Ark. Code Ann. § 16-95-101 (2026)

ARTICLE I

The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.

ARTICLE II

As used in this agreement:

1. “State” shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of America; a territory or possession of the United States; the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
2. “Sending state” shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he or she initiates a request for final disposition pursuant to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to Article III or Article IV thereof.

ARTICLE III

1. Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he or she shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after he or she shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his or her imprisonment and his or her request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his or her counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
2. The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of him or her, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
3. The warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him or her of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him or her and shall also inform him or her of his or her right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint on which the detainer is based.
4. Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations, or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
5. Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him or her, after completion of his or her term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his or her body in any court where his or her presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
6. Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his or her execution of the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the request.

ARTICLE IV

1. The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he or she has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded, and transmitted the request: and provided further that there shall be a period of thirty (30) days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his or her own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.
2. Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts in the receiving states who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.
3. In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty (120) days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his or her counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
4. Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which he or she may have to contest the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
5. If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.

ARTICLE V

1. In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such indictment, information, or complaint is pending against such person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the custodian.
2. The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
   1. Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
   2. A duly certified copy of the indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
3. If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information, or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.
4. The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one (1) or more untried indictments, informations, or complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. Except for his or her attendance at court and while being transported to or from any place at which his or her presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution.
5. At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.
6. During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time being served on the sentence shall continue to run, but good time shall be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.
7. For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state, and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by law.
8. From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one (1) or more untried indictments, informations, or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping, and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies, and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.

ARTICLE VI

1. In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction in the matter.
2. No provisions of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.

ARTICLE VII

Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom by enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.

ARTICLE IX

This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

History. Acts 1971, No. 705, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3201.

Cross References. Prosecutor's obligations, Ark. R. Crim. P. 29.1.

Research References

ALR.

Construction and Application of Article IV of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related to “Speedy Trial” Requirement, and Construction of Essential Terms. 51 A.L.R.6th 1.

Construction and Application of Article IV of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related to “Anti-Shuttling” Provision, Dismissal of Action Against Detainee, and Adequacy of Certificate. 52 A.L.R.6th 1.

Construction and Application of Article IV of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related to Custody, Temporary Custody, Contest as to Legality of Custody, Necessity of Hearing, and Transmittal Orders. 53 A.L.R.6th 1.

Construction and Application of Article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) — Issues Related to “Speedy Trial” Requirement, and Construction of Essential Terms. 70 A.L.R.6th 361.

Construction and Application of Article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related to Certificate, Request by Defendant for Disposition, and “Anti-Shuttling” Provision. 71 A.L.R.6th 335.

Construction and Application of Article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related To Custody, Duties of Prison Officials, Waiver of Extradition, Escape, Assistance of Counsel, and Necessity of Hearing. 72 A.L.R.6th 141.

Case Notes

In General.

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers amounts to nothing more than a statutory set of procedural rules which do not rise to the level of constitutionally guaranteed rights. Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1978); Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988).

Construction.

While the agreement should be liberally construed, this does not mean that courts are free to bend the legislation out of shape or to remold it to some other form. Phillips v. State, 15 Ark. App. 372, 695 S.W.2d 388 (1985).

Defendant erroneously claimed that, under Article IV(e) of this section, an Arkansas county circuit court lost jurisdiction of a capital felony murder charge against him after his trial was declared a mistrial and he was returned to federal prison; that reading of this section was clearly distorted since this section merely provides that an indictment, information, or complaint is invalidated only where a criminal defendant is not brought to trial at all on pending state charges before he is returned to federal custody. Hutcherson v. State, 316 Ark. 551, 873 S.W.2d 164 (1994).

Purpose.

Sanctions contained in Art. IV(e) are intended to prevent excessive interference with a prisoner's rehabilitation in the state prisoner system. Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1978); Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988).

This subchapter is designed to standardize interstate rendition procedures in order to protect the inmate's right to speedy trial and reduce any uncertainties which might obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Padilla v. State, 279 Ark. 100, 648 S.W.2d 797 (1983).

This act deals specifically with ensuring that prisoners with pending charges in other states are protected from speedy trial violations. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).

Applicability.

A detainer that was issued due to a previous conviction, and not due to pending charges, is not subject to this Act. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).

Once a prisoner is released on parole, he or she is no longer in the class of prisoners covered by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Cunningham v. State, 341 Ark. 99, 14 S.W.3d 869 (2000).

Where defendant was returned to Arkansas after waiving extradition, the Interstate Agreements on Detainers was never triggered; extraditions are governed by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, § 16-94-201 et seq.Gondolfi v. Clinger, 352 Ark. 156, 98 S.W.3d 812 (2003).

Because defendant plead nolo contendere on the charges underlying the original sentence of probation, there was nothing “untried” within the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), § 16-95-101 et seq.; a charge of violating the terms of a suspended sentence was not an untried indictment within the scope of the meaning of the IAD and was inapplicable and, even if the court found that the IAD did apply, defendant made no demand for trial in compliance with the statute. Lindsey v. State, 86 Ark. App. 297, 184 S.W.3d 458 (2004).

Detainer.

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act itself contains no definition of the word “detainer.” Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988).

Defined generally, a detainer is the restraint of a man's personal liberty against his will. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).

For purposes of this act, a detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence advising that he is wanted to face criminal charges in another jurisdiction. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).

The state's notifying federal authorities that defendant should be returned to Arkansas custody after completion of his federal sentence was not a detainer as defined by this chapter. Harper v. State, 315 Ark. 195, 865 S.W.2d 647 (1993).

A detainer is placed on a prisoner in another jurisdiction for purposes of having that prisoner return to the claiming jurisdiction to stand trial on pending charges; the definition does not include a notice that the prisoner has a sentence to serve in a foreign jurisdiction. Harper v. State, 315 Ark. 195, 865 S.W.2d 647 (1993).

Dismissal of Charges.

Evidence showed defendant held not deprived of his right to a speedy trial by the court's refusal to grant the motion to dismiss charges. Curan v. State, 260 Ark. 461, 541 S.W.2d 923 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 843, 98 S. Ct. 144, 54 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1977).

Any violation of Article III does not automatically require dismissal of the charges and release of a habeas corpus petitioner for the petitioner must not only show a clear violation of the statute but also that he was prejudiced as a direct result of the violation. Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).

Defendant was not entitled to dismissal pursuant to Article III(d) as a result of being returned to federal custody before the charge against him was disposed of. Derring v. State, 273 Ark. 347, 619 S.W.2d 644 (1981).

On appeal of defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery and theft, he did not show that the State failed to follow proper extradition procedures under Article IV(e) as the record did not indicate that he was sent to Arkansas before the extradition process and then returned to Mississippi only to be sent back to Arkansas. Thus, he was not entitled to dismissal of the criminal information. Spearman v. State, 2013 Ark. 196, 427 S.W.3d 593 (2013).

Mandamus.

Where the sheriff issued a detainer, the fact that there was not a statute that specifically granted the sheriff the authority to issue detainers did not show the specific legal right required for a writ of mandamus to issue. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).

Nonparty States.

Defendant, tried after expiration of 180 days from request for trial, could not assert that there was a violation of his statutory rights where the state of incarceration was not a party to the interstate agreement. Young v. State, 254 Ark. 72, 491 S.W.2d 789 (1973).

Request for speedy trial held ineffective because the arresting state had not adopted the statute and hence was not a party to the interstate agreement. Smith v. State, 258 Ark. 533, 528 S.W.2d 359 (1975).

Claim by prisoner in federal custody arising under this section as it operates in conjunction with the federal enactment of the agreement was a claim arising under the laws of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254; it was of no consequence that the state where the U.S. Penitentiary was located was not a party to the agreement since that state was never a custodial state within the meaning of this subchapter. Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).

Speedy Trial.

The speedy trial provisions in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act are nonjurisdictional and waivable. Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988).

Time Limitations.

—Demand by Officer.

The defendant's time limit in this chapter was never triggered where the state never filed a detainer and the defendant was never served with a detainer while incarcerated in another state. Durdin v. State, 59 Ark. App. 207, 955 S.W.2d 912 (1997).

—Demand by Prisoner.

This section cannot stand where no demand for trial was ever made in compliance with Art. III(a). Walker v. State, 263 Ark. 485, 565 S.W.2d 605 (1978).

Date of receipt of notice by the prosecuting authorities triggers the 180-day running of the statutory period; the key word in the statutory language is “delivered” and, comporting with the purpose of the notice provision, the term would have little meaning if something other than the receipt of the notice were contemplated inasmuch as the state authorities are bound to act within 180 days toward bringing the prisoner to trial in the receiving jurisdiction and to abrogate the uncertainties of the pending charges against the prisoner. Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).

There is a positive duty upon a prisoner to seek a trial after he is notified that charges are pending; an accused in prison in another state, for a different crime, must affirmatively request trial in order to activate the speedy trial rule or statute. Dukes v. State, 271 Ark. 674, 609 S.W.2d 924 (1981).

Where defendant made no demand for trial in compliance with Article III(a), there was no violation of the time limit in this chapter. Patterson v. State, 318 Ark. 358, 885 S.W.2d 667 (1994).

Tolling.

The statutory time limits should be tolled during those periods when a prisoner is removed from the custodial place of incarceration and taken to another jurisdiction, other than the demanding jurisdiction, to stand trial on charges pending there. Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).

Tolling provision of Article VI(a) held applicable. Young v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).

Failure to accord a timely trial, as required by Art. III(a), may mandate dismissal of the untried charge; however, the time limits are tolled during the periods when the prisoner is removed from the custodial place of incarceration to a place other than the demanding jurisdiction. Spears v. State, 280 Ark. 577, 660 S.W.2d 913 (1983).

Untried Indictment.

Charge of violation of probation, absent an allegation of the commission of an indictable offense, is not an “untried indictment, information, or complaint” within the scope and meaning of Article III(a). Padilla v. State, 279 Ark. 100, 648 S.W.2d 797 (1983).

A probation revocation proceeding does not involve “untried” matters within the purview of Article III(a). Padilla v. State, 279 Ark. 100, 648 S.W.2d 797 (1983).

The 180-day time limitation contained in Article III(a) is triggered only when a prisoner has complied with the requirements of the article. Phillips v. State, 15 Ark. App. 372, 695 S.W.2d 388 (1985).

Defendant failed to substantially meet the necessary requirements of the agreement and, therefore, the 180-day time limitation was never activated. Phillips v. State, 15 Ark. App. 372, 695 S.W.2d 388 (1985).

Waiver.

Violation of Art. IV(e) by the United States was a nonjurisdictional error waivable by a criminal defendant. Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1978).

Cited: State v. Davidson, 254 Ark. 172, 492 S.W.2d 246 (1973); Young v. Arkansas, 533 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1976); Grooms v. State, 260 Ark. 879, 545 S.W.2d 610 (1977); Underwood v. Pritchard, 638 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981); Blackmon v. Weber, 277 Ark. 393, 642 S.W.2d 294 (1982); Dukes v. Lockhart, 769 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1985); Marshall v. State, 289 Ark. 462, 712 S.W.2d 894 (1986).