Ark. Code Ann. § 16-64-123 (2020)
Excessiveness of damages generally
The verdict of any jury rendered in any action for the recovery of damages where the measure thereof is indeterminate or uncertain shall not be held to be excessive or be set aside as excessive, except for some erroneous instruction or, upon evidence, aside from the amount of the damages assessed, that it was rendered under the influence of passion or prejudice.
History. Acts 1901, No. 125, § 1, p. 196; C. & M. Dig., § 1313; Pope's Dig., § 1538; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1903.
Research References
ALR.
Liability of cigarette manufacturers for punitive damages. 108 A.L.R.5th 343.
Case Notes
Constitutionality.
The court held this section to be void insofar as it curtailed the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Whether this section is void insofar as it affects the jurisdiction of the circuit court was not decided. St. Louis & N. A. R. Co. v. Mathis, 76 Ark. 184, 91 S.W. 763 (1905).
In General.
This section is not the basic authority for reduction of a jury verdict by a trial court and it only purports to limit the basic and inherent power of the court in certain cases. Dorey v. McCoy, 246 Ark. 1244, 442 S.W.2d 202 (1969).
Applicability.
Where losing party did not waive all errors and where the winning party did not remit the excess, this section does not apply. Dorey v. McCoy, 246 Ark. 1244, 442 S.W.2d 202 (1969).
Factors Considered.
The standard of review for whether damages are so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court or demonstrate that the jury was motivated by passion or prejudice involves consideration of such elements as past and future medical expenses, permanent injury, loss of earning capacity, scars resulting in disfigurement, and pain, suffering, and mental anguish. Gipson v. Garrison, 308 Ark. 344, 824 S.W.2d 829 (1992).
Grounds for Reduction.
A belief by a trial court that damages are excessive is not, standing alone, a sufficient ground for ordering a reduction. Morrison v. Lowe, 274 Ark. 358, 625 S.W.2d 452 (1981).
Record sufficient to find that award of actual and punitive damages was excessive, but that underlying liability determinations were not tainted; therefore remittitur was appropriate. Dees v. Allied Fid. Ins. Co., 655 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
Power of Court.
This section, which provides that in cases where damages are not susceptible of definite measurement a remittitur shall be ordered only where the judgment is rendered under the influence of passion and prejudice, is not the basic authority for the reduction of a jury verdict, since remittitur is within the inherent power of a court. Morrison v. Lowe, 274 Ark. 358, 625 S.W.2d 452 (1981).
Reduction improper.
Punitive damages award of $350,000 against husband for assaulting his wife did not shock the court's conscience or demonstrate passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. Cater v. Cater, 311 Ark. 627, 846 S.W.2d 173 (1993).
Cited: Jamison v. Spivey, 197 Ark. 698, 125 S.W.2d 453 (1939); Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Noles, 201 Ark. 1088, 148 S.W.2d 650 (1941); Dorey v. McCoy, 246 Ark. 1244, 442 S.W.2d 202 (1969).