Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-115 (2026)

Case Notes

Accrual.

Subdivision lot owner's action for breach of restrictive covenants and a declaration that such covenants were unenforceable was barred by the applicable statute of limitations under this section, as the cause of action accrued when a golf club and a successor-in-interest to the developer of the subdivision sold the first lot that they deferred a monthly fee for, not with each deferred lot sold. Beckworth v. Diamante, 2010 Ark. App. 815, 379 S.W.3d 752 (2010).

Action Time-Barred.

It was generally known by 2003 that the club was actively deferring dues, and assuming that 2003 was the date for the tolling of the statute, the latest that suit could have been brought was in 2008; as the suit was brought in 2012, any action based on the club's deferment of dues was time-barred. Dye v. Diamante, 2017 Ark. 42, 510 S.W.3d 759 (2017).

Actions on Accounts.

An action to surcharge the account of a treasurer is barred in five years. Sims v. Craig, 171 Ark. 492, 286 S.W. 867 (1926).

Applicability.

This section's five-year statute of limitations is applicable to those child support payments due prior to the effective date of §§ 9-14-236 and 16-56-129 (repealed), and the new ten-year statute of limitations found in those sections is applicable to payments accruing after the effective date of those sections. Sullivan v. Edens, 304 Ark. 133, 801 S.W.2d 32 (1990), superseded by statute as stated in, Johnson v. Lilly, 308 Ark. 201, 823 S.W.2d 883 (1992), superseded by statute as stated in, Branch v. Carter, 54 Ark. App. 70, 923 S.W.2d 874.

Attorney's Lien.

Lien of attorney on land sold by estate could not be asserted after eight years. Tellier v. Darragh, 220 Ark. 363, 247 S.W.2d 960 (1952).

Breach of Warranties.

It is clear that physical encroachments may result in a constructive eviction, and likewise, if a person builds a fence or wall completely surrounding his or her home and in so doing encloses a portion of their neighbor's yard, the record owner has been dispossessed; such an encroachment need not completely foreclose the possibility of physical entry in order to result in constructive eviction. Riddle v. Udouj, 371 Ark. 452, 267 S.W.3d 586 (2007).

Trial court properly found that buyers' claim of breach of the warranties of title and quiet enjoyment were barred by the statute of limitations under this section; there were visible fences establishing the boundary and the neighbors were using the disputed property as their own on the date of the conveyance, and thus the buyers were constructively evicted and the warranties of title and quiet enjoyment were breached as of the date of the conveyance in 1996, and the limitations period had expired when the buyers filed their complaint in 2005. Riddle v. Udouj, 371 Ark. 452, 267 S.W.3d 586 (2007).

For statute of limitation purposes under this section regarding buyers' claim of breach of the warranties of title and quiet enjoyment, the question was whether the buyers were constructively evicted from the disputed property at some point before an order was entered in a prior, separate quiet title action; the court noted that a neighbors' letter could only have put the buyers on notice of a competing claim to the land and it could not have effected an eviction if the buyers were currently in possession of the property, and while the trial court's reasoning was flawed in this regard, the court could affirm if the trial court reached the correct decision, which it did, that the breach of warranty claim was time-barred. Riddle v. Udouj, 371 Ark. 452, 267 S.W.3d 586 (2007).

Five-year statute of limitations for breach of warranty of title under this section began to run at the time defendants cut off electricity to a life estate grantee's home located on the property, not at an earlier date when she was unable to use the entire 463 acres of the property. Jackson v. Smith, 2010 Ark. App. 681, 380 S.W.3d 443 (2010).

Change in limitations.

There is no constitutional impediment, except in title to property cases, to increasing the length of a limitation period and making the increase retroactive to cover claims already in existence; however, the General Assembly may not expand a limitation period so as to revive a claim already barred. Chunn v. D'Agostino, 312 Ark. 141, 847 S.W.2d 699 (1993).

Child Support.

Action to recover delinquent child support payments is governed by this section. Brun v. Rembert, 227 Ark. 241, 297 S.W.2d 940 (1957); Johnson v. Lilly, 308 Ark. 201, 823 S.W.2d 883 (1992).

A father's legal obligation to support his minor children can be enforced against the father unless barred by the five-year statute of limitations. Brown v. Brown, 233 Ark. 422, 345 S.W.2d 27 (1961).

Where mother brought action for support of illegitimate child against putative father, more than five years after the child's birth, it was error to grant the father summary judgment, since the child is the real party in interest and should thus not be barred by the mother's failure to bring the action. Dozier v. Veasley, 272 Ark. 210, 613 S.W.2d 93 (1981).

Section 9-14-236 applies retroactively to expand the statute of limitations for causes of action for delinquent child-support payments not barred on the date of the section's enactment. Branch v. Carter, 326 Ark. 748, 933 S.W.2d 806 (1996).

Civil Rights.

In an action brought by an Arkansas resident against Arkansas police officers for alleged deprivation of civil rights, either the Arkansas three-year statute of limitations for actions founded on contract or liability, which has been construed to cover liability created by statute, or the five-year general statute of limitations was applicable, and since the action was instituted within the statutory period of both statutes, it was timely. Glasscoe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1970)Questioned byKessel v. Schaff, 697 F. Supp. 1102 (D.N.D. 1987).

Contracts.

Five-year statute applies to action to recover funds paid under a void contract with an improvement district. Core v. McWilliams Co., 175 Ark. 112, 298 S.W. 879 (1927).

Landowners and taxpayers in an action to recover funds alleged to have been paid defendant on a void contract and converted to its own use were permitted to recover under this section. Core v. McWilliams Co., 175 Ark. 112, 298 S.W. 879 (1927).

Where alleged fraud in the sale of stock could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence at time stockholder executed written guarantee as additional security to deed of trust on lands of corporation, and this occurred more than five years prior to institution of action for fraud, action was barred by this statute. Kahn v. Hardy, 201 Ark. 252, 144 S.W.2d 725 (1940).

Action filed for breach of warranty a few days prior to date of deed was timely, the warranty being breached as of the date of conveyance. Wood v. Setliff, 229 Ark. 1007, 320 S.W.2d 655 (1959).

Where grantee sued grantor for breach of warranty, the property having been originally granted more than five years prior to commencement of suit, action would be barred by the statute of limitations. Wood v. Setliff, 229 Ark. 1007, 320 S.W.2d 655 (1959).

The statute of limitations regarding an action to recover real or personal property did not begin to run, where evidence sufficient to find that trustee held corpus of trust under new trust with remainderman's consent. McDermott v. McAdams, 268 Ark. 1031, 598 S.W.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1980).

Decedent's Estate.

An order of the probate court erroneously precluding an heir from participation in an estate is a conversion, and the statute of limitations of five years ran against the heir as soon as the distribution was made and was not arrested by reason of his nonresidence. Hill v. Wade, 155 Ark. 490, 244 S.W. 743 (1922).

Heirs whose names were omitted from a will have five years in which to bring a suit to recover their share of an estate. James v. Helmich, 186 Ark. 1053, 57 S.W.2d 829 (1933).

This section does not apply to suit to probate will. Hudson v. Hudson, 219 Ark. 211, 242 S.W.2d 154 (1951).

Proceeding by collateral heirs, who were nonresidents, to set aside judgment secured by alleged sole heir against estate was barred where it was filed 18 years after rendition of judgment, since alleged fraud in securing of judgment did not toll limitation period, as there were no positive acts of fraudulent concealment, and plaintiffs could have obtained information by checking records of estate. Williams v. Purdy, 223 Ark. 275, 265 S.W.2d 534 (1954).

Where landlord held landlord's lien and mortgages as security, the court held that none of the indebtedness of decedent to landlord was barred by the statute of limitations where the limitation had not run before decedent's death. Goins v. Sneed, 229 Ark. 550, 317 S.W.2d 269 (1958).

Pretermitted children had five years from the date of distribution under their father's will to bring an action against the devisee under the will for partition of the devised property. Negovanov v. Wensko, 248 Ark. 1109, 455 S.W.2d 929 (1970).

Heir to decedent father's estate who at time of probate was presumed dead was precluded by statute of limitations from attacking the determination of heirship. McBroom v. Clark, 252 Ark. 372, 480 S.W.2d 947 (1972).

There is no reason for a requirement that a petition for the determination of heirship be filed within five years or any other specified time after the death of the person whose heirs are to be ascertained. Bryant v. Lemmons, 269 Ark. 5, 598 S.W.2d 79 (1980).

Commitment of fraud in administration of estate tolled the statute of limitations. Walters v. Lewis, 276 Ark. 286, 634 S.W.2d 129 (1982).

Heirship Action.

In a case where heirship was being determined, the action was not barred by the limitations periods in § 18-61-101 and this section because the time period did not begin to run until a pecuniary consequence arose; there had been no demand for the trust property that would have triggered the limitations period. Moreover, the case was filed within the limitations period if it began to run when mineral leases were executed. Scroggin v. Scroggin, 103 Ark. App. 144, 286 S.W.3d 758 (2008).

Local Governments.

The statute of limitations can be pleaded by a county. Gaines v. Hot Springs County, 39 Ark. 262 (1882).

Statute does not apply to actions against board of education for interest belonging to county school fund. County Bd. of Educ. v. Morgan, 182 Ark. 1110, 34 S.W.2d 1063 (1931), overruled, Hartwick v. Thorne, 300 Ark. 502, 780 S.W.2d 531 (1989).

The three year, and not the five year, statute of limitations is applicable to suit against county treasurer. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. State ex rel. Columbia County, 197 Ark. 1027, 126 S.W.2d 293 (1939).

In suit against county treasurer, statute of limitations commences to run from the date of the settlement. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. State ex rel. Columbia County, 197 Ark. 1027, 126 S.W.2d 293 (1939).

In suit against county treasurer, for money paid out on void warrants and falsely credited in her account, the statute of limitations commences to run from the date of the settlement. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. State ex rel. Columbia County, 197 Ark. 1027, 126 S.W.2d 293 (1939).

The municipality is a creature of the state; in this case warranty in municipal land transfer was breached as of the date of conveyance of the property. Wood v. Setliff, 229 Ark. 1007, 320 S.W.2d 655 (1959).

Tort.

A civil action for seduction sounds in tort and may be brought within five years. Darnell v. Lea, 162 Ark. 516, 258 S.W. 363 (1924).

The five year statute of limitations provided for in this section applies to an action for alienation of affections. Gibson v. Gibson, 240 Ark. 827, 402 S.W.2d 647 (1966). (Case was decided prior to the 1967 amendment of § 16-56-104.).

In suit for severe emotional distress upon the plaintiffs, the three-year statute of limitations under § 16-56-105 applied, and the five-year statute of limitations under this section did not apply; thus, suit filed four years after distress was inflicted was time-barred. Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1981)Criticized byPoindexter v. Armstrong, 934 F. Supp. 1052 (W.D. Ark. 1994).

Unfair Practices Act.

The Arkansas Unfair Practices Act contains no limitation period, which results in the application of the general catch-all five-year statute found in this section. Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

Circuit court correctly applied the five-year statute of limitations to claims under the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act, § 4-72-201 et seq., as neither § 16-56-105 nor this section applied; five-year statute applied because the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act contained no statute of limitations. Miller Brewing Co. v. Ed Roleson, Jr., Inc., 365 Ark. 38, 223 S.W.3d 806 (2006).

Cited: Breining v. Lippincott, 125 Ark. 77, 187 S.W. 915 (1916); England v. Hughes, 141 Ark. 235, 217 S.W. 13 (1919); Scroggin Farms Corp. v. McFadden, 165 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1948); Wheeler v. Wallingsford, 229 Ark. 576, 317 S.W.2d 153 (1958); Nelson v. Eckert, 231 Ark. 348, 329 S.W.2d 426 (1959); Wilson v. Wilson, 231 Ark. 416, 329 S.W.2d 557 (1959); Tollett v. Mashburn, 183 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Ark. 1960); Wilder v. Garner, 235 Ark. 400, 360 S.W.2d 192 (1962); Lane v. Graves, 525 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1975); Bankston v. Davis, 262 Ark. 635, 559 S.W.2d 714 (1978); Russ v. Ratliff, 578 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1978); Winston v. Robinson, 270 Ark. 996, 606 S.W.2d 757 (1980); Pruitt v. Pruitt, 271 Ark. 404, 609 S.W.2d 84 (1980); Ragland v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 286 Ark. 33, 689 S.W.2d 349 (1985); Coast-to-Coast Stores, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 676 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Ark. 1987); Carroll County v. Eureka Springs School Dist. # 21, 292 Ark. 151, 729 S.W.2d 1 (1987); F & M Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners Ltd. Partnership, 702 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Ark. 1988); Ark. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. House, 320 Ark. 423, 897 S.W.2d 565 (1995); Douglas v. First Student, Inc., 2011 Ark. 463, 385 S.W.3d 225 (2011).