Ark. Code Ann. § 14-54-104 (2020)
Additional powers of cities of the first class
In order to better provide for the public welfare, safety, comfort, and convenience of inhabitants of cities of the first class, the following enlarged and additional powers are conferred upon these cities:
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- To regulate the use of sidewalks, and all structures and excavations thereunder, to require the owner or occupant of any premises to keep the sidewalks in front or alongside the premises free from obstruction, to build and maintain suitable pavement or sidewalk improvements therealong whenever they may become necessary to the safety or convenience of travel, and to designate the kind of sidewalk improvement to be made, the kind of material to be used by the owner or occupant, and the time within which the improvement is required to be completed.
- The kind and character of sidewalk improvement for the same street and block shall be uniform.
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- Sidewalk improvement shall be ordered, either by a general ordinance for all property owners or occupants on a certain street or within a certain quarter where the necessity of sidewalks is general to that extent, or by a resolution or order adopted by the city council and notice served upon the particular individuals owning or occupying the premises where the special necessity exists.
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- In either case, the city shall have power to enforce obedience to the sidewalk ordinance, order, resolution, or notice upon the owners or occupants failing or refusing to obey them by the imposition of fines upon conviction thereof in the district court, in like manner and with like consequences and effect as for a violation of any other ordinance of the city.
- Each day that the failure or refusal is continued shall constitute a separate offense.
- After the owner, upon notice, has failed to repair it, in cases where the sidewalk improvement shall be constructed by an occupant who holds the premises as a tenant or lessee, he or she shall have the right to deduct the cost thereof from the rent that may be due from him or her, or to hold the possession of the premises for such time as the rental value thereof will be sufficient to reimburse him or her for the cost.
- Nothing contained in this subdivision shall be so construed as to prevent the city from proceeding by civil action or in any other manner provided by existing laws;
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- To alter or change the width or extent of streets, sidewalks, alleys, avenues, parks, wharves, and other public grounds, and to vacate or lease out portions thereof, and where lands have been acquired or donated to the city for any object or purpose which has become impossible or impracticable to achieve, the lands may be used or devoted for other proper public or corporate purposes or sold by order of the city council and the proceeds applied for public or corporate purposes;
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- To punish, prevent, or remove encroachments or obstructions upon any of the streets, sidewalks, wharves, or other public grounds of the city, whether by buildings, fences, or structures of any kind, posts, trees, or any other matter or thing whatsoever.
- No statute of limitations or lapse of time during which any obstruction or encroachment may have existed or been continued shall be permitted as a bar or defense against any proceeding or action to remove or abate it or to punish for its continuance after an order has been made by the city council or the district court for its removal or abatement;
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- To prevent and punish the bringing or importation into the city of any pauper, mendicant, diseased, or other person likely to become a burden on the city or any charity therein or become a charge upon the county in which the city is situated unless such action has been authorized by some competent officer in this state in a manner provided for by law;
- To punish the conductor of any railroad, captain of any boat or vessel, proprietor or driver of any stage or other conveyance bringing any such person into the city unless the party providing conveyance can show that he or she had no reasonable grounds to know or become apprised of the condition or circumstances of such person;
- To prevent or regulate the carrying on of any trade, business, or vocation of a tendency dangerous to morals, health, or safety, or calculated to promote dishonesty or crime. To provide by ordinance for the punishment of dishonest practices of any kind, and for the prompt arrest and punishment of all dishonest characters or persons of known bad reputation, such as burglars, pickpockets, sneakthieves, forgers, fakirs, confidence men, common cheats, tricksters, and the like, who shall come into or be found within the corporate limits of the city without being able to give a good account of themselves, and to provide that, upon the trial of all such persons, evidence as to general character, reputation, associates, and places frequented shall be admissible, and in all such cases to authorize a fine of not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100); and
- To prevent, abate, or remove nuisances of every kind, and to declare what are nuisances, and also to punish the authors or continuers thereof by fine or imprisonment, or both. However, no previous declaration shall be necessary as to any matter, act, or thing that would have been a nuisance at common law, and all nuisances may be proceeded against either by order of the city council or prosecution in the district court.
History. Acts 1885, No. 67, § 3, p. 92; C. & M. Dig., § 7748; Pope's Dig., § 9944; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2304; Acts 2017, No. 260, §§ 8-10; 2017, No. 926, § 1.
Amendments. The 2017 amendment by No. 260 substituted “district court” for “police court” in (1)(B)(i) (b)(1) , (3)(B), and (4)(D).
The 2017 amendment by No. 926 substituted “portions thereof” for “such portions thereof as may not for the time being be required for corporate purposes” in (2).
Cross References. Municipal streets generally, § 14-301-101 et seq.
Case Notes
In General.
An ordinance under this section must not be oppressive to a property owner. James v. City of Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 199, 4 S.W. 760 (1887).
Cities of the first class are authorized to regulate the use of streets and sidewalks within their limits. State ex rel. Latta v. City of Marianna, 183 Ark. 927, 39 S.W.2d 301 (1931).
Nuisances.
City cannot declare that to be a nuisance which is not a nuisance per se. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).
City has no right to declare keeping of bees in the city a nuisance. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).
The keeping of cattle, a livery stable, or the hide and fur business in a city are not nuisances per se. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).
City may regulate location of livery stables, but such regulation must not be arbitrary or unjust. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).
City may regulate keeping of chickens, but such regulation must not be arbitrary or unjust. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).
Sidewalks.
Regulation of use of sidewalks is valid delegation of police power and is not unconstitutional. James v. City of Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 199, 4 S.W. 760 (1887).
Owner can be required only to do surface grading in building sidewalks. City of Little Rock v. Fitzgerald, 59 Ark. 494, 28 S.W. 32 (1894).
Cities may require removal of wooden awnings from above sidewalks. City of Helena v. Wooten, 98 Ark. 156, 135 S.W. 828 (1911).
Streets, Alleys, Etc.
City has no power to sell, exchange, or give away streets. Beebe v. City of Little Rock, 68 Ark. 39, 56 S.W. 791 (1900).
Title to an alley cannot be acquired by limitations. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Boles, 88 Ark. 533, 115 S.W. 375 (1908).
Where improvement district in city was organized for purpose of improving a street, the board of commissioners acquired no control over the street except for the purpose of making the improvement, and when that object was accomplished, the street became subject to the exclusive control of the city. Pulaski Gaslight Co. v. Remmel, 97 Ark. 318, 133 S.W. 1117 (1911).
City is without power to organize an improvement district in a city for the purpose of opening, establishing, and creating an alley through property when no alley has ever been opened, dedicated, or provided for. Lewis v. Rieff, 114 Ark. 366, 169 S.W. 1184 (1914).
Subdivision (2) was not repealed by § 14-301-301 et seq. providing a method for the vacation of streets and alleys. Cernauskas v. Fletcher, 211 Ark. 678, 201 S.W.2d 999 (1947); Jones v. American Home Life Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 330, 738 S.W.2d 387 (1987).
City cannot bind itself by perpetual contract or by one that lasts an unreasonable time, and any attempt on the part of the city to enter into a contract relating to the permanent establishment or abandonment of its streets would be ultra vires. Risser v. City of Little Rock, 225 Ark. 318, 281 S.W.2d 949 (1955), cert. denied, Risser v. Little Rock, 350 U.S. 965, 76 S. Ct. 433 (1956), overruled in part, Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968).
Where only issue in prior suit to enjoin city from enforcing ordinance adopted under the authority of § 14-301-301 purporting to close certain strees was the validity of the ordinance, authority of city to adopt ordinance under this section relocating portions of the streets was not res judicata in proceedings to enjoin enforcement of second ordinance. Risser v. City of Little Rock, 225 Ark. 318, 281 S.W.2d 949 (1955), cert. denied, Risser v. Little Rock, 350 U.S. 965, 76 S. Ct. 433 (1956), overruled in part, Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968).
When public had only an easement in city streets that were vacated when railroad constructed a terminal so that the railroad could build its tracks, train sheds, and platforms across the streets, and thereafter rail service into the city was discontinued and the terminal facilities were used for other purposes, city, by such discontinuance, acquired no right to reopen the streets except under their power of eminent domain. Kansas City S. Ry. v. City of Ft. Smith, 228 Ark. 625, 309 S.W.2d 315 (1958).
Section 14-301-301 et seq. did not repeal this section, and the failure of parties to secure the closing of an alley under the procedure set out in § 14-301-301 et seq., which required the consent of the abutting property owners, would not be res judicata of any future litigation between the same parties instigated under this section, the procedure in this section involving the closing of an alley in order to better provide for the public welfare of the inhabitants of a city. Roberts v. Pace, 230 Ark. 280, 322 S.W.2d 75 (1959).
In litigation involving closing of an alley where the procedure was instituted under § 14-301-303, which necessitated the written consent of the owners of all abutting lots, while the written consent of those owners actually abutting the two ends of the alley had been obtained, from the practical standpoint upon both ends of the alley being closed, the entire alley would become closed and therefore, all abutting property owners not having given their consent, the petitioners had to fail. Roberts v. Pace, 230 Ark. 280, 322 S.W.2d 75 (1959).
Since this section contains no provision limiting to 30 days any attack on a city ordinance, and thus ordinary statutory period for suits against enforcement of an ordinance would apply, plenary suit filed 31 days after passage of ordinance that provided for closing of a street to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance was timely filed. Stephens v. City of Springdale, 233 Ark. 865, 350 S.W.2d 182 (1961).
City does not have right to vacate and close portion of a street where there is no showing that portion to be closed is not being used by the public as a street. Brooksher v. Jones, 238 Ark. 1005, 386 S.W.2d 253 (1965).
On request of person who desired sections of streets and alley, abutting which he owned all the land, vacated to enable him to construct additional facilities, city had power to vacate the sections of streets and alley on evidence that their closing would cause but little inconvenience to persons then using them and their traffic could be readily carried by other nearby streets and alleys. City of Little Rock v. Linn, 245 Ark. 260, 432 S.W.2d 455 (1968).
Ordinance vacating an easement theretofore accepted by public use and passed without notice to the affected property owners could not deprive an abutting property owner who relied on such easement for access to and egress from his property of his right to use such easement. Flake v. Thompson, Inc., 249 Ark. 713, 460 S.W.2d 789 (1970).
Where city found that traffic on a portion of a street had declined and that closing of this portion of the street would not work a hardship on many people, and where owners of abutting property consented to closing of the street, an ordinance vacating and abandoning the street was not ultra vires. Freeze v. Jones, 260 Ark. 193, 539 S.W.2d 425 (1976).
Where nonabutting owners could not show special and peculiar injury suffered in connection with the closing of a street in which the city had only an easement, the nonabutting owners did not have standing to challenge ordinance vacating and abandoning the street. Freeze v. Jones, 260 Ark. 193, 539 S.W.2d 425 (1976).
Where street right-of-way had been dedicated by filing of a plat and the easement had been accepted by the city, the ownership of the fee in the right-of-way remained in the abutting owners, so that when the city vacated the street it could not be sold by the city nor devoted to another public use. Freeze v. Jones, 260 Ark. 193, 539 S.W.2d 425 (1976).
Where company in developing subdivision incurred great expense in reliance upon its continued access to street, and since the developer's right of ingress and egress is a property right that cannot be taken away by a city, at least without payment of just compensation, city's action in vacating street that permitted ingress and egress to the development was arbitrary and invalid. City of Sherwood v. Dupree Co., 263 Ark. 442, 565 S.W.2d 425 (1978).
Decision concerning the validity of one ordinance under § 14-301-301 et seq., regarding the closing of an alley was not res judicata with respect to the validity of second ordinance enacted pursuant to this section. Jones v. American Home Life Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 330, 738 S.W.2d 387 (1987).
Ordinance vacating a street exceeded the scope of subdivision (2) when it attempted to extinguish an abutting landowner's property right of ingress and egress over the street without compensation. Wright v. City of Monticello, 345 Ark. 420, 47 S.W.3d 851 (2001).
Trial court did not err in deciding that § 14-54-303 was controlling for the town to vacate a street, because an incorporated town's ability to vacate a street under § 14-54-303 was independent, and §§ 14-301-301 to 14-301-303 had no application when an incorporated town used its authority under § 14-54-303. Riley v. Town of Higginson, 2009 Ark. App. 294, 307 S.W.3d 34 (2009).
Trades, Businesses, or Vocations.
Ordinance requiring butchers to take out a license and requiring their meats to be inspected is a valid exercise of regulatory power. Trigg v. Dixon, 96 Ark. 199, 131 S.W. 695 (1910).
Ordinances regulating sale of milk and fresh meats are a valid exercise of police power. Carpenter v. City of Little Rock, 101 Ark. 238, 142 S.W. 162 (1911).
Sale of cider either by wholesale or retail is a proper subject of municipal regulation. City of Texarkana v. Hudgins Produce Co., 112 Ark. 17, 164 S.W. 736 (1914).
There is no limitation on power of city to prohibit, by ordinance, the maintenance of gasoline filling stations, gasoline pumps, oil tanks, service appliances, etc., on the streets of the city within the fire limits. Sander v. City of Blytheville, 164 Ark. 434, 262 S.W. 23 (1924).
Cities of the first class have regulatory powers over hotels. City of Texarkana v. Brachfield, 207 Ark. 774, 183 S.W.2d 304 (1944).
Ordinance enacted by city under public welfare clause is presumed to be legal and reasonable. Goldman & Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 220 Ark. 792, 249 S.W.2d 961 (1952).
City has power to prohibit operation of junkyard and storing of waste paper within a fire district. Goldman & Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 220 Ark. 792, 249 S.W.2d 961 (1952).
City has power and authority to enact an ordinance providing no license to operate a rooming house or hotel shall be granted unless it shall appear probable that applicant will not rent rooms for immoral purposes or allow prostitutes or pimps to remain on the premises or permit gambling or sale, storage, or the keeping of intoxicating liquor on the premises sought to be licensed, and such an ordinance is not unconstitutional. Hertenberger v. City of Texarkana, 224 Ark. 235, 272 S.W.2d 435 (1954).
Cited: Wynn Motel Hotel, Inc. v. City of Texarkana, 217 Ark. 314, 230 S.W.2d 649 (1950); Lacey v. Bekaert Steel Wire Corp., 619 F. Supp. 1234 (W.D. Ark. 1985).