Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-701 (2020)
Authority to grant and parameters
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- The Parole Board may release on parole any eligible inmate who is confined in any correctional institution administered by the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction, when in the board's opinion there is a reasonable probability that the inmate can be released without detriment to the community or himself or herself and is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.
- All paroles shall issue upon order, duly adopted, of the board.
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- Before ordering the release of an eligible inmate, the inmate shall be interviewed by the board or a parole revocation judge or investigator employed by the board, unless a hearing is not required under § 16-93-615(a)(1)(D) and, for all parole decisions after January 1, 2012, the board shall consider the results of the risk-needs assessments of all parole applicants.
- The parole shall be ordered only for the best interest of society and shall not be considered as a reduction of sentence or pardon.
- An inmate while on parole shall remain in the legal custody of the agency from which he or she was released, but shall be subject to the orders of the board.
History. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 29; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2808; Acts 1989, No. 937, § 6; 2011, No. 570, § 104; 2015, No. 609, § 5; 2019, No. 910, § 918.
A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”
Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in the section heading, substituted “Authority to grant” for “Grant” and “parameters” for “procedures generally”; added “and, for all parole decisions after January 1, 2012, the board shall conduct a risk-needs assessment review of all parole applicants” in (b)(1); and made a stylistic change.
The 2015 amendment rewrote (a)(1) and (b)(1); deleted the (b)(2)(A) designation; substituted “shall not be considered as a reduction of sentence or pardon” for “not as an award for clemency” in present (b)(2); deleted (b)(2)(B) and (b)(3); redesignated (b)(4) as (b)(3); and, in (b)(3), substituted “An inmate” for “Every prisoner” and “agency” for “institution”.
The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (a)(1).
Case Notes
Liberty Interest.
For discussion of criteria which give rise to a protected liberty interest in parole, see Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Wadlington v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161902 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, Robinson v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125167 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2017).
This section does not produce a liberty interest. Pittman v. Gaines, 905 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1990).
Possibility of Parole.
While the possibility of parole is established by this section, there is nothing further established than a mere possibility; nothing in this section creates a right of an inmate to release on parole which would invoke due process protection. Robinson v. Mabry, 476 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
By committing a felony while incarcerated, a prisoner increases the portion of his original sentence which he must serve before he is again eligible for parole. Garner v. Howell, 840 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1988).
Cited: Tabor v. State, 246 Ark. 983, 440 S.W.2d 536 (1969); Smith v. State, 1 Ark. App. 241, 614 S.W.2d 527 (1981); Schwindlig v. Smith, 596 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Cherry v. State, 302 Ark. 462, 791 S.W.2d 354 (1990).