We rej ect the substantial compliance argument with respect to the psychological testing requirement because of the emphatic language of Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108 (a) which makes clear the intent of the general assembly that we are not to tolerate anything but strict compliance…”
Leggett v. Centro, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 523 (Ark. 1994). “Act 796 of 1993 reaffirms the exclusive remedy doctrine and specifically annuls Baysinger and two other ill advised decisions of this court.”
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