Ark. Code Ann. § 16-116-101 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Copeland, The Implied Warranty of Habitability and the Use of the Uniform Commercial Code by Analogy, 1983 Ark. L. Notes 5.

Smolla, What Types of Losses Are Recoverable Under Arkansas's Products Liability Law, 1984 Ark. L. Notes 11.

Copeland, A Statutory Primer: Article 2 of the U.C.C., — When Do Its Rules Apply?, 1990 Ark. L. Notes 39.

Ark. L. Rev.

Legislative Note — Act 111 of 1973: An Act to Impose Liability for Injury and Damages Done in Certain Circumstances by Defective Products, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 562.

Brill, Harvey v. Eastman Kodak Company: Faculty Note, 34 Ark. L. Rev. 722.

Note, The Arkansas Product Liability Act of 1979, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 364 (1981).

Note, Liability of Builder-Vendor: Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 35 Ark. L. Rev. 654.

Woods, Product Liability: Is Comparative Fault Winning the Day?, 36 Ark. L. Rev. 360.

Note, The Decline of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in Favor of Direct Patient Warnings of Drug Product Risks, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 821.

Recent Developments, Sproles v. Associated Brigham Contractors, Incorporated, 319 Ark. 94, 889 S.W.2d 740 (1994), 48 Ark. L. Rev. 883.

Thompson, The Arkansas Products Liability Statute: What Does “Unreasonably Dangerous” Mean in Arkansas?, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 663.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Torts, 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 191.

Arkansas Law Survey, Saunders, Torts, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 259.

Arkansas Law Survey, Roberts and Deere, Torts, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 207.

Oliver, Rejecting the “Whipping-Boy” approach to tort law: Well-made handguns are not defective products, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 1.

Note, Torts — Product Liability — Arkansas Adopts Comment K as an Affirmative Defense in Prescription Drug Actions. 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 199.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Section held not retroactive in application to cause of action which accrued prior to its passage since section created a new cause of action. General Motors Corp. v. Tate, 257 Ark. 347, 516 S.W.2d 602 (1974). But see Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720 (1981).

Where grain cart was designed and manufactured prior to, and plaintiff was injured after, the passage of this section, trial court was correct in applying the statute to plaintiff since the prohibition against bill of attainder, ex post facto law and laws which impair the obligation of contracts did not apply to this section to prevent its retroactive application. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720 (1981).

Neither the Arkansas Products Liability Act, § 16-116-201 et seq., nor this section, the Arkansas strict liability statute, apply to the commercial leasing of an industrial building because the lease of the building does not qualify as a “product” within the meaning of the Arkansas statutes. McMichael v. United States, 856 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1988).

Though majority of courts in the United States hold that a strict liability action cannot be successful if the only damages that occur are to the product itself, state law endorses the minority view allowing recovery in instances where the only damages are to the defective product itself. Alaskan Oil, Inc. v. Central Flying Serv., Inc., 975 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1992).

Where worker was injured as a result of a defective platform, provided for his use by a contractor, this section did not apply because the contractor was not a supplier engaged in the business of manufacturing assembling, selling, leasing or otherwise distributing the defective product within the meaning of this section. Sproles v. Associated Brigham Contractors, 319 Ark. 94, 889 S.W.2d 740 (1994), overruled, Suneson v. Holloway Constr. Co., 337 Ark. 571, 992 S.W.2d 79 (1999).

Court rejected a tractor manufacturer's claim that the executor of a decedent's estate fraudulently joined a non-diverse tractor seller in her tort action against the manufacturer and the seller and remanded the executor's action to state court because (1) the claim against the seller was based on this section, and the court determined that the Arkansas Supreme Court would find that the seller, a corporation with a revoked charter, could be sued; (2) there was no basis for concluding that the state of the seller's citizenship would be changed by revocation of its charter as the seller had been incorporated by the State of Arkansas, and to the extent it had any citizenship, it was a citizen of the State of Arkansas under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1332(c)(1); and (3) while the seller might be judgment-proof, but that did not dictate a finding that the executor had no intention to take a judgment against it as there might be liability insurance or other assets from which a judgment could be collected, in spite of the seller's corporate status, and even with the virtual abolition of joint liability under Arkansas law, an uncollectible judgment against one defendant might serve to increase the amount collectible on a judgment against another defendant pursuant to § 16-55-203. Davis v. CNH Am. LLC, No. 08-3015, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25774 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 17, 2008).

Causation.

In the absence of direct proof of a specific defect, it is sufficient if a plaintiff negates other possible causes of failure of the product, not attributable to the defendant, and thus raises a reasonable inference that the defendant is responsible for the defect. Southern Co. v. Graham, 271 Ark. 223, 607 S.W.2d 677 (1980); Higgins v. GMC, 287 Ark. 390, 699 S.W.2d 741 (1985).

Evidence sufficiently negated the other possible causes argued by defendant and, therefore, defendant was responsible for plaintiffs' damages. Southern Co. v. Graham, 271 Ark. 223, 607 S.W.2d 677 (1980).

Directed verdict for seller not warranted where jury could have found that later acts of negligence by third persons were merely concurrent, not superseding, causes of user's death. Moody Equip. & Supply Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 273 Ark. 319, 619 S.W.2d 637 (1981).

When a vehicle suddenly goes out of control while being operated, driver error is a likely cause, absent a reliable explanation in the alternative; however that factor can be ruled out, when the circumstances are such that common experience teaches that the accident would not have occurred in the absence of a defect. Yielding v. Chrysler Motor Co., 301 Ark. 271, 783 S.W.2d 353 (1990).

The evidence presented by plaintiff in her effort to assign liability to the manufacturer was not substantial enough to negate the existence of other possibilities of sources of contamination. Campbell Soup Co. v. Gates, 319 Ark. 54, 889 S.W.2d 750 (1994).

Vehicle manufacturer was properly granted summary judgment in a driver's product liability suit alleging that injuries he sustained when he struck a tree while driving his vehicle were a result of defects in the air bag and seat belt and that the manufacturer was strictly liable for his injuries because pursuant to former §§ 4-86-102(a), 16-116-102(7)(A) (now §§ 16-116-101(a), 16-116-202(7)(A)), the driver had to prove that the product was unreasonably dangerous because of a design or manufacturing defect for which the manufacturer was responsible and he also had to prove that the product was in a defective condition at the time it left the hands of the particular seller, but the driver offered no evidence regarding the existence of a specific defect in the occupant protection system, requiring speculation as to whether it was defective at the time it left the manufacturer's control, and the driver failed to demonstrate liability on the basis of circumstantial evidence because the intricacies of occupant protection systems and their potential design or manufacturing defects were outside the realm of a juror's everyday experience, and there were other potential explanations for the driver's injuries other than a defect for which the manufacturer would be responsible. Ruminer v. GMC, 483 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 2007).

In a case alleging negligence, breach of contract, breach of warranty, strict product liability, and violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act based on a claim that a casket was defective, the complaint failed to include the elements of the causes of actions pled because it failed to state facts that linked the damages to the conduct or product supplied; there was no way of knowing the condition of the casket purchased since it had not been disinterred or inspected since its burial in 1996. Clayton v. Batesville Casket Co., 2015 Ark. App. 361, 465 S.W.3d 441 (2015).

Circuit court properly granted summary judgment where the parents' evidence merely established that there were several possible sources of ignition of a child's hair while using a hair product, and thus, the parents failed to establish causation to support their strict-liability claims. Chandler v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 372, 498 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

Defect.

Where there was no evidence of alteration, adjustment, etc., of the vehicle after it left the manufacturer, the jury could properly find that the defect existed when the vehicle left the factory and could allow recovery against the manufacturer. Harrell Motors, Inc. v. Flanery, 272 Ark. 105, 612 S.W.2d 727 (1981).

Proof of a specific defect is not required when common experience teaches that the accident would not have occurred in the absence of a defect; the mere fact of an accident, standing alone, does not make out a case that the product is defective, but the addition of other facts tending to show the defect existed before the accident, may be sufficient. Higgins v. GMC, 287 Ark. 390, 699 S.W.2d 741 (1985).

A user's testimony alone may be sufficient evidence of a defect. Higgins v. GMC, 287 Ark. 390, 699 S.W.2d 741 (1985).

Although the evidence established that a coating product did not adhere to the plaintiff's swimming pool and that the peeling coating caused injury to some people's feet, that evidence did not show that the product was defective, an essential element of a strict liability claim. Lakeview Country Club, Inc. v. Superior Prods., 325 Ark. 218, 926 S.W.2d 428 (1996).

District court did not err by refusing to grant tobacco company's motion for judgment as a matter of law because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the claim that its cigarettes had a design defect; the decedant's doctor testified that decedant died from the effects of cigarette smoke, the tobacco company's cigarettes had higher levels of carcinogenic tar than any other brand, and they lacked effective filter technology. Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2005).

In buyer's action against seller and two manufacturers, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on the theory of strict liability where buyer failed to submit proof that the used Hydro-Ax machine that he purchased for his logging business was defective and unreasonably dangerous; according to the testimony of buyer's own experts, the only defect that was found in the machine — the absence of a fire suppression system — was remedied by the inclusion of a fire suppression system on the machine when it was originally purchased. Pilcher v. Suttle Equip. Co., 365 Ark. 1, 223 S.W.3d 789 (2006).

Summary judgment dismissing plaintiff consumers' claim was affirmed where consumers failed to show the product was unreasonably dangerous or had either a manufacturing or design defect at the time it was purchased; supplier liability was also was not proven. Martin v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 464 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006).

Vehicle and seatbelt manufacturers were properly granted summary judgment on a products liability claim where even if the individual had worn her seatbelt during a collision and the seatbelt unlatched because of a defect, she did not establish that the defect was present when it left the manufacturers' control. Madden v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 45, 481 S.W.3d 455 (2016).

Summary judgment was properly granted to the sellers on a products liability claim where there was no evidence that would have allowed a jury to move beyond speculation as to the cause of the alleged defect in a seatbelt. Madden v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 45, 481 S.W.3d 455 (2016).

Instructions.

Since, under Arkansas law, the burden of proof in strict liability is quantitatively greater than it is in a breach of warranty action, as a general rule a failure to instruct the jury on the warranty issue cannot be rendered harmless by the granting of instructions on strict liability. Brewer v. Jeep Corp., 724 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1983).

Where jury instruction was proffered on the meaning of “unreasonably dangerous” that simply quoted the statutory definition in full, but the court rejected this instruction and gave the jury instead an instruction that tracked only the first sentence of the statute, omitting any reference to the legal definition of unreasonably dangerous as to a minor, it was error to refuse the instruction defining unreasonably dangerous as to a minor. Harris v. Pacific Floor Mach. Mfg. Co., 856 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1988).

The plaintiff originally has the burden of proving the warnings or instructions provided on a product's label were inadequate; once a plaintiff proves the lack of an adequate warning or instruction, a presumption arises that the user would have read and heeded adequate warnings or instructions, rebuttable by evidence which persuades the trier of fact that an adequate warning or instruction would have been futile under the circumstances. Bushong v. Garman Co., 311 Ark. 228, 843 S.W.2d 807 (1992).

If the proof regarding inadequate cattle feed shows that the feed was simply supplied in a defective condition, the strict liability instruction should not be given; however, if the proof shows that the feed was defective and unreasonably dangerous, for example, that it was toxic, the instruction should be given. Purina Mills, Inc. v. Askins, 317 Ark. 58, 875 S.W.2d 843 (1994).

Open and Obvious Danger.

The open and obvious danger rule is not an automatic bar to recovery on a strict liability claim in a defective design case. Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1991).

A manufacturer's failure to warn of a danger does not give rise to liability when the dangerous defect is open and obvious, and whether contributory negligence should preclude recovery is generally a question of fact for the jury. Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1991).

Product.

Where third purchaser of home filed complaint that carpet and pad installed by defendant builder emitted strong odor and fumes of formaldehyde, the word “product” used in this section was held to apply to a house, thus giving plaintiff a cause of action under a strict liability theory. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981).

The language of this section cannot conceivably be stretched to encompass a street as a product; the developer of a residential subdivision is obviously not engaged in the business of manufacturing, assembling, selling, leasing, or distributing streets. Milam v. Midland Corp., 282 Ark. 15, 665 S.W.2d 284 (1984), overruled, Suneson v. Holloway Constr. Co., 337 Ark. 571, 992 S.W.2d 79 (1999).

Proof.

Plaintiff is not required to prove a specific defect when common experience tells us that the accident would not have occurred in the absence of a defect. Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 292 Ark. 376, 730 S.W.2d 479 (1987).

The doctrine of strict liability does not change the burden of proof as to the existence of a flaw or defect in a product; however, it does away with the necessity of proving negligence in order to recover for injuries resulting from a defective product. Southern Co. v. Graham, 271 Ark. 223, 607 S.W.2d 677 (1980); Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 292 Ark. 376, 730 S.W.2d 479 (1987).

The definitions in former § 16-116-102 (now § 16-116-202) of the key terms “defective condition” and “unreasonably dangerous,” when applied to this section, impose no requirement that a feasible and safer alternative be proven by a plaintiff in a personal injury action; the existence, practicality, and technological feasibility of an alternative safe design are not necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause of action, but rather are merely factors, that may be considered by the jury in determining whether a product was supplied in a defective condition that rendered it unreasonably dangerous. French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1981).

In order for a cause of action for strict liability to lie, Arkansas law requires demonstration of the additional element that the defect be of such a nature as to cause the product to become unreasonably dangerous. Brewer v. Jeep Corp., 724 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1983).

In order to recover under the strict product liability theory, the plaintiff must prove (1) that he has sustained damages; (2) that the defendant was engaged in the business of manufacturing or assembling or selling or leasing or distributing the product; (3) that the product was supplied by the defendant in a defective condition which rendered it unreasonably dangerous; and (4) that the defective condition was a proximate cause of plaintiff's damages. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Dillaha, 280 Ark. 477, 659 S.W.2d 756 (1983).

The procedural effect of strict liability in product liability actions is that the plaintiff is relieved of proving any negligence of the defendant whatsoever; this differs from the application of res ipsa loquitur which requires the defendant to go forward with evidence to offset the inference of negligence, but the primary burden of proving negligence still rests with the plaintiff. Stalter v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 282 Ark. 443, 669 S.W.2d 460 (1984).

The adoption in this section of the doctrine of strict liability in torts in products liability cases does not change the burden of proof as to the existence of a defect in a product. Such proof may be by circumstantial evidence. Petrus Chrysler-Plymouth v. Davis, 283 Ark. 172, 671 S.W.2d 749 (1984).

A plaintiff must prove the product was defective so as to render it unreasonably dangerous, and that the defect was the cause of the injury. Higgins v. GMC, 287 Ark. 390, 699 S.W.2d 741 (1985); Yielding v. Chrysler Motor Co., 301 Ark. 271, 783 S.W.2d 353 (1990).

The mere fact that under certain circumstances an accident may occur in connection with the use of a product does not make the product unreasonably dangerous for purposes of strict liability. Elk Corp. v. Jackson, 291 Ark. 448, 725 S.W.2d 829 (1987).

Mere fact of an accident, standing alone, does not make out a case that product was defective, nor does fact that it was found in a defective condition after the event; but addition of other facts tending to show that defect existed before the accident may make out a sufficient case. Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 292 Ark. 376, 730 S.W.2d 479 (1987).

Defendant grader manufacturer was entitled to summary judgment on a strict liability claim under subsection (a) of this section; plaintiff county had no direct proof that the grader was defective because of a manufacturing flaw or inadequate design, and the county had not sufficiently negated the possibility that the failure of the hydraulic hose resulted from normal wear and tear or the natural loosening of the hose connection. Lee County v. Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-00082 BSM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95745 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 20, 2008).

Punitive Damages.

A plaintiff who proceeds solely under a strict products liability theory may seek punitive damages under Arkansas law. Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1991).

Statute of Limitations.

This section which governs causes of action based on strict liability creates a new right that was not available at common law; but does not contain a specific period of limitation. Such actions are governed by the general statute of limitations applicable to all products liability cases in former § 16-116-103 (now § 16-116-203). Therefore, § 16-56-116 operates to extend the time for minors to file a products liability action brought on a strict liability theory. Harris v. Standardized San. Sys., 658 F. Supp. 438 (W.D. Ark. 1987).

Suppliers.

A railroad company which owned a hopper car was a “supplier” of that car under the plain meaning of this section. Parker v. Seaboard C.L.R.R., 573 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1978).

The supplying of blood for transfusions is a service rather than a product; blood is not a “product” for purposes of imposing strict liability in tort. Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989).

In suit involving an allegedly defective wheel and tire brought against the tire manufacturer, wheel manufacturer, and truck manufacturer, judgment as a matter of law was awarded to defendant truck manufacturer where plaintiffs offered no evidence that the wheel involved was supplied by the truck manufacturer, nor that the truck manufacturer was the original designer of the wheel. Fought v. Hayes Wheels Int'l, Inc., 101 F.3d 1275 (8th Cir. 1996).

In a case involving the group of diet drugs popularly known as Fen/Phen, the court, citing the factors involved in applying strict liability to a pharmacist's role as supplier in prescription drug transactions, declined to extend the rule of strict supplier liability to pharmacists. Kohl v. American Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885 (W.D. Ark. 1999).

Unreasonably Dangerous.

The phrase “unreasonably dangerous” as used in this section requires that the defect render the product not simply deficient but dangerous; it contemplates a type of defect which renders the product not merely inadequate, but one which poses an actual danger to persons or property. Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983).

The fact that irrigation pumps failed to produce the volume of water desired or expected by the buyer raised issues of warranty, negligence or misrepresentation, but it did not render the pumps “unreasonably dangerous.” Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983).

“Unreasonably dangerous” is defined as requiring something beyond that contemplated by the ordinary and reasonable buyer, taking into account any special knowledge of the buyer concerning the characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers, and proper and improper uses of the product. Purina Mills, Inc. v. Askins, 317 Ark. 58, 875 S.W.2d 843 (1994).

For a case involving inadequate cattle feed to be correctly submitted to the jury on strict liability, the plaintiffs will have to offer proof that the feed was in a defective condition which rendered it unreasonably dangerous and that the defective condition was a proximate cause of harm to the cattle; the possibility that manufactured feed for livestock might not contain the nutritional constituents recited on its labels, or that such levels might be affected by time, weather, or methods of storage, would hardly be beyond the contemplation of the ordinary buyer so as to constitute being “unreasonably dangerous.” Purina Mills, Inc. v. Askins, 317 Ark. 58, 875 S.W.2d 843 (1994).

Plaintiff demonstrated that a saw with a sawdust sawpit was defective and unreasonably dangerous where plaintiff demonstrated that the door to the sawpit could be opened while the saw blade was still spinning; plaintiff's familiarity with the open and obvious danger of the saw did not bar her strict liability claim. Buchanna v. Diehl Machine, Inc., 98 F.3d 366 (8th Cir. 1996).

In an action alleging that the use of pesticides in a home resulted in a child's multiple birth defects, the plaintiffs failed to show that the product was defective rendering it unreasonably dangerous and, therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to the defendants. National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 1999).

Building owner's strict liability claim against a toilet supply line seller was properly dismissed where the owner did not present sufficient evidence that the danger of water escaping from the line was beyond the contemplation of an ordinary and reasonable consumer, and thus failed to show that the line was unreasonably dangerous. Apex Oil Co. v. Jones Stephens Corp., 881 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 2018).

Cited: Cockman v. Welder's Supply Co., 265 Ark. 612, 580 S.W.2d 455 (1979); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1982); W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982); Pruitt v. Cargill, Inc., 284 Ark. 474, 683 S.W.2d 906 (1985); Elk Corp. of Ark. v. Builders Transport, Inc., 862 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1988); Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768 (W.D. Ark. 1988); Davis v. DuPont, 729 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Rogers v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 744 F. Supp. 901 (E.D. Ark. 1990); Bushong v. Garman Co., 311 Ark. 228, 843 S.W.2d 807 (1992); Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 260 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2001); Harrell v. Madison County Miss. Mote Co., 370 F.3d 760 (8th Cir. 2004).