Ark. Code Ann. § 16-115-101 (2026)

Case Notes

Mandamus.

Mandamus will not lie to control the judicial discretion or judgment of an inferior court or tribunal, but only to compel them to an exercise of their discretion or judgment. Gunn's Adm'r v. Pulaski, 3 Ark. 427 (1841); Ex parte Hutt, 14 Ark. 368 (1854); Ex parte Johnson, 25 Ark. 614 (1869); Ex parte Hays, 26 Ark. 510 (1871); McMillen v. Smith, 26 Ark. 613 (1871); County Court v. Robinson, 27 Ark. 116 (1871); Hempstead County v. Grave, 44 Ark. 317 (1884) (preceding decisions under prior law).

A jurat is necessary to a petition for mandamus. Black v. Auditor of State, 26 Ark. 237 (1870) (decision under prior law).

Where the writ of mandamus is sought for the enforcement of a public right, it is not necessary that the relator should have any special interest; but the proceeding must be in the name of the state. Moses v. Kearney, 31 Ark. 261 (1876) (decision under prior law).

The officer whose conduct is complained of should alone be made the party defendant in a petition for mandamus. Fry v. Reynolds, 33 Ark. 450 (1878) (decision under prior law).

The writ of mandamus is a writ to compel the performance of an act or duty, and not to prevent it; and the statutes do not intend that it shall take the place of an injunction. Crawford v. Carson, 35 Ark. 565 (1880) (decision under prior law).

Petitioner for the writ of mandamus to require a certain officer to perform some duty must show a valid statute imposing that duty. Hodges v. Dawdy, 104 Ark. 583, 149 S.W. 656 (1912); Hodges v. Keel, 108 Ark. 184, 159 S.W. 21 (1913); Robertson v. Derrick, 113 Ark. 40, 166 S.W. 936 (1914) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Mandamus will not issue unless there is a clear legal right to the writ shown and no other remedy is provided, nor will it issue to compel an officer to do what the law will not compel him to do without it. Coleman v. Eight Mile Drainage Dist., 106 Ark. 22, 152 S.W. 1004 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus is not a writ of right but is within the judicial discretion of courts to issue or withhold, and a party to be entitled to the writ must show that he has a clear legal right to the subject matter and that he has no other adequate remedy. State v. Board of Directors, 122 Ark. 337, 183 S.W. 747 (1916) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus cannot be used to establish a right, but may be used to enforce a right after it is once established. Bingham v. McGehee, 185 Ark. 707, 49 S.W.2d 358 (1932) (decision under prior law).

When, in the absence of statutory regulation, the proceedings are for the enforcement of a duty affecting not a private right, but a public one common to the whole community, it is not necessary that the relator should have a special interest in the matter or that he should be a public officer. Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W.2d 100 (1979).

Petition in “public interest” was held in substantial compliance with the statutory requirement that mandamus actions be in the name of the state. Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W.2d 100 (1979).

The writ of mandamus cannot be issued to the legislature, even when the duty sought to be compelled is clear and unmistakable. Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W.2d 100 (1979).

Mandamus will not lie to compel the presiding officer of the Senate or the Speaker of the House to perform any act which is within his legislative functions, except for acts which are purely ministerial in character. Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W.2d 100 (1979).

A mandamus action enforces the performance of a legal right after it has been established; a mandamus' purpose is not to establish a right. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).

The Department of Human Services (DHS) was not entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the Claims Commission to dismiss a claim pending before it since the DHS had an adequate remedy of appealing the Claims Commission's ruling to the General Assembly. Hanley v. Arkansas State Claims Comm'n, 333 Ark. 159, 970 S.W.2d 198 (1998).

Judge's discretion to control a docket is not completely obviated by § 16-106-101(c); therefore, state's petition for a writ of mandamus was denied where the state was seeking to remove a mayor from office under Ark. Const. art. 5, § 9 because the trial judge had the discretion to control the docket, and the judge was not required to postpone other cases where the state was not a party in order to accommodate the state. State v. Vittitow, 358 Ark. 98, 186 S.W.3d 237 (2004).

Mandamus action was permitted to continue against a trial judge, despite the fact that a circuit court was improperly named as respondent, because the attorney general made an appearance after the petition was properly served on an individual judge. State v. Vittitow, 358 Ark. 98, 186 S.W.3d 237 (2004).

Court properly dismissed student's petition for a writ of mandamus requesting the court to enjoin school officials to reinstate his cancelled test scores in a voluntary reading program after he was accused of cheating; the court knew of no law to compel the school officials to reinstate the student's scores in a voluntary reading program and the student did not sufficiently plead any facts that gave rise to a legal remedy. T.J. v. Hargrove, 362 Ark. 649, 210 S.W.3d 79 (2005).

Voter demonstrating that a proposed constitutional amendment was unconstitutional was entitled to both declaratory and mandamus relief, as (1) declaratory relief is available whether or not other relief can be obtained; (2) the Arkansas Supreme Court has routinely ordered the Arkansas Secretary of State to not count or certify any ballots cast for a proposed amendment that does not meet the requirements of the Arkansas Constitution or Arkansas law; and (3) a voter has a right to cast a ballot only on referred constitutional amendments that meet the standards set forth by the Arkansas Constitution. Martin v. Humphrey, 2018 Ark. 295, 558 S.W.3d 370 (2018).

Prohibition.

Prohibition cannot be invoked in a cause arising out of jurisdiction until the want of jurisdiction has been pleaded and the plea overruled in the court where the proceeding is pending. Ex parte Little Rock, 26 Ark. 52 (1870) (decision under prior law).

The mere filing of the petition for prohibition and notice to the judge will not restrain him from proceeding. Henry v. Steele, 28 Ark. 455 (1873) (decision under prior law).

The writ of prohibition will never be granted unless the inferior court has clearly exceeded its authority and the applicant has no other remedy. Russell v. Jacoway, 33 Ark. 191 (1878); Jones v. Coffin, 96 Ark. 332, 131 S.W. 873 (1910) (preceding decisions under prior law).

A motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction is a sufficient compliance with the rule that objections must be made in the court to its jurisdiction before a petition for the writ of prohibition will be entertained. State ex rel. Butler v. Williams, 48 Ark. 227, 2 S.W. 843 (1886) (decision under prior law).

Upon a petition to prohibit a circuit judge from proceeding to hear a cause pending in his court, for want of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court will not consider the truth or sufficiency of the allegation of the complaint in the case. American Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 56 Ark. 539, 20 S.W. 416 (1892) (decision under prior law).

Prohibition lies only to a court, and not to a judge. Reese v. Steel, 73 Ark. 66, 83 S.W. 335 (1904) (decision under prior law).

A writ of prohibition is that process by which a superior court prevents an inferior court or tribunal from usurping or exercising jurisdiction with which it has not been vested by law. Ferguson v. Martineau, 115 Ark. 317, 171 S.W. 472 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Prohibition is not available as a remedy if the statute of limitations governing a particular proceeding is not jurisdictional, but may only be raised as an affirmative defense. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Erwin, 304 Ark. 321, 802 S.W.2d 140 (1991).

A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ and is granted only when the lower court is wholly without jursdiction, there are no disputed facts, there is no adequate remedy otherwise, and the writ is clearly warranted. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Partlow, 311 Ark. 633, 846 S.W.2d 637 (1993).

Writs of prohibition are prerogative writs, extremely narrow in scope and operation; they are to be used with great caution and forbearance. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Partlow, 311 Ark. 633, 846 S.W.2d 637 (1993).

A characteristic of prohibition is that it does not lie as a matter or right, but as a matter of sound judicial discretion. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Partlow, 311 Ark. 633, 846 S.W.2d 637 (1993).

Prohibition is never granted to prevent an inferior tribunal from exercising its jurisdiction erroneously; it is only granted where such tribunal is wholly without jurisdiction. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Partlow, 311 Ark. 633, 846 S.W.2d 637 (1993).

Cited: Ark. State Police Comm'n v. Davidson, 252 Ark. 137, 477 S.W.2d 852 (1972); Kemp-Bradford VFW Post 4764 v. Wood, 262 Ark. 168, 554 S.W.2d 344 (1977); Springdale School Dist. v. Jameson, 274 Ark. 78, 621 S.W.2d 860 (1981); DeSoto Gathering Co., LLC v. Ramsey, 2016 Ark. 22, 480 S.W.3d 144 (2016).