Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-307 (2026)

Case Notes

Purpose.

The purpose of the 60-day requirement in subsection (b) of this section is to assure that a defendant who has been arrested for violation of probation is not held in jail for an unreasonable time awaiting his revocation hearing. Beasley v. Graves, 315 Ark. 663, 869 S.W.2d 20 (1994) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Applicability.

The 60-day limitation of subsection (b) of this section is not applicable to a case where there is nothing in the record that indicates defendant was arrested for violating the terms of his probation. Beasley v. Graves, 315 Ark. 663, 869 S.W.2d 20 (1994) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Circuit court did not err by not finding that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that the probation revocation hearing had been outside the 60-day limitation set by this section because the 60-day limitation period did not apply, as defendant was released on bail pending the revocation hearing. Johnson v. State, 2014 Ark. 74 (2014).

Authority to Modify.

Trial court had the authority to modify a sentence pronounced in open court prior to the entry of judgment because the oral order was not effective until set forth in writing and filed of record; although defendant claimed a denial of the right to be present at all proceedings, he was present for all portions of the proceedings, and although § 16-65-121 had provided that a judgment rendered in open court was effective from that date, the statute has been superseded. Hankins v. State, 84 Ark. App. 370, 141 S.W.3d 905 (2004) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Trial court lacked authority, pursuant to former § 5-4-303(d)(2) (now § 16-93-309(a)(2)), to lengthen defendant’s probationary period where defendant had made progress in the drug-court program under the Drug Court Act, § 16-98-301 et seq., because the trial court did not hold a revocation hearing pursuant to this section. Cross v. State, 2009 Ark. 597, 357 S.W.3d 895 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Authority to Revoke.

Where, while the defendant was serving probation imposed by the court of one county, he was convicted of an unrelated felony by the court of a second county, the court of the second county was without authority to revoke his probation; instead, the defendant should have been returned to the first county for a revocation hearing. Gill v. State, 290 Ark. 1, 716 S.W.2d 746 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

A conviction in violation of probation warrants revocation even though the conviction may have been appealed. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The court did not have the power to revoke defendant's suspended sentence prior to the commencement of the suspension period. Harness v. State, 352 Ark. 335, 101 S.W.3d 235 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Because defendant violated a condition of his probation by committing two misdemeanor offenses, and because any delay in the revocation hearing was excludable when continuances were granted at defendant's request, the trial court did not err in revoking defendant's probation. Pratt v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 185 (2011) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Burden on State.

In probation revocation proceeding, the burden was on the State to show that defendant had been apprised of the revocation hearing, and the nature thereof, and had been given an opportunity to contact his counsel if he so desired. Akins v. State, 4 Ark. App. 235, 628 S.W.2d 880 (1982) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

In a hearing to revoke, the burden is on the state to prove the violation of a condition by a preponderance of the evidence, and on appellate review, the trial court's findings are upheld unless they are clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Hoffman v. State, 289 Ark. 184, 711 S.W.2d 151 (1986); Tipton v. State, 47 Ark. App. 187, 887 S.W.2d 540 (1994) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Conversion of Fine into Sentence.

The equal protection rule that the state cannot impose a fine as a sentence and then automatically convert it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full was not violated where the defendant, with the assistance of counsel, tendered his own schedule of payment for restitution in exchange for a suspended sentence and then made sporadic payments in violation of the payment schedule. Hoffman v. State, 289 Ark. 184, 711 S.W.2d 151 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Due Process.

Where defendant received suspended sentences on four charges and a petition to revoke suspension of one sentence was dismissed on the basis of the 60-day limitation of this section, but motion to dismiss was denied respecting petitions on other three sentences and suspension was revoked with respect to one of them, defendant was not denied due process by court's refusal to dismiss such petitions. Gordon v. State, 269 Ark. 946, 601 S.W.2d 598 (Ct. App. 1980) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant was held not to be denied the due process right of confrontation of witnesses, since this section only entitles defendant to fundamental fairness, with an opportunity to be heard rather than a comprehensive hearing. Lockett v. State, 271 Ark. 860, 611 S.W.2d 500 (1981) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where the trial court merely concluded that it had previously heard enough evidence at trial for another offense to revoke defendant's probation, the defendant was denied the fundamental fairness of a hearing as is required under this section. Akins v. State, 4 Ark. App. 235, 628 S.W.2d 880 (1982) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The trial judge erred in revoking the defendant's suspended imposition of sentence in violation of his constitutional right to due process because defendant was not given notice of the basis for his revocation nor was he afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard on it. Robinson v. State, 14 Ark. App. 38, 684 S.W.2d 824 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where defendant's suspended sentences were revoked after a full trial and verdict of guilty on another charge, there was no question that he was afforded his due process rights before the revocation decision was made. Phillips v. State, 17 Ark. App. 86, 703 S.W.2d 471 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

In a case seeking the revocation of a suspended sentence, defendant failed to show that there was a due process violation because he was present at a hearing, was provided the opportunity to hear and controvert evidence against him at the hearing, was provided the opportunity to offer evidence in his own defense, and was represented by counsel. Moreover, defendant failed to show that there was any prejudice, which was required for a reversal. Gholson v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 373, 308 S.W.3d 189 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Evidence.

Although the mere presence of marijuana in defendant's apartment would not have been sufficient to convict one charged with possession of a controlled substance, it was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could determine that defendant had violated the terms of his probation. Harris v. State, 270 Ark. 634, 606 S.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1980) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Fact that police officers act in good faith is sufficient at a revocation hearing to permit the introduction of evidence not admissible at a formal trial; the reason is to provide the trial judge with complete information bearing on the admissibility of revoking probation. Dabney v. State, 278 Ark. 375, 646 S.W.2d 4 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Relevant evidence which is not admissible at a criminal trial may be admissible at a revocation hearing. Fitzpatrick v. State, 7 Ark. App. 246, 647 S.W.2d 480 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Evidence as to defendant's accomplice liability in liquor store robbery was sufficient to justify the revocation of his probation. Fitzpatrick v. State, 7 Ark. App. 246, 647 S.W.2d 480 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The statement of an accomplice concerning the details of the robbery committed by him and the probationer constituted relevant evidence in revocation hearing. Fitzpatrick v. State, 7 Ark. App. 246, 647 S.W.2d 480 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The trial court's decision to revoke the defendant's suspended sentence, which had been conditioned on his making restitution, was not clearly against a preponderance of the evidence; the defendant's failure to make the ordered payments, in light of his standard of living, his purchase of a $17,000 car, and the fact that he did not search for a job outside his field could be construed as an inexcusable failure to comply with the conditions of his suspension. Hoffman v. State, 289 Ark. 184, 711 S.W.2d 151 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The rules of evidence are not applicable in sentence revocation proceedings. Tipton v. State, 47 Ark. App. 187, 887 S.W.2d 540 (1994) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Trial court did not err under subdivision (c)(2) of this section in admitting audio and video recordings of cocaine deliveries at defendant's suspended sentence revocation proceeding because defendant had invited the confidential informant into defendant's home for the purpose of conducting illegal business; it was not reasonable for defendant to believe that the person to whom defendant sold cocaine would not share the information with others. Sherman v. State, 2009 Ark. 275, 308 S.W.3d 614 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Applying subdivision (c)(2) of this section, a circuit court did not abuse its discretion in a probation revocation proceeding by taking judicial notice of its own case file in the same case. Gray v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 159 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Hearings.

A preliminary revocation hearing is not required to determine if defendant has violated a condition of suspension if defendant is arrested for committing another criminal offense. Brandon v. State, 300 Ark. 32, 776 S.W.2d 345 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Jurisdiction.

Subject matter jurisdiction is granted to a particular position and not to the individual who fills it; accordingly, the defendant who had his suspended sentences revoked was mistaken in his argument that the language that the revocation “hearing shall be conducted by the court that suspended imposition of sentence on defendant” in subsection (b) meant that only the judge who suspended his sentences could revoke them. Nation v. State, 283 Ark. 250, 674 S.W.2d 939 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where a defendant appealed the revocation of his probation, the trial court's failure to hold the revocation hearing within 60 days of his arrest did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Since he was in custody on a parole violation during the pendency of the probation revocation, he did not suffer any prejudice. Givan v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 701 (2013).

Where a defendant appealed the revocation of his probation by arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to hold the revocation hearing, the fact that he had been convicted in one division of a county circuit court did not mean that a court in another division of the same county circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hold the revocation hearing. Givan v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 701 (2013).

Where a defendant appealed the revocation of his probation, he unsuccessfully argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the State failed to file a petition for revocation or issue a warrant comporting with former § 5-4-309(f) (current version at § 16-93-308); however, subsection (f) was not applicable because defendant's probation was revoked by an order filed well within the probationary period. Givan v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 701 (2013).

Notice.

The allegations of the petition for revocation of a suspended sentence gave adequate notice of the claimed violation of suspension where it alleged that defendant had been charged with burglary and theft and that the facts and circumstances surrounding the charges violated the conditions of the suspended sentence. Ellerson v. State, 261 Ark. 525, 549 S.W.2d 495 (1977) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant held not to have received proper notice as required by this section. Akins v. State, 4 Ark. App. 235, 628 S.W.2d 880 (1982) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

There was no error in failure to give defendant written notice of the time and place of revocation hearing, in light of the fact that defendant did receive actual notice of the time and place of the hearing and did not ask for a continuance. Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Motion to dismiss revocation petition was denied where state was not placed on notice before revocation hearing that 60-day statutory period would be raised. Summers v. State, 292 Ark. 237, 729 S.W.2d 147 (1987) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's request for continuance, and defendant was not prejudiced by the state's failure to provide written notice of the revocation hearing where defendant had actual notice of the hearing. Green v. State, 29 Ark. App. 69, 777 S.W.2d 225 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Trial court did not err by revoking probation on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the first degree after the state had notified defendant that rape would be the basis for the revocation. Davis v. State, 308 Ark. 481, 825 S.W.2d 584 (1992) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where defendant demonstrated no prejudice resulting from his probation being revoked based on evidence that he delivered a counterfeit controlled substance, after acquittal on a charge of delivery of a controlled substance, defendant was not denied notice or an opportunity to be heard under this section. Phillips v. State, 40 Ark. App. 19, 840 S.W.2d 808 (1992) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The State has a right to be notified prior to the hearing that a defendant will raise a speedy-hearing objection, and defendant waived his objection by failing to move for dismissal of the petition prior to the hearing. Wilkerson v. State, 53 Ark. App. 52, 920 S.W.2d 15 (1996) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Notice Sufficient.

Petition, as a whole, sufficiently communicated the purpose of the petition and advised defendant of the potential punishments where it cited the general revocation statutes, which cited imprisonment as a potential punishment, the petition was titled as a petition to revoke, the State alleged that defendant had violated her probation terms by failing to pay and failing to report for community service, and defendant acknowledged that violating the conditions of probation could have resulted in up to 20 years in prison when she signed her plea agreement. Turman v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 383, 467 S.W.3d 181 (2015).

Defendant's argument that the petition for revocation failed for lack of personal service was rejected where it was undisputed that defendant and his counsel had actual notice of the time and place of the probation revocation hearing, a plain reading of this section indicated that it required only prior written notice, and defendant admitted that he had received notice. Brown v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 403, 500 S.W.3d 781 (2016).

Defendant's argument that the allegations in the revocation petition were too vague was rejected as the petition specifically alleged, inter alia, that defendant had committed battery and arson, possessed a knife, and failed to pay his fines or report to his probation officer. Brown v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 403, 500 S.W.3d 781 (2016).

Preliminary Hearing.

Where the defendant was charged with violating conditions of his suspension because he committed the offense of criminal attempt, the probable cause hearing on the criminal attempt charge served the same purpose as a preliminary hearing on the suspension revocation, and the defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of a preliminary hearing pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. Dunavin v. State, 18 Ark. App. 178, 712 S.W.2d 326 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where the defendant was charged with violating conditions of his suspension because he committed another criminal offense, the probable cause hearing on the new offense served the same purpose as a preliminary hearing on the suspension revocation and, therefore, the defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of a preliminary hearing pursuant to subsection (a). Bonham v. State, 73 Ark. App. 320, 43 S.W.3d 753 (2001) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to dismiss the revocation of his probation because defendant waived his right to have a preliminary hearing since he never requested a preliminary hearing but filed a motion to dismiss over a year after his arrest; defendant failed to show how the delay, which the circuit court determined was caused by his repeated requests for continuances, prejudiced him. Hart v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 434, 530 S.W.3d 366 (2017).

Right to Confront Witnesses.

Where the substance of accomplice's written statement concerning robbery was disclosed by other evidence at revocation hearing, particularly the testimony of the probationer himself, the probationer was not prejudiced by the accomplice's failure to testify in person even though the trial court made no specific finding of any cause for not allowing confrontation as is required under subdivision (c)(1). Fitzpatrick v. State, 7 Ark. App. 246, 647 S.W.2d 480 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

In a probation revocation proceeding the trial court must balance the probationer's right to confront witnesses against grounds asserted by the state for not requiring confrontation. The court should first assess the state's explanation of why confrontation is undesirable or impractical, and second, consider the reliability of the evidence which the state offers in place of live testimony. Goforth v. State, 27 Ark. App. 150, 767 S.W.2d 537 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Although the rules of evidence do not apply in revocation proceedings, this is not meant to deny a probationer his due process right to confront witnesses. Goforth v. State, 27 Ark. App. 150, 767 S.W.2d 537 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Although the rules of evidence, including the hearsay rule, are not strictly applicable in revocation proceedings, the right to confront the witnesses is. Jones v. State, 31 Ark. App. 23, 786 S.W.2d 851 (1990) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Confrontation error in a suspended sentence revocation hearing was not harmless because the absent informant’s testimony was important, and the state’s case was not overwhelming to begin with. Once defendant invoked her confrontation rights, precedent required that the circuit court enforce those rights absent a specific finding of “good cause,” pursuant to subdivision (c)(1) of this section. Graham v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 162 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Any right to confrontation error in allowing fingerprint evidence in a suspended sentence revocation hearing without presenting the witness who took the fingerprints was harmless because there was live testimony from a homeowner who caught defendant in the act of a burglary and who identified him as the burglar. Reynolds v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 705 (2012).

While the trial court did not find good cause to deny defendant's statutory right to confront the owner of his alleged residence, the error was harmless because other testimony clearly demonstrated that defendant regularly spent a substantial amount of time at locations other than his registered address. Fountain v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 71 (2014).

Circuit court properly found that defendant had violated the conditions of his probation because, even assuming that the admission of a violation report prepared by defendant's probation officer violated the confrontation clause, the error was harmless where defendant failed to pay his fines, costs, and fees as required, he admitted that he had recently smoked marijuana, which was another violation of his probation, and the State only had to prove one violation. Harris v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 51 (2015).

By allowing two police officers to testify that a confidential informant had identified appellant as the person who had delivered a controlled substance when the informant did not testify at the revocation hearing, and by denying appellant's confrontation-clause objections without explaining the basis for its ruling, the circuit court violated the confrontation clause. The confrontation-clause error was not harmless. Brisher v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 488, 505 S.W.3d 223 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in admitting a police officer's hearsay testimony in a hearing regarding revocation of defendant's suspended sentence where the victim was not present at the hearing; the circuit court's statement that it was satisfied with the information given by the officer regarding the victim's injuries sufficed as a finding of reliability under subdivision (c)(1) of this section. Apodaca v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 63, 482 S.W.3d 358 (2016).

Even if the admission of out-of-court statements into evidence violated the Confrontation Clause under the United States Constitution, the error was harmless because the evidence regarding new charges filed against defendant was not necessary to prove the State's case for revocation based on the fact that defendant violated other conditions of his probation by testing positive for drugs and alcohol numerous times. Ryan v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 105, 484 S.W.3d 689 (2016)

Trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by allowing a police officer to testify in a probation revocation hearing about the reason defendant had been discharged from a treatment program where the State offered no explanation for why the director of the facility was not available to be confronted, and the trial court did not make a good-cause finding for not allowing confrontation. Nelson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 324, 551 S.W.3d 417 (2018).

Trial court's Sixth Amendment error in allowing a police officer to testify about defendant's discharge from a treatment program rather than confronting the director of the program was harmless where it found defendant and his explanation concerning his discharge incredible, and defendant admitted that his discharge from the treatment program violated the terms of his probation. Nelson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 324, 551 S.W.3d 417 (2018).

Defendant's right to confrontation was not violated at the hearing to revoke defendant's suspended sentence; although the jailer whom defendant was accused of having assaulted did not testify, a video of the attack was shown and defendant was allowed to confront and cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified at the hearing. Furthermore, no hearsay evidence was offered. Caldwell v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 588, 565 S.W.3d 539 (2018).

Right to Counsel.

In probation revocation proceedings, the right to counsel may be waived, but the waiver must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; and defendant's waiver of his right to counsel when he initially pled guilty did not constitute an intelligent waiver to all further proceedings. Furr v. State, 285 Ark. 45, 685 S.W.2d 149 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The trial court's action in relieving the defendant's counsel at the revocation hearing without affording the defendant an opportunity to retain new counsel constituted reversible error, even though the defendant had not paid his counsel in full, and the defendant had had numerous opportunities to obtain counsel but had failed to do so. Suire v. State, 18 Ark. App. 166, 712 S.W.2d 317 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant's direct appeal of his judgment of conviction preserved his right to object to his lack of counsel during sentencing where he was never informed by the court he had a right to counsel for the sentencing phase, and he was not precluded from objecting to his lack of counsel at sentencing because of his failure to object at the trial level or because he also filed a new-trial motion. Smith v. State, 329 Ark. 238, 947 S.W.2d 373 (1997) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Because defendant failed to timely object to the admission of certain testimony, and because the circuit court was charged with resolving all questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence, pursuant to former §§ 5-4-309(d) and 5-4-310(c)(2) (now §§ 16-93-308(d) and 16-93-307(c)(2)), a preponderance of the evidence supported the revocation of defendant's probation. Ellis v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 654 (2011).

Where the State filed a petition to revoke defendant's probation for residential burglary alleging he violated the conditions of his probation by failing to pay fines, costs, and fees, failing to report to his probation officer, and providing a false address to his probation officer, the trial court conducted his hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of this section; a county employee testified that he did not pay his fines, costs, and fees, and defendant's probation officer testified that he failed to report and did not live at the address he provided. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's decision revoking probation. Foster v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 2 (2013).

Where defendant appealed the revocation of his probation, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that he was aware of the conditions of his probation. Defendant did not assert that he, in fact, was unaware that criminal possession of cocaine was a violation of his probationary terms or that he was required by those terms to pay fines and report to his probation officer. Givan v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 701 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support a decision to revoke defendant's probation where he tested positive for drugs and alcohol numerous times; a probation officer's affidavit, a violation report, the supervision contact notes, and the drug test results were admitted into evidence without objection and confirmed testimony relating to the positive test results. The State only had to prove one violation. Ryan v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 105, 484 S.W.3d 689 (2016).

Time Limitation.

Requirement that a suspension or revocation hearing be conducted within statutory period after arrest applies only to arrest for a revocation or suspension of a suspended sentence, not an arrest on another charge while defendant was allegedly serving a suspended sentence. Walker v. State, 262 Ark. 215, 555 S.W.2d 228 (1977) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where a defendant was arrested not for violation of the terms of suspension, but for a new offense, the statutory period which runs from the date of arrest on a petition to revoke a suspended sentence, would not apply and a revocation order entered more than statutory period after the arrest was valid. Blake v. State, 262 Ark. 301, 556 S.W.2d 427 (1977) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The statutory period contained in this section begins to run from his arrest for a violation of the terms of suspension, not from his arrest upon other charges. Lincoln v. State, 262 Ark. 511, 558 S.W.2d 146 (1977); Boone v. State, 270 Ark. 83, 603 S.W.2d 410 (1980) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The statutory period specified in subsection (b) was not intended by the legislature to be jurisdictional but merely represents the period beyond which the hearing cannot be delayed if the defendant objects. Haskins v. State, 264 Ark. 454, 572 S.W.2d 411 (1978) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

It would not be proper to hold that the statutory period of this section applies not only to cases on which the state has filed to revoke suspension, but to cases on which it has not filed, where there is no inference that failure was the result of an improper motive. Gordon v. State, 269 Ark. 946, 601 S.W.2d 598 (Ct. App. 1980) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Since the purpose of the limitation period is to assure that a defendant is not detained in jail for an unreasonable time awaiting his revocation hearing, the limitation loses its meaning when he is already serving time on another charge. Boone v. State, 270 Ark. 83, 603 S.W.2d 410 (1980); Phillips v. State, 17 Ark. App. 86, 703 S.W.2d 471 (1986); Green v. State, 29 Ark. App. 69, 777 S.W.2d 225 (1989); Parks v. State, 303 Ark. 208, 795 S.W.2d 49 (1990) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Statutory period for a revocation hearing did not begin to run on date warrant of arrest was issued on revocation petition where defendant was already incarcerated on other charge. Boone v. State, 270 Ark. 83, 603 S.W.2d 410 (1980) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The statutory period of subsection (b) begins to run from the date of a defendant's arrest for the alleged violation of the terms of his suspended sentence. Lark v. State, 276 Ark. 441, 637 S.W.2d 529 (1982) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where the state was put on notice by defendant's motion for habeas corpus that he was seeking a speedy hearing on revocation petition and he never backed away from this position at any time, the state should have conducted the hearing no later than the statutory period after arrest and where a greater period of time had elapsed before hearing, petition for revocation must be dismissed. McKee v. State, 7 Ark. App. 273, 647 S.W.2d 490 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

This section relates to an arrest for violation of the conditions of a suspended sentence and not an arrest on another charge; accordingly, where defendant, who was arrested on another charge, was brought to a hearing within the statutory period from the time he was notified that the petition for revocation had been filed, the requirements of this section were met. Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The appellate courts look to the provisions of Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3 for guidance in computing excludable periods of time from the statutory period required for revocation hearings under subsection (b) of this section. Cheshire v. State, 16 Ark. App. 34, 696 S.W.2d 322 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

A period of days after defendant was arrested in another state as a fugitive and before he was returned to Arkansas was excludable from the statutory period required for revocation hearings under subsection (b). Cheshire v. State, 16 Ark. App. 34, 696 S.W.2d 322 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

A clearly established distinction has been made between arrest for violation of the conditions of a suspended sentence and arrest for other charges in determining whether a revocation hearing under subsection (b) has been held within statutory period after arrest. Vann v. State, 16 Ark. App. 199, 698 S.W.2d 814 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The statutory period for a revocation hearing provided by subsection (b) of this section must also be applied to former § 5-4-309(e) (see now § 16-93-308(f)) in determining whether a defendant has been arrested for violation of the conditions of a suspended or probated sentence before the expiration of the period of the suspension or probation. Vann v. State, 16 Ark. App. 199, 698 S.W.2d 814 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant suffered no prejudice by the revocation hearing not being held within the statutory period, because after his arrest he had already been incarcerated on an unrelated charge. Phillips v. State, 17 Ark. App. 86, 703 S.W.2d 471 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

This section does not require that judgment must be given within 60 days of arrest. Felix v. State, 20 Ark. App. 44, 723 S.W.2d 839 (1987) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The purpose of the requirement that the hearing must be held within 60 days of the arrest is to assure that a defendant is not detained in jail for an unreasonable time awaiting his revocation hearing. Felix v. State, 20 Ark. App. 44, 723 S.W.2d 839 (1987) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Time limitation for holding hearing relates to the time for having a hearing after the defendant is notified that the revocation petition has been filed, and that is all that is required. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

When there has been no arrest, the requirement of holding the hearing within 60 days is not absolute. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Compliance with former § 5-4-309 (see now § 16-93-308) and this section was sufficient where the defendant was not surprised by the timing of the hearing nor was he prejudiced in any way by not having been arrested or summoned. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The specific wording of subdivision (b)(2) states that the hearing must be held within 60 days “after” the defendant's arrest. Therefore, for purposes of computation, counting would begin on the day following defendant's arrest. Petty v. State, 31 Ark. App. 119, 788 S.W.2d 744 (1990) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The purpose of subdivision (b)(2) is to assure that a defendant is not detained in jail for an unreasonable time awaiting his revocation hearing. Holmes v. State, 33 Ark. App. 168, 803 S.W.2d 563 (1991) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant, until he waived extradition, was “unavailable” for trial for the purpose of computing the 60 days. Rodgers v. State, 49 Ark. App. 136, 898 S.W.2d 475 (1995) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

When a defendant chooses to have the revocation matter be deferred until disposition of an underlying charge, he cannot then turn around and complain of delay pursuant to subsection (b)(2). White v. State, 329 Ark. 487, 951 S.W.2d 556 (1997) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The constitutional right to a speedy trial does not apply to probation revocation hearings. White v. State, 330 Ark. 720, 957 S.W.2d 683 (1997) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Hearing on a petition for revocation was held within the 60-day time limit under subdivision (b)(2) of this section and, thus, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss. Lindsey v. State, 86 Ark. App. 297, 184 S.W.3d 458 (2004) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Because defendant failed to raise his argument that his probation revocation hearing was not held before the expiration of the 60 days provided in subdivision (b)(2) of this section, defendant waived his right to insist on a timely hearing. Cooper v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 861 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

In an appeal from a suspended sentence revocation proceeding, defendant waived his speedy hearing argument under subdivision (b)(2) of this section because he failed to raise it in the revocation proceeding. Simpson v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 33 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Waiver.

On appeal of the decision revoking defendant's suspended sentence for burglary, his argument that the trial court erred by failing to provide a reason for the revocation as required by subdivision (b)(5) of this section was not preserved for review because he failed to object. Love v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 600 (2012).

Defendant claimed that the trial court's revocation of his probation was subject to reversal because the trial court failed to include a written explanation as required by this section; however, defendant failed to raise this issue below. In line with precedent, the issue was not addressed, and defendant's claim that certain case law made new law in regards to error preservation was rejected. Massey v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 240 (2015).

Defendant waived his right to demand that the revocation hearing be held within 60 days because he did not request that the circuit court hold the hearing within 60 days, and asked the circuit court for a continuance, which was denied; although defendant claimed that subdivision (b)(2) of this section provides a substantive right and shifting the burden to a defendant to ask for a timely hearing would limit that right, his contention was rejected. Lane v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 672 (2015).

Issue defendant raised on appeal regarding the circuit court's failure to comply with the writing requirement in subdivision (b)(5) of this section was not preserved, as he did not object. Lane v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 672 (2015).

Written Statement.

Although the order entered by the trial court in revoking defendant's suspended sentence did not give a statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the revocation, when the “Bill of Exceptions” showed the trial court relied on a subsequent conviction, there was substantial compliance with this section. Rutledge v. State, 263 Ark. 300, 564 S.W.2d 511 (1978) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where defendant failed to request a written statement of the court's basis for revoking probation, as provided for in subsection (b), failure to object to the omission precluded consideration of the point on appeal. Lockett v. State, 271 Ark. 860, 611 S.W.2d 500 (1981) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

One purpose of the written statement is to permit the defendant to know the precise basis of the trial court's decision so that he may conduct an intelligent appeal. Phillips v. State, 25 Ark. App. 102, 752 S.W.2d 301 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where the defense has failed to show the prejudicial effect of not receiving a written statement, the trial court must be affirmed. Phillips v. State, 25 Ark. App. 102, 752 S.W.2d 301 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Written findings are required under subdivision (b)(5) only when suspension or revocation is revoked. DeHart v. State, 312 Ark. 323, 849 S.W.2d 497 (1993) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant waived the right to receive a written statement of the evidence used by a trial court to revoke defendant's probation by failing to raise the issue in the trial court. Sisk v. State, 81 Ark. App. 276, 101 S.W.3d 248 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant waived his right to a written statement on the evidence relied on in revoking his suspended sentence by failing to object to the trial court’s failure to furnish such a statement. Dooly v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 591, 377 S.W.3d 471 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Cited: Richards v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 15 (2013); Alls v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 713 (2013); Parmer v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 5 (2017).