Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-701 (2020)

Authority to grant and parameters

✓ Arkansas Code release r76: Acts through about 2020 (2021-2025 sessions missing)
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    1. The Parole Board may release on parole any eligible inmate who is confined in any correctional institution administered by the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction, when in the board's opinion there is a reasonable probability that the inmate can be released without detriment to the community or himself or herself and is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.
    2. All paroles shall issue upon order, duly adopted, of the board.
    1. Before ordering the release of an eligible inmate, the inmate shall be interviewed by the board or a parole revocation judge or investigator employed by the board, unless a hearing is not required under § 16-93-615(a)(1)(D) and, for all parole decisions after January 1, 2012, the board shall consider the results of the risk-needs assessments of all parole applicants.
    2. The parole shall be ordered only for the best interest of society and shall not be considered as a reduction of sentence or pardon.
    3. An inmate while on parole shall remain in the legal custody of the agency from which he or she was released, but shall be subject to the orders of the board.

History. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 29; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2808; Acts 1989, No. 937, § 6; 2011, No. 570, § 104; 2015, No. 609, § 5; 2019, No. 910, § 918.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in the section heading, substituted “Authority to grant” for “Grant” and “parameters” for “procedures generally”; added “and, for all parole decisions after January 1, 2012, the board shall conduct a risk-needs assessment review of all parole applicants” in (b)(1); and made a stylistic change.

The 2015 amendment rewrote (a)(1) and (b)(1); deleted the (b)(2)(A) designation; substituted “shall not be considered as a reduction of sentence or pardon” for “not as an award for clemency” in present (b)(2); deleted (b)(2)(B) and (b)(3); redesignated (b)(4) as (b)(3); and, in (b)(3), substituted “An inmate” for “Every prisoner” and “agency” for “institution”.

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (a)(1).

Case Notes

Liberty Interest.

For discussion of criteria which give rise to a protected liberty interest in parole, see Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Wadlington v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161902 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, Robinson v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125167 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2017).

This section does not produce a liberty interest. Pittman v. Gaines, 905 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1990).

Possibility of Parole.

While the possibility of parole is established by this section, there is nothing further established than a mere possibility; nothing in this section creates a right of an inmate to release on parole which would invoke due process protection. Robinson v. Mabry, 476 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Ark. 1979).

By committing a felony while incarcerated, a prisoner increases the portion of his original sentence which he must serve before he is again eligible for parole. Garner v. Howell, 840 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1988).

Cited: Tabor v. State, 246 Ark. 983, 440 S.W.2d 536 (1969); Smith v. State, 1 Ark. App. 241, 614 S.W.2d 527 (1981); Schwindlig v. Smith, 596 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Cherry v. State, 302 Ark. 462, 791 S.W.2d 354 (1990).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1988–2026 · leading case: Howard Togo Wood v. Arkansas Parole Bd., John Felts, & Andy Shock, 2022 Ark. 30, 639 S.W.3d 340.
Howard Togo Wood v. Arkansas Parole Bd., John Felts, & Andy Shock, 2022 Ark. 30, 639 S.W.3d 340. · cites it 2× “The regulations of the parole board make clear that discretionary transfer may be granted to an eligible person by the board when, in its opinion, there is a reasonable probability that the person can be released without detriment to the community.”
Lane v. State, 2017 Ark. 34, 513 S.W.3d 230. · cites it 2× “” See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-701 (b)(3) (Supp. 2015).”
Cherry v. State, 791 S.W.2d 354 (Ark. 1990). · cites it 2× “See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-701 (b)(4) (1987).”
Alax Clingmon v. State of Arkansas, 2021 Ark. App. 107, 620 S.W.3d 184. “§ 16-93-701 (b)(3) (Supp. 2015). 5 Clingmon asserts that in order to be eligible for parole, he was required to sign a waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and seizure, and that if he refused to sign the waiver, he would be ineligible for parole.”
Richmond v. Duke, 909 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ark. 1995). · cites it 2× “Code Ann. § 12-29-201(d) (Michie Supp.1993); ADC Admin.”
Steven Polston v. State of Arkansas, 2020 Ark. App. 530. · cites it 2× “” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-701 (b)(2) (Repl. 2019); see also Cridge v.”
Sera v. Zimmerman, No. 4:24-cv-00817 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 4, 2025). · cites it 8× “” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-701 (a)(1). In most cases, a parole-eligible inmate must be interviewed by the Post-Prison Transfer Board, a revocation hearing judge, or an investigator employed by the board.”
Todd Hall v. State of Arkansas, 2022 Ark. App. 232, 646 S.W.3d 204. “§ 16-93-701 (b)(3)). This court has held that the special needs of the parole process call for intensive supervision of the parolee, making the warrant requirement impractical.”
James Martin Garner v. Kay Howell, Records Supervisor Arkansas Dep't of Corr. Larry Norris, Warden, Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 840 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1988). “§ 43-2808 (recodified at Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-701 (b)(2) (1983)), (parole shall not be considered a reduction of sentence or pardon).”
Roberts v. Payne, No. 3:20-cv-00219 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 17, 2020). · cites it 2× “Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-701 (a)(1). The Parole Board is also granted discretion to formulate “all policies, rules, and regulations regarding parole,” to set conditions for parole, and to determine if or when a particular inmate will be paroled.”
Robinson v. Payne, No. 4:24-cv-00536 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 3, 2024). · cites it 2× “when in the board’s opinion there is a reasonable probability that the inmate can be released without detriment to the community or himself or herself and is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.”
Roberts v. Payne, No. 4:22-cv-00229 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 4, 2024). · cites it 2× “See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-701 (b)(1)-(2). Arkansas parole statutes, therefore, create only a possibility of parole and confer no right to parole giving rise to a liberty interest.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-701(4): 1 case
McAdory v. State, 253 S.W.3d 16 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007).
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-701(a): 1 case
Richmond v. Duke, 909 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ark. 1995). “Code Ann. § 12-29-201(d) (Michie Supp.1993); ADC Admin.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-701(a)(1): 1 case
Howard Togo Wood v. Arkansas Parole Bd., John Felts, & Andy Shock, 2022 Ark. 30, 639 S.W.3d 340. “The regulations of the parole board make clear that discretionary transfer may be granted to an eligible person by the board when, in its opinion, there is a reasonable probability that the person can be released without detriment to the community.”
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