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Agreement on Detainers
Courts have cited this section in 20 opinions since 1988, 3 of them in the last five years.
The Agreement on Detainers is enacted into law and entered into by the State of Arkansas with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:
The contracting states solemnly agree that:
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.
As used in this agreement:
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom by enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.
History. Acts 1971, No. 705, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3201.
Cross References. Prosecutor's obligations, Ark. R. Crim. P. 29.1.
ALR.
Construction and Application of Article IV of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related to “Speedy Trial” Requirement, and Construction of Essential Terms. 51 A.L.R.6th 1.
Construction and Application of Article IV of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related to “Anti-Shuttling” Provision, Dismissal of Action Against Detainee, and Adequacy of Certificate. 52 A.L.R.6th 1.
Construction and Application of Article IV of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related to Custody, Temporary Custody, Contest as to Legality of Custody, Necessity of Hearing, and Transmittal Orders. 53 A.L.R.6th 1.
Construction and Application of Article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) — Issues Related to “Speedy Trial” Requirement, and Construction of Essential Terms. 70 A.L.R.6th 361.
Construction and Application of Article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related to Certificate, Request by Defendant for Disposition, and “Anti-Shuttling” Provision. 71 A.L.R.6th 335.
Construction and Application of Article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related To Custody, Duties of Prison Officials, Waiver of Extradition, Escape, Assistance of Counsel, and Necessity of Hearing. 72 A.L.R.6th 141.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers amounts to nothing more than a statutory set of procedural rules which do not rise to the level of constitutionally guaranteed rights. Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1978); Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988).
While the agreement should be liberally construed, this does not mean that courts are free to bend the legislation out of shape or to remold it to some other form. Phillips v. State, 15 Ark. App. 372, 695 S.W.2d 388 (1985).
Defendant erroneously claimed that, under Article IV(e) of this section, an Arkansas county circuit court lost jurisdiction of a capital felony murder charge against him after his trial was declared a mistrial and he was returned to federal prison; that reading of this section was clearly distorted since this section merely provides that an indictment, information, or complaint is invalidated only where a criminal defendant is not brought to trial at all on pending state charges before he is returned to federal custody. Hutcherson v. State, 316 Ark. 551, 873 S.W.2d 164 (1994).
Sanctions contained in Art. IV(e) are intended to prevent excessive interference with a prisoner's rehabilitation in the state prisoner system. Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1978); Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988).
This subchapter is designed to standardize interstate rendition procedures in order to protect the inmate's right to speedy trial and reduce any uncertainties which might obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Padilla v. State, 279 Ark. 100, 648 S.W.2d 797 (1983).
This act deals specifically with ensuring that prisoners with pending charges in other states are protected from speedy trial violations. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).
A detainer that was issued due to a previous conviction, and not due to pending charges, is not subject to this Act. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).
Once a prisoner is released on parole, he or she is no longer in the class of prisoners covered by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Cunningham v. State, 341 Ark. 99, 14 S.W.3d 869 (2000).
Where defendant was returned to Arkansas after waiving extradition, the Interstate Agreements on Detainers was never triggered; extraditions are governed by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, § 16-94-201 et seq.Gondolfi v. Clinger, 352 Ark. 156, 98 S.W.3d 812 (2003).
Because defendant plead nolo contendere on the charges underlying the original sentence of probation, there was nothing “untried” within the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), § 16-95-101 et seq.; a charge of violating the terms of a suspended sentence was not an untried indictment within the scope of the meaning of the IAD and was inapplicable and, even if the court found that the IAD did apply, defendant made no demand for trial in compliance with the statute. Lindsey v. State, 86 Ark. App. 297, 184 S.W.3d 458 (2004).
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act itself contains no definition of the word “detainer.” Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988).
Defined generally, a detainer is the restraint of a man's personal liberty against his will. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).
For purposes of this act, a detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence advising that he is wanted to face criminal charges in another jurisdiction. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).
The state's notifying federal authorities that defendant should be returned to Arkansas custody after completion of his federal sentence was not a detainer as defined by this chapter. Harper v. State, 315 Ark. 195, 865 S.W.2d 647 (1993).
A detainer is placed on a prisoner in another jurisdiction for purposes of having that prisoner return to the claiming jurisdiction to stand trial on pending charges; the definition does not include a notice that the prisoner has a sentence to serve in a foreign jurisdiction. Harper v. State, 315 Ark. 195, 865 S.W.2d 647 (1993).
Evidence showed defendant held not deprived of his right to a speedy trial by the court's refusal to grant the motion to dismiss charges. Curan v. State, 260 Ark. 461, 541 S.W.2d 923 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 843, 98 S. Ct. 144, 54 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1977).
Any violation of Article III does not automatically require dismissal of the charges and release of a habeas corpus petitioner for the petitioner must not only show a clear violation of the statute but also that he was prejudiced as a direct result of the violation. Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).
Defendant was not entitled to dismissal pursuant to Article III(d) as a result of being returned to federal custody before the charge against him was disposed of. Derring v. State, 273 Ark. 347, 619 S.W.2d 644 (1981).
On appeal of defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery and theft, he did not show that the State failed to follow proper extradition procedures under Article IV(e) as the record did not indicate that he was sent to Arkansas before the extradition process and then returned to Mississippi only to be sent back to Arkansas. Thus, he was not entitled to dismissal of the criminal information. Spearman v. State, 2013 Ark. 196, 427 S.W.3d 593 (2013).
Where the sheriff issued a detainer, the fact that there was not a statute that specifically granted the sheriff the authority to issue detainers did not show the specific legal right required for a writ of mandamus to issue. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).
Defendant, tried after expiration of 180 days from request for trial, could not assert that there was a violation of his statutory rights where the state of incarceration was not a party to the interstate agreement. Young v. State, 254 Ark. 72, 491 S.W.2d 789 (1973).
Request for speedy trial held ineffective because the arresting state had not adopted the statute and hence was not a party to the interstate agreement. Smith v. State, 258 Ark. 533, 528 S.W.2d 359 (1975).
Claim by prisoner in federal custody arising under this section as it operates in conjunction with the federal enactment of the agreement was a claim arising under the laws of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254; it was of no consequence that the state where the U.S. Penitentiary was located was not a party to the agreement since that state was never a custodial state within the meaning of this subchapter. Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).
The speedy trial provisions in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act are nonjurisdictional and waivable. Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988).
The defendant's time limit in this chapter was never triggered where the state never filed a detainer and the defendant was never served with a detainer while incarcerated in another state. Durdin v. State, 59 Ark. App. 207, 955 S.W.2d 912 (1997).
This section cannot stand where no demand for trial was ever made in compliance with Art. III(a). Walker v. State, 263 Ark. 485, 565 S.W.2d 605 (1978).
Date of receipt of notice by the prosecuting authorities triggers the 180-day running of the statutory period; the key word in the statutory language is “delivered” and, comporting with the purpose of the notice provision, the term would have little meaning if something other than the receipt of the notice were contemplated inasmuch as the state authorities are bound to act within 180 days toward bringing the prisoner to trial in the receiving jurisdiction and to abrogate the uncertainties of the pending charges against the prisoner. Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).
There is a positive duty upon a prisoner to seek a trial after he is notified that charges are pending; an accused in prison in another state, for a different crime, must affirmatively request trial in order to activate the speedy trial rule or statute. Dukes v. State, 271 Ark. 674, 609 S.W.2d 924 (1981).
Where defendant made no demand for trial in compliance with Article III(a), there was no violation of the time limit in this chapter. Patterson v. State, 318 Ark. 358, 885 S.W.2d 667 (1994).
The statutory time limits should be tolled during those periods when a prisoner is removed from the custodial place of incarceration and taken to another jurisdiction, other than the demanding jurisdiction, to stand trial on charges pending there. Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).
Tolling provision of Article VI(a) held applicable. Young v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).
Failure to accord a timely trial, as required by Art. III(a), may mandate dismissal of the untried charge; however, the time limits are tolled during the periods when the prisoner is removed from the custodial place of incarceration to a place other than the demanding jurisdiction. Spears v. State, 280 Ark. 577, 660 S.W.2d 913 (1983).
Charge of violation of probation, absent an allegation of the commission of an indictable offense, is not an “untried indictment, information, or complaint” within the scope and meaning of Article III(a). Padilla v. State, 279 Ark. 100, 648 S.W.2d 797 (1983).
A probation revocation proceeding does not involve “untried” matters within the purview of Article III(a). Padilla v. State, 279 Ark. 100, 648 S.W.2d 797 (1983).
The 180-day time limitation contained in Article III(a) is triggered only when a prisoner has complied with the requirements of the article. Phillips v. State, 15 Ark. App. 372, 695 S.W.2d 388 (1985).
Defendant failed to substantially meet the necessary requirements of the agreement and, therefore, the 180-day time limitation was never activated. Phillips v. State, 15 Ark. App. 372, 695 S.W.2d 388 (1985).
Violation of Art. IV(e) by the United States was a nonjurisdictional error waivable by a criminal defendant. Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1978).
Cited: State v. Davidson, 254 Ark. 172, 492 S.W.2d 246 (1973); Young v. Arkansas, 533 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1976); Grooms v. State, 260 Ark. 879, 545 S.W.2d 610 (1977); Underwood v. Pritchard, 638 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981); Blackmon v. Weber, 277 Ark. 393, 642 S.W.2d 294 (1982); Dukes v. Lockhart, 769 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1985); Marshall v. State, 289 Ark. 462, 712 S.W.2d 894 (1986).
The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.
One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 2022. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.
Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.
Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.
Edition shown: Arkansas Code release r76: Acts through about 2020 (2021-2025 sessions missing). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.