Purposes of Sentencing. The primary purposes of sentencing a person convicted of a crime are:
To punish an offender commensurate with the nature and extent of the harm caused by the offense, taking into account factors that may diminish or increase an offender's culpability;
To protect the public by restraining offenders;
To provide restitution or restoration to victims of crime to the extent possible and appropriate;
To assist the offender toward rehabilitation and restoration to the community as a lawful citizen; and
To deter criminal behavior and foster respect for the law.
Purpose of Sentencing Standards.
Though voluntary, the purpose of establishing rational and consistent sentencing standards is to seek to ensure that sanctions imposed following conviction are proportional to the seriousness of the offense of conviction and the extent of the offender's criminal history.
The standards seek to ensure equitable sanctions which provide that offenders similar with respect to relevant sentencing criteria will receive similar sanctions and offenders substantially different with respect to relevant sentencing criteria will receive different sanctions.
Sentencing criteria should be neutral with respect to race, gender, social, and economic status.
Appropriate Use of Sentencing Sanctions.
Rational and consistent sentencing policy requires a continuum of sanctions which increases in direct proportion to the seriousness of the offense and the extent of the offender's criminal history.
Commitment to the Division of Correction is the most severe sanction and due to the finite capacity of the division's facilities, it should be reserved for those convicted of the most serious offenses, those who have longer criminal histories, and those who have repeatedly failed to comply with conditions imposed under less restrictive sanctions.
Arkansas law provides for significant intermediate penal sanctions in the community which should be utilized when appropriate.
Restrictions on an offender's liberty should only be as restrictive as necessary to fulfill the purposes of sentencing contained in this policy.
Amendments.
The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “division’s facilities” for “department’s facilities” in (c)(2).
Case Notes
Constitutionality.
Defendant's claim that the General Assembly improperly delegated both legislative and judicial power to the Arkansas Sentencing Commission in violation of Article 4 of the Arkansas Constitution was denied because defendant failed to demonstrate that the Sentencing Guidelines Act had a prejudicial impact on him. Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000).
Requirement that a prosecutor approve defendant's request to plead guilty and waive a jury trial did not violate defendant's due process rights because the sentencing scheme codified at §§ 16-90-801 — 16-90-804 did not create a liberty interest in protecting from exposure to higher ranges of sentences. Whitlow v. State, 357 Ark. 290, 166 S.W.3d 45 (2004).
Resentencing.
Where original judgment was illegal and case was reversed and remanded for resentencing, trial court could consider all punishments which the court originally had available to it and could further take note of defendant's failure to comply with conditions of the first sentence. Meadows v. State, 324 Ark. 505, 922 S.W.2d 341 (1996).
Valid Purposes.
Defendant's contention that it was improper to penalize a defendant in such a way as to make a law enforcement or political statement held without merit since this section provides that a primary purpose of sentencing a person convicted of a crime is to deter criminal behavior and foster respect for the law. Love v. State, 324 Ark. 526, 922 S.W.2d 701 (1996).
Subdivision (a)(5) of this section permits juries to use a sentence to “send a message,” i.e., to deter other potential criminals. Muldrew v. State, 331 Ark. 519, 963 S.W.2d 580 (1998).
Lard v. State, 2014 Ark. 1 (Ark. 2014). · cites it 4דArkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-801(a)(5) (Repl. 2006) provides that a primary purpose of sentencing a person convicted of a crime is to “deter criminal behavior 27 Cite as 2014 Ark.”
Harmon v. State, 8 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2000). · cites it 4דHarmon contends that in passing Act 532, codified as Ark.Code Ann. §§ 16-90-801 to -804 (Supp.”
Henderson v. State, 910 S.W.2d 656 (Ark. 1995). · cites it 4ד1 In short, both this court and the General Assembly have endorsed proportionality review of the offense vis-avis the punishment in limited circumstances. Had Henderson been charged with witness tampering or obstruction of justice and convicted, or had he been charged and…”
Hill v. State, 887 S.W.2d 275 (Ark. 1994). · cites it 2דRefusal to give non-model instruction on sentencing policy Hill initially proffered an instruction setting out Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801 (Supp. 1993) verbatim and in its entirety.”
Rush v. State, 919 S.W.2d 933 (Ark. 1996). · cites it 4דSuch an interpretation is consistent with the “Statement of sentencing policy” in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801 (a)(l)(Supp. 1995), which provides that one of the primary purposes of sentencing is “[t]o punish an offender commensurate with the nature and extent of the harm caused…”
Lee v. State, 11 S.W.3d 553 (Ark. 2000). · cites it 2דFurther, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801 (a)(5)(Supp. 1995) provides that a primary purpose of sentencing a person convicted of a crime is to “deter criminal behavior and foster respect for the law.”
Love v. State, 922 S.W.2d 701 (Ark. 1996). · cites it 2דFurther, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801 (a)(5) (Supp. 1995) provides that a primary purpose of sentencing a person convicted of a crime is to “deter criminal behavior and foster respect for the law.”
Buckley v. State, 20 S.W.3d 331 (Ark. 2000). · cites it 2דThe State contends that evidence of Buckley’s prior drug activity was admissible under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801 (a), § 16-97-101(2), and § 16-97-103(5) and (6).”
Muldrew v. State, 963 S.W.2d 580 (Ark. 1998). · cites it 2דFurther, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801 (a)(5) (Supp. 1995) provides that a primary purpose of sentencing a person convicted of a crime is to “deter criminal behavior and foster respect for the law.”
Meadows v. State, 922 S.W.2d 341 (Ark. 1996). · cites it 2דSee Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801 to 804 (Supp. 1995).”
Moseley v. State, 80 S.W.3d 325 (Ark. 2002). “Therefore, in accord with the sentencing policy of the state contained in Arkansas Code § 16-90-801(c), which provides that there should be a continuum of sanctions with significant intermediate sanctions (including short terms of confinement) utilized when appropriate.”
Barritt v. State, 277 S.W.3d 211 (Ark. 2008). · cites it 6דSee Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801 (a) (Repl. 2006).”
Barritt v. State, 277 S.W.3d 211 (Ark. 2008). “See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801 (a) (Repl. 2006).”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801(a)(1) — 1 case
Rush v. State, 919 S.W.2d 933 (Ark. 1996). “Such an interpretation is consistent with the “Statement of sentencing policy” in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801 (a)(l)(Supp. 1995), which provides that one of the primary purposes of sentencing is “[t]o punish an offender commensurate with the nature and extent of the harm caused…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801(a)(5) — 1 case
Lard v. State, 2014 Ark. 1 (Ark. 2014). “Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-801(a)(5) (Repl. 2006) provides that a primary purpose of sentencing a person convicted of a crime is to “deter criminal behavior 27 Cite as 2014 Ark.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801(b)(1) — 1 case
Henderson v. State, 910 S.W.2d 656 (Ark. 1995). “1 In short, both this court and the General Assembly have endorsed proportionality review of the offense vis-avis the punishment in limited circumstances. Had Henderson been charged with witness tampering or obstruction of justice and convicted, or had he been charged and…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801(c) — 1 case
Moseley v. State, 80 S.W.3d 325 (Ark. 2002). “Therefore, in accord with the sentencing policy of the state contained in Arkansas Code § 16-90-801(c), which provides that there should be a continuum of sanctions with significant intermediate sanctions (including short terms of confinement) utilized when appropriate.”
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