Ark. Code Ann. § 14-15-404 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Laurence and Circo, An Exchange of Collegial Memoranda on the Attachment of a Judgment Lien to Real Property Subject to a Buy-Sell Agreement, 2006 Arkansas L. Notes 93.

Ark. L. Rev.

Secured Transactions: Article IX: Part 1, 16 Ark. L. Rev. 108.

Nickles, A Localized Treatise on Secured Transactions — Part 1: Scope of Article 9, 34 Ark. L. Rev. 377.

Case Note, Killam v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp.: A Portrait of Uncertainty for Title Examiners and Mineral Interest Owners, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 679.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Property Law, 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1025.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Subsection (b) applies only to instruments touching and affecting real estate and has no applicability to assignments of promissory notes even though the notes are secured by a lien on real estate. Neal v. Bradley, 238 Ark. 714, 384 S.W.2d 238 (1964).

Actual Notice.

Deed for conveyance of real estate, duly executed, is good and valid against creditor of person executing such deed, obtaining a judgment, which, by law, is a lien on real estate, and also against a purchaser of such real estate at a judicial sale under the judgment, if actual notice of the deed is given to the purchaser and to the creditor, or to his attorney of record, or if such deed is filed for record at any time before the sale, though not until after the judgment is rendered and execution levied upon the land; such notice must be given at any time before, or at, the time of the sale under execution, and will be sufficient, though the deed is not produced. Byers v. Engles, 16 Ark. 543 (1855).

Absent recorded notice, a new barn, stockpond, barbed fence, and general clean-up were sufficient facts and circumstances as would put a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry, and thus a second purchaser was put on actual notice. Bowen v. Perryman, 256 Ark. 174, 506 S.W.2d 543 (1974).

Judgment was properly awarded to appellee in its quiet title action as appellee's chain of title was superior; evidence showed that appellants' predecessors had actual knowledge of the conveyance of the disputed strip of land to appellee's predecessor, and thus the deed of appellee's predecessor, although recorded later, took priority. Rice v. Welch Motor Co., 95 Ark. App. 100, 234 S.W.3d 327 (2006).

Constructive Notice.

Record of conveyance by mortgagee was not constructive notice to mortgagor. Turman v. Sanford, 69 Ark. 95, 61 S.W. 167 (1901).

Record of deed of owner as conveyed by an alias was constructive notice. Kendall v. J.I. Porter Lumber Co., 69 Ark. 442, 64 S.W. 220 (1901).

Record of deed of growing timber was constructive notice. Kendall v. J.I. Porter Lumber Co., 69 Ark. 442, 64 S.W. 220 (1901).

All persons are affected with notice of original instruments as they are filed for record in the recorder's office. Rowland v. Griffin, 179 Ark. 421, 16 S.W.2d 457 (1929).

An unrecorded deed is not constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser or mortgagee. Davis v. Burford, 197 Ark. 965, 125 S.W.2d 789 (1939).

Where purchasers of second lien attempted, under the aegis of Arkansas case law, to get around an SBA first lien, they were frustrated where court held their conduct culpable and neglectful in ignoring constructive notice under subsection (a) as well as other knowledge they evidenced of the SBA mortgage. United States v. Hughes, 499 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1974).

Recording of lien created by bill of assurance of property owners' association against property as a result of members' delinquent and unpaid assessments constituted constructive notice to all persons. Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners' Ass'n, 258 Ark. 757, 528 S.W.2d 651 (1975).

Facts in bankruptcy trustee's preferential transfer action against two creditor banks demonstrated clearly that the bank's mortgages were granted by and recorded against entities which were not record owners of the property mortgaged; thus, absent any other argument, since the banks' mortgages were not properly recorded against the entities which possessed legal interests in the properties, those mortgages did not affect title to the properties and would not operate as constructive notice under § 18-40-102 and subsection (a) of this section. Rice v. First Ark. Valley Bank (In re May), 310 B.R. 405 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2004).

Although the farm argued that, even if the notice was constitutionally insufficient, the railroad's claim to the mineral rights was barred by the one-year limitations period in § 26-37-203, the court found that: (1) this section, which provided that subsequent purchasers of real estate were put on constructive notice of a properly recorded deed, this section did not govern the running of the statute of limitations as to the railroad because it was not a subsequent purchaser of the mineral rights; and (2) imposition of § 26-37-203 presupposed adequate notice to the landowner, and due process required notice reasonably calculated under all of the circumstances to inform the property owner of the taking so that he may object, and if that notice was lacking, the passage of one year from the taking, without more, would not satisfy the requirements of due process. Linn Farms Timber Ltd. P'ship v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 4:09CV00663 JLH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51714 (E.D. Ark. May 25, 2010), aff'd, 661 F.3d 354 (8th Cir. 2011) (decided under prior version of statute).

Recorded affidavit of lost mortgage, with a copy of the mortgage appended, was not constructive notice to a bankruptcy trustee of the mortgagee's interest in the subject property because the affidavit was not an “instrument of writing affecting title,” under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, as (1) the affidavit did not affect title, since the affidavit's purpose was to give notice that there was a mortgage executed which was lost, and (2) an instrument affecting real estate had to be acknowledged before being admitted to record, under § 16-47-101, but the grantor did not acknowledge the affidavit, nor was the grantor required to, as the affidavit was witnessed and notarized only for the purpose of attesting to the signature of the lender's employee who stated the mortgage was lost and the bank claimed an interest in the property, so the trustee, as a bona fide purchaser for value, under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544, could avoid the mortgagee's lien. Wetzel v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 2010 Ark. 242 (2010).

Transaction between the city and debtor appeared without doubt a deed absolute on its face intended by the parties to be a mortgage, and was treated as such under Arkansas law. Under the provisions of this section, the Lease and Agreement between the City and debtor which was duly recorded was “an instrument of writing affecting title, in law or equity, to any real or personal property” and constituted notice of the writing and was binding on the Trustee; therefore, the Trustee had constructive notice of the deed from debtor to the city and the Lease and Agreement containing the provision to repurchase the property back for a nominal sum because the documents were duly recorded in the records of White County, Arkansas. Ark. Dev. Fin. Auth. v. Rice (In re Yarnell's Ice Cream Co.), 486 B.R. 918 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2013).

Chapter 7 trustee was not allowed under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544 to avoid liens which a mortgagee held on real property Chapter 7 debtors owned in Arkansas because he was on notice of the mortgagee's interests; although two mortgages the mortgagee recorded contained only the street address of the debtors' property, the mortgages were not defective, they gave the trustee constructive notice of the mortgagee's liens and imposed a duty on the trustee to conduct an inquiry concerning the mortgagee's interests, and the trustee could have discovered the mortgagee's interests by making an inquiry to the assessor's office where the mortgages were recorded. Lee v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (In re Savage), 504 B.R. 921 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2014).

Fraud.

In fraud actions, for purposes of determining when the statute of limitations begins to run, parties alleging fraud are charged with knowledge of any pertinent real estate conveyances from the time such conveyances are placed in public records, since filing for public record and concealment are mutually exclusive. Hughes v. McCann, 13 Ark. App. 28, 678 S.W.2d 784 (1984).

Although Debtor deeded 600 acres of land to his son for $10 in 1986, for purposes of the Arkansas fraudulent transfer statute, the transfer and the effect upon the debtor and his insolvency status must be analyzed at the time the deed was recorded in 1995. Williams v. Marlar, 246 B.R. 606 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2000), aff'd, Williams v. Marlar (In re Marlar), 252 B.R. 743 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000).

Implied Repeal.

Subsection (a) was repealed by the Uniform Commercial Code insofar as it refers to the recording of instruments concerning “goods and chattels” as giving notice to all persons. In re King Furn. City, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1965).

Instruments Not Recorded.

Grant of mineral deed from person in possession under recorded deed that apparently conveyed title would not be set aside on ground that prior to such deed, the title had been conveyed to the deceased husband of grantor, where deed was lost and never placed of record. Henry v. Texas Co., 201 Ark. 996, 147 S.W.2d 742 (1941).

In suit to establish title to mortgaged land against purchaser at foreclosure sale on ground that, prior to execution of mortgage, plaintiff had deeded land to his wife, evidence was held to show that alleged deed was not recorded and that mortgagee knew nothing about it. Teel v. Harnden, 204 Ark. 103, 161 S.W.2d 1 (1942).

One who takes a deed with knowledge of a prior unrecorded deed to another is in the same position as though the prior deed had been of record. Skelly Oil Co. v. Johnson, 209 Ark. 1107, 194 S.W.2d 425 (1946).

Agreement accepting a new survey as correct property line, notwithstanding existence of fences located elsewhere, which was not recorded until after litigation had arisen, was not valid against persons who had no other knowledge of such agreement. Rindeikis v. Coffman, 231 Ark. 422, 329 S.W.2d 550 (1959).

An assignment of a mortgage need not be recorded to be valid against later claims against the assignor. Bryan v. Easton Tire Co., 262 Ark. 731, 561 S.W.2d 79 (1978).

Obligation to Inquire Not Satisfied.

Where subsequent purchaser was put on notice of prior interest in the property, he did not satisfy his obligation to inquire by consulting his own attorney, or by searching the records. There was no evidence that his attorney had any knowledge of the circumstances, and subsequent purchaser's search of the records was not a diligent inquiry as the “actual notice” exception to the protection afforded by subsection (b) covers situations in which a property interest does not appear in the records. Massey v. Wynne, 302 Ark. 589, 791 S.W.2d 368 (1990).

Recording.

Record of an unacknowledged mortgage is not notice. Challis v. German Nat'l Bank, 56 Ark. 88, 19 S.W. 115 (1892).

In case of contemporaneous conveyances of same land, deed first recorded holds. Penrose v. Doherty, 70 Ark. 256, 67 S.W. 398 (1902); Storthz v. Chapline, 71 Ark. 31, 70 S.W. 465 (1902).

Presumption of delivery of deed from its being recorded was not rebutted by proof that deed was in grantor's possession. Estes v. German Nat'l Bank, 62 Ark. 7, 34 S.W. 85 (1896).

Where purchaser of lands records a deed absolute, and the intent of the parties is established by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that the deed is intended to be a mortgage, the court properly declares the deed a mortgage. Gunnels v. Machen, 213 Ark. 800, 212 S.W.2d 702 (1948).

When a properly executed and properly acknowledged lease is filed for recording, it protects the parties to the lease against intervening rights of third parties, even though it is not properly recorded. Wasp Oil, Inc. v. Arkansas Oil & Gas, Inc., 280 Ark. 420, 658 S.W.2d 397 (1983).

To the extent the borrowers argued that the creditor had a duty to record any assignment of the note or mortgage, there was no such duty, given that a mortgage's efficacy as to the original parties was not diminished if the mortgage went unrecorded, as the purpose of recording was to give constructive notice to subsequent purchasers. Anderson v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 683, 450 S.W.3d 251 (2014).

In a declaratory judgment action, even if the five-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until there was notice that a first lease was being relied on, a complaint was time-barred due to a recordation of an assignment; the recording served as constructive notice from the time the instrument was filed for record, and the case was filed more than 5 years after an assignment was recorded. The circuit court did not err by treating the claim as raising contract enforcement issues and applying the relevant statutory period of limitations. McDougal v. Sabine River Land Co., 2015 Ark. App. 281, 461 S.W.3d 359 (2015).

Subsequent Purchasers.

A bona fide purchaser of real estate for a valuable consideration who enters into possession acquires a good title against a prior, unrecorded conveyance from the same vendor. Long v. Langsdale, 56 Ark. 239, 19 S.W. 603 (1892).

A subsequent purchaser is not charged with notice of any fact not connected with the course of his title. Abbott v. Parker, 103 Ark. 425, 147 S.W. 70 (1912).

Subsequent purchasers take subject to a lien mentioned in a recorded deed; assignment of such lien need not be recorded. Hebert v. Fellheimer, 115 Ark. 366, 171 S.W. 144 (1914).

Where range was omitted from description, purchaser would not be held to have had notice. Neas v. Whitener-London Realty Co., 119 Ark. 301, 178 S.W. 390 (1915).

Where purchaser quitclaimed back to grantor land erroneously included in his deed and quitclaim deed was recorded prior to the recording of purchaser's deed to a third person and without knowledge of it, original grantor should be regarded as an innocent purchaser for value without notice and entitled to the land. Davis v. Burford, 197 Ark. 965, 125 S.W.2d 789 (1939).

Where warranty deeds executed in 1932 and 1935 were not recorded until December, 1940, grantee who had obtained a deed in March, 1940, without notice of prior deeds, was an innocent purchaser under subsection (b). Sturgis v. Nunn, 203 Ark. 693, 158 S.W.2d 673 (1942).

A deed is effective to convey title upon its delivery to the grantee, whether recorded or not, and is good and valid against a subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration who has actual knowledge of the deed. Halbrook v. Lewis, 204 Ark. 579, 163 S.W.2d 171 (1942).

A subsequent purchaser who places his deed on record acquires a title superior to a prior purchaser who does not file his deed for record until after the subsequent purchaser has filed his deed for record, if the subsequent purchase was for a valuable consideration and without actual knowledge of the prior conveyance. Halbrook v. Lewis, 204 Ark. 579, 163 S.W.2d 171 (1942).

Under subsection (b), a subsequent purchaser acquires a superior title when he places his title of record before a previous purchaser records his title only where the purchasers derived their interests from a common grantor. Richardson v. Fisher, 236 Ark. 612, 367 S.W.2d 440 (1963).

Where there was an executed contract by both deceased husband and widow that would be specifically enforced in equity against the prior unrecorded deed with deceased remaining in possession of the property and with widow having no knowledge of the unrecorded deed, it placed the widow in the position of being an innocent purchaser for value in possession and with title to her vested by the will relating back to death of decedent and prior to recording of unrecorded deed, and rule that a parol contract to execute a will may be enforced in equity only where the agreement is established by clear, cogent, and convincing testimony would not apply. Hogan v. Hogan, 241 Ark. 377, 407 S.W.2d 735 (1966).

Purchasers held to be innocent purchasers for value and, therefore, not bound by the terms of an unrecorded lease where lease was not recorded and because the circumstances were not such as to put purchasers on notice of the lease. Garmon v. Mitchell, 53 Ark. App. 10, 918 S.W.2d 201 (1996).

Trial court properly quieted title in the subsequent purchasers under the escrow contracts, which were also contracts of sale, because the subsequent purchasers' interests in the property was filed of record before the mortgage holder's later foreclosure action against the original purchaser, who executed a first mortgage which was released, then executed a subsequent mortgage, and the subsequent purchasers were thereby protected by this section. Hatchett v. Terry, 87 Ark. App. 276, 190 S.W.3d 302 (2004).

Court doubts that the principle that an unrecorded deed is not valid against a subsequent purchaser unless he had actual notice of the prior interest applies in mortgage priority disputes, given that every mortgage of real estate shall be a lien on the mortgaged property from the time it is filed in the recorder's office for record, and not before, and case law held that a defective mortgage constituted no notice to third parties of the existence of the mortgage. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC v. Summit Bank, N.A. (In re Francis), 750 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2014).

Sufficiency of Notice.

Evidence sufficient to find that subsequent purchasers of mineral leases had sufficient notice of prior interest to put them on guard for an inquiry. Killam v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 303 Ark. 547, 798 S.W.2d 419 (1990).

Subsequent purchasers were not bona fide purchasers because a prior purchaser's possession of the property provided actual notice, and the subsequent purchasers were charged with notice when the land was in possession of someone other than the record owner, even though the subsequent purchasers were not aware of such. However, a fact issue remained as to whether the prior purchaser was in exclusive possession of the property. Walls v. Humphries, 2013 Ark. 286, 428 S.W.3d 517 (2013).

Tax Deeds.

Subsection (b) gives priority to the first recording only as between purchasers deriving their interest from a common grantor. It has no application to an intervening tax deed obtained from a county clerk. Thorne v. Magness, 34 Ark. App. 39, 805 S.W.2d 95 (1991).

Cited: Roach v. Terry, 263 Ark. 774, 567 S.W.2d 286 (1978); Reichenbach v. Kizer, 174 B.R. 997 (Bankr. E.D. Ark 1994).