Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-109 (2020)
Fixing of punishment — Conviction of two or more offenses
- If the defendant is convicted of two (2) or more offenses, the punishment of each of which is confinement, the judgment shall be so rendered that the punishment in one (1) case shall commence after the termination of it in the others.
- When any person is convicted of more than one (1) offense, regardless if all of the convictions are in the same court or if one (1) of the convictions is in a different court of the state, a court of another state, or a federal court, where the punishment for a conviction begins before the expiration of the sentence imposed on the other conviction, the sentencing court shall have the authority to direct that the sentence adjudged shall run concurrently with the other sentence if it shall be deemed best for society and the person convicted.
History. Crim. Code, § 283; C. & M. Dig., § 3239; Acts 1923, No. 152, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 4056; Acts 1971, No. 193, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2311, 43-2312.
Cross References. Multiple sentences, § 5-4-403.
Research References
Ark. L. Rev.
Criminal Law — Multiple Punishment Resulting From a Single Course of Criminal Conduct, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 181.
Case Notes
Concurrent Sentences.
The authority and discretion granted by subsection (b) is vested in the trial court alone. Hayes v. State, 169 Ark. 883, 277 S.W. 36 (1925).
Unless the judgment specifically directs that one sentence shall commence upon the expiration of the other, the sentences will run concurrently. Williams v. State, 229 Ark. 42, 313 S.W.2d 242 (1958).
Findings of the jury, in fixing the punishment, that the sentences should be serve consecutively can only be considered advisory inasmuch as the question of whether sentences shall be served consecutively or concurrently lies solely within the province of the court. Higgins v. State, 235 Ark. 153, 357 S.W.2d 499 (1962).
Prior to the passage of § 16-93-601, a prisoner committed to serve two sentences was required to completely serve one of the sentences prior to the other before becoming eligible for parole. Tabor v. State, 246 Ark. 983, 440 S.W.2d 536 (1969).
It was not error to refuse to instruct the jury as to whether sentences on several counts would run concurrently or consecutively. Tucker v. State, 248 Ark. 979, 455 S.W.2d 888 (1970).
Consecutive Sentences.
If the judgment did not direct that the imprisonment in one case commence after the termination of it in the other, the terms of imprisonment ran concurrently, but the rule did not apply if the judgments were pronounced for fines only and the defendant was subsequently imprisoned for nonpayment of the fines. Ex parte Brady, 70 Ark. 376, 68 S.W. 34 (1902) (decision under prior law).
Courts may direct that the term of confinement shall begin at the expiration of a previous term. Hayes v. State, 169 Ark. 883, 277 S.W. 36 (1925).
Though the court had the power to correct clerical errors in its judgments, orders or decrees, the order could not be corrected to read that the sentence was to begin at the expiration of the sentence defendant was at present serving, it being construed that the commitment would run concurrently. Williams v. State, 229 Ark. 42, 313 S.W.2d 242 (1958).
Where a defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary for 21 years for robbery and 7 years for burglary, the terms to run consecutively, the 21 years for robbery should be served first. Rowe v. State, 243 Ark. 375, 419 S.W.2d 806 (1967).
Where the defendant was convicted and sentenced for two offenses in state court, but before he was confined was tried on a federal charge and imprisoned in a federal penitentiary, his state sentence started running on the date he was delivered to the state penitentiary to start serving his sentence. Young v. State, 252 Ark. 184, 477 S.W.2d 823 (1972).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the sentences to run consecutively. Graham v. State, 254 Ark. 741, 495 S.W.2d 864 (1973); Shields v. State, 281 Ark. 420, 664 S.W.2d 866 (1984); Edwards v. State, 300 Ark. 4, 775 S.W.2d 900 (1989).
A trial court has the discretion to make maximum sentences run consecutively if it is in the best interests of society and the person convicted and his exercise of discretion will not be reversed unless it is shown that he abused that discretion. Hinton v. State, 260 Ark. 42, 537 S.W.2d 800 (1976); Blair v. State, 284 Ark. 330, 681 S.W.2d 374 (1984).
Under this section, the trial court clearly has authority to order that sentences be served consecutively. Love v. State, 324 Ark. 526, 922 S.W.2d 701 (1996).
Cited: Jackson v. State, 254 Ark. 246, 492 S.W.2d 897 (1973); Klimas v. State, 271 Ark. 508, 609 S.W.2d 46 (1980); Matthews v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1984); Harper v. State, 315 Ark. 195, 865 S.W.2d 647 (1993).