Ark. Code Ann. § 14-301-303 (2020)
Hearing — Written consent of abutting owners
At the meeting of the council as designated in the notice, any property owner affected by the petition shall be heard. The council shall then determine whether, from the standpoint of public interest and welfare, the street or alley should be vacated as proposed in the petition. However, no street or alley, or any portion thereof, shall be abandoned or vacated unless there has been filed with the council the written consent of the owners of all lots abutting on the street or alley, or the portion thereof, to be vacated.
History. Acts 1945, No. 17, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3827.
Case Notes
Abutting Property Owners.
In litigation involving the closing of an alley where the procedure was instituted under this section, which necessitated the written consent of the owners of all abutting lots, while the written consent of those owners actually abutting the two ends of the alley had been obtained, from the practical standpoint upon both ends of the alley being closed, the entire alley would become closed, and therefore, all abutting property owners not having given their consent, the petitioners had to fail. Roberts v. Pace, 230 Ark. 280, 322 S.W.2d 75 (1959).
This section did not repeal § 14-54-104, and the failure of parties to secure the closing of an alley under the procedure set out in this section, requiring the consent of the abutting property owners, would not be res judicata of any future litigation between the same parties instigated under § 14-54-104, the procedure there involving the closing of an alley in order to better provide for the public welfare of the inhabitants of the city. Roberts v. Pace, 230 Ark. 280, 322 S.W.2d 75 (1959).
Where the alley had never been platted, filed of record, or dedicated to the city and the written consent of the abutter had not been obtained as provided in this section, the city had no authority to close alley under § 14-301-301; therefore, the 30-day statute of limitations in § 14-301-305 was not applicable to this ordinance. Jones v. American Home Life Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 330, 738 S.W.2d 387 (1987).
Whether the appellants were the owners of abutting property was an issue of material fact that should have been tried, and the chancellor erred in dismissing the appellants' complaint where (1) the appellants owned the property that abutted the north end of a street and the appellees owned the property that abutted the south end of the street, (2) the appellees sought to have the south 10 feet of the street vacated and abandoned, and (3) although the appellants' ingress and egress would not be blocked by the closing, the portion of the street abutting their property would be been narrowed, which they claimed would have an adverse effect on the use of their property. Holliman v. Liles, 72 Ark. App. 169, 35 S.W.3d 369 (2000).
Proper Authority.
Trial court did not err in deciding that § 14-54-303 was controlling for the town to vacate a street, because an incorporated town's ability to vacate a street under § 14-54-303 was independent, and §§ 14-301-301 to 14-301-303 had no application when an incorporated town used its authority under § 14-54-303. Riley v. Town of Higginson, 2009 Ark. App. 294, 307 S.W.3d 34 (2009).
Cited: Ellington v. Remmel, 226 Ark. 569, 293 S.W.2d 452 (1956); Thomas v. City of Little Rock, 52 Ark. App. 24, 914 S.W.2d 328 (1996).