Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-111 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Criminal Defendant's Age or Height as Factor in Determination of Whether Circumstances of Witness's Identification of Defendant in Photographic Array Shown by Police to Witness Were Impermissibly Suggestive as Matter of Federal Constitutional Law. 102 A.L.R.6th 365 (2015).

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Corroboration of Confessions in the Theft by Receiving Context: Is Proof of Theft Enough?, 44 Ark. L. Rev. 805.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Evidence, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 191.

Arkansas Law Survey, Smith, Evidence, 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 165.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The more stringent corroboration requirements in the case of accomplice testimony does not violate the equal protection clause as there is a legitimate rationale for greater safeguards when a defendant's conviction is based on the testimony of a third person rather than on his own words. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702.

Applicability.

Subsection (d) of this section does not require that a confession be corroborated by other evidence in order to sustain a conviction; subsection (d) deals only with the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, and not mere admissibility. McVay v. State, 312 Ark. 73, 847 S.W.2d 28 (1993).

Subsection (d) was inapplicable in a prosecution for driving on a suspended driver's license, notwithstanding the defendant's argument that the only evidence to support his conviction was his uncorroborated confession, as the defendant's admission to the arresting officer that his license had been suspended was only one element of the offense of driving with a suspended license; the criminal act of driving with a suspended license was established by the defendant's admission in conjunction with the officer's testimony that the defendant was the only person in the vehicle. White v. State, 73 Ark. App. 264, 42 S.W.3d 584 (2001).

Court properly admitted juvenile's statements at a probation revocation proceeding to her probation officer regarding taking drugs because § 9-27-321 protected juveniles from Miranda violations in a pre-adjudication context, not at a revocation hearing; in addition, the statement was properly admitted because the statement was offered to prove that defendant had violated the terms of her probation. K.N. v. State, 360 Ark. 579, 203 S.W.3d 103 (2005).

In a case in which a minor was adjudicated delinquent pursuant to a juvenile court's finding that he committed the criminal offense of misdemeanor theft by receiving, in violation of § 5-36-106(a), the minor unsuccessfully argued that a witness's testimony had to be corroborated. Since the minor had been charged with a misdemeanor, subdivision (e)(1) of this section did not apply. R.W. v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 220 (2010).

Accomplice Testimony.

Where an accomplice's confession was cross-implicating, even though enough other evidence was available from accomplice for conviction, the court was ordered to sever the case for retrial. Kerr v. State, 256 Ark. 738, 512 S.W.2d 13 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110, 95 S. Ct. 783, 42 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1975).

Testimony of an accomplice is insufficient to justify conviction of a felony, even though the court and jury believe the testimony. The reason for this rule is that the instinct for survival renders the testimony of an accomplice less than completely credible. Foster v. State, 290 Ark. 495, 720 S.W.2d 712 (1986), rehearing denied, 290 Ark. 495, 290 Ark. 498A, 290 Ark. 498, 722 S.W.2d 869, cert. denied, Arkansas v. Foster, 107 S. Ct. 3213, 96 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1987).

An accomplice's testimony must be corroborated by other evidence. The corroboration must be sufficient standing alone to establish the commission of the offense and to connect the defendant with it; it may be circumstantial evidence as long as it is substantial. David v. State, 295 Ark. 131, 748 S.W.2d 117 (1988); Franklin v. State, 311 Ark. 601, 845 S.W.2d 525 (1993); Hogue v. State, 323 Ark. 515, 915 S.W.2d 276 (1996).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict on his capital murder conviction because the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of the underlying felony, aggravated robbery, even after eliminating the testimony of one of defendant's accomplices. Evidence showed that: (1) defendant had the purpose of committing a theft with the use of physical force, as he and three other individuals went to a witness's house to acquire ammunition for their firearm; (2) the fourth individual testified that defendant and three men arrived at his trailer where defendant displayed a gun, and that he provided ammunition for the gun; (3) a second witness, one of the three men who accompanied defendant, testified that he heard two gunshots fired after the two other men left the victim's apartment after the struggle between defendant and the victim ensued; and (4) the chief medical examiner testified that the victim died from a gunshot wound. Gardner v. State, 362 Ark. 413, 208 S.W.3d 774 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony and to convict defendant of first degree murder and theft where, in addition to the testimony of defendant's wife, who was an accomplice, defendant's own statements to the police, his conduct before and after the crime, and statements of the victim's friends regarding her fear of defendant tended to connect him to the crimes; further, although there was no evidence that defendant ever drove victim's Cadillac or had the vehicle in his possession, the jury might have determined that defendant facilitated the theft by leaving the accomplice without a vehicle at the victim's house, and there was evidence that the theft of the Cadillac was part of the plan to murder the victim. MacKool v. State, 365 Ark. 416, 231 S.W.3d 676 (2006).

There was sufficient evidence to support convictions for aggravated robbery and capital murder based on defendant's admission that she held the victim's hands down while he was beaten inside an apartment during an alleged robbery and the testimony of an accomplice waiting outside; the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated. Johnson v. State, 366 Ark. 8, 233 S.W.3d 123 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's kidnapping conviction where defendant's accomplice testified that defendant killed the victim, and an officer testified that defendant stated that the accomplice attacked the victim, knocked him down, taped him in a chair, and that the victim was “moaning” and “in a bad way” before he died; although there was a discrepancy as to which individual attacked the victim, both statements pointed to defendant's involvement in the victim's murder. Holsombach v. State, 368 Ark. 415, 246 S.W.3d 871 (2007).

Because three of the state's witnesses were not charged as accomplices, and defendant neither requested that the trial court declare them accomplices nor proffered an accomplice jury instruction for the record, his argument that they were accomplices and that, without their testimony, the state would not have been able to prove its case, was not preserved for appeal. Boldin v. State, 373 Ark. 295, 283 S.W.3d 565 (2008).

Defendant's convictions for two counts of capital murder were appropriate because there was sufficient evidence to corroborate an accomplice's testimony under former § 43-2116; after eliminating the accomplice's testimony, other testimony still independently established the crimes and tended to connect defendant with their commission. Defendant's former wife testified that he was not home on the night in question, that a shotgun was missing, and that defendant told the wife's daughter that she would not have to return to her father's home; the father was one of the victims. Wertz v. State, 374 Ark. 256, 287 S.W.3d 528 (2008).

Where defendant's friend testified that defendant tried to rob the victim in his truck and shot him when he resisted, defendant's fingerprints were found on the truck and the blood on the gun matched defendant's DNA. Even if the friend was deemed an accomplice, there was sufficient corroborating evidence for purposes of this section to support defendant's conviction for capital murder. Bush v. State, 374 Ark. 506, 288 S.W.3d 658 (2008).

Defendant's convictions for capital murder and kidnapping were appropriate because a witness' testimony alone was enough to corroborate an accomplice's testimony against defendant, pursuant to subdivisions (e)(1)(A) and (B) of this section. Evidence showed that bullets found near the victims' bodies were fired from a .22 caliber rifle and a .38 caliber revolver and according to another witness, an individual wanted to buy a .38 caliber revolver from defendant; essentially, when all of the evidence was viewed in a light most favorable to the state, it tended to connect defendant to the commission of the crimes. Gilcrease v. State, 2009 Ark. 298, 318 S.W.3d 70 (2009), appeal dismissed, 2011 Ark. 108 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain drug and firearm convictions because the testimony of defendant's wife that defendant bought the cocaine and that they were both involved in a drug-dealing operation was corroborated by other evidence that tended to connect defendant with possession of the drugs. Defendant not only was a co-owner of the car but he was driving it when he was stopped by the police for speeding, defendant admitted to the police that he was in possession of the loaded handgun that was in plain view and easily accessible to him at the time of the stop. Layton v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 96, 302 S.W.3d 610 (2009).

There was insufficient evidence corroborating the testimony of an accomplice to adjudicate a defendant as a delinquent juvenile because there was no substantial evidence that tended to connect defendant with the commission of the crime: there was no conclusive proof that the crime took place during the time alleged, defendant's location during this time was approximately a quarter of a mile away; other evidence established an extremely narrow window of time in which defendant could have committed the crime; and substantial evidence was also lacking with regard to defendant's association with the accomplice who had confessed to the crime in a manner suggestive of joint participation. Westbrook v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 723 (2009).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's convictions for commercial burglary, criminal mischief, and breaking and entering because the testimony of defendant's accomplice, who was defendant's son, was sufficiently corroborated, as required by subdivision (e)(1) of this section, by an officer's testimony as to the items he found in defendant's truck, matching the description of items stolen from a convenience store. The accomplice admitted that he and defendant entered the store by using a cable to pull open the front doors and that he and defendant used bolt cutters and a pry bar to break into gaming machines, and these items, along with packages of cigarettes stolen from the store, were found by police officers in defendant's truck. Dunlap v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 582 (2010).

Appellant's conviction for delivery of methamphetamine was affirmed because the jury was properly instructed that the witness's testimony must be corroborated and an officer and the witness both testified that the crime of delivery of methamphetamine occurred. Hall v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 717 (2010).

In a capital murder trial, a circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict because there was sufficient evidence to corroborate an accomplice's testimony; even if the accomplice's testimony was eliminated, the testimony of a police officer and the victim's nephew was consistent with the accomplice's testimony of the events surrounding the murder, the testimony of several police officers established defendant was in possession of the murder weapon four days after the crime occurred, and the testimony of several law enforcement officials established defendant's flight from the vicinity of the crime, constituting corroboration of all the other evidence establishing defendant's guilt. Taylor v. State, 2011 Ark. 10, 370 S.W.3d 503 (2011).

In defendant's capital murder trial, the state provided sufficient evidence to corroborate the alleged accomplice's testimony pursuant to this section and, even if the accomplice's testimony was eliminated, the other evidence presented independently established the crime and tended to connect defendant with its commission. Taylor v. State, 2011 Ark. 10, 370 S.W.3d 503 (2011).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated residential burglary and aggravated robbery were appropriate because the state provided sufficient evidence to corroborate his accomplices' testimony; even eliminating the accomplice testimony, the remaining evidence presented independently established the crimes and tended to connect defendant with their commission, as required by subdivisions (e)(1)(A) and (B) of this section. In part, witnesses testified about defendant being with the accomplices on the day of the crimes and the state also presented a witness's testimony that defendant had sold him the three shotguns that were identified as being the ones stolen from the victim. Tucker v. State, 2011 Ark. 144, 381 S.W.3d 1 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict during a trial for first-degree murder as an accomplice because there was sufficient evidence under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section corroborating a codefendant's testimony that defendant hired the codefendant to murder his wife; two witnesses identified the murder weapon as a gun belonging to defendant. Camp v. State, 2011 Ark. 155, 381 S.W.3d 11 (2011).

Defendant's argument that he was convicted on the basis of the uncorroborated accomplice testimony of his wife contrary to subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section was not preserved for review. Defendant's wife was never found to be an accomplice, and defendant failed to request that accomplice instructions be submitted to the jury for consideration. Bryant v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 348, 384 S.W.3d 46 (2011).

Independent evidence corroborated defendant's passenger's testimony that drugs in a blue glove in her pants belonged to defendant, including a letter defendant wrote to the passenger from jail asking her to change her statement and to implicate someone else in the crime and the passenger's statements to officers that she had something concealed on her body. Owens v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 763, 387 S.W.3d 250 (2011).

Defendant's conviction for second-degree forgery was proper considering accomplice testimony along with the other evidence, under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section. Although the evidence was circumstantial given that it was the accomplice, rather than defendant, who cashed the forged check, circumstantial evidence could provide the basis to support the conviction. Benton v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 71, 388 S.W.3d 488 (2012).

There was sufficient evidence tending to connect defendant to an aggravated robbery and thus to corroborate accomplice testimony because surveillance video established the commission of the crime and an officer testified that defendant matched the description of a robber in the video based on his height and that the officer confirmed the truth of identifying information from a non-accomplice. Smith v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 534, 423 S.W.3d 624 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for capital murder and aggravated robbery because a witness's testimony corroborated that defendant was an accomplice to the aggravated robbery, defendant knew there was a large amount of marijuana at the home, a gun was used during the robbery, and the victim's death occurred during the robbery under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Bradley v. State, 2013 Ark. 58, 426 S.W.3d 363 (2013).

Because no accomplice instruction was submitted to the jury, and because defendant never requested that the circuit court declare defendant's cousin to be an accomplice as a matter of law, accomplice status was never determined, and the appellate court was unable to reach the merits of defendant's argument that the State failed to sufficiently corroborate the testimony of his alleged accomplice. Rainey v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 254 (2015).

Defendant's accomplice-corroboration argument as to the misdemeanor theft-of-property conviction failed under subdivision (e)(2) of this section as the violation was a misdemeanor, and defendant candidly admitted that his accomplice's testimony supported the conviction. Lovelace v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 146, 516 S.W.3d 300 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice's testimony as to defendant's first-degree battery conviction where the vehicle from which defendant fled matched the description seen in a video, and the victim identified defendant as the man who shot him. Lovelace v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 146, 516 S.W.3d 300 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery either as a principal or as an accomplice because defendant's boyfriend told her they were going to pick up the victim and that he intended to beat him up and take anything that the victim had on him; despite knowing the boyfriend's purpose, defendant still agreed to drive him; substantial corroborating evidence connecting defendant to the crime included two interviews she gave to the police and her written statement, which were admitted at trial; and the victim's death made the offense an aggravated robbery regardless of her knowledge of whether a gun might be used. Vaughan v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 439, 555 S.W.3d 922 (2018).

While the State's case against defendant for capital felony murder/aggravated robbery was premised on circumstantial evidence, testimony clearly corroborated an accomplice's testimony against defendant and the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict even without the accomplice testimony; testimony from multiple witnesses demonstrated that three masked men entered a gas station convenience store, the man in red demanded money from the owner, shot him in the neck, and then turned his gun on an employee, shooting him in the face. Lawshea v. State, 2019 Ark. 68, 567 S.W.3d 853 (2019).

—Accomplice Defined.

One who with full knowledge that a crime has been committed conceals it from the magistrate or harbors and protects the criminal is an accomplice. Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117 (1880).

An accomplice is one who could himself be convicted of the crime charged against the defendant, either as principal or accessory. Simon v. State, 149 Ark. 609, 233 S.W. 917 (1921); Henderson v. State, 174 Ark. 835, 297 S.W. 836 (1927); McClure v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 215 S.W.2d 524 (1948); Havens v. State, 217 Ark. 153, 228 S.W.2d 1003 (1950).

Receiver of stolen goods and thief from whom he received them are accomplices within the meaning of this section. Long v. State, 192 Ark. 1089, 97 S.W.2d 67 (1936).

Ordinarily the question of whether a witness is an accomplice is a mixed question of fact and law and must be submitted to the jury where the evidence is in dispute. Jackson v. State, 193 Ark. 776, 102 S.W.2d 546 (1937); Clayton v. State, 247 Ark. 643, 447 S.W.2d 319 (1969); Shrader v. State, 13 Ark. App. 17, 678 S.W.2d 777 (1984); Woodward v. State, 16 Ark. App. 18, 696 S.W.2d 759 (1985).

One jointly indicted with defendant, if evidence tends to show his or her connection with the commission of the offense, even though such evidence be meager and unsatisfactory, is to be regarded as an accomplice. Jackson v. State, 193 Ark. 776, 102 S.W.2d 546 (1937).

Where question as to whether or not one is an accomplice is submitted to jury, its finding on the subject is final, unless the testimony shows conclusively that the witness was an accomplice. Jackson v. State, 193 Ark. 776, 102 S.W.2d 546 (1937); Shrader v. State, 13 Ark. App. 17, 678 S.W.2d 777 (1984).

Victim not an accomplice. Waterman v. State, 202 Ark. 934, 154 S.W.2d 813 (1941); Wise v. State, 204 Ark. 743, 164 S.W.2d 897 (1942); Havens v. State, 217 Ark. 153, 228 S.W.2d 1003 (1950).

Evidence sufficient to show that question of whether witness was an accomplice was waived by the defendant. Trotter v. State, 215 Ark. 121, 219 S.W.2d 636 (1949).

One who buys a controlled substance is not an accomplice of the person who sells or delivers it. Sweatt v. State, 251 Ark. 650, 473 S.W.2d 913 (1971); Long v. State, 260 Ark. 417, 542 S.W.2d 742 (1976); Brizendine v. State, 4 Ark. App. 19, 627 S.W.2d 26 (1982); Barnes v. State, 15 Ark. App. 153, 691 S.W.2d 178 (1985); Williams v. State, 290 Ark. 449, 720 S.W.2d 305, 1986 Ark. LEXIS 2215 (1986), aff'd, 292 Ark. 616, 732 S.W.2d 135 (1987).

Grant of immunity alone does not cause a witness to be an accomplice as a matter of law. Scherrer v. State, 294 Ark. 287, 742 S.W.2d 884 (1988).

Failure to inform law enforcement officers of crime does not make one an accomplice as a matter of law. Scherrer v. State, 294 Ark. 287, 742 S.W.2d 884 (1988).

Mere presence at scene of a crime does not make one an accomplice. Scherrer v. State, 294 Ark. 287, 742 S.W.2d 884 (1988).

A buyer of illicit drugs is not an accomplice of the seller. Talley v. State, 312 Ark. 271, 849 S.W.2d 493 (1993).

The fact that a witness has been granted immunity is not a basis to rule that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law. State v. Young, 315 Ark. 656, 869 S.W.2d 691 (1994).

Where witness lured murder victim to the murder site, but there was no evidence that witness had knowledge of the crime that was going to occur, the facts did not show conclusively that witness was an accomplice as a matter of law. King v. State, 323 Ark. 671, 916 S.W.2d 732 (1996).

—Appeal.

Where an appeal by the state in a felony case presents only the question of the sufficiency of the corroborating testimony of the appellee's accomplice in the commission of the crime charged, it will be denied, since that is a question of fact and the Supreme Court's opinion could not serve as a precedent for the trial of other cases founded on a similar charge. State v. Massey, 194 Ark. 439, 107 S.W.2d 527 (1937).

State conceded at trial that the witness was an accomplice; therefore, Supreme Court could not question that fact on appeal. Du Bois v. State, 254 Ark. 543, 494 S.W.2d 700 (1973).

The appellate court reviews the sufficiency of corroborating evidence by the test of whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, which means whether the fact finder could have reached the verdict without resorting to speculation and conjecture; in such cases the court merely determines whether the circumstantial evidence tends to some degree to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime and does not look to see whether every other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt has been excluded. Roe v. State, 7 Ark. App. 263, 647 S.W.2d 483 (1983).

If an accused must be acquitted if the state's case is based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, then that determination on appeal prohibits retrial just as it does when acquittal occurs at the trial; the reason for reversal is not “error,” but insufficiency of the state's proof. Foster v. State, 290 Ark. 495, 290 Ark. 498A, 290 Ark. 498, 722 S.W.2d 869.

On appeal, the inquiry is, or should be, not whether the court views the corroborating evidence as sufficient, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that the corroborating evidence was sufficient. In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that the corroborating evidence was sufficient, the court need only consider testimony lending support to the jury verdict and may disregard any testimony that could have been rejected by the jury on the basis of credibility. Maynard v. State, 21 Ark. App. 20, 727 S.W.2d 858 (1987).

Where state court reverses a conviction because the prosecution fails to corroborate accomplice testimony as required by this section, such a reversal is one based on evidentiary insufficiency, and therefore, a second prosecution is barred by the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution.DuBois v. Lockhart, 859 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1988).

State supreme court would not overturn trial judge, sitting as fact finder, who found that a witness was not an accomplice; defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery, in part based on the witness' testimony, was affirmed. Gray v. State, 311 Ark. 209, 843 S.W.2d 315 (1992).

Despite not asking for a jury instruction that witness was an accomplice as a matter of law and it was necessary for the state to produce evidence connecting defendant to the crime, independent of witness' testimony, the issue of an erroneous denial of a directed verdict motion on insufficient corroborative evidence was preserved for appeal. Hogue v. State, 323 Ark. 515, 915 S.W.2d 276 (1996).

In an appeal from the trial court's grant of a directed verdict of not guilty in defendant's murder trial, the state sought to have the Supreme Court determine whether the corroborating evidence submitted was sufficient to connect defendant to the offense under the accomplice-corroboration statute, but any decision in response to that portion of the state's appeal would have required consideration of the application of the statute to the specific facts of the case, which the Supreme Court would not do in appeals by the state. State v. Fuson, 355 Ark. 652, 144 S.W.3d 250 (2004).

Defendant was entitled to have the jury decide whether a state's witness was an accomplice whose testimony had to be corroborated pursuant to subdivision (e)(1) of this section and, if so, whether sufficient corroboration was proved; because the witness's testimony raised a question as to his accomplice status and the trial court refused to give a correct instruction permitting the jury to decide the question, the trial court committed reversible error. Torrence v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 225 (2010).

—Burden of Proof.

A person must first be found to be an accomplice under § 5-2-403 for the requirement of corroborative evidence to come into play under subdivision (e)(1) of this section; it is the burden of the defendant to prove that a witness is an accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated. Rockett v. State, 319 Ark. 335, 891 S.W.2d 366 (1995).

Testimony of accomplices must be corroborated, but evidence corroborating accomplice testimony need not be sufficient standing alone to sustain the conviction; however, it must tend to connect the defendant to a substantial degree with the commission of the crime independent of the accomplice's testimony. Tate v. State, 84 Ark. App. 184, 137 S.W.3d 404 (2003), rev'd, 357 Ark. 369, 167 S.W.3d 655 (2004).

—Corroboration.

Corroboration of testimony may be supplied by proof of the acts, conduct, or declarations of the party informed against, either before or after the commission of the crime. Long v. State, 192 Ark. 1089, 97 S.W.2d 67 (1936). For cases discussing the use of tape recordings as corroborating evidence, see Miller v. State, 230 Ark. 168, 321 S.W.2d 199, 1959 Ark. LEXIS 591 (1959).

This section requiring corroboration for felony convictions does not apply to the revocation of a previous suspension of sentence and, thus, the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient basis for the revocation of a suspension of sentence. Townsend v. State, 256 Ark. 570, 509 S.W.2d 311 (1974); Ellerson v. State, 261 Ark. 525, 549 S.W.2d 495 (1977).

Corroboration may be furnished by the acts, conduct, declarations or testimony of the accused; false statements to the police and flight by an accused may constitute corroborating evidence. On the other hand, an explanation by the accused of suspicious circumstances may be considered in determining whether the evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony is sufficient. Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983).

Admission of uncorroborated accomplice testimony in penalty phase of capital case did not violate this section prohibiting conviction on the basis of uncorroborated accomplice testimony. Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 656 S.W.2d 684 (1983), cert. denied, Clines v. Arkansas, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S. Ct. 1328, 79 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1984).

That the legislature chose 16 years as the age of accountability for purposes of the crime of incest does not mean that it also intended that when an unwilling victim of incest is 16 years old, then corroboration is required. The testimony of the 16-year old victim of incest did not require corroboration under this section where the intercourse was not with her consent, as evidenced by her running away following the incident and her refusal to stay at home. Camp v. State, 288 Ark. 269, 704 S.W.2d 617 (1986).

The requirement of corroboration is satisfied by proof that crime was committed by someone. Shells v. State, 22 Ark. App. 62, 733 S.W.2d 743 (1987).

Flight by an accused may constitute a corroborating circumstance. Jimenez v. State, 24 Ark. App. 76, 749 S.W.2d 331, 1988 Ark. App. LEXIS 203 (1988).

Corroboration is not needed as to every detail supplied by an accomplice. York v. Lockhart, 856 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1026, 109 S. Ct. 1759 (1989).

The corroborating evidence must establish the commission of the crime and tend to connect the accused with the crime. York v. Lockhart, 856 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1026, 109 S. Ct. 1759 (1989); McDonald v. State, 37 Ark. App. 61, 824 S.W.2d 396 (1992).

There is no requirement that each element of the crime attested to by the accomplice be corroborated by independent testimony; rather, if an accomplice is corroborated as to some particular fact or facts, the jury is authorized to infer that he speaks the truth as to all. York v. Lockhart, 856 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1026, 109 S. Ct. 1759 (1989).

The corroboration required by subdivision (e)(1) is directed toward proof of the criminal offense and not to venue or jurisdictional facts, for which corroboration is not required. Lee v. State, 27 Ark. App. 198, 770 S.W.2d 148 (1989), cert. denied, Lee v. Arkansas, 493 U.S. 847, 110 S. Ct. 142 (1989).

Corroborating evidence is evidence which tends to connect the accused with the commission of the crime, but is something less than that evidence necessary to sustain a conviction. Meeks v. State, 317 Ark. 411, 878 S.W.2d 403 (1994).

Corroboration need not be so substantial in and of itself to sustain a conviction. Hogue v. State, 323 Ark. 515, 915 S.W.2d 276 (1996).

Corroborative evidence held sufficient to connect defendant to the crime. Hogue v. State, 323 Ark. 515, 915 S.W.2d 276 (1996).

Where defendant was on trial for misdemeanor theft, testimony of his brother, an accomplice, alone was sufficient to support a conviction. Gutherie v. State, 52 Ark. App. 145, 915 S.W.2d 739 (1996).

Testimony of accomplice to the victim's kidnapping prior to the murder was sufficiently corroborated to support defendant's conviction for first-degree murder. Peeler v. State, 326 Ark. 423, 932 S.W.2d 312 (1996).

Although the evidence independent of the accomplice's testimony was sufficient to establish that the crimes were committed and that the defendant was near the scene of the crime, such evidence was not sufficient corroborative evidence to satisfy the requirement of subdivision (e)(1). Pickett v. State, 55 Ark. App. 261, 935 S.W.2d 281 (1996).

Trial court erred in granting a new trial pursuant to ARCrP 37.1 where defendant counsel's inadvertent failure to request a jury instruction regarding accomplice corroboration would not have changed the result of the trial. State v. Slocum, 332 Ark. 207, 964 S.W.2d 388 (1998).

The accomplice-corroboration rule does not apply to juvenile proceedings. Munhall v. State, 337 Ark. 41, 986 S.W.2d 863 (1999).

The testimony of an accomplice was sufficiently corroborated in a murder prosecution where (1) the defendant admitted that he and the accomplice were with the victim shortly before the victim was killed, (2) other witnesses testified to inculpatory statements made by the defendant, and (3) there was some physical evidence that tied the defendant to the murder. Marta v. State, 336 Ark. 67, 983 S.W.2d 924 (1999).

Standing alone, the corroboration for a felony conviction based upon accomplice testimony must be sufficient to establish the commission of the offense and to connect the defendant with it. Henderson v. State, 337 Ark. 518, 990 S.W.2d 530 (1999).

The test for corroborating evidence is whether, if the testimony of the accomplice were totally eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. Henderson v. State, 337 Ark. 518, 990 S.W.2d 530 (1999).

Circumstantial evidence qualifies as corroborating evidence, but it must be substantial, although not so substantial in and of itself to sustain a conviction. Henderson v. State, 337 Ark. 518, 990 S.W.2d 530 (1999).

In a prosecution for felony-murder, the evidence was sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice where (1) the medical examiner testified that the victim died of a gunshot wound to the chest, (2) a witness testified that the defendant was involved in a conversation with his accomplices about robbing a dice game at the scene of the crime, (3) another witness identified the defendant from a photo-lineup as one of the men who approached the scene of the crime just before the victim was shot, and (4) another witness testified that three or four men approached the scene of the crime and one of them was facing the victim just before she heard the gunshot that killed him. Flowers v. State, 342 Ark. 45, 25 S.W.3d 422 (2000).

In a prosecution for aggravated robbery and theft of property, testimony of another witness corroborated the testimony of an accomplice by establishing the commission of the crime and by tending to connect the defendants with the crime's commission. Rose v. State, 72 Ark. App. 175, 35 S.W.3d 365 (2000).

Testimony of victim and defendant's confession to police sufficiently corroborated testimony of defendant's two accomplices that defendant had been a knowing and willing participant in the robbery of a mailman. Johnson v. State, 75 Ark. App. 81, 55 S.W.3d 298, 2001 Ark. App. LEXIS 639 (2001).

Murder of woman who allegedly gave defendant the AIDS virus was corroborated by evidence other than that provided by an accomplice to the murder where another witness saw defendant shove the murder victim into a car and defendant's nervous actions right after the murder. Martin v. State, 346 Ark. 198, 57 S.W.3d 136 (2001).

Testimony of a murder defendant's accomplice that defendant repeatedly asked him to kill the victim was adequately corroborated by defendant's testimony admitting these requests. Atkinson v. State, 347 Ark. 336, 64 S.W.3d 259 (2002).

Where witnesses identified the state's exhibit as being the gold handgun used during the robbery and chose defendant's photograph out of a photo lineup as looking like the robber, and identified defendant as looking like the robber in the courtroom, and where an accomplice testified the gun belonged to his sister, the accomplice's testimony that he drove defendant to the store and waited as defendant robbed the store was sufficiently corroborated and defendant's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. Jones v. State, 349 Ark. 331, 78 S.W.3d 104, 2002 Ark. LEXIS 376 (2002).

Defendant was properly convicted as an accomplice in a murder of a 15-year-old girl the codefendant had allegedly impregnated where evidence other than the testimony of the codefendant connected defendant with the commission of the offense; evidence showed that defendant provided the murder weapon, that defendant helped the killer prepare for the murder by selecting a grave site to dispose of the body, and that defendant assisted the killer in planning so as to avoid evidence that could connect him to the murder. Davis v. State, 350 Ark. 22, 86 S.W.3d 872 (2002).

Testimony of the accomplice was admissible where other evidence independently established the accomplice's description of the double murder; the medical examiner's testimony that one victim died as a result of being stabbed, having his throat cut, and to a lesser extent, blunt force trauma, an officer's testimony that defendant was found with the other victim's car, and testimony that defendant's van contained substantial blood from the victims, were all in accordance with the accomplice's testimony of how they had disposed of the bodies. Baughman v. State, 353 Ark. 1, 110 S.W.3d 740 (2003).

Much of the testimony against defendant was provided by defendant's girlfriend, who helped defendant plan and carry out the murder, and there was substantial corroboration of the girlfriend's testimony in the form of physical evidence and the testimony of other witnesses, thus, there was no merit to defendant's claim that the trial court denied his motion for a directed-verdict. Holder v. State, 354 Ark. 364, 124 S.W.3d 439 (2003).

Evidence that defendant was found in a residence containing drug paraphernalia and an odor associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine and that he attempted to avoid detection and arrest corroborated the testimony of the accomplices and tended to connect defendant with the commission of the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia. Breshears v. State, 83 Ark. App. 159, 119 S.W.3d 61 (2003).

Co-defendant was properly convicted as an accomplice to the offenses of robbery and kidnapping where the victim testified that two people were present during the beating and a city marshal testified that he saw co-defendant at the scene of the crime; this evidence was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice testimony provided by defendant. Millholland v. State, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 220 (Mar. 24, 2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated robbery and to corroborate the accomplice's testimony where witnesses testified as to the role defendant played in the robbery and described his clothing and weapon, which were collected at the scene. Flowers v. State, 92 Ark. App. 29, 210 S.W.3d 907 (2005).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict as there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of the underlying felony, aggravated robbery, and capital murder, after eliminating the accomplice testimony; other corroborating evidence demonstrated that defendant had the purpose of committing theft with the use of physical force, was armed with a deadly weapon, and caused the death of the victim and, further, a doctor testified that the victim died from a gunshot wound. Gardner v. State, 364 Ark. 506, 221 S.W.3d 339 (2006).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict where defendant never requested that the circuit court declare co-defendant an accomplice as a matter of law, nor did defendant ask that the circuit court give a jury instruction on the question of whether co-defendant was an accomplice as a matter of fact; therefore, defendant's accomplice-corroboration challenge was barred and the accomplice-corroboration principles of subdivision (e)(1) of this section did not apply. Price v. State, 365 Ark. 25, 223 S.W.3d 817 (2006).

In a capital murder and kidnapping case, evidence was sufficient to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony, such as testimony of other witnesses that one of the victims had stolen marijuana plants from defendant, that defendant instructed others to say he was at home at the time of the murders, and that defendant approached his nephew and told him that if he ever said anything about the victims he would get hurt; however, the case was reversed because the trial court improperly allowed evidence concerning other bad acts and reputation. Green v. State, 365 Ark. 478, 231 S.W.3d 638 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine where an accomplice testified that defendant was inside his residence “cleaning up a cook” and “bagging everything up”; that testimony was corroborated by an officer who stated that, when he entered the home, defendant was in close proximity to the manufacturing items that were seized from the residence. Fitting v. State, 94 Ark. App. 283, 229 S.W.3d 568 (2006).

Sufficient evidence corroborated the accomplice witness testimony as to the crimes at a pharmacy and a bank where defendant confessed to a man and a woman overheard him, a witness testified she overhead defendant and others talking about robbing a pharmacy before the break-in occurred, there was physical evidence of the damages to the varying properties, as well as the hammer, tire iron, and concrete chunks, and defendant's behavior after the crimes. Collins v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 551, 444 S.W.3d 889 (2014).

If the testimony of an accomplice were totally eliminated from the case, the remaining corroborating evidence was sufficient to establish that the juvenile committed the offenses of breaking or entering and first-degree criminal mischief where it showed that the juvenile and the accomplice spent the night together, a yoga studio was vandalized on that same night, the juvenile and accomplice had been involved in a string of vandalism incidents, and the juvenile admitted that he was present at the yoga studio and watched the accomplice throw a rock through its door. M.J. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 242 (2015).

In a case where defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, there was sufficient evidence presented to corroborate the accomplice's testimony because defendant told a detective he was at the store on the date of the robbery; surveillance tapes showed defendant, co-defendant, and the accomplice in the store at the same time as the victim, leaving the store immediately after the victim, and leaving the parking lot right behind the victim; defendant's mother testified that the vehicle police were searching for in connection with the aggravated robberies belonged to defendant; and, at trial, the victim's sister identified defendant as the person who committed the aggravated robberies with co-defendant. Foster v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 63, 510 S.W.3d 782 (2017).

Evidence to corroborate a witness's testimony was not required because defendant failed to demonstrate that the witness was an accomplice; first, the witness testified that he was merely present in the vehicle and this testimony was unrefuted, second, the circuit court did not find him to be an accomplice at law, and finally, the appellate court had no knowledge of whether the jury decided if the witness was an accomplice. Farmer v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 331 (2019).

Even assuming the witness was an accomplice, there was independent evidence tending to connect defendant with attempted capital murder, unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and fleeing, as his letters and call to the witness were consistent with testimony that defendant was the shooter, and the jury could have found that defendant's alleged actions in firing the assault rifle at the officer and telling the driver to go aided and encouraged the driver in fleeing from the officer. Farmer v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 331 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of capital murder with the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the victim's death because the accomplices' testimony was corroborated by defendant's statement to police, forensic evidence, and testimony from other witnesses; the medical examiner (ME) testified that the victim died from internal blood loss caused by multiple blunt force injuries; defendant instructed the accomplices to beat the victim with baseball bats; the ME found oil on the victim's inner thighs and in her vagina, which was consistent with chainsaw oil; and defendant told the accomplices to use chainsaw oil as a lubricant and to shove a baseball bat inside the victim's vagina. Chumley v. State, 2019 Ark. 383, 590 S.W.3d 154 (2019).

— —By Defendant.

A voluntary confession of a defendant, made to one who is not an accomplice, is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. Knowles v. State, 113 Ark. 257, 168 S.W. 148 (1914); Porter v. State, 206 Ark. 758, 177 S.W.2d 408, 1944 Ark. LEXIS 540 (1944).

The testimony of the defendant alone may be sufficient corroboration of an accomplice. Ford v. State, 205 Ark. 706, 170 S.W.2d 671 (1943); York v. Lockhart, 856 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1026, 109 S. Ct. 1759 (1989).

Corroborating acts of defendant properly considered by court and jury. McClure v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 215 S.W.2d 524 (1948).

Defendant's acts and testimony held to corroborate accomplice testimony. Coston v. State, 10 Ark. App. 242, 663 S.W.2d 187 (1984); Walker v. State, 13 Ark. App. 124, 680 S.W.2d 915 (1984).

— —Circumstantial Evidence.

Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to corroborate an accomplice, although of itself it would not justify a verdict of guilty, where it is unequivocal and certain in character, of a material nature, and tends to connect the defendant with the crime. Roath v. State, 185 Ark. 1039, 50 S.W.2d 985 (1932); Mullen v. State, 193 Ark. 648, 102 S.W.2d 82 (1937).

Where circumstantial evidence is utilized to support accomplice testimony, all facts of the evidence can be considered to constitute a chain sufficient to present a question for the resolution by the jury as to the adequacy of the corroboration and the court will not look to see whether every other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt has been excluded. Rhodes v. State, 276 Ark. 203, 634 S.W.2d 107 (Ark. 1982).

Where circumstantial evidence is utilized, all facets of the evidence may be considered to constitute a chain sufficient to present the question for the resolution by the fact finder as to the adequacy of the corroboration. Roe v. State, 7 Ark. App. 263, 647 S.W.2d 483 (1983); McDonald v. State, 37 Ark. App. 61, 824 S.W.2d 396 (1992).

The corroborating evidence may be circumstantial, but it must be of a material nature and legitimately tend to connect the accused with the commission of the crime. Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983); Meeks v. State, 317 Ark. 411, 878 S.W.2d 403 (1994).

The connecting evidence may be circumstantial but it must be substantial. Jimenez v. State, 24 Ark. App. 76, 749 S.W.2d 331, 1988 Ark. App. LEXIS 203 (1988).

Evidence corroborating testimony of an accomplice must tend to connect accused with the crime and be independent of evidence given by the accomplice. Corroborating evidence may be circumstantial if it is substantial, but need not be so substantial as to support a conviction without the testimony of the accomplice. Lee v. State, 27 Ark. App. 198, 770 S.W.2d 148 (1989), cert. denied, Lee v. Arkansas, 493 U.S. 847, 110 S. Ct. 142 (1989).

Where defendant was in the room where drug manufacturing materials were found during execution of a search warrant, under subdivision (e)(1) of this section, such evidence and accomplice testimony against defendant was sufficient evidence support defendant's drug possession and manufacturing convictions. Tate v. State, 357 Ark. 369, 167 S.W.3d 655 (2004).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of theft of scrap metal under § 5-36-123 and first-degree criminal mischief under § 5-38-203 because defendant's girlfriend admitted that she and defendant were depicted in photos taken by a motion-activated camera, and while her testimony did not have to be corroborated as to the misdemeanors pursuant to subdivision (e)(2) of this section, circumstantial evidence independently established the crimes and tended to connect defendant to the commission of those crimes. The photos indicated that defendant and his girlfriend were near the wire prior to its being stolen, a signal maintainer testified that he did not leave unused wire on the ground when replacing the stolen wire, and there was testimony that the theft of the wire stopped after defendant was caught. Procella v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 515, 504 S.W.3d 686 (2016).

— —Juvenile Proceedings.

The accomplice-corroboration rule does not apply to juvenile proceedings. Swanner v. State, 73 Ark. App. 4, 37 S.W.3d 697 (2001).

—Corroboration Not Shown.

Insufficient evidence corroborated the accomplice witness testimony as to the arson because evidence of the physical damage to the bank and evidence recovered from the crime scene did not connect defendant to the crime. Collins v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 551, 444 S.W.3d 889 (2014).

Adjudication of delinquency on charges of theft by receiving was improper because the evidence was insufficient without resorting to prohibited suspicion and conjecture; after excluding an accomplice's testimony, being a passenger in a stolen vehicle was not enough to establish constructive possession. The only evidence corroborating the accomplice testimony was that of his sister, who testified that she knew appellant and the other passengers in the stolen car and that all of them, appellant included, had seen her vehicle before. D.F. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 656, 476 S.W.3d 189 (2015).

Corroboration of accomplice testimony was not sufficient; excluding the accomplice's testimony and the alleged statements of another accomplice, none of the testimony other than that of an officer established that a crime was committed; there was no testimony at trial describing defendant, and the officer's testimony, even if properly admitted, did not sufficiently establish either that an armed robbery was committed or that defendant was involved. Vann v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 601, 566 S.W.3d 170 (2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder because there was no evidence that the victim was the victim of an intended theft apart from the accomplice's testimony. The State showed only that defendant was with the accomplice and another alleged participant an hour before the victim died and that defendant was with another person in a crowd of gawkers at the location where the victim died. Clark v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 455, 588 S.W.3d 64 (2019).

—Question of Law.

Where the testimony of the witnesses showed conclusively that they were accomplices and took part in the conspiracy, the question of whether they were accomplices for purposes of this section is one of law for the trial judge to determine. Williams v. State, 328 Ark. 487, 944 S.W.2d 822 (1997).

—Sufficiency.

For cases discussing standards for determining sufficiency of corroboration, see: Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117 (1880); Ernest v. State, 120 Ark. 148, 179 S.W. 174 (1915); Brewer v. State, 137 Ark. 243, 208 S.W. 290 (1918); Hill v. State, 144 Ark. 642, 218 S.W. 197 (1920); Brown v. State, 143 Ark. 523, 222 S.W. 377, 1920 Ark. LEXIS 250 (1920); Strum v. State, 168 Ark. 1012, 272 S.W. 359 (1925); Powell v. State, 177 Ark. 938, 9 S.W.2d 583 (1928); Yates v. State, 182 Ark. 179, 31 S.W.2d 295 (1930); Fleeman v. State, 204 Ark. 772, 165 S.W.2d 62 (1942); Casteel v. State, 205 Ark. 82, 167 S.W.2d 634 (1943); Ford v. State, 205 Ark. 706, 170 S.W.2d 671 (1943); Underwood v. State, 205 Ark. 864, 171 S.W.2d 304 (1943); Thompson v. State, 207 Ark. 680, 182 S.W.2d 386 (1944); Bright v. State, 212 Ark. 852, 208 S.W.2d 168 (1948); McClure v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 215 S.W.2d 524 (1948); Froman v. State, 232 Ark. 697, 339 S.W.2d 601 (1960); Shipp v. State, 241 Ark. 120, 406 S.W.2d 361 (1966); Pitts v. State, 247 Ark. 434, 446 S.W.2d 222 (1969); Petron v. State, 252 Ark. 945, 481 S.W.2d 722 (1972); Gardner v. State, 263 Ark. 739, 569 S.W.2d 74 (1978), cert. denied, Gardner v. Arkansas, 440 U.S. 911, 99 S. Ct. 1224, 59 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1979); Bly v. State, 267 Ark. 613, 593 S.W.2d 450 (1980); Price v. State, 267 Ark. 1172, 599 S.W.2d 394, 1980 Ark. App. LEXIS 1342 (Ct. App. 1980); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark. App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693 (1981); Rhodes v. State, 276 Ark. 203, 634 S.W.2d 107 (Ark. 1982); Walker v. State, 277 Ark. 137, 639 S.W.2d 742 (1982); Lear v. State, 278 Ark. 70, 643 S.W.2d 550 (1982); Mackey v. State, 279 Ark. 307, 651 S.W.2d 82 (1983); Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983); Orsini v. State, 281 Ark. 348, 665 S.W.2d 245 (1984), cert. denied, Orsini v. Arkansas, 469 U.S. 847, 105 S. Ct. 162, 83 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1984), US Supreme Court cert. denied, Orsini v. Arkansas, 523 U.S. 1099, 118 S. Ct. 1568, 140 L. Ed. 2d 801 (1998); Redmon v. State, 282 Ark. 353, 668 S.W.2d 541 (1984); Linell v. State, 283 Ark. 162, 671 S.W.2d 741 (1984), cert. denied, Linell v. Arkansas, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S. Ct. 1778 (1985); Bennett v. State, 284 Ark. 87, 679 S.W.2d 202 (1984); Kennel v. State, 15 Ark. App. 45, 689 S.W.2d 5 (1985); Combs v. State, 286 Ark. 74, 690 S.W.2d 712 (1985); Stephens v. State, 15 Ark. App. 352, 693 S.W.2d 64 (1985); Lipsmeyer v. State, 16 Ark. App. 14, 695 S.W.2d 848 (1985); Woodward v. State, 16 Ark. App. 18, 696 S.W.2d 759 (1985); Evans v. State, 287 Ark. 136, 697 S.W.2d 879 (1985); Hart v. State, 301 Ark. 200, 783 S.W.2d 40 (1990); Davis v. State, 310 Ark. 582, 839 S.W.2d 182 (1992), appeal dismissed, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Ark. LEXIS 603 (Nov. 8, 2007); Hughey v. State, 310 Ark. 721, 840 S.W.2d 183 (1992); Henderson v. State, 337 Ark. 518, 990 S.W.2d 530 (1999).

Evidence held sufficient to corroborate testimony of accomplice. Chancellor v. State, 76 Ark. 215, 88 S.W. 880 (1905); Larimore v. State, 84 Ark. 606, 107 S.W. 165 (1907); Roberts v. State, 96 Ark. 58, 131 S.W. 60 (1910); Townsend v. State, 148 Ark. 573, 231 S.W. 1 (1921); Mullen v. State, 193 Ark. 648, 102 S.W.2d 82 (1937); Fleeman v. State, 204 Ark. 772, 165 S.W.2d 62 (1942); Webb v. State, 206 Ark. 640, 176 S.W.2d 915 (1944); Padgett v. State, 212 Ark. 716, 207 S.W.2d 719 (1948); Trotter v. State, 215 Ark. 121, 219 S.W.2d 636 (1949); Beasley v. State, 219 Ark. 452, 242 S.W.2d 961 (1951); Knight v. State, 228 Ark. 502, 308 S.W.2d 821 (1958); Lauderdale v. State, 233 Ark. 96, 343 S.W.2d 422 (1961); Nolen v. State, 239 Ark. 681, 393 S.W.2d 765 (1965); Clayton v. State, 247 Ark. 643, 447 S.W.2d 319 (1969); Henson v. State, 248 Ark. 992, 455 S.W.2d 101 (1970); Thacker v. State, 253 Ark. 864, 489 S.W.2d 500 (1973); King v. State, 254 Ark. 509, 494 S.W.2d 476 (1973); Jackson v. State, 256 Ark. 406, 507 S.W.2d 705 (1974); Anderson v. State, 256 Ark. 912, 511 S.W.2d 151, 1974 Ark. LEXIS 1564 (1974); Hubbard v. State, 258 Ark. 472, 527 S.W.2d 608 (1975); Dyas v. State, 260 Ark. 303, 539 S.W.2d 251 (1976); Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755 (1976), overruled in part, White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Coffey v. State, 261 Ark. 687, 550 S.W.2d 778 (1977); Burnett v. State, 262 Ark. 235, 556 S.W.2d 653 (1977), cert. denied, Burnett v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 944, 98 S. Ct. 1525, 55 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1978); Bly v. State, 267 Ark. 613, 593 S.W.2d 450 (1980); Smithey v. State, 269 Ark. 538, 602 S.W.2d 676 (1980); Gipson v. State, 271 Ark. 700, 610 S.W.2d 261 (1981); Brewer v. State, 271 Ark. 810, 611 S.W.2d 179 (1981); Sargent v. State, 272 Ark. 366, 614 S.W.2d 507 (1981); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark. App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693 (1981); Rhodes v. State, 276 Ark. 203, 634 S.W.2d 107 (Ark. 1982); Walker v. State, 277 Ark. 137, 639 S.W.2d 742 (1982); Roe v. State, 7 Ark. App. 263, 647 S.W.2d 483 (1983); Mackey v. State, 279 Ark. 307, 651 S.W.2d 82 (1983); Rhodes v. State, 280 Ark. 156, 655 S.W.2d 421 (1983); Rayford v. State, 284 Ark. 519, 683 S.W.2d 911 (1985); Kennel v. State, 15 Ark. App. 45, 689 S.W.2d 5 (1985); Evans v. State, 287 Ark. 136, 697 S.W.2d 879 (1985); Johnson v. State, 289 Ark. 589, 715 S.W.2d 441 (1986); Thrash v. State, 291 Ark. 575, 726 S.W.2d 283 (1987); Stickley v. State, 294 Ark. 44, 740 S.W.2d 616 (Ark. 1987); Maynard v. State, 21 Ark. App. 20, 727 S.W.2d 858 (1987); Moore v. State, 296 Ark. 30, 751 S.W.2d 345 (1988); Johnson v. State, 303 Ark. 12, 792 S.W.2d 863 (1990); Taylor v. State, 303 Ark. 586, 799 S.W.2d 519 (1990); McDonald v. State, 37 Ark. App. 61, 824 S.W.2d 396 (1992); Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993); Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484 (2001).

Insufficient evidence of burglary and theft of property was presented to corroborate the testimony of an admitted accomplice. Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993).

The amount of the corroborating evidence necessary is a question for the jury. Kennedy v. State, 115 Ark. 480, 171 S.W. 878 (1914); Powell v. State, 177 Ark. 938, 9 S.W.2d 583 (1928); Mankey v. State, 192 Ark. 901, 96 S.W.2d 463 (1936); Mullen v. State, 193 Ark. 648, 102 S.W.2d 82 (1937); Smith v. State, 199 Ark. 900, 136 S.W.2d 673 (1940); McClure v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 215 S.W.2d 524 (1948); Knight v. State, 228 Ark. 502, 308 S.W.2d 821 (1958).

Evidence held insufficient to corroborate testimony of accomplice. London v. State, 204 Ark. 189, 161 S.W.2d 207 (1942); Bright v. State, 212 Ark. 852, 208 S.W.2d 168 (1948); Miller v. State, 230 Ark. 168, 321 S.W.2d 199, 1959 Ark. LEXIS 591 (1959); Paschal v. State, 245 Ark. 396, 432 S.W.2d 879, 1968 Ark. LEXIS 1214 (1968); Du Bois v. State, 254 Ark. 543, 494 S.W.2d 700 (1973); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204 (1974); Dunn v. State, 256 Ark. 508, 508 S.W.2d 555 (1974); Prather v. State, 256 Ark. 581, 509 S.W.2d 309 (1974); Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755 (1976), overruled in part, White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Pollard v. State, 264 Ark. 753, 574 S.W.2d 656 (1978); Pace v. State, 267 Ark. 610, 593 S.W.2d 20 (1980); Roleson v. State, 272 Ark. 346, 614 S.W.2d 656 (1981); Redmon v. State, 282 Ark. 353, 668 S.W.2d 541 (1984); Combs v. State, 286 Ark. 74, 690 S.W.2d 712 (1985); Meeks v. State, 317 Ark. 411, 878 S.W.2d 403 (1994).

The corroboration of an accomplice's testimony required by this section is sufficient if it shows independently that a crime occurred and the accused was connected with its commission. Johnson v. State, 289 Ark. 589, 715 S.W.2d 441 (1986); Foster v. State, 290 Ark. 495, 720 S.W.2d 712 (1986), rehearing denied, 290 Ark. 495, 290 Ark. 498A, 290 Ark. 498, 722 S.W.2d 869, cert. denied, Arkansas v. Foster, 107 S. Ct. 3213, 96 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1987).

The question of sufficiency of the corroborating evidence to justify submission of the question of a defendant's guilt, must, of necessity, be governed by the facts and circumstances of the particular case, having regard for the nature of the crime, the character of the accomplice's testimony, and the general requirements with respect to corroboration. Maynard v. State, 21 Ark. App. 20, 727 S.W.2d 858 (1987).

Admissible hearsay statements of child declarant alleging rape by his stepfather provided sufficient corroboration of stepfather's confession despite child's subsequent testimony denying the truthfulness of his original allegations. Johnson v. State, 298 Ark. 617, 770 S.W.2d 128 (1989).

The test for determining the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence is whether, if the accomplice's testimony were eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. However, the corroborating evidence does not have to be sufficient to convict defendant of capital felony murder independently of the accomplice's testimony. Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 510, 838 S.W.2d 359 (1992).

The corroborating evidence need not be sufficient standing alone to sustain the conviction, but must, independent from that of the accomplice, tend to a substantial degree to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993).

The test is whether, if the testimony of the accomplice were completely eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993).

Evidence that only raises a suspicion of guilt is insufficient to corroborate an accomplice's testimony. Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993).

Corroboration must be evidence of a substantive nature since it must be directed toward proving the connection of the accused with the crime and not directed toward corroborating the accomplice's testimony. Meeks v. State, 317 Ark. 411, 878 S.W.2d 403 (1994).

Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993).

In a case involving the manufacture of a controlled substance, evidence held insufficient to satisfy the requirements of subdivision (e)(1) of this section where the evidence produced by the State, other than the testimony of the accomplice, did no more than place defendant in a location where marijuana was used and where the marijuana growing plot was discussed. Gordon v. State, 326 Ark. 90, 931 S.W.2d 91 (1996).

Evidence that defendant was present at a residence where a search warrant was executed and was found by police exiting a bedroom in which items used to manufacture methamphetamine were found and that the residence had the odor of a methamphetamine laboratory was not sufficient to support the co-defendant residence owner's testimony that defendant had been manufacturing methamphetamine at the residence; defendant's convictions of possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were reversed as evidence was otherwise insufficient to support the convictions. Miles v. State, 76 Ark. App. 255, 64 S.W.3d 759 (2001), overruled, Tate v. State, 357 Ark. 369, 167 S.W.3d 655 (2004).

Test for determining the sufficiency of corroborating evidence is whether, if accomplice testimony were totally eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. Tate v. State, 84 Ark. App. 184, 137 S.W.3d 404 (2003), rev'd, 357 Ark. 369, 167 S.W.3d 655 (2004).

In an armed robbery and theft prosecution, testimony of the driver of the getaway car that directly linked defendant to the robbery, the corroborating testimony of a store employee that defendant took money from, and that of an officer that defendant fled from after the getaway car crashed, was sufficient to convict defendant under this section. Parker v. State, 355 Ark. 639, 144 S.W.3d 270 (2004).

—Not Shown.

The trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that two witnesses who had been given immunity were accomplices of defendant and that he could not, therefore, be convicted on the basis of their testimony alone. State v. Young, 315 Ark. 656, 869 S.W.2d 691 (1994).

Confessions.

Confession made before a justice of the peace while holding court is a judicial confession and is sufficient. Skaggs v. State, 88 Ark. 62, 113 S.W. 346 (1908).

A confession, unless made in open court, cannot be used in evidence against a person charged with a crime unless it is first shown that the confession was freely and voluntarily made. Claborn v. State, 115 Ark. 387, 171 S.W. 862 (1914).

Where sheriff and prosecuting attorney testified as to admissions made by the defendant, which testimony was brought into the record without objection, it was proper testimony for the jury to consider. Wadlington v. State, 216 Ark. 914, 227 S.W.2d 940 (1950).

Subsection (d) has no application to a proceeding for revocation of a suspended sentence, and defendant's virtual confession would afford sufficient basis for the judgment revoking his suspension. Selph v. State, 264 Ark. 197, 570 S.W.2d 256 (1978).

Defendant's statement to his mother was a “confession,” as that term is used in subsection (d) of this section. Bishop v. State, 294 Ark. 303, 742 S.W.2d 911 (1988), overruled in part, Matthews v. State, 2009 Ark. 321, 319 S.W.3d 266 (2009).

This section implies that a confession in open court is sufficient to sustain conviction. Davis v. State, 33 Ark. App. 198, 804 S.W.2d 373 (1991).

Pre-arrest statement by defendant charged with DWI that he was the driver of the vehicle was not a “confession” as that term is used in subsection (d), because defendant's statement contained no admission that defendant was intoxicated or that his blood alcohol level was in excess of the legal limit at the time of the accident; defendant's statement that he was the operator of the vehicle merely constituted an admission of one element of the offense of DWI, rather than a confession of the crime. Stephens v. State, 320 Ark. 426, 898 S.W.2d 435 (1995).

Evidence was sufficient for a conviction of arson where defendant stated that the victim's body was placed on a wood burning stove where investigator's stated the fire had started, defendant admitted that he had kicked the pipe off of the stove, and the value of the destroyed trailer and its contents was between $20,000 and $25,000. Johnson v. State, 358 Ark. 460, 193 S.W.3d 260 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient for conviction of first-degree murder where the victim was last seen in the company of defendant, defendant confessed to his fellow inmates that he killed the victim with his hands in a fight after an argument, defendant told his brother that he would like to kill the victim, the victim's body was placed on wood burning stove, defendant kicked the pipe off of the stove, and the victim's body was found charred. Johnson v. State, 358 Ark. 460, 193 S.W.3d 260 (2004).

Convictions for sexual assault were reversed because the state failed to carry its burden of proof where a defendant's confession to sexual assault of his stepdaughters was not made in open court and was not accompanied with other proof that the offenses were committed and where both victims denied abuse at trial. Goodsell v. State, 104 Ark. App. 183, 289 S.W.3d 534 (2008).

—In General.

The requirement of subsection (d) for other proof requires the State to prove (1) the existence of an injury or harm constituting a crime and (2) that the injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal activity. Barnes v. State, 346 Ark. 91, 55 S.W.3d 271 (2001), substituted opinion, 65 S.W.3d 389 (Ark. 2001).

—Additional Evidence.

The confession of the defendant, accompanied with the proof that the offense was actually committed by someone, will warrant his conviction. Melton v. State, 43 Ark. 367 (1884); Smith v. State, 168 Ark. 253, 269 S.W. 995 (1925); Haraway v. State, 203 Ark. 912, 159 S.W.2d 733, cert. denied, Haraway v. Arkansas, 317 U.S. 648, 63 S. Ct. 42 (1942); Mouser v. State, 215 Ark. 131, 219 S.W.2d 611 (1949); Hargett v. State, 235 Ark. 189, 357 S.W.2d 533 (1962); Wallis v. State, 245 Ark. 1024, 436 S.W.2d 273, 1969 Ark. LEXIS 1396 (1969); Fitzhugh v. State, 293 Ark. 315, 737 S.W.2d 638 (1987); Grimes v. State, 295 Ark. 426, 748 S.W.2d 657 (1988).

Additional evidence held sufficient to show that the offense was committed. Finn v. State, 127 Ark. 204, 191 S.W. 899 (1917); Johnson v. State, 135 Ark. 377, 205 S.W. 646 (1918); Haraway v. State, 203 Ark. 912, 159 S.W.2d 733, cert. denied, Haraway v. Arkansas, 317 U.S. 648, 63 S. Ct. 42 (1942); Mouser v. State, 215 Ark. 131, 219 S.W.2d 611 (1949); Ezell v. State, 217 Ark. 94, 229 S.W.2d 32 (1950); Forester v. State, 224 Ark. 194, 272 S.W.2d 320 (1954); Moore v. State, 227 Ark. 544, 299 S.W.2d 838 (1957), cert. denied, Moore v. Arkansas, 358 U.S. 946, 79 S. Ct. 356, 3 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1959); Boone v. State, 230 Ark. 821, 327 S.W.2d 87 (1959); Stewart v. State, 237 Ark. 748, 375 S.W.2d 804 (1964), cert. denied, Stewart v. Arkansas, 379 U.S. 935, 85 S. Ct. 336 (1964), cert. denied, Stewart v. Arkansas, 386 U.S. 946, 87 S. Ct. 983, 17 L. Ed. 2d 877 (1967); Paschal v. State, 243 Ark. 329, 420 S.W.2d 73 (1967); Mosley v. State, 246 Ark. 358, 438 S.W.2d 311 (1969); Nash v. State, 248 Ark. 323, 451 S.W.2d 869 (1970); Mosby v. State, 253 Ark. 904, 489 S.W.2d 799 (1973); Upton v. State, 257 Ark. 424, 516 S.W.2d 904 (1974); Neal v. State, 259 Ark. 27, 531 S.W.2d 17 (1975), vacated, Collins v. Arkansas, 429 U.S. 808, 97 S. Ct. 44, 97 S. Ct. 45 (1976), aff'd, 261 Ark. 336, 548 S.W.2d 135 (1977); Whitmore v. State, 263 Ark. 419, 565 S.W.2d 133 (1978); Jamison v. State, 272 Ark. 24, 611 S.W.2d 753 (1981); Derring v. State, 273 Ark. 347, 619 S.W.2d 644 (1981); Thomerson v. State, 274 Ark. 17, 621 S.W.2d 690 (1981); McQueen v. State, 283 Ark. 232, 675 S.W.2d 358 (1984); Jacobs v. State, 294 Ark. 551, 744 S.W.2d 728 (1988); Hart v. State, 301 Ark. 200, 783 S.W.2d 40 (1990); Spears v. State, 321 Ark. 504, 905 S.W.2d 828 (1995).

Additional evidence held insufficient to show that the offense was committed. Hickerson v. State, 196 Ark. 497, 118 S.W.2d 671 (1938); Johnson v. State, 198 Ark. 871, 131 S.W.2d 934 (1939); Eaton v. State, 255 Ark. 45, 498 S.W.2d 648 (1973); Boden v. State, 270 Ark. 614, 605 S.W.2d 429 (1980); Bray v. State, 12 Ark. App. 53, 670 S.W.2d 822 (1984); Trotter v. State, 290 Ark. 269, 719 S.W.2d 268 (1986), overruled, Smith v. State, 292 Ark. 162, 729 S.W.2d 5 (1987); Thomas v. State, 295 Ark. 29, 746 S.W.2d 49 (1988).

The “other evidence” and the “circumstances” required in addition to a confession to warrant conviction must be of a substantial character which, independent of the confession, and considered without reference to what the accused is alleged to have said or written, would suffice to overcome the legal presumption that casualty was an accident, or that it resulted from natural events. Johnson v. State, 198 Ark. 871, 131 S.W.2d 934 (1939).

The test of the correctness of verdict is not whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, but whether there was evidence that such an offense was committed, so that, before the confession could be introduced against the defendant, there must be evidence that the crime was committed by someone. Charles v. State, 198 Ark. 1154, 133 S.W.2d 26 (1939); Bivens v. State, 242 Ark. 362, 413 S.W.2d 653 (1967); Sawyer v. State, 284 Ark. 26, 678 S.W.2d 367 (1984).

Corroborating evidence that offense was committed need not be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Morgan v. State, 286 Ark. 264, 691 S.W.2d 164 (1985); Bryant v. State, 16 Ark. App. 45, 696 S.W.2d 773, 1985 Ark. App. LEXIS 2174 (1985).

Defendant's alleged statement merely constituted an admission of one element of the offense charged and not a confession; a statement amounts to a confession only if there is an admission of guilt as to the commission of a criminal act. Thus, the defendant's statement did not require corroboration in order to support the defendant's conviction. Snyder v. City of DeWitt, 15 Ark. App. 277, 692 S.W.2d 273 (1985).

To satisfy this section and corroborate the confession, the state only had to prove that the crime was committed by someone. Trotter v. State, 290 Ark. 269, 719 S.W.2d 268 (1986), overruled, Smith v. State, 292 Ark. 162, 729 S.W.2d 5 (1987); Grimes v. State, 295 Ark. 426, 748 S.W.2d 657 (1988); Rucker v. State, 320 Ark. 643, 899 S.W.2d 447 (1995).

In corroborating defendant's confession state did not have to connect defendant to the offense by independent evidence; there must only be “other proof” that the offense occurred, in other words, proof of the corpus delicti. Hart v. State, 301 Ark. 200, 783 S.W.2d 40 (1990).

State must prove, independent of a defendant's confession, that two elements exist: (1) an injury or harm constituting the crime, and (2) that the injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal activity. Hart v. State, 301 Ark. 200, 783 S.W.2d 40 (1990).

The primary reason the state must prove the corpus delicti in corroborating a defendant's confession is to insure that a person is not convicted of a crime that did not occur. Hart v. State, 301 Ark. 200, 783 S.W.2d 40 (1990).

Where defendant confessed to police that he raped victim on two occassions and at trial there was no substantive proof of a second rape, it was error not to grant defendant's motion for acquittal as to one count of rape. Yates v. State, 301 Ark. 424, 785 S.W.2d 199 (1990).

In prosecution for rape of his stepdaughter, where defendant admitted to having oral intercourse with the child, corroboration requirement was met by testimony of defendant's wife as to what child had told her regarding the alleged incidents. Hinzman v. State, 53 Ark. App. 256, 922 S.W.2d 725 (1996).

Statement containing knowledge of crime not known by the general public accompanied by witness' overhearing a direct confession was sufficient to sustain conviction for capital murder. Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996), cert. denied, Echols v. Arkansas, 520 U.S. 1244, 117 S. Ct. 1853, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1055 (1997).

The testimony demonstrating that defendant did in fact steal the pastries provided ample corroborating evidence of his intent. Releford v. State, 59 Ark. App. 136, 954 S.W.2d 295 (1997).

In a prosecution for rape of a five year old, the defendant's confession was sufficiently corroborated by other evidence where the physician who examined the victim on the day after the incident testified that he found bruises over the lower part of the body, that the bruises were on the buttocks, thighs, and groin area, and that there was a bruise on the right labia majora of the vaginal area, which could be consistent with sexual abuse. Lewis v. State, 74 Ark. App. 61, 48 S.W.3d 535 (2001).

Under the corpus delicti rule, the state had to prove the existence of an injury or harm constituting a crime and that the injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal activity; the victim's body and the physical evidence found at the scene establish the crime of murder and were sufficient to satisfy the rule. Jenkins v. State, 348 Ark. 686, 75 S.W.3d 180 (2002).

Corpus Delicti Rule.

The corpus delicti rule requires the State to prove, independent of a confession, two elements: (1) an injury or harm constituting a crime; and (2) that the injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal activity. Ferrell v. State, 325 Ark. 455, 929 S.W.2d 697 (1996).

Where defendant: 1) led police officers to a remote wooded area where the decomposed remains of the body of one victim were found, and while the body of the other victim was never found, defendant inquired of police if it had been found and pleaded with them to continue looking for it so the victim could have a proper burial; 2) asked officers if he could be charged with murder if they could not find any bodies; and 3) made other incriminating statements, there was strong circumstantial evidence of both the fact of the victims' deaths and defendant's responsibility for the deaths to prove corpus delicti. Ware v. State, 348 Ark. 181, 75 S.W.3d 165 (2002).

Because a defendant admitted to a battery in open court during a hearing on the state's petition to revoke defendant's suspended sentence, the rule of corpus delicti found in subsection (d) of this section did not apply. May v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 703 (2009).

Convictions for sexual assault were reversed because the state failed to carry its burden of proof where a defendant's confession to sexual assault of his stepdaughters was not made in open court and was not accompanied with other proof that the offenses were committed and where both victims denied abuse at trial. Goodsell v. State, 104 Ark. App. 183, 289 S.W.3d 534 (2008).

Trial court did not err in convicting defendant of manslaughter in violation of § 5-10-104(a)(3) because the state presented sufficient evidence to corroborate defendant's confession when the evidence showed that the victim died hours after defendant admittedly went to his apartment, that the victim's apartment was in a state of disarray, which could have been interpreted as circumstantial evidence of a struggle, that blood was found in an area not in the immediate vicinity of where the victim ultimately passed away, and that the medical examiner would have ruled the victim's death a homicide had he known that he had been punched in the head five times; the corpus delicti rule, subsection (d) of this section, does not require the state to corroborate that the defendant committed the crime charged. It merely requires a showing that the crime occurred. Freeman v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 90 (2010).

When defendant was convicted of simultaneously possessing drugs and firearms, in violation of § 5-74-106(a)(1), defendant's statement to police that a gun found in defendant's wife's purse belonged to defendant was properly admitted, under subsection (d) of this section, because the statement was corroborated by circumstantial evidence that (1) defendant and defendant's wife were in defendant's car, in which defendant's wife's purse was found, together when police pulled up behind the car, and (2) defendant fled the scene after police tried to arrest defendant upon finding a marijuana cigarette in the car. Patton v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 453 (2010).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's convictions for capital murder, residential burglary, and theft of property because the state offered evidence to corroborate defendant's confession under subsection (d) of this section; the state presented evidence that the murder victim died at the hands of another, that a second victim's home was burglarized, and that guns were removed from the second victim's home. Meadows v. State, 2012 Ark. 57, 386 S.W.3d 470 (2012).

Defendant's confession that he started the first fire that burned the cabin down, along with the cabin owner's testimony that the electricity and propane were disconnected at the time of the fire and that defendant had repeatedly threatened to burn the cabin days before the fire, and defendant's admission to removing the crime-scene tape, setting the second fire, and having someone remove the scrap metal from the scene, was sufficient to support his conviction for arson. Molpus v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 452, 469 S.W.3d 374 (2015).

Evidence offered by the State, including testimony that the victims' door was kicked in, that the victims were robbed, and that the victims were shot, established that the alleged offenses of aggravated robbery, aggravated residential burglary, first-degree battery, second-degree battery, interference with emergency communication, and theft of property occurred, and combined with defendant's confession during a custodial interrogation, constituted substantial evidence to support the convictions. Williams v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 277, 550 S.W.3d 42 (2018).

—Instructions.

An instruction in a criminal case that the jury might convict the defendant if they were satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, by his confession not made in open court that he was guilty of the crime charged, was erroneous. Hubbard v. State, 77 Ark. 126, 91 S.W. 11 (1905).

In a criminal prosecution, a confession not made in open court will not warrant a conviction unless there is other proof tending to show that the offense had been committed, and an instruction to that effect is essential when, from statements attributed to the defendant alone, a specific intent to commit crime might be inferred by the jury. Davis v. State, 115 Ark. 566, 173 S.W. 829 (1914).

Confrontation Rights.

—Incentives to Testify.

Evidence of guarantees of immunity or promises of leniency or other considerations given to a prospective witness are proper subjects of cross-examination, and the denial of that right may violate constitutional guarantees of confrontation. Sullivan v. State, 32 Ark. App. 124, 798 S.W.2d 110 (1990).

The fact that it might have been error to deny the right to cross-examine on evidence of guarantees of immunity or promises of leniency or other considerations given to a prospective witness does not necessarily mandate reversal. The denial of the right of cross-examination on such issues, like any other trial error, is subject to being found harmless under the circumstances of the particular case. Sullivan v. State, 32 Ark. App. 124, 798 S.W.2d 110 (1990).

Instructions.

Instructions on accomplice testimony held proper. Celender v. State, 86 Ark. 23, 109 S.W. 1024 (1908); Casteel v. State, 151 Ark. 69, 235 S.W. 386 (1921); Stout v. State, 164 Ark. 553, 262 S.W. 641 (1924); Barnhardt v. State, 169 Ark. 567, 275 S.W. 909 (1925); Bryan v. State, 179 Ark. 216, 15 S.W.2d 312 (1929); Bennett v. State, 201 Ark. 237, 144 S.W.2d 476 (1940); Pope v. State, 216 Ark. 314, 225 S.W.2d 8 (1949).

For discussion of defendant's responsibility to request instruction, see: Miller v. State, 155 Ark. 68, 243 S.W. 1063, 1922 Ark. LEXIS 121 (1922); Slinkard v. State, 193 Ark. 765, 103 S.W.2d 50 (1937); Morris v. State, 197 Ark. 778, 126 S.W.2d 93 (1939); Carnal v. State, 234 Ark. 1050, 356 S.W.2d 651 (1962), cert. denied, Carnal v. Arkansas, 371 U.S. 876, 83 S. Ct. 146 (1962); Garrison v. State, 13 Ark. App. 245, 682 S.W.2d 772 (1985).

Instructions on accomplice testimony held improper. Cummins v. State, 163 Ark. 24, 258 S.W. 622 (1924); Sweatt v. State, 251 Ark. 650, 473 S.W.2d 913 (1971).

For cases discussing defendant's entitlement to particular instructions, see: Jackson v. State, 193 Ark. 776, 102 S.W.2d 546 (1937); Boyd v. State, 215 Ark. 156, 219 S.W.2d 623 (1949)Questioned byIn re Briefing of Criminal Cases, 234 Ark. 826, 234 Ark. 846, 354 S.W.2d 740 (1962); McCabe v. State, 245 Ark. 769, 434 S.W.2d 277 (1968); Hilliard v. State, 259 Ark. 81, 531 S.W.2d 463 (1976); Norton v. State, 260 Ark. 412, 540 S.W.2d 588 (1976); Tyler v. State, 265 Ark. 822, 581 S.W.2d 328 (1979).

Proper instructions given at close of trial erased any possible error or prejudice resulting from use of certain words during the trial. Knight v. State, 228 Ark. 502, 308 S.W.2d 821 (1958).

An instruction that may have left the question as to whether a witness was an accomplice to be decided by the jury was not reversible error. Rice v. State, 241 Ark. 570, 408 S.W.2d 902 (1966).

Where there is a fact question concerning whether parties were accomplices, it is proper for the court to instruct the jury that they are to determine whether a certain person was an accomplice rather than instructing them that such person was an accomplice. DuBois v. State, 258 Ark. 459, 527 S.W.2d 595 (1975).

Where the state presented ample evidence tending to connect the petitioner to the crime, the lack of an accomplice instruction did not prejudice the petitioner. O'Rourke v. State, 298 Ark. 144, 765 S.W.2d 916 (1989).

Where a defendant appealed his convictions on the lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, because no accomplice instruction was submitted to the jury and defendant never requested that the trial court hold the witnesses to be accomplices as a matter of law, accomplice status was never determined, and the appellate court was unable to reach the merits of defendant's sufficiency argument. Brooks v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 84 (2014).

Where a defendant appealed his convictions on the lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, given the evidence that the shooting may have been prompted by revenge, the familial relations of the witnesses to the defendant, and the conflicting explanations for the trip given by the witnesses, the trial court erred in refusing to give the proffered accomplice instruction. Brooks v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 84 (2014).

—Jury Question.

The sufficiency of the corroborating evidence will frequently be a question of fact, for the jury, rather than a question of law for the court. Where the circumstantial evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense is substantial, the question of its sufficiency, along with the testimony of the accomplice, becomes one for the jury. Maynard v. State, 21 Ark. App. 20, 727 S.W.2d 858 (1987).

Even though one circumstance or a combination of several circumstances might not be sufficient, all of the circumstances in evidence may constitute a chain sufficient to present a jury question as to their adequacy as corroboration of the accomplice. Maynard v. State, 21 Ark. App. 20, 727 S.W.2d 858 (1987).

—Misdemeanors.

The sale of intoxicating liquors on Sunday is a misdemeanor, which may be proven by the uncorroborated testimony of one witness. Richardson v. State, 211 Ark. 1019, 204 S.W.2d 477 (1947).

Post-Conviction Relief.

In an appeal from a denial for post-conviction relief, the appellate court could consider not only the testimony from the ARCrP Rule 37 hearing, but also the testimony given and evidence received at trial and abstracted in defendant's brief because the entire trial transcript was admitted as an exhibit at the Rule 37 hearing. Vickers v. State, 320 Ark. 437, 898 S.W.2d 26 (1995).

Rebuttal or Reopening.

Witness may be allowed to restate his testimony after submission of the case. Bennifield v. State, 62 Ark. 365, 35 S.W. 790 (1896), overruled, Tallman v. State, 151 Ark. 108, 235 S.W. 389 (1921); Tallman v. State, 151 Ark. 108, 235 S.W. 389 (1921).

State may be permitted to introduce evidence after the defendant has rested. Walker v. State, 100 Ark. 180, 139 S.W. 1139 (1911); Polk v. State, 252 Ark. 320, 478 S.W.2d 738 (1972).

Trial court has discretion to allow the introduction of testimony in rebuttal which more properly should be introduced in chief. Bobo v. State, 179 Ark. 207, 14 S.W.2d 1115 (1929).

Rebuttal evidence held improper. Henson v. State, 239 Ark. 727, 393 S.W.2d 856 (1965).

Subsection (c) permits the court to allow the state to reopen its case and offer new evidence. Lacy v. State, 240 Ark. 84, 398 S.W.2d 508 (1966).

It is within the trial court's discretion to permit the state to present other witnesses after the state has rested, where the circumstances are such as not to prejudice the defendant through surprise or otherwise at a time when the disadvantage cannot be overcome. Wimberly v. State, 240 Ark. 345, 399 S.W.2d 274 (1966); Rochester v. State, 250 Ark. 758, 467 S.W.2d 182 (1971).

The court did not err in permitting the state to bolster its case in chief by use of rebuttal. Pointer v. State, 248 Ark. 710, 454 S.W.2d 91 (1970), cert. denied, Pointer v. Arkansas, 400 U.S. 959, 91 S. Ct. 359 (1970).

State properly allowed to introduce new evidence after resting case. Bland v. State, 251 Ark. 23, 470 S.W.2d 592 (1971); McClendon v. State, 254 Ark. 902, 496 S.W.2d 428 (1973).

Defendant's testimony can be impeached by rebuttal evidence. Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 592 S.W.2d 91 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057, 101 S. Ct. 630, 66 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1980); Walls v. State, 280 Ark. 291, 658 S.W.2d 362 (1983).

It is generally in the sound discretion of the trial court to allow rebuttal testimony which might have been properly introduced in the state's case-in-chief. In prosecution of a homicide, the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the introduction of a witness' testimony concerning the homicide that properly belonged in the state's case-in-chief, where the prosecutors actually interviewed the witness before they had finished calling their witnesses. Sims v. State, 19 Ark. App. 45, 716 S.W.2d 774 (1986).

State's Evidence.

Refusal of the trial court to require state to offer proof in a murder prosecution before the defendant stated his case to the jury was not error. McDaniels v. State, 187 Ark. 1163, 63 S.W.2d 335 (1933).

Cited: Harshaw v. State, 94 Ark. 343, 127 S.W. 745 (1910); Iverson v. State, 99 Ark. 453, 138 S.W. 958 (1911); Greenwood v. State, 107 Ark. 568, 156 S.W. 427 (1913); Hall v. State, 125 Ark. 263, 188 S.W. 801 (1916); Tongs v. State, 130 Ark. 344, 197 S.W. 573 (1917); Griffin v. State, 172 Ark. 606, 289 S.W. 765 (1927); Robinson v. State, 177 Ark. 534, 7 S.W.2d 5 (1928); Bell v. State, 177 Ark. 1034, 9 S.W.2d 238 (1928); Cush v. State, 180 Ark. 448, 21 S.W.2d 616 (1929); Howell v. State, 220 Ark. 278, 247 S.W.2d 952 (1952); Smith v. State, 222 Ark. 650, 262 S.W.2d 272 (1953); Kasinger v. State, 234 Ark. 788, 354 S.W.2d 718 (1962); Pointer v. State, 248 Ark. 710, 454 S.W.2d 91 (1970); Moore v. State, 251 Ark. 436, 472 S.W.2d 940 (1971); Reynolds v. State, 254 Ark. 1007, 497 S.W.2d 275 (1973); Murphy v. State, 255 Ark. 90, 498 S.W.2d 884 (1973); Decker v. State, 255 Ark. 138, 499 S.W.2d 612 (1973); Ferguson v. State, 255 Ark. 917, 503 S.W.2d 907 (1974); Upton v. State, 257 Ark. 424, 516 S.W.2d 904 (1974); Sanders v. State, 259 Ark. 329, 532 S.W.2d 752 (1976); Pennington v. Housewright, 666 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1981); Gipson v. Lockhart, 692 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1982); Harris v. Housewright, 697 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1982); Kellensworth v. State, 275 Ark. 252, 631 S.W.2d 1 (1982); Hunter v. State, 8 Ark. App. 283, 653 S.W.2d 159 (1983); Hill v. State, 285 Ark. 77, 685 S.W.2d 495 (1985); Smith v. State, 286 Ark. 247, 691 S.W.2d 154 (1985); Birchett v. State, 289 Ark. 16, 708 S.W.2d 625 (1986); Parette v. State, 301 Ark. 607, 786 S.W.2d 817 (1990); Clements v. State, 303 Ark. 319, 796 S.W.2d 839 (1990); Leshe v. State, 304 Ark. 442, 803 S.W.2d 522 (1991); Andrews v. State, 305 Ark. 262, 807 S.W.2d 917 (1991); Smith v. State, 310 Ark. 247, 837 S.W.2d 279 (1992); Jackson v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1993); Franklin v. State, 318 Ark. 99, 884 S.W.2d 246 (1994); Campbell v. State, 319 Ark. 332, 891 S.W.2d 55 (1995); Mills v. State, 322 Ark. 647, 910 S.W.2d 682 (1995); Martin v. Norris, 82 F.3d 211 (8th Cir. 1996); Tinsley v. State, 338 Ark. 342, 993 S.W.2d 898 (1999); Windsor v. State, 338 Ark. 649, 1 S.W.3d 20 (1999); Barnett v. State, 346 Ark. 11, 53 S.W.3d 527 (2001); United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579 (8th Cir. 2002); Joiner v. State, 2010 Ark. 309 (2010); Rainey v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 383, 439 S.W.3d 67 (2014); Hubbard v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 93, 513 S.W.3d 289 (2017).