Ark. Code Ann. § 18-44-101 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Circo, Put the Arkansas Construction Lien Notice Statute Out of Its Misery, 2008 Ark. L. Notes 3.

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, BB & B Construction Company v. F.D.I.C. — Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in Arkansas: Priority as a Function of Removability, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 783.

Recent Developments: Contracts — Forum Selection Clause, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 215 (2004).

Comment, Contracting Away an Honest Day's Pay: An Examination of Conditional Payment Clauses in Construction Contracts, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 353.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Debtor/Creditor Relations, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 767.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw: Contract Law, 27 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 665.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Criminal provision formerly contained in this section violated Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 16 prohibiting imprisonment for debt in the absence of fraud. Peairs v. State, 227 Ark. 230, 297 S.W.2d 775 (1957).

Construction.

This section is to be strictly construed because it is an extraordinary remedy not available to every merchant or worker. Christy v. Nabholz Supply Co., 261 Ark. 127, 546 S.W.2d 425 (1977); Valley Metal Works, Inc. v. A.O. Smith-Inland, Inc., 264 Ark. 341, 572 S.W.2d 138 (1978); Ragsdell v. Gazaway Lumber Co., 11 Ark. App. 188, 668 S.W.2d 60 (1984).

The 1969 amendment to subsection (a) of this section made improvements to land lienable. BB & B Constr. Co. v. FDIC, 316 Ark. 663, 875 S.W.2d 48 (1994).

Although this section provides which materialman shall receive protection by a land improvement lien as well as the nature and the extent of the lien, § 18-44-110 still sets forth the priority of these liens to other encumbrances and the nature of the lien's attachment. BB & B Constr. Co. v. FDIC, 316 Ark. 663, 875 S.W.2d 48 (1994).

In Arkansas, a materialman's lien arises by statute on the date construction begins; it remains inchoate until it is perfected (or expires by failure to timely perfect); and upon perfection, it relates back to the date construction began. Betty's Homes, Inc. v. Cooper Homes, Inc., 411 B.R. 626 (W.D. Ark. 2009).

Bankruptcy.

Where claimants in bankruptcy furnished labor and material to bankrupt prior to filing date of bankruptcy, and mechanics' liens were recorded by the claimants prior to such date, such liens were perfected prior to date of bankruptcy and were allowable claims. In re Taylor Oak Flooring Co., 87 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Ark. 1949).

Burden of Proof.

Property owner asserting defense of estoppel to suit to foreclose lien has the burden of proof to establish defense. Kennemore v. Robbins, 223 Ark. 384, 266 S.W.2d 64 (1954).

In a suit for a materialman's lien, where the defendant claims an estoppel the burden of proving estoppel is on the person asserting it by a preponderance of the evidence. Orrell v. E.C. Barton & Co., 240 Ark. 211, 398 S.W.2d 685 (1966).

The findings of the trial court that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the materials in question were allegedly delivered and incorporated in the house was not against the preponderance of the evidence. Stone Mill & Lumber Co. v. Finsterwalder, 249 Ark. 363, 459 S.W.2d 117 (1970).

The burden is on the materialman to show that the materials for which he claims a lien were used in the improvements on which the lien is sought. Ragsdell v. Gazaway Lumber Co., 11 Ark. App. 188, 668 S.W.2d 60 (1984).

The requirement of this section was met where plaintiff had a contract with an agent of the contractor. Seyller v. Pierce & Co., 306 Ark. 474, 816 S.W.2d 577 (1991).

Where a trial court heard the testimony of two conflicting expert opinions and it decided that both experts were credible, it did not err when it placed the burden of proof upon contractors to show that their improvements increased the value of a property that had gone into foreclosure. Del Mack Constr., Inc. v. Owens, 82 Ark. App. 415, 118 S.W.3d 581 (2003).

Consistent rule has been to place the burden on the supplier to show that the materials for which he claims a lien were used in the improvement on which a lien was sought because the lien does not attach until the materials supplied are actually used and incorporated into the improvement; if the rule were otherwise, it would render meaningless the provision of § 18-44-110(b)(1) that the materialmen's lien extends only to the enhancement of the value of the improvement for which the materials were used. Del Mack Constr., Inc. v. Owens, 82 Ark. App. 415, 118 S.W.3d 581 (2003).

Contract.

There can be no materialman's or laborer's lien upon an improvement for material furnished and work done upon a contract with an administrator made after the death of the intestate. Doke v. Benton County Lumber Co., 114 Ark. 1, 169 S.W. 327 (1914).

A principal contractor can make no contract with the owner of land which would defeat the lien of subcontractors, laborers, and materialmen. Home Oil Co. v. Helton, 179 Ark. 132, 14 S.W.2d 549 (1929).

A materialman's lien is not effective against the land, unless a contract is made with the owner or his agent. Daly v. Arkadelphia Milling Co., 126 Ark. 405, 189 S.W. 1053 (1916); Morehart v. A.B. Beeler Lumber Co., 176 Ark. 818, 4 S.W.2d 29 (1928); Hawkins v. Faubel, 182 Ark. 304, 31 S.W.2d 401 (1930).

Circuit court erred in foreclosing a materialmen's lien because the lienor did not have a valid lien; while it orally contracted with a party it thought had an ownership interest in the property, it did not enter into a contract either with the owner of the property or with a person or entity that had an interest in the property at the time it supplied materials. Florida Oil Investment Group, LLC v. Goodwin & Goodwin, Inc., 2015 Ark. App. 209, 463 S.W.3d 323 (2015).

—Agents.

Where the contract is made with an agent, in order to bind the principal, it is essential that the agent have authority to make such a contract; the burden of proof is upon the parties attempting to assert the lien to show that the person with whom they contracted was the agent of the owner and that as agent, he acted within the scope of his authority when he authorized the work to be done. Daly v. Arkadelphia Milling Co., 126 Ark. 405, 189 S.W. 1053 (1916).

One who sells material to a husband to be used in improving the wife's property is not entitled to a lien therefor in the absence of proof that the husband had authority to act as agent of the wife. Morehart v. A.B. Beeler Lumber Co., 176 Ark. 818, 4 S.W.2d 29 (1928).

Materialmen's lien can be created if a contract is shown to exist between a materialman and a contractor representing the owner, and the necessary contract can be by express agreement or implied from the circumstances or conduct of the parties. Gillison Disct. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Talbot, 253 Ark. 696, 488 S.W.2d 317 (1972).

Evidence did not show agency relationship between the purchaser-contractor who made improvements before acquiring title and the owner sufficient to imply a contract on the part of the owner to pay for the improvements or the materials. Young v. Mobley Constr. Co., 266 Ark. 935, 587 S.W.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1979).

—Lessees.

Where a lease authorized the lessee to make certain improvements which were to be paid for by deducting the cost of the same from the rent, one who furnishes materials to the lessee to make the improvements will be entitled to a lien on the property for the amount thereof. Whitcomb v. Gans, 90 Ark. 469, 119 S.W. 676 (1909).

One who does work on certain leased premises at the request of the lessee cannot enforce a mechanic's lien against the property where there was no agreement between the lessee and the owner that the latter should pay for the repairs. Langston v. Matthews, 117 Ark. 626, 173 S.W. 397 (1915).

—Owners.

Where material was furnished to a purchaser of real property to make improvements on land, the deed to which was placed in escrow till the purchase money was paid, and if not paid, the deed to be returned, there was no such title in the purchaser as would enable the materialmen to secure a lien unless the purchase money were paid. Mansfield Lumber Co. v. Gravette, 177 Ark. 31, 5 S.W.2d 726 (1928).

Materials furnished to construct warehouse on land owned by third party do not subject land to a lien where there was no showing they were furnished pursuant to a contract with the landowner and the evidence created no elements of estoppel against owner's paramount rights over the lienors. Arkansas Foundry Co. v. Farrell, 238 Ark. 757, 385 S.W.2d 26 (1964).

Although record was void of any evidence of a contract between sellers of building materials and home owners, the evidence was sufficient as to the individual's contractor status and a contract between him and the sellers to establish a prima facie case as to asserted materialmen's liens. Gillison Disct. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Talbot, 253 Ark. 696, 488 S.W.2d 317 (1972).

Where owners of house had no knowledge of secret agreement between materialman and contractor to apply payments to past-due accounts and did not have the opportunity to protect their interests, the materialman was estopped from enforcing his lien against the property. Howard Bldg. Centre v. Thornton, 282 Ark. 1, 665 S.W.2d 870 (1984).

Entitlement to Lien.

Property owner was entitled to prevail in suit by painter to foreclose lien where there was substantial evidence that painter agreed with property owner that the owner could pay full amount of contract price to contractor. Kennemore v. Robbins, 223 Ark. 384, 266 S.W.2d 64 (1954).

One who contracted with the owner of a building to install air conditioning in a restaurant therein leased to a third party was entitled to a lien for his labor and material when the restaurant was destroyed by fire before completion of the installation and never rebuilt. Bell v. Carver, 245 Ark. 31, 431 S.W.2d 452 (1968).

The utility contractor was awarded a materialman's lien against the owner's real property for the amount of contractor's judgment where the repairs made by the contractor inured to the benefit of the owner by improving its property. Howell v. Worth James Constr. Co., 259 Ark. 627, 535 S.W.2d 826 (1976).

Where unpaid materialman did not have a fixed-sum contract for any part of the job, supplied materials to the job, and from time to time sent its laborers to the job to perform construction work but the laborers did not assign their rights to a lien, the materialman was not entitled to a lien for labor. Christy v. Nabholz Supply Co., 261 Ark. 127, 546 S.W.2d 425 (1977).

Subcontractors, as materialmen, had a statutory right to seek judgment on their liens previously filed pursuant to Arkansas law and foreclosure on the general contractor's real property located in Arkansas; subsection (a) gave the subcontractors an absolute right to file such a lien and the choice-of-law provision in the contracts was meaningless because, as to real property located within Arkansas, this statute controlled over the forum-selection clause in the contract. RMP Rentals v. Metroplex, Inc., 356 Ark. 76, 146 S.W.3d 861 (2004).

Subcontractor did not acquire a mechanic's and materialman's lien on a home because neither the subcontractor nor the contractor gave the homeowner the notice required by § 18-44-115, notwithstanding that the subcontractor provided the notice required by § 18-44-114(a). Bryant v. Jim Atkinson Tile, 100 Ark. App. 408, 269 S.W.3d 383 (2007).

Legislative Intent.

Review of the foreword to Acts 1969, No. 112 (which amended this section), shows that the legislature's purpose in changing the wording in subsection (a) to “to or upon” was to include certain contractors under the umbrella of creditor protection; there is no suggestion in this language that the legislature, by making this change, intended, in the absence of removable improvements, to give materialmen priority over all liens. BB & B Constr. Co. v. FDIC, 316 Ark. 663, 875 S.W.2d 48 (1994).

The legislature, by stating “improvements upon land” rather than “improvement to land” did not intend a lien to attach to the land so improved, but confined the lien to the land “upon which the same are situated.” BB & B Constr. Co. v. FDIC, 316 Ark. 663, 875 S.W.2d 48 (1994).

Materials Furnished.

To entitle the materialman to a lien under this section, the material or machinery furnished must as a rule be attached to or become a part of the improvement or building upon land, or must be used in making such improvement. Meek v. Parker, 63 Ark. 367, 38 S.W. 900 (1897).

Where materials are delivered at or near where the building is to be erected and the building is actually completed of materials like those furnished, this is prima facie evidence that the materials were used in its construction and the burden is on the owner to show that they were not so used. Central Lumber Co. v. Braddock Land & Granite Co., 84 Ark. 560, 105 S.W. 583 (1907); Half Moon Gin Co. v. E. C. Ribinson Lumber Co., 207 Ark. 483, 181 S.W.2d 239 (1944).

Under this section, materials furnished for a building must be actually used in it before a lien will be acquired. Central Lumber Co. v. Braddock Land & Granite Co., 84 Ark. 560, 105 S.W. 583 (1907); Half Moon Gin Co. v. E. C. Ribinson Lumber Co., 207 Ark. 483, 181 S.W.2d 239 (1944).

In view of § 18-44-109, there is a presumption that materials furnished to a contractor are furnished on the credit of the building. Pratt v. Nakdimen, 99 Ark. 293, 138 S.W. 974 (1911).

Electric lighting fixtures installed in a building to be used as a motion picture theater were included within the section giving a person a lien upon a building for materials furnished in its construction. O'Neill v. Lyric Amusement Co., 119 Ark. 454, 178 S.W. 406 (1915).

Oil tanks and fixtures furnished on a mining lease were within this section. American Tank Co. v. Continental & Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank, 3 F.2d 122 (8th Cir. 1924).

Materialman can recover for the retail value of material furnished including profits. John E. Bryant & Sons Lumber Co. v. Moore, 264 Ark. 666, 573 S.W.2d 632 (1978).

Mortgages.

Mortgage filed after work commences will be subordinate to any liens based on the commenced work. Dempsey v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 292 Ark. 207, 729 S.W.2d 150 (1987).

Preparatory Work.

A contractor's lien does not attach until the commencement of work and inspecting and measuring the premises and driving a peg to locate the center of the house was not such a commencement of the work. Mark's Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Republic Mtg. Co., 242 Ark. 475, 414 S.W.2d 106 (1967).

Preparatory work, such as grading, removal of debris, and demolition of old structures, which is not visible notice that a building is to be erected does not constitute commencement of work so as to give the lien for such work priority over a subsequently recorded construction mortgage. Clark v. GE Co., 243 Ark. 399, 420 S.W.2d 830 (1967).

This section does not give a right of lien to one performing the services of surveyor or civil engineer preparatory to contemplated improvements. John E. Mahaffey & Assocs. v. Brophy, 249 Ark. 884, 462 S.W.2d 226 (1971).

Priority.

The claims of a contractor are subordinated to the claims of laborers and materialmen. Long v. Charles T. Abeles & Co., 77 Ark. 156, 93 S.W. 67 (1905).

Where, prior to the recording of a construction money mortgage, a materialman furnished materials for construction of home, the mortgagee, by paying first materialman, did not defeat the priority of liens of materialmen who furnished materials after the recording of the mortgage, as their liens related back to commencement of construction of the home and were on an equality with that of the first materialman. Planters Lumber Co. v. Jack Collier E. Co., 234 Ark. 1091, 356 S.W.2d 631 (1962).

A construction mortgage had priority over a subsequent materialmen's lien as to proceeds of the mortgage advanced for labor and materials, but not as to money retained by the mortgagee for the purchase price of the ground nor as to money paid by the disbursing agent to the mortgagee for interest. Planters Lumber Co. v. Wilson Co., 241 Ark. 1005, 413 S.W.2d 55 (1967).

Where there was no actual, legal, or constructive notice that bank had a mortgage on land when work commenced, materialmen had a right to rely on record and materialmen's lien had priority over mortgage. Lien on new construction by materialman related back to the time when work commenced and took priority over any claims perfected after that time. Dempsey v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 292 Ark. 207, 729 S.W.2d 150 (1987).

Despite the 1969 amendment to subsection (a) of this section, the law remains that as between the lien of a mechanic or the furnisher of material and the lien of a prior mortgage, the lien of the former is superior only upon a separate building constructed on the land with the labor and material furnished, or to such an addition as is separable from the original building; as between a materialman and a prior mortgagor, “first-in-time, first in right” is the law in Arkansas unless the materialman can remove the improvements from the land. BB & B Constr. Co. v. FDIC, 316 Ark. 663, 875 S.W.2d 48 (1994).

Scope of Lien.

A materialman who has furnished materials for building a sidewalk has a lien therefor upon the sidewalk and the abutting lots. Leiper & Mills v. Minnig, 74 Ark. 510, 86 S.W. 407 (1905).

One who, under contract with the owner of a lot, connected a building thereon with the water main by laying a pipe across the property of adjoining proprietors with their consent was entitled to a mechanic's lien for the entire pipe and the lien could be enforced against one who subsequently purchased the lot from such owner. Speer Hdwe. Co. v. Bruce Bros., 105 Ark. 146, 150 S.W. 403 (1912).

A contractor's lien is limited to materials furnished or labor actually performed by him; he has no lien for profits. Cook v. Moore, 152 Ark. 590, 239 S.W. 750 (1922); Withrow v. Wright, 215 Ark. 654, 222 S.W.2d 809 (1949).

One who claimed a lien against a purchaser of land for materials furnished to build a garage had no lien on the land after the vendor had retaken the property upon the purchaser's default. Judd v. Rieff, 174 Ark. 362, 295 S.W. 370 (1927).

Property to which a sewer line is accessible though not an appurtenance is not subject to a lien for pipe furnished in the construction of the sewer line. Cabot Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Shearman Concrete Pipe Co., 239 Ark. 93, 387 S.W.2d 336 (1965).

One who furnished asphalt and labor for the pavement of streets and roadways in a subdivision, under contract with the subdivider, was not entitled to a lien on the entire subdivision and it was encumbent upon him to show by evidence the location of the roadways and streets upon which he supplied labor and materials and what lots abutted upon them. Dix v. Olds, 242 Ark. 850, 415 S.W.2d 567 (1967).

Materialmen's liens attached only to the land and improvements and did not attach to the unexpended proceeds of a construction mortgage, securing future advances, still unadvanced by the mortgage. House v. Scott, 244 Ark. 1075, 429 S.W.2d 108 (1968).

Where the contract or purchase of materials was made by previous owners and the suit was a suit in rem against the property, the only recovery that could be made by the plaintiff was under this section which grants a lien against the property for materials and labor furnished; because this section does not provide that the supplier of the materials or labor has a lien for attorney's fees, attorney's fees were not recoverable. Transportation Properties, Inc. v. Central Glass & Mirror of N.W. Ark., Inc., 38 Ark. App. 60, 827 S.W.2d 667 (1992).

Lien provided by this section did not extend to profits on a cost-plus contract, but only to the costs of labor and material, and where the trial court improperly allowed the construction company the full amount of its claim, which included the builder's fee, without segregating the builder's fee or any profits, that portion of the trial court's judgment was reversed. Hickman v. Kralicek Realty & Constr. Co., 84 Ark. App. 61, 129 S.W.3d 317 (2003).

Entire value of a materialman's lien for steel was properly found to attach to four barges; the barge builder failed to rebut the presumption that the barges incorporated the supplier's steel. An argument that the presumption did not apply because the steel was not solely furnished for the barge project failed because substantial evidence indicated that the supplier understood that the steel was to be used to build the barges. Falcon Steel, Inc. v. J. Russell Flowers, Inc., 635 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 2011).

—Multiple Projects.

Work done and materials furnished for the improvement of two separate tracts of land will not create a lien on both tracts unless the work was done and materials furnished under entire contract. Meek v. Parker, 63 Ark. 367, 38 S.W. 900 (1897).

Where materials were furnished and labor performed for the construction of several buildings, each building will be liable only for the materials furnished and labor done in its construction, unless the buildings were upon the same lot or upon contiguous lots and the contract for labor and materials was entire, in which case all such lots would be jointly liable. Central Lumber Co. v. Braddock Land & Granite Co., 84 Ark. 560, 105 S.W. 583 (1907).

A lien exists in favor of a materialman upon two or more lots where the materials are furnished under a single contract for buildings to be constructed upon two or more lots which are not contiguous. Burel v. East Ark. Lumber Co., 129 Ark. 58, 195 S.W. 378 (1917).

Work or Labor Done.

To qualify as a laborer or mechanic, a person must perform manual labor either with his hands or with tools. Drawings which require skill are not the type of services contemplated by a laborer's lien. Westside Galvanizing Servs., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 724 F. Supp. 644 (W.D. Ark. 1989), aff'd, 921 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1990).

Physical presence on a job site without more does not fall within the definition of “work or labor done.” Buckman v. Gay, 27 Ark. App. 184, 768 S.W.2d 547 (1989).

Cited: Rea v. Lammers, 212 Ark. 792, 207 S.W.2d 740 (1948); Wood v. Hummel, 217 Ark. 617, 232 S.W.2d 454 (1950); Crump & Rodgers Co. v. Southern Implement Co., 229 Ark. 285, 316 S.W.2d 121 (1958); Burks v. Sims, 230 Ark. 170, 321 S.W.2d 767 (1959); Scott v. Vuurens, 236 Ark. 731, 368 S.W.2d 80 (1963); State v. Jacks, 243 Ark. 77, 418 S.W.2d 622 (1967); Bobo v. Sebree, 244 Ark. 915, 429 S.W.2d 95 (1968); Lambert v. Newman, 245 Ark. 125, 431 S.W.2d 480 (1968); Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Moffitt, 245 Ark. 992, 436 S.W.2d 91 (1969); Skipper v. Hoskins, 247 Ark. 235, 444 S.W.2d 875 (1969); Branch v. Standard Title Co., 252 Ark. 737, 480 S.W.2d 568 (1972); Dow Chem. Co. v. Bruce Rogers Co., 255 Ark. 448, 501 S.W.2d 235 (1973); Gipson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 272 Ark. 485, 615 S.W.2d 363 (1981); Johnson v. Southern Elec., Inc., 29 Ark. App. 160, 779 S.W.2d 190 (1989); In re Horton Vaults, Inc., 109 B.R. 356 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1989); In re McCord, 219 B.R. 251 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1998).