Ark. Code Ann. § 14-301-305 (2020)
Suit to reject ordinance — Evidence of consent
- The determination, findings, and ordinance of the council shall be conclusive unless, within thirty (30) days after the passage of the ordinance, suit is brought to reject the ordinance in the chancery court of the county where the city or town is located.
- In determining whether all abutting property owners have consented to the abandonment, the council and chancery court shall be limited by the record of deeds in the office of the recorder of the county and shall not consider unrecorded instruments.
History. Acts 1945, No. 17, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3829.
Case Notes
Abutting Property Owners.
In litigation involving the closing of an alley where the procedure was instituted under § 14-301-303, which necessitated the written consent of the owners of all abutting lots, while the written consent of those owners actually abutting the two ends of the alley had been obtained, from the practical standpoint upon both ends of the alley being closed, the entire alley would become closed, and therefore, all abutting property owners not having given their consent, the petitioners had to fail. Roberts v. Pace, 230 Ark. 280, 322 S.W.2d 75 (1959).
Nonabutting Owners.
Where nonabutting owners could not show special and peculiar injury suffered in connection with the closing of a street in which city had only an easement, the nonabutting owners did not have standing to challenge city ordinance vacating and abandoning the street. Freeze v. Jones, 260 Ark. 193, 539 S.W.2d 425 (1976).
Ordinances Upheld.
Where city board of directors found that traffic on a portion of a street had declined and that closing of this portion of the street would not work a hardship on many people, and where owners of abutting property consented to closing of the street, an ordinance adopted by the board of directors vacating and abandoning the street was not ultra vires. Freeze v. Jones, 260 Ark. 193, 539 S.W.2d 425 (1976).
Res Judicata.
Where only issue in prior suit to enjoin city from enforcing ordinance adopted under the authority of this subchapter purporting to close certain streets was the validity of such ordinance, authority of city to adopt ordinance under § 14-54-104 relocating portions of such streets was not res judicata in proceeding to enjoin enforcement of second ordinance. Risser v. City of Little Rock, 225 Ark. 318, 281 S.W.2d 949 (1955), cert. denied, Risser v. Little Rock, 350 U.S. 965, 76 S. Ct. 433 (1956), overruled in part, Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968).
This section did not repeal § 14-54-104, and the failure of parties to secure the closing of an alley under the procedure set out in § 14-301-303, requiring the consent of the abutting property owners, would not be res judicata of any future litigation between the same parties instigated under § 14-54-104, the procedure there involving the closing of an alley in order to better provide for the public welfare of the inhabitants of the city. Roberts v. Pace, 230 Ark. 280, 322 S.W.2d 75 (1959).
Decision concerning the validity of one ordinance under § 14-301-301 regarding the closing of an alley was not res judicata with respect to the validity of second ordinance enacted pursuant to § 14-54-104. Jones v. American Home Life Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 330, 738 S.W.2d 387 (1987).
Statute of Limitations.
Where the alley had never been platted, filed of record, or dedicated to the city and the written consent of the abutter had not been obtained as provided in § 14-301-303, the city had no authority to close this alley under § 14-301-301; therefore, the 30-day statute of limitations in this section was not applicable to this ordinance. Jones v. American Home Life Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 330, 738 S.W.2d 387 (1987).
If the statutory conditions have not been met when a city council passes an ordinance that closes a portion of a street, then the 30 day statute of limitations does not apply. Holliman v. Liles, 72 Ark. App. 169, 35 S.W.3d 369 (2000).
Cited: Ellington v. Remmel, 226 Ark. 569, 293 S.W.2d 452 (1956); City of Little Rock v. Linn, 245 Ark. 260, 432 S.W.2d 455 (1968).