Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-201 (2026)
Definitions
As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
- “Action for medical injury” means all actions against a medical care provider, whether based in tort, contract, or otherwise, to recover damages on account of medical injury as defined in this section;
- “Medical care provider” means a physician, certified registered nurse anesthetist, physician's assistant, nurse, optometrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, dentist, podiatrist, pharmacist, veterinarian, hospital, nursing home, community mental health center, psychologist, clinic, or not-for-profit home healthcare agency licensed by the state or otherwise lawfully providing professional medical care or services, or an officer, employee, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of employment in the providing of such medical care or medical services; and
- “Medical injury” or “injury” means any adverse consequences arising out of or sustained in the course of the professional services being rendered by a medical care provider to a patient or resident, whether resulting from negligence, error, or omission in the performance of such services; or from rendition of such services without informed consent or in breach of warranty or in violation of contract; or from failure to diagnose; or from premature abandonment of a patient or of a course of treatment; or from failure to properly maintain equipment or appliances necessary to the rendition of such services; or otherwise arising out of or sustained in the course of such services.
History. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2613; Acts 2013, No. 1196, §§ 2, 3.
A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1196, § 1, provided: “Intent — Limitation.
“(a) This act is intended to ensure that:
“(1) A person who suffers a medical injury has the opportunity to seek compensation to return to the state of health that he or she enjoyed before the medical injury; and
“(2) For any one (1) medical injury, a person is not compensated more than once.
“(b) This act is not intended to affect punitive damages.”
Amendments. The 2013 amendment, in (1), substituted “all actions” for “any action” and added “as defined in this section”; and inserted “to a patient or resident” following “provider” in (3).
Research References
Ark. L. Rev.
Note, Schmidt v. Gibbs: The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Arkansas Medical Malpractice Litigation, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 397.
Wrongful Death Damages Under the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act: Would a Change Make Cents?, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 577 (2001).
Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis v. Parham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in Arkansas, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 781.
J. Taylor White, Case Note: Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc., and Negligent Credentialing: A Look into Peer-Review Statutes and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 879 (2013).
J. Thomas Sullivan, Arkansas, Meet Tarasoff: The Question of Expanded Liability to Third Persons for Mental Health Professionals, 69 Ark. L. Rev. 987 (2016).
Case Notes
Constitutionality.
Statute of limitations in the Medical Malpractice Act, § 16-114-201 et seq., has a rational basis and it does not deprive a claimant of a constitutional right to a redress of wrongs or a jury trial, nor does it violate the right to equal protection. Davis v. Parham, 362 Ark. 352, 208 S.W.3d 162 (2005).
Medical Malpractice Act, § 16-114-201 et seq., in its entirety passes the rational-basis test; there is a clear rational relationship between the burden of proof required and the achievement of the legitimate governmental objective of reducing healthcare costs. Davis v. Parham, 362 Ark. 352, 208 S.W.3d 162 (2005).
Construction.
A pharmacy is a medical care provider within the meaning of this subchapter and the reference to a pharmacist in subdivision (2) of this section should be deemed to include a pharmacy. Kohl v. American Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885 (W.D. Ark. 1999).
Two-year limitations period of Medical Malpractice Act, § 16-114-201 et seq., conflicts with the three-year limitations period provided under the Wrongful Death Act, § 16-62-102(c) and is therefore controlling where death ensues from medical injuries. Davis v. Parham, 362 Ark. 352, 208 S.W.3d 162 (2005).
Medical Injury.
Patient was under a doctor's care while he was in the nursing home, but his death from leaving unnoticed in a wheelchair and being struck by a car, was not the result of a “medical injury”; instead, the question was whether the patient was properly supervised by the one LPN and five nurse's aides on duty that night. The answer to this question merely requires the jury to decide whether the nursing home used ordinary care in furnishing the patient the care and attention reasonably required by his mental and physical condition. Bailey v. Rose Care Ctr., 307 Ark. 14, 817 S.W.2d 412 (1991).
The actions of a licensed practical nurse in revealing confidential information she acquired at work did not fall within subdivision (3)'s definition of a medical injury. Wyatt v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 315 Ark. 547, 868 S.W.2d 505 (1994).
Subdivision (3) of this section defines “medical injury” sufficiently broadly; claims based on allegations of a failure to provide needed medical care and attention or the timely diagnosis of medical problems come within the ambit of this subchapter and are dependent upon expert testimony as outlined in § 16-114-206(a). Spring Creek Living Ctr. v. Sarrett, 319 Ark. 259, 890 S.W.2d 598 (1995).
Broad language in this section defining “medical injury” encompasses a cause of action for failure to diagnose child abuse. First Commercial Trust Co. v. Rank, 323 Ark. 390, 915 S.W.2d 262 (1996), supp. op., 323 Ark. 406A, 917 S.W.2d 167 (1996).
Where husband and wife were receiving treatment at a counseling center, wife did not suffer a medical injury from the center's failure to end an affair which developed between the center's receptionist and the husband. Howard v. Ozark Guidance Ctr., 326 Ark. 224, 930 S.W.2d 341 (1996).
A claim for adverse consequences arising from an allegedly defective product supplied in the course of rendering a surgical procedure falls within the definition of medical injury as well as actions based on strict or products liability. Adams v. Arthur, 333 Ark. 53, 969 S.W.2d 598 (1998).
The defendants were not entitled to summary judgment in an action in which a decedent's estate alleged that the decedent died as the result of injuries sustained while a resident in a nursing home and that the employees of the nursing home were negligent because they intentionally abused the decedent, failed to use ordinary care in properly supervising the decedent, or failed to follow a physician's order that the decedent be restrained. A question existed as to whether the injuries sustained by the decedent were medical injuries sustained while the decedent was thrashing about in bed or whether there was a negligent breach by custodial personnel of the physician's orders to restrain the decedent, causing a fall that resulted in her injuries. Loewer v. Cla-Cliff Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., 344 Ark. 258, 39 S.W.3d 771 (2001).
Husband's claims against a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a clinic fell within the purview of the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act as the claims involved the failure to properly diagnose, assess, and manage his wife's care and treatment. Dodd v. Sparks Reg'l Med. Ctr., 90 Ark. App. 191, 204 S.W.3d 579 (2005).
Summary judgment was properly awarded to a hospital in an action by appellants for negligent credentialing of a surgeon because the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act, subdivision (3) of this section, did not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing as a “medical injury”; credentialing decisions did not involve a professional service, a doctor's treatment or order, or a matter of medical science related to specific patient care. Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc., 2012 Ark. 55, 386 S.W.3d 462 (2012).
Cause of action brought by the personal representative of a decedent's estate was an action for medical injury because the decedent's death was a medical injury in that the patient of a treating psychiatrist shot and killed the decedent when the psychiatrist began to withdraw the level of pharmaceuticals administered to the patient. Fleming v. Vest, 2015 Ark. App. 636, 475 S.W.3d 576 (2015).
Professional Services.
A hospital is required to consider the patient's capacity to care for himself and to protect the patient from dangers created by his weakened condition; providing a safe environment for patients is within the scope of the professional services by a hospital. Sexton v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 275 Ark. 361, 631 S.W.2d 270 (1982).
A physician's actions in improperly touching or fondling his patients' breasts did not constitute the rendering of professional services, despite the fact that the touching occurred during physical examinations at the physician's office. McQuay v. Guntharp, 336 Ark. 534, 986 S.W.2d 850 (1999).
The drug manufacturer may rely on the prescribing physician to warn the ultimate user of the risk of a prescription drug, and pharmacies generally have no common-law or statutory duty to warn customers of the risks associated with the prescription drugs they purchase, unless there is evidence the pharmacy compounded the drug or changed the drug in some manner after receiving it from the manufacturer. Kohl v. American Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885 (W.D. Ark. 1999).
Cited: Dawson v. Gerritsen, 290 Ark. 499, 720 S.W.2d 714 (1986); HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. National Bank, 294 Ark. 525, 745 S.W.2d 120 (1988); Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671, 752 S.W.2d 25 (1988); Cox v. Bard, 302 Ark. 1, 786 S.W.2d 570 (1990); Weidrick v. Arnold, 310 Ark. 138, 835 S.W.2d 843 (1992); Haase v. Starnes, 323 Ark. 263, 915 S.W.2d 675 (1996); Pastchol v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 326 Ark. 140, 929 S.W.2d 713 (1996); Dodson v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys., 335 Ark. 96, 983 S.W.2d 98 (1998); Dooley v. Cap-Care of Ark., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 962 (E.D. Ark. 2004).